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Abstract 
Competitive balance is seen as crucial to the viability of professional sports leagues, and 
it has been a central concern ofsports economists, industry practitioners and fans. But 
the concept is complex und ill-defined. The theoretical approach in this thesis is to first 
analyse competitive balance in a simple league context. It is shown that even in a closed 
round-robin league with a single prize (i. e. league championship), there are three 
dimensions of competitive balance: win dispersion, p rformancc persistence and prize 
concentration. Further extensions to this three-dimensional approach are required when 
the analysis moves to complex real-world league structures which arc typically multi- 
prize tournaments, with host-season playoff and onerr open merit hierarchies with 
promotion und relegation. A new concept of competitive intensity is introduced. 
Thei three-dimensional approach is applied to the empirical analysis of 
Competitive balance in liurol1Can (association) football and the North American Major 
Leagues, It is found that cross-league comparisons ofcompetitive balance are dependent 
on the dim ensiott analysed. Will dispersion is better in the Big Five Hurolican domestic 
football leagues compared to the Major Leagues, but the reverse is found for 
championship concentration. The Major Leagues are also flound to be more competitive 
in respect elfthe concentration ofpost-season playoff qualification. i)iffcrcnccs in 
Competitive balance are found between the I'uropcan domestic football leagues. The 
causes of these cross-league differences are investigated with regression analysis. 
Again the results are highly dependent on the specific dimension ofcompctitive 
balance. Will dispersion is significantly associated with national geographic and 
economic characteristics as well as league structure. Time-series analysis is undertaken 
to study changes over time in competitive balance in the top divisions of the Norwegian 
and 11nglish football leagues. The results are most significant for the English league, and 
run counter to the predictions of the invariance principle. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite competitive balance being central in the academic literature, as well as among 
industry practitioners and sports fans, it is still, more than half a century after the 
seminal paper in the field of the economics of professional team sports by Rottenberg 
(1956), an ill-defined concept, both theoretically and empirically. This is evidenced by 
the large number of measures trying to quantify the level of competitive balance. As 
Gerrard (2004b, p. 45) comments, "competitive balance has become a catchall for the 
different aspects of outcome uncertainty and contest significance". Confusion about the 
conceptual meaning of competitive balance undermines the understanding of the 
relationship between relative competitiveness in sporting contests/tournaments and 
economic value. Contributions that help create a common base for the concept are 
therefore important, and may help resolve some of the key political issues within 
professional sports league over the regulation of labour and product markets to promote 
greater competitive balance 
This thesis concentrates on issues related to the concepts of uncertainty of outcome and 
competitive balance in professional team sports. The principal focus is European 
professional (men's) football, with special attention to the top divisions in Norway and 
England. Norway is a small country in population terms, with only close to 4.7 million 
citizens. ' As a consequence, the Norwegian Football League is small compared to many 
other European football leagues. On the other hand, the English FA Premier League is 
probably the most popular football league internationally. The changing structures in 
European football during the 1990s have raised many questions regarding uncertainty of 
outcome and competitive balance in leagues in an open international market. 
1.1. Analytical Framework, Research Questions and Limitations 
To be able to afford player wages, the fundamental cost in professional team sports, 
teams must generate sufficient revenues. In professional team sports, there are a number 
of income sources, which have increased in scope and scale during the last thirty years 
1 recording to Statistics Norway. the number was 4,681,134 at the I'` of January 2007 
(\v\\\v. ssb. no/enincr/02 01 10 folkemengde! tab-200'-03-08-O 1. html). 
in European football. 2 However, gate attendances can still provide the best indicator of a 
team's revenue potential, not only matchday revenues, but also other revenue streams 
(i. e. media, sponsorship, merchandising and other commercial income). Understanding 
the underlying factors for gate attendance demand is hence important, as described in 
Peel and Thomas (1988, p. 242): 
The nature of the demand function in any professional team sport is important 
for the analysis of club and league behaviour and decision making. An 
understanding of the determinants of demand should influence decisions on 
price, investment in both physical and human resources, marketing and product 
characteristics - which has implications for league structure and organisation, 
and competition rules. 
The demand for professional team sports has been analysed, both in European football 
and in other leagues, and is also touched on by Rottenberg (1956). 3 There area number 
of drivers for demand in professional team sports. Some of these might be categorized 
as sports marketing drivers. However, this thesis will concentrate on sports economics 
drivers. Peel and Thomas (1988) divide the determinants of gate attendance demand 
into four groups; economic variables, geographic and demographic variables, variables 
related to the attractiveness of the fixture, and determinants "which can influence 
attendance at a match on the day" (p. 245). Absolute and relative team quality are 
relevant factors in the group of variables related to the attractiveness of the fixture. This 
thesis will focus on the first, relative quality, which is connected to the concepts of 
uncertainty of'outcome and competitive balance. Hence the conceptualised demand 
function takes the following form: 
Demand = f(uncertainty of outcome, other factors) 
Uncertainty of outcome is hypothesised to be one of the factors driving demand for 
professional team sports. Further, it is expected that closer competition between the 
teams in a league, which means better competitive balance, will increase the uncertainty 
Andreff and Staudohar (2002) explain this by comparing two models, where the SSSL model 
(Spec tators-Suh: idics-Sponsors- Loral, p. 25) reflects the traditional business of European team sports, 
while the \ICNINIG model (Media-Corporations-'Merchandising-`larkets-Globalization, p. 32-33) is 
based on modern business. particularly in big leagues. 
See. for example, Calms et al. (l9`6), Downward and Dawson (2000), Dobson and Goddard (2001 
and Borland and Macdonald (2003) for overviews. 
1) 
of outcome (see, for example, Rottenberg, 1956). In other words, demand is expected to 
be affected by competitive balance through uncertainty of outcome, as is argued for 
example in Scully (1989), who claims that the main determinant for uncertainty of 
outcome is the competitive balance among the teams: 
Uncertainty of outcome = f(competitive balance, other factors) 
Because of this hypothesised relationship between competitive balance and the demand 
for professional team sports through uncertainty of outcome, competitive balance has 
been central and regarded as crucial to the economic well-being of professional team 
sports. This importance is not only related to the maximisation of demand (and 
revenues) by individual teams, but also at the collective level there may be a need to 
maintain a minimum level of competitive balance in order to ensure the viability for 
leagues. 
Even although competitive balance is a frequently used term in the literature of business 
and economics of professional team sports (see, for example, Fort and Maxcy, 2003; 
Fort and Quirk, 1995), a common unique definition of competitive balance in this 
literature is missing (Kahane, 2003). This is, for example, emphasised in Szymanski 
(2003a, p. 471): "One problem that arises is the precise definition of competitive 
balance", and this is reflected in the number of terms and explanations related to the 
concept of competitive balance that can be found in the literature. Competitive balance 
has been described4 variously as the differences in playing strengths between the teams 
in a league (see, for example, Scully, 1989), the distribution of playing strengths (see, 
for example, Fort and Quirk, 1995; Dobson and Goddard, 1996; Kesenne, 1996,2002a), 
the comparable playing strength of teams (see, for example, Bennett and Fizel 1995; 
Kuypers 1997; Sutter and Winkler 2003), the equalisation of playing strengths (see, for 
example, El-Hodiri and Quirk 1971; Scully 1989; Forrest and Simmons 2002), the 
balance of playing strengths among teams (see, for example, Rottenberg, 1956), and the 
relative strengths among competitors (Sanderson and Siegfried, 2003). Describing 
competitive balance in terms of the playing strengths of teams tends to imply a concern 
directly with match and; 'or tournament outcomes, either actual or expected. Competitive 
balance is also referred to as quality differences between the teams with respect to the 
' These are based on my interpretations, and much of what I have called descriptions of competiti\ c 
balance in the literature has not been done explicitly. 
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relative quality of team play (see. for example, Demmert, 1973; Scully, 1989: \ rooman. 
1996; Cyrenne, 2001) and the more or less equal quality of play among teams (see, for 
example, Rottenberg, 1956). In the case of quality of play the emphasis. at least 
implicitly, is on the components of the team performance rather than necessarily the 
outcome. A popular description of competitive balance is as the distribution of plavin`UT 
talent (see, for example, Rottenberg, 1956; Sloane, 1969; Vrooman, 1995,1996,2000; 
Kesenne, 1996,1999; Hausman and Leonard, 1997; Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999; 
Dobson and Goddard, 2001; Depken, 2002; Leeds and von Allmen, 2002; Bourgheas 
and Downward, 2003; Fort, 2003). In this case, the focus is on the input to the sporting 
production function rather than the intermediate and/or final outputs. 
In general, competitive balance has been related to and reflected from many angles 
when it comes to competitions. Zimbalist (2003a) describes the concept as both 
complex and multi-dimensional, as well as being reflected by both historical and 
cultural aspects of a sport. This has made it almost impossible to come up with a simple, 
generally acceptable definition in the literature. However, this thesis is motivated by the 
importance of having a common understanding of competitive balance both 
theoretically and empirically. 
The suggested definition of competitive balance in this thesis will be based on 
simplicity. A generally accepted conceptual framework for competitive balance should 
also include definitions of related concepts to better distinguish between them. This is 
desirable in order to facilitate comparisons between different empirical studies which 
may arrive at different conclusions in part because of their use of different notions of 
competitive balance. It is also important that the conceptual framework is robust to 
different levels of complexity in league structures. 
Treating competitive balance mentioned in terms of sporting quality yields a definition 
of competitive balance as the distribution of sporting qualih- bettt'een the teams in a 
league/tournament. Such a definition may be appropriate in those leagues using a 
traditional (balanced) round-robin match schedule. But is it still a robust definition in 
more complex league structure with, for example, unbalanced schedules that depart 
from a pure round-robin format? This thesis will instead use the description above as a 
definition of what can be seen as a related expression to competitive balance. namely, 
the sporting quality balance (QB). 
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If the teams in a league play against each other the same number of times. and an equal 
number of home and away matches, the league can be said to have a balanced match 
schedule. Currently match schedules in a number of leagues are unbalanced. This might 
affect the distribution of sporting outcome in those leagues such that the expected 
distributions of sporting quality and sporting outcome might not be identical. Since it is 
desirable that a competitive balance definition is also robust to different systems of 
match schedules, this thesis suggests using the sporting outcome as the basis for the 
construction of a general definition of competitive balance. Competitive balance is the 
distribution of sporting outcomes in a league/tournament. However, since the sporting 
quality balance is the main (direct) component in competitive balance, but also because 
the match schedule might "disturb" this relationship, the following can be written: 
Competitive balance = f(QB, match schedule, others) 
This suggested definition of competitive balance might be better able to capture many 
other descriptions of competitive balance found in the literature, such as competitive 
equality (see, for example, Jones, 1969; Demmert, 1973; Daly and Moore, 1981; Cairns 
et al., 1986; Jones and Ferguson, 1988), balanced competition (see, for example, Cairns 
et at., 1986; Kesenne, 2002b; Vrooman, 2000), closeness of competition (see, for 
example, Davenport, 1969; Sloane, 1971; Daly and Moore, 1981; Vrooman, 2000), 
"tighter" competition (Rottenberg, 1956), equality among clubs (see, for example, 
Sloane, 1969), sporting equality5 (Dabscheck, 1975a, 1975b; Sloane, 1976b), equality 
of competition (Dabscheck, 1975a; Sloane, 1976a), parity6 (see, for example, Depken 
1999; Sutter and Winkler, 2003; Cain and Haddock, 2006; Fort, 2007), and the evenness 
of sporting competition (Macdonald and Borland, 2004). Noll (2003, p. 549) claims that 
"competitive balance refers to the extent to which teams are sufficiently closely 
matched that game outcomes are uncertain. " 
Further, the proposed definition of competitive balance takes into account the essence of 
the meaning by competitive balance, often expressed in various measures, based on the 
distribution of sporting outcomes between the teams in a league-'tournament, as is 
emphasised in Humphreys (2003, p. 286): 
` This expression might be related to the (sporting) quality distribution. 
6 This is a general expression. If it is based on sporting outcome, then it is appropriate in the context of 
this thesis. 
Z, 
Sports economists and others have developed a number of different measures of 
competitive balance. All measure the distribution of «eins and losses across 
teams in sports leagues; each represents a different method of describing this 
distribution. 
The definition of competitive balance in this thesis takes a more restricted approach 
than the general description of competitive balance, as "a catchall term that refers to a 
number of different aspects of competition on the playing field" (Quirk and Fort, 1992, 
p. 244 ). 7 The complex and ill-defined nature of the concept of competitive balance is 
related to complications in at least three of the core elements of the economics of 
professional team sports. 
First, identifying appropriate measures to quantify the level of competitive balance of a 
league requires a clear understanding of what needs to be measured. The understanding 
of competitive balance affects how it is to be measured and vice versa. The complexity 
of the concept is reflected in the wide range of measures applied in the literature (see, 
for example, Fort and Maxcy, 2003). 
The second element is based on the relationship, discussed earlier, that competitive 
balance is hypothesised to be an indirect demand driver. Before evidence from analyses 
of these relationships can be seen as reliable, it is required that the variable(s) reflecting 
competitive balance is (are) valid. The relationship between competitive balance and 
uncertainty of outcome is entirely dependent on restricting of the concept of competitive 
balance. The wider the use of competitive balance as a catchall term, the more difficulty 
it is to find a clear relationship between these two concepts. They become synonymous. 
Understanding the hypothesised relationship between competitive balance and demand 
through uncertainty of outcome therefore not only requires an understanding of the 
limitations of competitive balance as a concept, but also that of uncertainty of outcome. 
Like competitive balance. uncertainty of outcome is complex and relates to different 
dimensions of the consumption decision. Mapping similarities and differences are 
important in understanding the hypothesised relationships, and also for being able to 
structure appropriate empirical analyses to measure the significance of this relationship. 
7 This is followed by Bennett and Fizel (1995). 
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This thesis aims to develop such a mapping, as well as clearly identifying the concept of 
competitive balance separately from other competitiveness-related concepts. 
Third, complexity is not only directly related to the concept of competitive balance, but 
also to that of the intended target, the tournament. Multi-prize tournaments are 
hypothesised to have diverse impacts on the relationship between consumer demand and 
sporting competition over time. Leagues are complex. Hence, complexity in relation to 
the competitive balance is not only related to the concept itself, but also to the 
complexity of league structures. The combined complexity complicates the landscape 
for measures of competitive balance. This thesis aims both to capture the relationship 
between complexity in competitive balance as well as in tournaments, and, in addition, 
take advantage of both the complexity of real-world league structures and the diversity 
of measures of competitive balance, to show that a portfolio of indicators must be used 
to assess competitive balance levels across complex, real-world leagues. 
The concern of this thesis is not just related to measuring the level of competitive 
balance for a specific league in a single sport. A better understanding of competitive 
balance is acquired by comparing competitive balance across leagues and across sports. 
A natural follow-up is to analyse the determinants of competitive balance both by cross- 
sectional studies across leagues as well as time-series analysis of individual leagues. 
This thesis aims to deal with all of these empirical issues. 
Part of the complexity of the concept of competitive balance is related to its multi- 
dimensionality. This thesis will focus on the three general dimensions: within season 
competitive balance, across season competitive balance and prize concentration. The 
suggested definition of competitive balance in this thesis is robust to these three 
dimensions, and makes it possible to highlight them, because they are all important 
parts of the competitive balance concept. How to treat competitive balance in a simple 
way requires recognising the three dimensions, but not to over-complicate the 
relationship between them. In other words, this thesis does not attempt to formulate the 
ultimate measure of competitive balance, but instead recognises the three dimensions, 
and treats and measures them as important parts of the total picture of competitive 
balance. It will be shown that the three dimensions are also valid in a simple league 
context.. number of the measures used in the literature can be argued to be related to a 
simple league context, and some of them have to be adjusted in order to be appropriate 
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for complex real-world league tournaments. This thesis aims to categorise different 
measures into different dimensions of competitive balance, as well capture the real- 
world complications. 
This thesis will have a different approach to many of the problems mentioned above 
compared to the previous literature, by focusing on the concept from a simplified point 
of view first before turning attention to complexities. This argument turns into the main 
research question of this thesis: Can the understanding of the complexity of competitivc 
balance and related issues be improved by focusing on their simplicities? The main 
research question can be further split into a number of research questions about the 
phenomenon of competitive balance, such as what does the expression really mean? 
What are the theoretical implications of competitive balance'? How should competitive 
balance be measured? And what are the determinants for competitive balance" 
Some of the issues involving competitive balance can be illustrated by using the 
Norwegian football league as a small case study. One team has dominated this league in 
recent years, winning every single league championship between 1992 and 2004. This 
team, Rosenborg BK, has also been in a "league of its own" regarding financial 
strength, mainly because of substantial additional revenues earned from qualification to 
the UEFA Champions League, but also from developing players that have been sold 
abroad profitability (at least until 2000). 8 This success is particularly noteworthy since 
Rosenborg BK is located in only the third largest market in the Norwegian league. 9 
The domination of a sports league by one team, as has been in the case in the 
Norwegian top division in recent years, has been frequently discussed in the literature 
on the economics and business of professional team sports. The Louis-Schmelling 
paradox (Neale, 1964) emphasises that being too strong compared to (the) competitors 
can result in the league as a whole diverging significantly from profit maximization, and 
at the extreme Neale states that in sports: "Pure monopoly is disaster" (p. 2). In 
professional team sports the New York Yankees is used as a similar case, called the 
Yankees paradox (Vrooman, 1996). 10 It is related to what happened at the end of the 
This can for example be found in annual reports and several newspaper articles. 
My anticipation related to the size of the city (see. for example, 
%%-%% \w . ssb. no emner 
02 01 / 10ifolkber/tab-2006-12-20-01. html). Howe\ er, probably because of the team's 
sporting success. it has usually been the most watched team in this period, such as in the 2005 season (see 
fotball. vg. no hors tilskuer_klubb. php''sesong_id=143). 
10 See also Neale (1964) p. 2. 
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team's "dynasty period' in the 1950s, when the Yankees' gate attendances surprisingly 
rose in a season that the team did not perform as well as before. These examples can be 
directly related to the concepts of uncertainty of outcome and competitive balance. 
The dominating position of Rosenborg BK in modern Norwegian football began at the 
appointment of a charismatic coach in 1988. Apart from his second and fourth seasons 
(when the team finished as runners-up), Rosenborg BK won every championship until 
he retired after the 2002 season. ' 1 If Rosenborg BK in the Norwegian league followed 
the Yankee paradox, one would expect the attendance to have risen in the 2005 season 
when the team lost its dominating position and finished only seventh in the league. 
Below, table 1.1 shows average attendance and the point difference between Rosenborg 
BK and the best placed rival team since 1988. 
Table 1.1: Rosenborg's average attendance in the period 1988 - 2005 and the point 
score difference to the winner/second team 
Season Att. APoints Season Att. APoints Season Att. APoints 
1988 12 070 7 1994 11 061 8 2000 11 944 7 
1989 12 065 -8 1995 10 280 15 2001 12 070 1 
1990 11 115 2 1996 11 062 13 2002 14 626 6 
1991 11 451 -5 1997 11 338 11 2003 15 825 14 
1992 13 569 6 1998 13 163 9 2004 17 395 0 
1993 11 750 2 1999 13 359 6 2005 17 541 - 12 
Sources: www. rbkweb. no/statistikk/snitt. shtml and www. rsssf. com. 
Attendance at Rosenborg's home matches over the period shown in table 1.1 and the 
point difference has a correlation coefficient of -0.343, and is only weakly significant 
(one-tailed test). This might indicate some positive relationship between attendance at 
the team's home matches and closeness of the championship race. However, the 
increased attendance at the end of the period is also related to stadium rebuilding. 
Therefore, including point difference and rebuilding phase one (from 1995) and phase 
two (from 2002) as determinants in a regression analysis where attendance is the 
dependent variable, is more appropriate, and the results are presented in table 1.2. 
11 He had a "one season break" in 1ýýý) (wývwww. rbkwveh. no statistikk trenere. shtml). 
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Table 1.2: Regression analysis on Rosenbo 
Constant Pointdiff 
Coefficient 11983.44 -66.92 
Standard error 387.65 37.73 
P-value 0.000 0.098 
is attendance over the period 1988 - 2005 
Stadium 1 Stadium2 
497.31 3999.84 
603.99 684.60 
0.424 0.000 
F-value Adjusted R2 DW 
21.297*** 0.782 1.720 
Significant on one percent level. 
It can be seen that the last rebuilding (full seat) has had a strong significant positive 
effect on attendance, while, from a competitive balance point of view, it is interesting 
that "pointdiff' is (weakly) significant. This means that increased point difference, 
compared to the best placed rival team has a negative response on the number of 
spectators, ceteris paribus. 12 However, the reduction in the number of spectators, due to 
higher point difference, is not very high at about 67 spectators on average per point. 
The last observation (2005) in table 1.1 showing increased attendance, even in a poor 
performance season, is interesting in the light of the Yankee paradox, and might reflect 
that spectators value close competition and/or alternation at the top of the league. 
Another factor in the 2005 season that might have affected the attendance is that, even if 
Rosenborg BK did not compete for the prizes at the top of the league, it still had to 
focus on another sporting prize. This prize, staying in the division and not being 
relegated, is significant in European football. Rosenborg BK only secured its place in 
the Norwegian top division with one home match to go. In other words, even if 
Rosenborg BK performed relatively bad in the 2005 season, many of the matches were 
significant and went into what Jennett (1984) calls "relegation significance". The 
relegation significance is based on the hypothesis that relegation battles are more 
interesting for spectators than matches between middle-of-the-table teams. 
The 2004-season also had many significant matches, but this time it was related to the 
highest valued prize in the tournament, the championship. So even if Rosenborg BK had 
been dominating for a longer period, the championship in 2004 was highly competitive. 
The championship was only decided at the very end of the last round of matches in that 
season (on goal difference). The tight fight for the championship should indicate high 
12 This result seems to be robust, as can be shown by including a season variable and leave stadiuml. 
Including both of these gri%es high value of VIF (%ariance inflation factor) and indicates multicolinearity 
(see, for example, Greene. 2008). 
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level of "championship significant" matches, which is, according to Jennett (1984), a 
significant interest driver. 
1.2. Outline of the Thesis 
To be able to understand and handle the complexity of competitive balance better, 
Chapter 2 will address a framework that is based on a simple league tournament 
context. What will be shown in this thesis is that even in a simple league context, 
competitive balance will comprise three dimensions. This requires a wide set of 
statistical measures, in order to be able to give a full picture of competitive balance in a 
league. It can also be argued that the existing literature concerning competitive balance 
is, to a large degree, based on a simple league structure. 
The real-world complexity of sports leagues is taken into account in Chapter 3. Multi- 
prize tournaments typically deviate from a simple league context, and will demand an 
extension or modification of measures for competitive balance. Based on multi-prize 
structures of leagues, it can be seen as appropriate to conceptualise the relationship 
between team competitiveness and fan interest in terms of the competitive intensity of 
leagues. The basic idea behind competitive intensity goes back to Jennett's (1984) 
championship- and relegation significance concepts. These concepts have traditionally 
been related to the uncertainty of outcome. 13 Therefore, competitive intensity will be 
linked to the basic concepts in this thesis; competitive balance and uncertainty of 
outcome. Knowledge about issues related to complex league structure and 
competitiveness within a league in relation to competitive balance can increase the 
understanding of the consequences of regulatory policies on leagues, and is hence 
relevant for governing bodies. 
Chapter 4 follows up the conceptual framework in the two previous chapters, and will 
apply empirical measures to categorise the level of competitive balance among 
European football leagues and North American major leagues (NAML'4) in respect of 
the three basic dimensions of competitive balance. While NAML typically have weaker 
competitive balance in one dimension compared to European football leagues, the 
opposite usually holds for the second, and the third is relatively equal. Also between 
1' Sec, for example, Cairns et al. (1986) and Do\ýnward and Dawson (2000). 
14 This thesis will use the letters NANIL as notation for the North American major leagues. and is hence 
not following the notation NAL in Fort and Lee (2007). 
European football leagues, important differences can be found between different groups 
of leagues. In addition, measures related to complex league systems will be applied in 
selected leagues, including Australian leagues. One of these relates to qualification for 
post-seasonal playoffs, where the empirical findings are somewhat at odds with the 
general impression of the level of competitive balance between the major leagues in 
North America. 
Chapter 5 concentrates on why differences in competitive balance occur between 
leagues. A number of determinants will be analysed, with the focus on the European 
football leagues. Because of structural differences between these leagues, compared to 
the differences between the NAML, it is argued that the determinants applied on the 
other side of the Atlantic cannot necessarily be similarly applied in European football. 
These are specifically related to two groups: (i) factors affecting drawing power; and (ii) 
prize and tournament structure. The latter is chosen as a consequence of divergence 
among the European football leagues, as will also be highlighted. Cross-sectional 
regression analyses show that significance among the determinants is dependent on the 
dimension of competitive balance to be measured. 
Chapter 6 focuses on relationships between competitive balance and changes in 
regulations and prize and tournament structure, within single leagues over time. Two 
cases will be presented: the English top division and the Norwegian top division in 
football. Analyses of these two leagues will, among others, be undertaken using time- 
series analysis. In general, the response on competitive balance from regulatory changes 
is much more significant in the English top division than in the Norwegian league. 
Some of these results are interesting, because they depart from the theoretical invariance 
proposition. An example is the negative impact on competitive balance in England, after 
labour market restrictions were relaxed at the beginning of the 1960s. 
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2. Competitive Balance in a Simple League Context 
2.1. Introduction 
The concept of competitive balance will be the focus of this chapter. The importance of 
competitive balance is related to the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis proposed by 
Rottenberg (1956) that higher uncertainty of outcome increases the interest for matches 
and the league, ceteris paribus. If improved competitive balance increases the 
uncertainty of outcome and this is valued by fans, the hypothesised relationship implies 
that a minimum level of competitive balance is required for a league to be financially 
viable. 
The interest in the concept of competitive balance is not only related to the more 
fundamental economic and financial consequences. Even today, more than half of a 
century after Rottenberg's seminal paper, the meaning of the concept is still confused 
and uncertain. The question what is really meant by competitive balance has been a 
recurring theme in the literature. The concept is both complex and multidimensional. 
This is not surprising, since it is related to competition and competitiveness, both 
concepts that are themselves difficult to define precisely and comprehensively beyond 
vague and general descriptions. However, it is not satisfactory for this research area to 
be without common acceptable definitions of such a central concept. 
This thesis will take a different angle than the existing literature by considering the 
concept of competitive balance in different league structures. Many competitive balance 
measures might be most useful in a theoretical simple league tournament context, while 
leagues in reality have a higher level of complexity. As a consequence, competitive 
balance measures may need to be adjusted to take account of more realistic complex 
tournament structure. 
This chapter aims to define what is meant by a simple league context and to give an 
overview of measures of competitive balance used in the literature. It will concentrate 
on the conceptual framework of the concept of competitive balance, as well as the 
related concept of uncertainty of outcome. This framework will include suggested 
definitions, different time dimensions, relationships between the concepts, and their 
determinants. 
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2.2. Central Concept 
Competitive sports are organised as contests defined as individual matches between 
athletes or teams, and as tournaments consisting of a set of contests between a group of 
athletes or teams. A team sports tournament is, in general, either played as a knock- 
out/elimination (i. e. cup) competition and/or a round-robin (i. e. league) tournament. 
This thesis will focus on the latter, where teams play a number of matches, and at the 
end of the season, the results are aggregated into an end-of-season table. However, 
many of the issues considered are also relevant to other tournaments. There are, for 
example, a number of similarities between a round-robin league tournament and a 
competition such as the Tour de France. Each match and each contest has its winner, in 
addition to an overall tournament winner. Both modern round-robin team sports leagues 
and Tour de France are "multi-prize tournaments", where the teams/athletes compete for 
more than just one overall prize. Examples of other prizes include qualifying for post- 
season play-offs and avoiding relegation. In the Tour de France there are four major 
individual prizes - the yellow jersey, the green jersey, the red polka dot jersey, and the 
white jersey (www. letour. fr). 15 This thesis also uses the term professional to indicate the 
role of financial resources and incentives on the sporting performance for teams. 
However, many of the results from the analysis will also be valid for amateur sports. 
The primary product in professional team sports, the match, is unique since it cannot be 
produced by a single team. 16 In other words, combinations of inputs (teams) are 
required to produce a match (see, for example, Neale, 1964; Demmert, 1973; Vrooman, 
1996). Neale (1964, p. 2) calls this phenomenon the "inverted joint product", or the 
"product joint". A match requires two teams, and a league tournament needs a several 
number of teams. In general, this means that one particular team will not survive in a 
league when the other teams resign (and are not replaced) (see, for example, Jones, 
1969). This is a peculiarity of professional team sports, '7 with no parallel in other 
industries, and first highlighted by Rottenberg (1956, p. 254): 
" \lore about Tour dc France in a sport economics context can be found in Tor`gIcr (2007). 
Rottenber_g (1956) describes the product as the match weighted h% the revenues it is generating. 
See also Zimbalist (2003b, p. 501). More about peculiarities of professional team sports can be found in 
Neale (1964) and Gerrard (2006b). See also Noll (2006) for discussions of Neal's article related to 
peculiarities. 
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If a seller of shoes is able to capture the market and to cause other sellers of 
shoes to suffer losses and withdraw, the surviving competition is a clear gainer. 
But in baseball no team can be successful unless its competitors also survive and 
prosper sufficiently so that the differences in the quality of play among teams are 
not "too great". 
In other words, there is a need for co-operation between the competitors in a league (and 
a match), or what Gerrard (2000c, p. 202) calls "co-operative competition". The teams 
therefore have both common collective interests and their own private interests 
(Knowles et al., 1992; Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999). The individual private interest of 
teams is to be competitively successful against rival teams. However, between the 
competing teams, there is co-operation on match schedules and tournamenti'match rules. 
These practical issues are decided indirectly by the teams through the league's 
governing body. The league's governing body represents the teams and is responsible 
for protecting both co-operation and competition by making and monitoring rules within 
a framework given by the sport's own international governing bodies (e. g. UEFA and 
FIFA)' 8 and domestic and international laws (e. g. the EU). These rules are not only 
"sporting rules", but also rules affecting the industry's economy (see, for example, 
Sanderson, 2002). 
The differences between individual and collective interest create an economic dilemma: 
individual team success versus the negative collective consequences from dominated, 
predictable leagues. Gerrard (1999, p. 274) claims that this can undermine collective 
interests: "If the leagues become predictable, fans lose interest and all teams lose 
financially". Rottenberg (1956) shows this relationship as the main reason for the 
collapse of the first professional baseball league in the middle of the 1870s. Both 
Rottenberg and Szymanski and Zimbalist (2005) emphasise that the next professional 
baseball league to be formed (i. e. the National League) clearly recognised the 
importance of competitive balance. As a consequence, the so-called reserve clause was 
introduced in 1879. Moreover, Horowitz (1997, p. 373) claims that: "maintaining league 
balance in the major leagues was an expressed goal of the 1903 National Agreement 
that provided the blueprint for the modern major leagues (Davis, 1974, p. 363)". 
' The Union of European Football Associations and the Federation Internationale de Football 
: Association. 
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A league tournament has a number of characteristics (Demmert, 197 3; Gerrard, 2004b). 
and uncertainty of outcome is one of the key elements in the product that professional 
team sport is offering its customers. 19 Rottenberg (1956) expresses the term 
"uncertainty of outcome" explicitly, and it is used in arguments such as that 
"uncertainty of outcome is necessary if the consumer is to be willing to pay admission 
to the game" (p. 246). The importance of the concept of uncertainty of outcome is 
therefore built on the hypothesis that a particular match will be more interesting the 
smaller are the differences in sporting quality between the teams. Since a league 
consists of many teams, high uncertainty of outcome of the matches played requires 
small differences in sporting quality between the competing teams. In other words, for 
the unpredictability matches to be as high as possible, competitive balance must be 
high. Zimbalist (2003b, p. 503) summarizes these relationships in the following way: 
The success of a league is, to some extent, affected by the degree of uncertainty 
of outcome of its contests and its seasonal competitions, or, stated differently, by 
the degree of balance among its teams. 
This follows the hypothesis by Rottenberg (1956, p. 7) that "the 'tighter' the 
competition the larger the attendance". Downward and Dawson (2000, p. 21) explain 
the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis in the following way: 
This 'uncertainty of outcome' hypothesis argues that close competition between, 
for example, team A and team B confers benefits on the league not only via 
increased attendance at teams' own games but also at games involving teams C 
and D, hence the externality. 
The importance of competitive balance is therefore related to the uncertainty of outcome 
hypothesis on the basis that better competitive balance will increase uncertainty of 
outcome, and hence be positively related to interest and attendance. Both the match 
attendee and the television viewer are viewed as valuing uncertainty of outcome 
(Kuypers, 1997). Actually, Szymanski (2003c) claims that competitive balance is more 
important for TV viewers, since many of them are more interested in playing quality 
1° Customers are used here to put the product into an economic context. However. they would usually 
rather prefer to be called Supporters and fans. 
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and uncertainty of outcome than following one particular team. Following Szymanski. 
the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis might be stronger for TV viewers. 20 
Since it is the interest in the matches, through people at the stadium or people watching 
television, which usually is the main revenue driver for teams, the uncertainty of 
outcome hypothesis links competitive balance directly with the profit-earning 
capabilities of the individual teams (Knowles et al., 1992). Therefore, in general, 
competitive balance and uncertainty of outcome can be seen as important drivers for the 
sporting and financial performance of the teams. Since a league is a function of the 
teams, these factors will also be fundamental at league level. Hence, Zimbalist (2002, p. 
119) puts it, "fan perceptions and behaviour are at the core of the competitive balance 
problematic". 
The importance of the concepts has been widely discussed. Fort and Fizel (2004, p. x) 
claim that "nothing is more important to pro leagues than competitive balance - or the 
lack thereof'. Bourg (2004, p. 4) states that "the notion of uncertainty is the very basis 
of all competition. " Uncertainty of outcome is variously described as "lifeblood" 
(Dobson and Goddard, 2001, p. 125), "key concept" (Peel and Thomas, 1988, p. 323), 
and "central concept" (Cairns et al., 1986, p. 5) of professional team sports. Scully 
(1989, p. 75) claims that "uncertainty of outcome is a necessary feature of competitive 
team sports". For example, Downward and Dawson (2000) emphasise that in relation to 
the Bosman verdict, the importance of competitive balance and uncertainty of outcome 
(in European team sports) was highlighted by the Advocate General (Lenz). 21 
The importance of the concepts drives the academic interest through a number of issues, 
such as how to measure them and to analyse their importance as demand drivers. 
However, the empirical evidence on the effects of uncertainty of outcome on spectator 
demand is mixed (see, for example Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999; Szymanski, 2003b). 
This may in part be caused by a failure to control fully for the differences in drawing 
power across teams. Typically, teams from big cities have the biggest fan bases and are 
therefore able to generate a higher level of revenues, and hence attract the best players 
(Gerrard, 1999). Further, Gerrard (1999, p. 274) claims that: 
1" Ho \\ ev cr, this is not supported empirically in Forrest et al. (2006), finding no impact from uncertaint\ 
of outcome on TV rating. 
'' See also footnote 2 in Szymanski (2001, p. F70). 
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The dynamics of team competition will force teams to acquire the best possible 
players and, inevitably, the teams with the bigger resources will dominate, 
creating dynasties and doormats. 
Recognising that the (potential) interest of the different teams are unequal and that 
demand studies find that sports fans are significantly attracted to winning teams. one 
can argue that improved sporting success among these teams can be positively related to 
the total attendance in a league . 
22 However, this relationship might only be valid up to 
some threshold, since certainty of victory can reduce spectator interest (Jennett, 1984). 
A reasonable level of competitive balance, preventing individual teams from achieving 
a level of dominance that would damage the league (Dobson and Goddard, 2001) has 
also been an important objective for governing bodies. Cross-subsidisation policy is at 
least partly motivated by improving/maintaining competitive balance. This aim to be 
pro-competitive differs from other industries (Gerrard, 2000c). The governing bodies 
have introduced market regulations, which would be deemed restrictive practices and 
anti-competitive in other industries (Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999). For example, 
regulations have been introduced to promote joint profits among teams in the league. 
This is cartel behaviour and usually illegal. 23 
Dobson and Goddard (2001) claim that in the free-market equilibrium, the small-market 
teams will have negative financial results. The governing bodies will therefore try to 
protect the league in such a way that it is both sporting and financially viable. This 
means that it has to promote the survival for these "weak drawing teams" (Sloane, 1971, 
Fort and Quirk, 1995). However, there are discussions about how regulations affect 
competitive balance. Cross-subsidisation policy related to competitive balance in 
professional team sports might also lead to enforcement problems, different incentive 
effects and conflicts, both within the industry (e. g. maximum wages) and between the 
industry and the public (e. g. transfer market restrictions and collective sale of 
broadcasting rights). 24 
'' Survey over variables affecting attendance can be found in for example Cairns et al. (1986), Dowmý and 
and Dawson (2000), Dobson and Goddard (2001) and Borland and Macdonald (2003). These references 
have also surveys over attendance studies. 
23 This is described in Balfour and Porter (1991, p. 9): "Recognizing this distinction, professional sports 
leagues have requested antitrust e\emption from collusive restrictions based on alleied business 
necessity". 
2' See, for example. Quirk and Fort (1993). Scully (199-5), Downward and Dawson (2000), Dobson and 
Goddard (2001) and Szymanski (2001). 
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Even if Szymanski (2001, footnote p. F69) and Barros et al. (2002) question if the 
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis might in fact be a modern phenomenon, since: the 
Romans, for instance, appear to have enjoyed the unbalanced contest between lions and 
Christians", there seems, in general, to be at least two main schools regarding the 
relationship between competitive balance/uncertainty of outcome and fan interest in a 
league. This is also the view in the review of this literature by Borland and Macdonald 
(2003). One group claims that there has to be a minimum level of competitive balance, 
but the general correlation between competitive balance and attendance is limited. 
Borland and Macdonald (2003) consider this group to argue largely from empirical 
evidence. The alternative view is that improvement of the competitive balance in 
general will improve fan interest for the league, through the uncertainty of outcome 
hypothesis. According to Borland and Macdonald (2003, p. 487), this group has 
"competitive balance as the `gold standard"'. 
On basis of the discussion above, and the concepts by themselves and the question of 
how to measure them, competitive balance and uncertainty of outcome have been 
central in the development of economic analyses of team sports (see, for example, 
Cairns et al., 1986; Bourg, 2004). 
2.3. Uncertainty of Outcome 
As we have seen, the concepts of competitive balance and uncertainty of outcome are 
closely related, and many sport economists seem to use them interchangeably. 
Confusion about these two concepts, including how to distinguish them from each 
other, is one reason for the high interest in competitive balance in the literature. This 
thesis argues for having clear definitions of the two concepts to be better able to 
understand them, and hence achieve more meaningful interpretations of what is meant 
by them, and their differences and similarities. The conceptual framework of 
uncertainty of outcome will provide an important basis for the development of the 
understanding of competitive balance later in this chapter. 
lt is difficult to find a common definition of uncertainty of outcome in the literature. 
Downward and Dawson (2000, p. 131) summarize this, by claiming that there is a 
"difficulty of deciding what precisely is meant by uncertainty of outcome". They also 
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claim that uncertainty of outcome is a frequently used term without a "careful 
delineation of its precise meaning" (p. 13 1) and that this is so, even though "researchers 
are ultimately forced to produce working definitions acceptable to other economists and 
capable of being observed" (p. 131). The difficulties making a precise definition of the 
expression have forced Downward and Dawson (2000, p. 131) to expect that. "there is 
little chance that any writer will produce a definition of uncertainty of outcome that will 
gain universal acceptance, still less one that wins long-term adherence". This fits with 
Jennett (1984) and his description of the complexity of uncertainty of outcome. 
The expression "uncertainty" indicates that the uncertainty of outcome concept concerns 
expectations, and should therefore (only) be in ex ante form. 25 This interpretation can be 
found in the more recent European literature on professional team sports, arguing that it, 
in general, has to do with (un)predictability. Dobson and Goddard (2001, p. 126) use the 
expression "unpredictability", and Gerrard (2004b, p. 43-4) describes uncertainty of 
outcome as "the degree of individual contest and tournament predictability". Forrest and 
Simmons (2002, p. 229) claim that "by uncertainty of outcome is meant a situation 
where a given contest within a league structure has a degree of unpredictability about 
the result and, by extension, that the competition as a whole does not have a pre- 
determined winner at the outset of the competition". 
A sporting contest can be related to a number of outcomes. For example, a single 
contest may be part of an overall tournament. When aiming at creating a definition of 
uncertainty of outcome, it is necessary to include these aspects. This thesis will 
therefore suggest a definition that takes into account that it is an ex ante concept related 
to the probability distribution of different outcomes: Uncertainty of outcome is the 
probabilist- distribution for the alternative outcomes of a specified sporting contest. 
This definition therefore takes into account the fact that there is more than one outcome 
(prize) in a league tournament. In other words, it also includes uncertainty associated 
with qualification for post-seasonal playoffs and avoiding relegation. An important 
implication from this thesis is the treatment of prizes in the context of uncertainty of 
outcome (and later competitive balance). This means that, on the seasonal and long-run 
'` This is also emphasised in for example Owen and Weatherston (2004), who claim that uncertaint\ of 
outcome is an ex ante concept. 
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level, there is usually more than one prize to take into consideration. Thi is why this 
thesis suggests expanding the term "outcome" to "outcomes" in the definition. 
The importance of separating different dimensions of uncertainty of outcome is, 
according to Cairns et al. (1986), both related to hypothesis and tests, and as a 
consequence, this may imply policy decisions. 26 Sloane (1971) is the first to emphasise 
that uncertainty of outcome in professional team sports consists of more than one 
dimension, when including long run uncertainty about championship winners (p. 124): 
"the uncertainty of the length of a team's winning run". In general, the literature has 
split the term uncertainty of outcome into three main dimensions; match, seasonal and 
long-run uncertainty of outcome (see, for example, Cairns et at.. 1986; Peel and 
Thomas, 1988; Downward and Dawson, 2000; Dobson and Goddard, 2001; Borland 
and Macdonald, 2003). 27 Jennett (1984) claims that short-run uncertainty of outcome 
concerns competitive balance within a season, while long-run uncertainty of outcome 
has to do with the question of dominance over time. Short-run uncertainty of outcome 
consists of two forms; the match uncertainty of outcome and seasonal uncertainty of 
outcome. In other words, the individual contest can be seen as the short-run match 
uncertainty of outcome, and aggregated to uncertainty of outcome(s) on tournament 
level, where one level is individual season and the other is the long-run repeated 
tournaments. 
2.3.1. Uncertainty of Outcome at Individual Contests (Match Uncertainty) 
Uncertainty of outcome in individual contests can be defined as the probabiliti' 
distribution for the alternative outcomes for a particular individual sporting contest. 
According to Cairns et al. (1986), Quirk and El-Hodiri (1974) express the following 
mathematical formula for uncertainty of outcome at individual contests with two 
outcomes (win and loss): p(t -p), where p is the probability for the home team to win. 
Consequently, the uncertainty is highest when p=0.5. If there is a possibility of drawn 
matches, the number of outcomes for a team in a match increases to at least three. 
however, including drawn matches will not change the general conclusions, i. e. the 
uncertainty of the outcome will increase initially as the probability of a home win rises 
'`' Sloane (2006) discusses the importance of including the different dimension, of uncertainty of 
outcome. 
'7 Snmansk1(2003b. p. 1155) uses the term "championship uncertainty" as the third dimension. 
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(and the probability of an away win falls) but at some point uncertainty will start to 
decline as the possibility of a home win (and an away loss) becomes more and more 
certain (Cairns et al., 1986). 
The uncertainty of a single match outcome is related to probabilities based on the 
sporting quality of the two teams, home field advantages and other information 
available, such as injuries prior to the match. These determinants are among the 
arguments behind the use of betting odds as a measure of this dimension of competitive 
balance (Peel and Thomas, 1988,1992,1996,1997; Knowles et al., 1992; Kuypers, 
1997; Forrest and Simmons, 2002). Measures based on betting odds might be seen as 
more appropriate than "first generation" measures of match uncertainty, (mainly) based 
on past performance (for example, the logarithm of the absolute difference in a priori 
standing) prior to the match, such as in Hart et al. (1975), which is the first contribution 
to empirically testing match uncertainty (Downward and Dawson, 2000). 28 
However, measures on match uncertainty based on differences in standings do not 
differentiate between a match between the top two teams contra a match between the 
teams ranked seventh and eighth in the league, even if these differences might be 
important for spectator demand and broadcasting rating. This problem was "solved" by 
Jennett (1984), introducing "championship" and "relegation" significance variables, 
which will be referred to as match significance variables in this thesis. "' One way to 
handle this problem in a demand function is to apply two sets of variables, where 
uncertainty of outcome at contest level is related to the expected output of the match, 
while the significance of the match relating to tournament outcome(s) will be handled 
by the match significance variable(s). Combining those variables will probably give a 
more realistic correlation between the two matches mentioned above and attendance, 
rather than only using one variable (contest/match uncertainty). It is important in 
distinguish between the relative and absolute levels of sporting quality. Uncertainty of 
outcome at contest level should be related to the relative differences between the two 
teams in a match. Match significance may, in this setting, be reflecting absolute quality. 
`s If applying betting odds, there are a number of potential biases to take into account (see, for example, 
Forrest and Simmons. 2002, Dobson and Goddard, 2001). The latter reference includes literature revie%%. 
More discussions about measures of match uncertainty can be found in Dawson and Downward (2005). 
'° This is also considered in Hart et al. (1975), but Jennett (1984) is the first to systematically focus on it. 
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2.3.2. Uncertainty of Outcomes on Tournament Level (Seasonal 
Uncertainty of Outcomes) 
The uncertainty of'outcomes at the tournament level can be defined as the probability 
distribution for the alternative tournament outcomes. This uncertainty does not only 
mean uncertainty on the championship title, but also to post-seasonal qualification and 
relegation issues. Uncertainty of outcome therefore directly matters for goy erning 
bodies (Sloane, 1971). 
The theoretical understanding of the concept of uncertainty of outcome at contest match 
level has been relatively unambiguous in the literature, where problems have been 
related to empirical issues. Uncertainty of outcomes at long-run (repeated tournament) 
level has not been a major focus of previous research. This topic will be discussed more 
thoroughly later in this chapter. The main concerns in the literature have been related to 
uncertainty of outcomes at tournament level, both empirically and theoretically. 
In general, uncertainty of outcomes at tournament level has revolved around three 
issues; the overall sporting difference among the teams, the closeness of competition 
around the tournament prizes, and match significance for the single team in respect of 
these prizes. 
Rottenberg (1956) and Jones (1969) focus on the general "playing balance" among all 
teams, and Borland (1987) and Cairns (1987) apply related measures. This is directly 
connected to the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis and the fact that a higher level of 
general uncertainty will be achieved, when there is more closeness in sporting quality 
among all teams. In addition to the above, Davenport (1969) also focussed on the 
closeness of the championship race, developing a measure that is more heavily weighted 
around the differences at the top of league than for the other teams, claiming that it is 
the championship race that is most important for the fans. It is interesting that 
contributions in the early literature of demand studies (Demmert, 1973; Noll, 1974) 
have variables for close competition for playoff positions. In other words, spectator 
demand is not only hypothesised to be related to the fight for winning the league, but 
also to the prize to qualify for playoff,,. Jennett (1984) emphasises that only focusing on 
the playing strength among the teams in a league might be too narrowly related to 
uncertainty at tournament level, because it is not capturing enough of the relationship 
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between uncertainty and attendance, since spectators also receive utility from matches 
that are significant for "the overall championship race" (p. 179). 
Broadly speaking, the literature focuses on the (un)predictability of tournament 
outcomes, mainly the championship, but also playoffs and relegation. Whitney (1988) 
and Lee (2004) use the term playoff uncertainty, while Cairns (1987, p. 260) claims that 
"seasonal uncertainty refers to the outcome of the championship". This is probably the 
statement that has been most widely accepted as uncertainty of tournament outcomes. 
Kuypers (1997) and Szymanski and Kuypers (1999) explicitly include uncertainty of 
both championship and relegation, Szymanski (2003b, p. 1155) defines seasonal 
uncertainty as "a close championship race within a season", and Dobson and Goddard 
(2001) relate it to uncertainty concerning championship, or divisional outcomes, within 
each season. 30 These arguments are also recognised in the early literature, by Demmert 
(1973, p. 62), who emphasises that "an essential aspect of the pennant race is that a 
close race increases uncertainty of outcome by increasing the number of potential 
winners". 
Kuypers (1997) gives an example of how outcome uncertainty was affected in the 
English Football League through the introduction of a playoff system for promotion. 
Previously, the top three teams were promoted automatically from the second-tier 
division (i. e. the Championship) to the top-tier division (i. e. the FA Premier League). 
The introduction of promotion playoffs limited automatic promotion to the top two 
teams only with the third promotion place decided by a playoff tournament between the 
teams finishing third through to sixth. This process increases the uncertainty of 
tournament outcomes, and is consistent with Fort and Quirk (1995), who state that 
introducing a championship playoff will increase the uncertainty of which team will win 
the championship, and Sandy et al. (2004, p. 19) who claim that: "the elaborate playoffs 
common in many leagues, whereby the top teams play each other for the title or 
promotion, will help to sustain fan interest". 
Uncertainty of outcomes at tournament level, as described above, is considered as the 
direct form by Cairns (1990), and is described as an uncertainty where "individuals 
value the identity of the eventual winner of the championship being uncertain" in Cairns 
30 Sec also, for example, Cairns (I Q`7) 
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et al. (1986, p. 6). 31 Downward and Dawson (2000, p. 137) use the term "within-season 
uncertainty", while Borland and Macdonald (2003. p. 482) apply "intra-seasonal 
uncertainty" and claim that "at any point during a season, a greater degree of evenness 
in team winning percentages will mean a larger number of teams are in contention for 
the play-offs. " 
The second form that has been treated as uncertainty of tournament outcomes is related 
to prizes and the differences in interest between matches closely related to prizes and 
other matches. In other words, the interest for a match between two teams of 
approximately equal sporting quality might be higher if it is a match relevant for 
avoiding relegation, compared to a match at the middle-of-the-table (with little or no 
relevance for the top or the bottom of the league) (Sloane, 1971). 2 Hart et al. (1975, p. 
18) point out that there are "key matches", such as the fight for avoiding relegation, 
which should be taken into consideration in a demand function (at match level). 
These arguments emphasise that it is not only the "total" quality of the teams in a match 
that matters. For example, Knowles et al. (1992) and Borland and Macdonald (2003) 
construct variables measuring total quality. The latter use a measure based on average 
ranking of the two teams, while Knowles et al. apply a game behind leader measure, 
anticipating that this measure will give a picture of the relative importance of the match. 
This is based on a hypothesised positive correlation between sporting quality of the 
teams and the importance of the matches and is appropriate in closed leagues, but will 
only be true in an open league when comparing a top match with a middle-of-the-table 
match. However, this relationship will not satisfy the relationship anticipated in Sloane 
(1971), that a fight to avoid relegation might be more interesting than a middle-of-the- 
table match, even if the sporting quality of the latter match probably is significantly 
higher. 
Based on these arguments, one can say that the relationship between uncertainty of 
outcomes and demand must be wider than just focusing on uncertainty of outcome at 
match level, and that measures of absolute quality of the matches cannot provide on 
their own a satisfactory explanation of observed fan behaviour. This means that the 
relationship between uncertainty and demand also has to include uncertainty about the 
See also Cairns (1958,1990). 
See. for example. Noll (2003). who describes the relationship bcmeen the fight to avoid relegation and 
the interest. 
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prizes of a league and take into account that a match between two teams in the middle 
of the table, especially at the end of the season, will be irrelevant to the league's prize 
structure, while a match between two teams fighting to avoid relegation will be very 
important, when taking into account the prize "not to be relegated" (or to avoid to get 
the negative prize: relegation), as well as for two teams fighting for the last playoff 
place. 
Jennett's (1984) championship significance and relegation significance measure the 
level of importance for the specific prize outcome of a match for a given team. These 
measures are related to both time and league standings during the tournament stage. 
Jennett focuses on the time dimension and the relatively greater importance matches at 
the end of the season have on the final standings (given the points already secured). '? 
Others have followed Jennett, using match significance as a measure of seasonal 
uncertainty of outcome. Janssens and Kesenne (1987), Cairns (1987), Borland and Lyle 
(1992), Dobson and Goddard (1992), Wilson and Sim (1995), Kuypers (1997), and 
Garcia and Rodrigues (2002) have all used similar measures or measures that have 
taken Jennett into consideration. Other demand studies, which have also used measures 
that are related to this interpretation of uncertainty of outcome at tournament level, are 
Borland (1987), Jones and Ferguson (1988), and Baimbridge et al. (1996). 
This form of uncertainty of outcome can be seen as indirect and related to single teams' 
success. The individual spectator is attracted by their team's success. The hypothesis is 
that the more teams involved in the race for the championship, the higher aggregate 
attendance (Cairns et al., 1986, Cairns, 1988,1990; Downward and Dawson, 2000). 
Downward and Dawson call this form the "seasonal (team-specific) uncertainty of 
outcome". In other words, match significance in its direct form can be related to 
absolute quality, but at aggregate level it can be used as indication of the total 
uncertainty of the "prize race" at a given stage of the league. The more matches that are 
of higher prize significance, the higher is the level of seasonal uncertainty in the league. 
This is supported by Borland and Macdonald (2003), who claim that one form of 
seasonal uncertainty is a relatively higher number of matches being significant 
31 See also Gerrard (2004b). Going through the different approaches to measuring prize significant 
measures used in the literature mentioned abox e is beyond the scope of this thesis. Review can be found 
in for example Dobson and Goddard (2001) and Downward and Dawson (2000). For Jennett's measure, 
see Jennett (1984) and Cairns et at. (19, -, 6). 
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indicating "greater degree of evenness in a sporting competition- (p. 486). 
3` In other 
words, it is the "aggregate" championship significance that the league is concerned 
about (Cairns et al., 1986). Hence, the more matches that have higher championship 
significance, the more uncertain the championship race. The governing bodies might 
therefore attempt to improve uncertainty of outcome by introducing systems that 
maximise the number of teams in contention for the championship (Jennett, 1984). 
In summary, this thesis will treat uncertainty of outcomes at tournament level as 
uncertainty of the overall dispersion of sporting success to include uncertainty over 
which team will win the championship, which teams will qualify for different post- 
seasonal tournaments including playoffs and European competitions, and the 
uncertainty of which teams will be promoted and relegated. There is also a relationship 
between the issues of uncertainty of tournament outcomes. First, the closer the level of 
playing strength among the teams is, the tighter fights for prizes are anticipated, and 
hence, the higher level of aggregate match significance can be expected, ceteris paribus. 
Second, the higher number of significant prizes to compete for, the higher level of 
aggregate match significance, ceteris paribus, and hence, more uncertainty of 
tournament outcomes can be anticipated. The focus on different prizes in the literature, 
concerning uncertainty of tournament outcomes, will be used later in this thesis, with 
regards to the competitive balance and competitive intensity concepts. 
2.3.3. Uncertainty of Outcome in Long-Run Repeated Tournaments (Long- 
Run Uncertainty) 
The third dimension of uncertainty of outcome is the uncertainty of long-run repeated 
tournaments (long-run uncertainty) that takes into account the dynamic relationship in 
repeated tournaments. 3 Typically, a sports league is dynamic in the sense that it is 
repeated season after season, but examples can also be found in individual sports, such 
as Tour de France and World Cup in biathlon. The dynamics may be very strong 
particularly in team sports operated as merit hierarchy systems with promotion and 
34 Borland and Macdonald (2003, p. 4S6) use the comparison based on "natural e\periment" between 
tournaments the Football/Premier League and FA cup in English football by Szymanski (2001) as an 
example of a third approach of seasonal uncertainty. 
35 Borland and Macdonald (2003) use the term i?, ter-seasoºral unct'r taintly 0J outcome. 
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relegation such as European football. In these systems participation in the current 
season is a dependent on performance in the previous season. 
Discussion of long-run uncertainty tends to concentrate on the domination of a league 
by a small number of teams. Sloane (1971) considers the domination of the Scottish 
league by Rangers and Celtic and focuses on the negative effect that long-run 
domination might have on attendance (especially for dominated teams). Sloane's 
approach has been the norm for understanding uncertainty of outcome in long-run 
repeated tournaments. This can be seen in various descriptions and definitions of long- 
run uncertainty of outcome, as relating to domination by one team (Cairns et al, 1986; 
Cairns, 1987; Peel and Thomas, 1988; Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999; Downward and 
Dawson, 2000), by one or a few (two) teams (Jennett, 1984; Kuypers, 1997; Szymanski, 
2003b; Sandy et al., 2004), and by groups of teams (Borland, 1987; Borland and Lye, 
1992). 36 Long-run domination is related to the uncertainty at the beginning of the season 
as to which team will win the championship based on outcomes in previous seasons 
(see, for example, Dobson and Goddard, 2001, p. 42). 37 This uncertainty will be low if 
one team has been the dominant over many seasons. 
Given a certain level of competitive balance, the possibility of domination will depend 
in part on the structure of the league. If winning the championship over a number of 
years is the criterion for defining a dominant team (for example, Rosenborg BK 
winning the Norwegian championship thirteen times in a row 1992 - 2004, and Skonto 
Riga in Latvia winning fourteen in a row 1991 - 2004), 
38 a change in the structure of 
how the league champion is determined may alter a team's probability of winning the 
championship. One method of reducing the likelihood of long-run domination (i. e. 
dynasties and doormats) is the introduction of a championship playoff system (Fort and 
Quirk, 1995). 39 However, long-run repeated participation in the playoffs by the same 
36 A number of these examples have assumed that long-run domination is equivalent with long-run 
uncertainty of outcome. 
37 This is shown very clearly in the description of Szymanski (2003b, p. 1155), who calls this dimension 
"championship uncertainty". 
38 See, for example, www. rsssf. com. 
39 Another effect of such a system is that the uncertainty according to the championship, and hence 
uncertainty of outcomes at tournament/seasonal level, increases. An interesting example here can be 
found in the Norwegian top league for women's handball. The dominating team won all matches in the 
league, as well as becoming the cup winner. However, the team lost one match in the play-off, and it 
therefore did not qualify for the play-off final (www. vg. no/sport/haandball/03_04/kvinner/ and 
www. handball. no/pl. asp? p=17020). Consequently, it did not qualify for the EHF Champions League. 
The opinion found this to be unfair (pub. tv2. no/nettavisen/sport/handball/article221137. ece), as it 
"conflicts with our sense of justice", in Sanderson and Siegfried (2003, p. 260). 
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group of teams also represents a form of long-run domination (Borland and Macdonald. 
2003). 
The meaning of long-run uncertainty of outcome is difficult to define precisely. Is it 
only concerned with domination by one or two teams at the top of the league'? Or should 
it also explicitly include the performance of other teams in the league? The existence of 
dominant teams necessarily implies the existence of dominated teams. Concern with the 
performance of both dominant and dominated teams relates to the uncertainty of 
performance persistence. The nature of the uncertainty of persistence may change o\-er 
time within different segments of the league. For example, the nature of the domination 
at the top of English football has varied over the last 15 seasons. Initially the title race in 
the FA Premier League was dominated by one team (Manchester United). This 
domination has gradually expanded to two teams (Manchester United and Arsenal) and 
then to four teams (Manchester United, Arsenal, Chelsea and Liverpool). Thus there is 
low uncertainty of outcome as regards which teams are potential winners of the 
Premiership title at the start of each season but high uncertainty of outcome over which 
one of the "Big Four" will emerge as league champions. 
2.4. Competitive Balance 
Chapter 1 characterised competitive balance as complex, and the treatment of 
uncertainty of outcome in this chapter has further emphasised that real-world leagues 
are complex structures. One of the aims of this thesis is to create a conceptual 
framework for the understanding of competitive balance. A simple league context will 
be used as the basis for the analysis in the rest of this chapter. The arguments will be 
extended to a complex league structure in the next chapter. There are three reasons for 
distinguishing between simple and complex league systems. First, it is important to 
have a common basis for analysis given the huge variety of league systems, current and 
historic, between and within sports, as well as national and continental differences. 
There are very significant differences between the organisation of the NAML and that 
of European football, and, in turn, there are significant differences in the structure of 
domestic football leagues across the members of the UEFA. Second, it will simplify 
discussion and understanding of the large number of measures of competitive balance 
and uncertainty of outcome in different leagues. Third. most of the relevant aspects- of 
the peculiar economics of professional team sports are valid in simple leazue systems 
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and hence can be analysed more effectively by abstracting from the complexities of 
real-world leagues that often serve to obscure the key issues. 
2.4.1. A Simple League Context 
By a simple league context is meant a theoretical league constructed to be as simple as 
possible. The simple league context provides a common basis for discussion, and allows 
the analysis to be focused on the core aspects of concept competitive balance free from 
the confusions created by the complexities of real-world league structures. The simple 
league context has five defining characteristics: 
1. The league is closed with no relegation and promotion. It is also assumed that the 
same set of teams will compete in the league season after season. 
2. The structure of the league is unitanr. This means that the results from the matches 
are equally weighted to determine the tournament outcome. The tournament consists 
only of a regular season with no post-seasonal playoffs. 
3. A simple league structure consists of a round-robin match schedule with all teams in 
the league playing each other the same number of times home and away. There is no 
elimination (i. e. knock-out) phase in the league tournament. 
4. Individual match outcomes are limited to wins and losses with no tied matches. In 
addition there is no differentiation between whether the outcome is decided in 
regular time or via some form of overtime tie-breaker. And there is no 
differentiation based on the margin victory. All wins are awarded the same points 
with all losses awarded zero points. 
5. A simple league has only one prize, the championship, where the winner is decided 
on basis of the best win-loss record over all matches played. 
Although all modem league structures are much more complex, the simple league 
context is representative of the structure of "first generation leagues" from which 
modern leagues have evolved. 
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2.4.2. Conceptual Framework 
Competitive balance is a complex concept consisting of three principal dimension;, «win 
dispersion, performance persistence and prize concentration. "' Win dispersion relates to 
the distribution of wins within single-season tournaments. Performance persistence 
concerns the relationship between sporting outcomes across seasons. The third 
dimension is prize concentration, which in the simple league context refers to the 
concentration of championship winners over time. Whereas «in dispersion is concerned 
with within-season performance, win persistence and prize concentration are both time- 
dependent, related to performance across seasons. 
Competitive balance across seasons depends on the correlation over time, not only for 
the top teams, but for the whole league (see, for example, Daly and Moore, 1981; 
Balfour and Porter, 1991; Butler, 1995; Eckard, 1998,2001; Humphreys, 2002: 
Szymanski and Smith, 2002). As emphasised in Gerrard (1998), competitive balance 
depends not only on the distribution of performance of teams within a season but also 
includes the degree of stability in the performance for teams across seasons. A league 
with a high level of competitive balance should not have the same teams performing 
successfully season after season (i. e. dynasties) and the same teams performing weakly 
over many seasons (i. e. doormats). Lower competitive balance over time can therefore 
be reflected in less variation in the teams' performance over time, with all teams having 
a high probability of repeating their current performance levels in subsequent seasons 
(Eckard, 1998,2001). In such a league, the variation of the individual teams' winning 
percentages may be tend to be lower but not necessarily so. The league may also be 
characterised by strategic groups (Caves and Porter, 1977) consisting of groups of teams 
with similar levels of performance that persist across seasons. 
In addition to these three basic dimensions, the literature also tends to highlight 
domination by teams from large markets as a separate aspect of competitive balance 
(see, for example, Vrooman, 1996,2000). However, the view adopted in this thesis is 
that domination by large-market teams is a time-dependent phenomenon captured by 
win persistence and prize concentration. 
40 See La Croix and Kawaura (1999). There are also examples in the literature that the term competitive 
balance has been used on match level. This point will (only) be included in the discussion of uncertaint,, 
of outcome at match level, and is hence not treated as a dimension of competitive balance in this thc"i,. 
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Scully (1989) claims that measuring the distribution of championships is limited, since 
such measures are binary - either a team wins the championship or it does not - and 
thus cannot capture the closeness of the championship contest. This is also emphasised 
in Szymanski and Kuypers (1999), who claim that it is possible for a league competition 
to be extremely close and exciting each year and yet still be won by the same team. On 
the other hand, it is also possible that a number of teams could win the league without 
any of the championship races being close and exciting. In this case fan interest might 
be high at the start of the season with the anticipation of several credible contenders for 
the championship, but the interest may dissipate through the season as the championship 
contest becomes a "one-horse race". However, by recognising the potential importance 
of the three different dimensions, a fuller understanding of a particular league's 
competitive balance can be gained, thus avoiding the problems highlighted by Scully 
and Szymanski and Kuypers that result from focusing attention on only one specific 
aspect of competitive balance. Hence championship concentration can give valuable 
insights, particularly when combined with measures of the other dimensions of 
competitive balance. 
The complexity of competitive balance can be exemplified by looking at the Norwegian 
league, where the same team, Rosenborg BK, won 13 championships in a row from 
1992 to 2004. It is easy to conclude that this league must have weak competitive 
balance because of the long-run domination. However, it does not say anything about 
the closeness of each championship, neither the number of teams competing every 
season for the championship title, nor the "turnover" in the identity of the teams 
finishing second and third. For example, when Rosenborg won the 13`h title in a row. 
the final standing shows that the championship was won by only one goal. In addition, 
the distribution of sporting performance, when taking all teams in the top division into 
account, was well distributed, measured by the NSQF ratio (see below for further 
explanation of the source and definition of the NSQF ratio). 4' 
According to Buzzacchi et at. (2003), the literature of competitive balance has mostly 
been concerned with static measures4" of the equality of winning opportunities for 
" The calculated index was 0.99. Quirk and Fort (1992) indicate that an index of unity shows perfect 
competitive balance, and the higher value of the index. the ww eaker competitive balance. 
'' This term is used by S, v manski and Smith (2002) as a distinction from dynamic competiti\ e balance. 
Koning (2000) uses it as it description related to within-season competitive balance. 
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teams in either individual matches or the overall championship. Buzzacchi et al. assume 
that fans care about competitive balance in the sense that they want winners to change 
from time to time (although they may also care about the variance of success among the 
teams within the season). More teams in the championship contest increase fan interest 
among followers of those teams, as well as *'team- neutral" fans, compared to a league 
without a close contest for the championship. Buzzacchi et al. (p. 174) claim that if 
each team experiences diminishing returns to success in terms of fan interest, then a 
league with greater competitive balance in this dynamic sense will be more successful. " 
These considerations are also taken into account later in this thesis. 
The general definition of competitive balance can be expanded to include both ex ante 
and ex post time considerations. In other words, competitive balance will be treated as a 
wider concept than (the ex ante) uncertainty of outcome. Some of the newer literature 
has explicitly considered the concept of competitive balance to be related to 
expectations of the future. Gerrard (2004, p. 44) suggests that "competitive balance 
refers to the shape of the probability distribution of the likelihood of teams winning the 
tournament. " Szymanski (2001) and Buzzacchi et at. (2003, p. 168) claim that 
competitive balance is concerned with the expectation of "who will be the winner". 
Putting the ex ante (time) dimension into the general definition of competitive balance 
yields the following definition: Ex ante competitive balance is the probability 
distribution of sporting outcomes betii, een the teams competing in a league/tournament. 
Ex ante competitive balance is related to expectations based on currently available 
information, such as the strength of the teams in a league and the schedule system. 
Often the information is qualitative and imprecise. For example, Gerrard (2004b, p. 45) 
claims that "little evidence exists on the distribution of playing talent because of the 
inherent difficulties in measuring it. " In theoretical terms, competitive balance has been 
treated as both an ex ante and ex post concept, whereas empirical measures have 
focused almost exclusively on ex post outcomes. This is emphasised in Gerrard 
(2004b), claiming that measures of competitive balance are mainly based on either the 
ex post distribution of sporting outcomes or the distribution of the economic size of the 
teams. However, there is a connection between ex ante and ex post competitive balance, 
since the information from current and past performance provides data for determining 
expectations of the next season's (ex ante) competitive balance. The long-run 
uncertainty of outcomes concept can be related to ex ante across-, seasonal competitive 
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balance. Turning it around, ex ante competitive balance in relation to performance 
persistence and prize concentration can be seen as an element of the uncertainty of 
outcome in long-run repeated tournaments. A similar relationship is to be found 
between ex ante win dispersion competitive balance and the uncertainty of outcome at 
tournament level regarding overall dispersion of sporting outcome, as is also 
emphasised in Fort (2007, p. 648) referring to Dawson and Downward (2005). 
Indeed, there are examples in the literature of ex post definitions of competitive 
balance, 43 such as the distribution of performance (Hall et al., 2002), the distribution of 
team wins (Depken, 1999; Larsen et al., 2006), the distribution of winning percentages 
(Marburger, 2002; Maxcy, 2002), and the distribution of league championships (Fort, 
2003). In other words, the definition of ex post competitive balance is based on the 
distribution of actual outcomes in a league/tournament and hence is closely associated 
with the empirical measures of competitive balance. 44 Ex post competitive balance is 
defined in this thesis as the distribution of actual sporting outcomes between the teams 
in a league/tournament. 
A general overview on the understanding and suggestions of the concept of competitive 
balance, taken from the discussions above, is shown in Figure 2.1.45 
e3 Again it should be emphasised that the descriptions related to the concept competitive balance are 
mine. 
44 The descriptions are collected from literature that uses them explicitly to describe competitive balance. 
as This figure takes into account many of the points related to complexity of the concept competitive 
balance in Gerrard (2006a). 
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Figure 2.1: Overview of competitive balance 
The definition of competitive balance by the Blue Ribbon panel on Baseball Economics 
(Levin et al., 2000, p. 5) has been categorised as "qualitative", by for example Zimbalist 
(2002, p. 1 13) and Sanderson and Siegfried (2003, p. 257): 
In the context of baseball, proper competitive balance would be understood to 
exist when there are no clubs chronically weak because of %i LB's financial 
structural features. Proper competitive balance will not exist until every well-run 
club has a regularly recurring hope of reaching postseason play. 
It is difficult to use this description as a definition of the concept of competitive 
balance, because it seems to be more related to a proposed minimum level of what is 
considered to be an appropriate level of competitive balance in a league. There are 
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varying views of this "definition" in the literature. Szymanski (2003a) claims that this 
description of competitive balance "is not easily measurable" (p. 471). Humphreys 
(2003) calls the definition a "temporal dimension of competitive balance" (p. 285), 
while Kahane (2003) describes its indistinctness as follows (p. 289): 
If a so-called well-run team reaches the post season at least once in event' 5 
years, is this sufficient for competitive balance? If it is, then the alleged 
competitive balance problem in MLB can be solved quite easily by following the 
National Hockey League's paradigm by increasing the number of teams eligible 
for postseason play. 
Further Kahane (2003, p. 289) argues that: 
The bottom line is that there are many notions of competitiveness including a 
team's ability to win a championship, some given proportion of its contests, a 
divisional title, any individual contest, or to improve its chances for any of the 
former from season to season. Without a clear definition of competitive balance, 
the discussion of whether leagues are sufficiently balanced has little meaning. 
It is exactly these concerns of Kahane that are taken into account in this thesis. The 
many notions of competitiveness are summarised in the term competitive intensity (see 
Chapter 3), as well as in the analysis of competitive balance in a complex league context 
(see Chapter 3). Providing a clear and comprehensive meaning of the concept of 
competitive balance is the central objective of this thesis. The definition of competitive 
balance used by the Blue Ribbon panel on Baseball Economics and the arguments by 
Kahane will be followed up in Chapter 3. 
Several researchers have described competitive balance relative to some ideal or 
extreme case such as perfect competitive balance, perfect competitive dominance and 
optimal level of competitive balance. The cases are of course only theoretical 
conditions. By contrast, the Blue Ribbon panel (Levin et al., 2000) has given a 
definition of competitive balance more in terms of a minimum acceptable level of 
competitive balance. Similarly, Jones (1969) suggests an "equilibrium" solution where 
competitive balance is sufficient to ensure the viability of the league. "Although it will 
not be one which results either in joint profit maximization for the group or attempted 
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profit maximization for each club, it will ensure group "equilibrium"" (Jones. 1969. p. 
4). 
This thesis focuses on three dimensions of competitive balance and implies that an 
improvement in competitive balance (in a simple league context) is associated with a 
narrower distribution of win dispersion, weaker performance persistence from season to 
season, and less prize concentration. The polar cases, perfect competitive balance and 
perfect competitive dominance, will be treated below, while discussion of the optimal 
level of competitive balance is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
For the win dispersion dimension, perfect competitive balance implies that every team 
has an equal probability of winning each match, so that every team is expected to win 
half of their matches ratio: E(w; ) = 0.5, where w; is the win ratio for team i, i=1, ...., N, 
and N is the total number of teams in the league. 
Perfect competitive balance in the performance persistence dimension implies zero 
correlation between the distribution of outcomes in season t and season t-b: 
E[corr(CB CBt_b)] = 0, b>0 
where CB, is the distribution of match outcomes in season t. 46 
Prize concentration in perfect competitive balance in a simple league context implies an 
equal distribution of championship titles between all competing teams: E(C; ) = T/N, 
where C; is the number of championships won by team i, T is the number of seasons and 
N is the total number of teams in the league. This is consistent with Forrest and 
Simmons (2002), who use an equal number of championship wins by all teams in the 
league, during a specified period of time, as an indication of a perfectly balanced 
contest, implying that the frequency with which a team wins the championship is once 
every N seasons (Demmert, 1973). `7 The more closely the actual distribution of 
championship titles for each team is concentrated around the ideal of TiN, the better is a 
league's competitive balance, ceteris paribus. 
"' This is consistent with Groot (2008), arguing that perfect competitive balance is reflected by zero 
correlation, and not perfect negative correlation, where the same team %%ould be the champion every 
second season. 
4"? Scs also Rottenberg (1950). 
LEEDS ýýr: ý, ýºý A'3,7 
It should be noted that in the case of perfect competitive balance, there is no time 
dependency in outcomes. In terms of the uncertainty of outcome, this means that the 
probability of winning the next match is independent of all previous matches, and that 
the probability of winning any particular match in one season is independent of results 
in previous seasons. In other words, if there is perfect competitive balance in a league, 
each team has the same probability of winning a specific match in the final stage of the 
tournament as at the start of the season. The same holds for the probability of winning 
the championship overall. These relationships are also emphasised in Borland and 
Macdonald, referring to Leifer (2000, p. 11): 
Competitive balance yield winners and losers in both games and seasons, but it 
keeps open the chance that winners will lose and losers will win in subsequent 
competition. This helps undermine the significance of past winning and losing 
by arousing public interest in upcoming competition, no matter what has 
happened in the past. 
Forrest and Simmons (2002) look at alternatives of outcomes in a perfectly balanced 
contest. For the win dispersion dimension, they consider the case of every match ending 
as a tied contest48 (or the same outcome/equal score - Bourg, 2004) as well as the case 
of each team winning and losing half of their matches (see also Horowitz, 1997; 
Demmert, 1973). These suggestions can also be found in Rottenberg (1956). In the 
simple league context the case of tied matches is excluded. This is dealt with in the 
discussion of more complex league structures. The relationship between home field 
advantages and competitive balance also needs to be considered. An equal number of 
wins and losses for all teams, with teams winning all of their home matches, gives 
perfect competitive balance, but this negates the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, 
since although there is an equality of win ratios between teams, there is no uncertainty 
49 of match outcome for individual matches. 
Sloane (1976a, 1976b) emphasises that the win ratios of teams should be randomly 
distributed around the mean. This is allowed for in the notion of an idealized standard 
deviation of win ratios based on the normal distribution in the NSQF ratio, the most 
'' Given a complex league context. 
49 This is based on an answer from Prof Dr Bill Gerrard in a discussion among the audience after a 
presentation about home field advantages at the NASS\t 200conference. 
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widely used measure for within-season competitive balance (see below for further 
explanation of the source and definition of the NSQF ratio). W'e'hen describing perfect 
competitive balance, one should therefore remember the differences between the ex ante 
and ex post time dimensions, since it is at the ex ante level equality exists in regards to 
equal probabilities of outcomes and not equality of the ex post actual distribution. 
Perfect (ex ante) competitive balance is related to equal outcome probabilities. This 
means that equality of observed (ex post) outcomes is only expected when the number 
of repetitions tends towards infinity. Given the simple league context, the observed 
outcome should have a binominal distribution on basis of equal probability for success 
and failure in any individual event. This should be reflected in the statistical properties 
for all three dimensions of competitive balance. 
By analysing the ex ante and ex post aspects of perfect competitive balance, the 
potential problem that "It would be impossible to establish a ranking, and the interest of 
such a championship would be debatable", described in Bourg (2004, p. 5) for a league 
containing perfect competitive balance might not be a relevant problem for professional 
sports leagues, because subjective expectations (probability distributions) by individuals 
will create (subjective) rankings. 
Perfect competitive dominance occurs when every team is certain (i. e. unit probability) 
of beating every weaker team in every season. For a single season, this would imply that 
the strongest team wins all its matches, the next strongest team wins all of its matches 
apart from the matches against the strongest team, and so on. The weakest team loses all 
of its matches (see, for example, Utt and Fort, 2002 and their references). In respect to 
performance persistence, the same pattern of outcomes is repeated season after season. 
This means that, when in the case of perfect competitive dominance, the strongest team 
has a unit probability of winning the championship every season (Szymanski, 2001). 
2.5. Measures of Competitive Balance in a Simple League Context 
Empirical analyses of competitive balance have always been a relevant part of the 
literature. The studies are related to both general overviews of changes in competitive 
balance over time in single leagues, as well as comparisons to other leagues (see. for 
example, Quirk and Fort, 1992; Gerrard, 2004b). A number of studies have analysed the 
effects on competitive balance of changes in institutional rules (see, for example, Fort 
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and Quirk, 1995) and the relationship between competitive balance and attendance (see. 
for example, Schmidt and Berri, 2001). 
A key topic in the literature is how to measure competitive balance. This concern is of 
course driven by the importance of quantifying competitive balance for empirical 
analysis, but also by the difficulties of finding adequate measures, in part due to the 
complexity and conceptual difficulties described in the previous sections. As a 
consequence of the multi-dimensional complexity, it seems impossible to construct one 
perfect measure of competitive balance. However, there still seem to be many sport 
economists trying to find the perfect measure of competitive balance. This thesis adopts 
the position that there is no perfect single measure of competitive balance. In this 
section, the wide range of measures of competitive balance will be treated in the context 
of a simple league system using the three dimensions of win dispersion, performance 
persistence and prize concentration. Using a multi-dimensional approach recognises the 
warning by Szymanski (2003b) that many measures, such as the seasonal standard 
deviation, do not capture the dynamics of competitive balance over time. In addition to 
the one-dimensional measures presented below, Eckard (1998,2001) and Humphreys 
(2002) have constructed measures combining two dimensions - win dispersion and 
performance persistence (see also Eckard, 2003). These measures combine "dynamic" 
changes over time and the "static" within-season win dispersion in a single measure. 
2.5.1. Win Dispersion 
Measures of win dispersion can be seen as measures of the second moment of a 
distribution. Several are based on the dispersion of sporting outcomes among the teams 
in a league. Such measures have been used both for competitive balance and uncertainty 
of outcome at the tournament level (i. e. seasonal uncertainty of outcome). 
50 The basis 
for these measures is the dispersion of outcome, as suggested by Rottenberg (1956). 
51 
Generally, competitive balance improves if the win dispersion narrows. 
`° Since uncertainty of outcome and competitive balance have some common points, a number of the 
measures presented as competitive balance measures can originally ha\ e been constructed in the context 
of uncertainty of outcome. 
`' Rottenberg (1956, p. 246): "The dispersion of percentages of games won by the teams in the league". 
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One group of win dispersion measures is related to statistical measures of win ratio 
dispersion. The range is the simplest, and takes only into account the two extremes - 
the best and the weakest teams' performance - and ignores performance by the 
intermediate teams (Quirk and Fort, 1992). This measure is also used by Borland (1987) 
and Lee (2004). An alternative measure is the interquartile range. This is the 
difference between the first and the third quartile, but again only part of the distribution 
of outcome information is taken into account. 
The next measures of win dispersion are based on dispersion of outcome (standard 
deviation/variance) for all teams in the league. Rottenberg (1956) and Jones (1969) 
obviously focus on the general distribution of outcome among all teams. The first 
researchers to explicitly use of the variance of performance measure were Borland 
(1987) and Cairns (1987). 53 Compared to the range, a general advantage with these 
measures is that they reflect the competitive situation for all teams. The formal 
definition of variance in the case of win dispersion is: 
0- `= 
2: (w, 
-0.5)' 
N-1 
where w; is the win ratio for team i, and N is the total number of teams in the league. In 
the case of the simple league context, the average win ratio (tiiý) is 0.5. There might be a 
discussion whether the denominator should include a reduction in the degree of freedom 
or not. In the purpose of summary statistics, reduction of the denominator is not 
necessary, because the average win ratio in the simple league context is known. 
However, in the context of calculating a level of competitive balance, the purpose is 
inferential, so it can be used to compare competitive balance either across seasons in 
own league and/or other leagues. Sporting contests and tournaments are stochastic 
because they involve random and unexplained variation. It is, hence, conventional to 
use N-1, as is also consistent with the literature. 
51 It can also be called semi-interquartile range, as in Copeland et al. (2005). 
Dernmert ( 19731) also considers the variance on %% inning percentages among the teams. However, this 
measure had a different purpose than win dispersion, as it was aimed to be a measure for the intensity of 
pennant race in a demand study for the \ILB. Because it considered the weaker teams (out of the race) 
too much, it was omitted from the final demand equations. 
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Usually, the dispersion is reported in the terms of standard deviation, such as in Scully 
(1989) : 54 
(w; 
-0,5)2 
. =ý 
N-1 
Even in the simple league context, there is a problem in comparing competitive balance 
between leagues with different numbers of teams. Scully (1989, p. 89) claims that 
different numbers of matches between seasons might affect the "expected" standard 
deviation. "The fewer number of games played between contestants, the more likely is 
the impact of random factors in the outcomes. " In other words, measures based on 
summary statistics might be difficult to apply when comparing tournaments of different 
numbers of teams and matches, since many of these measures are dependent both on 
unit and number of observations. Therefore, it is suggested that one standardises 
summary statistics in relation to a given benchmark. In the context of competitive 
balance, this has usually meant calculating the ratio of actual (absolute) measure of 
competitive balance relative to the value of that measure in the ideal case of perfect 
competitive balance. 
This is what is done in the most popular measure of competitive balance, based on end- 
of-season outcomes, and designated in this thesis as the NSQF ratio. 55 The suggested 
name of the measure is related both to Quirk and Fort (1992) as the first to apply the 
measure, but also to Noll (1988) and Scully (1989), since the measures is, as 
emphasised in Quirk and Fort, "suggested by Noll (1988) and applied by Scully (1989)" 
(p. 244). However, a number of names have been used in the literature. Fort (2007) 
makes it clear that the measure is developed by Noll and Scully, and emphasises that it 
therefore should not only be referring to Quirk and Fort (1992). Even if Fort (2007) 
follows Lee and Fort (2005) applying the name RSD (ratio of standard deviation), this 
thesis prefers using the names behind the measure, because this will reduce the 
probability of confusion. This competitive balance measure is constructed on basis of an 
idealized standard deviation, calculated using perfect ex ante competitive balance as the 
ý' For transformation of the standard deviation measure into a zero to one scale, where perfect dominance 
is reflected by zero and perfect competitive balance is equal to unit, see Groot (2008). 
55 This measure is the most popular indicator of competitive balance in the North American literature (e. g. 
Szymanski, 2001; Dobson and Goddard, 2001 
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comparative benchmark. This measure takes account of differences between leagues as 
regards the number of teams and matches. The NSQF ratio is defined as follows: 
NSQF ratio = 
Actual standard deviation 
Idealized standard deviation 
(tit' -0.5), 
ASD 
ISD 0,5 
V-M 
where m is the number of league matches per team during the season. ý6 Expressing the 
actual standard deviation (ASD) as a ratio of the idealized standard deviation (ISD) 
provides a basis for comparing the degree of competitive balance in different leagues. 57 
Goossens (2006) uses a different type of benchmark, when constructing the N1 ISI 
(National Measure of Seasonal Imbalance) as her proposed measure of competitive 
balance. Rather than applying the idealized competitive balance (as a measure of perfect 
competitive balance), she uses the opposite polar situation of perfect competitive 
dominance as the benchmark. 
Another group of win dispersion measures uses only part of the win ratio distribution 
and compares the actual dispersion of a specified portion of the win ratio distribution 
with the theoretical idealised dispersion for that portion. The most common form of this 
type of measure is the excess tail frequency of the win ratio distribution (Quirk and Fort, 
1992; Fort and Quirk, 1995; Lee, 2004). Excess tail frequency is the difference in the 
actual number of observations in the tail of the win ratio dispersion and the idealised 
number of observations that would be expected lie in that tail under conditions of 
perfect competitive balance. Lee and Fort (2005) and Fort and Lee (2007) apply this 
measure in a logarithmic variant, called LTL, the Log of the Tail Likelihood. Weaker 
competitive balance may be reflected in excess tail frequencies both at the top of the 
league and the bottom of the league. 
Gerrard (1998) constructs a concentration ratio, -ý8 comparing the actual k-team 
concentration ratio for top k teams with the idealized concentration ratio for the same 
number of teams if every team had a xvin ratio of 0.5 (in a simple league context). 
"' Down%%ard and Dawson (2000, p. 63) show how to measure the idealized standard deviation using a 
binomial model. 
'D and ISD are used in Fort (2007). The short forms A", 
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Based on a five-firm concentration ratio from the "standard industry". Nlichie and 
Oughton (2004) apply a five-club concentration ratio (C5 Ratio) in European football. 
In a simple league context, this equates to the CR(5) used by Gerrard (1998). Adjusted 
for the number of teams in the league (division), Michie and Oughton extend the 
formula to give the Index of Competitive Balance (C5ICB): 
C51CB = 
C5 Ratio * 100 
where the C5 Ratio, in the simple league case, can be defined as the share of wins by the 
top five teams as a ratio of the total number of wins in the league. 
Koning (2000) measures the concentration ratio by comparing the actual performance 
by the top k teams with the theoretical best attainable performance by these k teams 
(and similar to the notion of perfect competitive dominance used in Goossens, 2006). 59 
Also Goossens and Kesenne (2007) measure concentration of the k better teams (big 
market teams). They measure the difference in aggregated win percent for the top k 
(large) teams and their theoretical minimum win percent, as a share of the difference 
between their theoretical aggregated maximum and minimum win percent. 
Alternatively, the concentration ratio can be reported as a ratio for the weakest teams, 
where relatively small concentration of wins among these teams can reflect weaker 
competitive balance in the league. 
Win dispersion can also be measured on basis of measures focusing on the level of 
inequality between the observed win ratios. Depken (1999, p. 207) refers to a number 
of industrial studies measuring concentration and relative "competitiveness", citing 
Kamerschen and Lam (1975) as a general overview of such measures. Depken (1999, 
2002) defines the Het. findahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as: 
HHI=L(. tLc, )2 
`' The model is originally based on it point score model. 
. The model is originally based on it point score model. 
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where MS; is the market share of the i`h firm on a scale of 0 to 1. 
In the context of professional team sports and competitive balance. MS, can be treated 
as team i's number of wins as a share of total number of wins in the league (Depken, 
1999; Downward and Dawson, 2000). As emphasised in these references, HHI is 
sensitive to the number of teams in the league. Perfect HHI is I/N. where Ni the total 
number of teams in the league. Depken (1999) uses actual HHI minus idealized HHI 
(see also Eckard, 2001), and defines: 
N 2*wins, Z 
dHHI = HHI - 1/N =-- 
; _, 
N*m N 
Downward and Dawson (2000) measure a "modified Herfindahl Index (MH I )" as: 
MHI=N*HHI 
A similar measure is used by Michie and Oughton (2004) for leagues with a point score 
system. Converting the measure to a simple league context is done by multiplying the 
MHI by 100. 
Instead of using perfect competitive balance as the benchmark, Gerrard (2004b) uses 
perfect competitive domination. Gerrard measures the Herfindahl index on the 
concentration of the top four teams, adjusted for maximum possible Herfindahl index, 
which is 0.25, if the same teams have top four finishes every season. 
Entropy, is a measure used for uncertainty in information theory, and is applied in the 
context of competitive balance by Horowitz (1997), measuring relative entropy as the 
actual (absolute) level of entropy standardised by maximum entropy. Gini coefficients 
(and Lorenz-curie, "') are widely used as "conventional economic measure of 
inequality" (Schmidt and Berri, 2001, p. 147), for example as indicators of the 
distribution of wages. They are also relevant in the context of professional team sports. 
The Gini coefficient, for example, is used by Gerrard (1998), Schmidt (2001) and 
Schmidt and Berri (2001) as a measure of within season competitive balance. The 
important clarification in Utt and Fort (2002) about the peculiarity of professional team 
N" See, for e aniplc, \tichie and Oughton (2004). 
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sports should be noted when it comes to measures of perfect competitive domination on 
seasonal level. Since any individual team can only win its own matches and hence 
cannot win every match played in the league, perfect competitive dominance cannot be 
treated in the same way as pure monopoly and measured as a unit "market share" of 
wins. The same holds for the HHI measure (Depken, 1999). 61 Utt and Fort (2002) point 
out that Fort and Quirk (1997) avoided this problem by benchmarking against perfect 
competitive dominance in the win dispersion dimension. This adjusted Gini coefficient 
is illustrated in Utt and Fort (2002, p. 370). 62 It is also applied in analyses of the NFL by 
Larsen et al. (2006). 
By ranking each team in a league, Haugen (2008) measures the aggregated squared 
differences between the theoretical score for each team in a perfect competitive 
dominance situation and their actual score, as a percent of the aggregated squared score 
differences between perfect competitive dominance and perfect competitive balance for 
this league. 63 
Different variants of games behind the leader (winner) measures are common among 
the early contributions in the field of the economics of professional team sports 
(Davenport, 1969; Demmert, 1973; Noll, 1974; Balfour and Porter, 1991; Ross and 
Lucke, 1997). Instead of using games behind the leader (winner), the degree of 
competitive balance can be indicated by simply focussing on measures of the 
performance of the best team (see, for example, Gerrard, 2004b; Groot, 2008). 
A recent contribution by Groot (2008) is the surprise index, measuring the realized 
surprise points as a ratio of the maximum number of surprise points. The surprise points 
are measured on basis of the results within the season, where the level of surprise 
increases with the distance in the end-of-season rank, when a weaker team wins against 
a stronger team. 64 
The measures above are all ex post measures (that might be used as a basis for the ex 
ante measure for season t+l ). There are no published examples of measures of ex ante 
61 See also Larsen et al. (2006) for discussions of HHI in the context of the discussion in Utt and Fort 
(2002) related to the Gini coefficient of perfect competitive dominance in a sports league. 
62 See Utt and Fort (2002, p. 371) for further discussions about the Gini coefficient, the adjusted Gini 
coefficient and the NSQF ratio. 
63 The measure is originally based on a three outcome point score system. 
"4 See chapter 3 in Groot for more about this measure. Originally, it is based on a three outcome system. 
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competitive balance for Kin dispersion. Player salary budgets and betting odds prior to 
the tournament are examples of the type of information sources that could be used to 
calculate ex ante competitive balance. Garcia and Rodriguez (2002, p. 10) use budget 
data in a demand function for football, related to both teams at the beginning of the 
season, ".... because they depend, among other things, on the salaries of the players, 
which should proxy their productivity". 65 Following up the discussion in Chapter 2.3.1, 
given unbiased betting odds, these should reflect market expectations of which team 
will win the championship providing a possible source of data to estimate ex ante 
competitive balance. Another possibility is to use measures based on calculated total 
quality index (TQI) (Gerrard, 2001,2004a). The TQI is an index for team quality based 
on the player quality index (PQI), which is again based on a player's age, career total 
league games, career total goals scored, previous season appearances (number of ganzes 
started, number of games as substitute, goals scored), and international recognition (hill 
caps, U-2 1, last appearance). The estimation must be done before every season. This 
measure also takes into account players who changed teams the previous season 
(transfer date and the date for being able to play for the new club must be available). On 
basis of the TQI and eventually other relevant information, such as match schedule in a 
complex league context, one could predict the league outcome for the season ex ante 
level, i. e. ex ante competitive balance. 
2.5.2. Performance Persistence 
Apart from the dispersion of championship winners, early researchers in the economics 
of professional team sports were little concerned with performance persistence. This is 
reflected in the measures of competitive balance most commonly used. As Eckard 
(1998,2001) points out, the variance in team performance from year to year in the 
league is not captured at all by measures such as the NSQF ratio. 
Performance persistence concerns team performance over time, specifically the 
correlation from season to season, or as Scully (1995) calls momentum in sports. Daly 
and Moore (1981) and Balfour and Porter (1991) provide the first attempts to measure 
performance persistence. Daly and Moore (1981) apply the Spearman 's rank 
`'` In a related footnote, Garcia and Rodriguez (22002) refer to Falter and 
Pcrignon (2000), including this 
kind of variable in a demand study. 
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correlation coefficient (SRCC) as a measure for testing changes in performance 
persistence in relation to introduction of free agency in the MLB. The following 
formula can be used: 
N 
dr 2 
(a1, 
- ai, r-I / 
SRCC=1- =1- i-' ,, NN--1 N (V -1 
where (a;,, - a;, t_, ) represents the difference in ranking for team number i on basis of 
performance in season t-1 and season t, and N is the total number of teams. This 
measure is also applied by Maxcy (2002) and Maxcy and Mondello (2006). 
Another measure for rank correlation coefficient is the Kendall's T, 66 which is applied in 
the context of professional team sports by Groot (2008). According to Groot, Kendall's 
i can for example be written like this: 
2(P-Q) 
N(N-1) 
where P is the number of concordant pairs and Q is the number of disconcordant pairs. 
Given an order based on the rank between the teams in season t- 1, the number of 
concordant pairs in season t is those in a natural order, and opposite for disconcordant 
pairs. 67 
Balfour and Porter (1991) calculate the correlation of teams' win percentage in season t 
with season t-l, t-2 and t-3. Significant correlations between team performance across 
seasons are interpreted as evidence of weaker competitive balance. Butler (1995) also 
uses correlation coefficients, but only considers first-order correlation between team's 
win percentages in two consecutive seasons. Gerrard (1998) uses correlation of league 
rankings and win percentages. 
"" I use t instead of t, as in Groot, because it will not o\ erlap with notations of other measures in this 
thesis. 
"' Following Noether (1981), a pair is concordant (disconcordant) when X, -X, and Yi-Y; have the same 
(opposite) sign, ; -, i\ en that (\,. Y, ) and (\ Yj) are "a pair of (bivariate) observations" (p. 41). Further, ,, cc 
chapter 1.4 in Groot for calculating Kendall's t between the first and the second season of the English top 
division (which had the same teams competing both seasons). 
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La Croix and Kawaura (1999) compare average win percentages over periods and relate 
persistence to changes between periods. For example. a low average win percentage in 
one period followed by a higher average in the next period might reflect an 
improvement in competitive balance. 
Vrooman (1996) and Szymanski and Schmidt (2002) both use autoregressive regression 
models, measuring the relationship between team performance (win percentage) in one 
season (t) with that in the previous (t-1) season using data from several seasons. Ross 
and Lucke (1997) also apply an autoregressive model but of a higher order (t-2 and t-3). 
A number of measures are related to variation in performance across seasons. Gerrard 
(1998) measures teams ' average position change and average absolute win ratio 
change. In constructing two-dimensional measures, both Eckard (1998,2001) and 
Humphreys (2002) use between-season competitive balance as a component of their 
measures for competitive balance. The measure proposed by Eckard (1998,2001) uses 
each team's variance over time against its average winning percentage, while 
Humphreys (2002), as a part of his CBR (competitive balance ratio), in practice follows 
Eckard, but uses a standard deviation approach (Eckard. 2003). Scully (1995) 
calculates the coefficient of variance on basis of historical winning percentage for single 
teams over time, and next across these teams for the league. 
Performance persistency among teams in sports might also be measured using methods 
applied to strategic groups and mobility barriers in studies of industrial organisation. 
Gerrard (1998) applies the M-index (originally proposed by Feigenbaum and Primeaux, 
1983) to English football. Gerrard (1998) defines five different strategic groups for the 
English top division. The different groups are defined on the basis of standard 
deviations from the mean win ratio. The D-index is another measure of mobility 
(Gerrard, 1998). In general, the D-index measures the degree of change in market share 
over time. For English football, Gerrard measures the degree of change in win ratios 
from the previous season. 
Looking at the level of performance from year to year, Gerrard (1998) anticipates that in 
a league with high level of competitive balance, "teams are less able to persistently 
achieve high levels of team performance" (p. 5). In other words, competitive balance 
can be reflected in the p t'r/ormance level of the best teams from Year to tear. If they 
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typically reproduce high performance season after season, it might be an indication of 
weak competitive balance. Hence analysis of the performance of the best teams over 
time might say something about trends in competitive balance. Gerrard (1998) defines, 
teams with win ratios greater than one standard deviation above the mean as high 
performing teams. 
Ross and Lucke (1997) measure the coefficient of variation on basis of what they cal l 
the incidence of competitive teams, where competitive teams are five or less games 
behind the winner. During a period of T seasons, the number of seasons each team can 
be called competitive is counted. These numbers are averaged over all teams, and 
standard deviation is calculated. The coefficient of variation is computed by dividing 
this standard deviation on the average. If perfect (ex post) competitive balance, the 
coefficient of variation is zero. Further, Ross and Lucke (1997, p. 662) count the 
number of teams going from performing "bad to good" and "good to bad". Good 
performing teams are defined as either five or fewer games behind the winner, or as ten 
or fewer games behind the winner. They standardize this measure, comparing the actual 
number over a given period with the total number of teams (i. e. the percentage of 
"counts"). 
Other studies count the number of teams achieving a top k outcome during aT season 
interval. In a simple league context, the top k outcome is required to be less than N, 
where N is the total number of teams (that continuously participate) in the league. 
Szymanski (2001) uses k=3,5 and 10, and T=3 and 7. Buzzacchi et al. (2003) count 
the number of teams that enter the top five over longer periods (10,20,30,40 and 50 
seasons) and develop a Gini type index related to the actual number of teams that 
capture a top k rank over a given period of time, relative to the idealized number. In the 
simple league context, the idealized number can be calculated by their closed league 
model. 68 One could also convert the measures Eckard (1998) and Sutter and Winkler 
(2003) use on college football (NCAA) in North-America to a simple league context by 
counting the number of teams to be ranked at top k over a given period of time, and 
next, calculate the concentration of top k teams by a HHI measure. Moreover, following 
Eckard and Sutter and Winkler, averaging seasonal entn"/re-entry in the k rank could be 
calculated for an interval of T seasons, where entry/re-entry in the top k rank is defined 
for teams that have not reached this outcome over the last five seasons. 
68 For description of this model. sec Buzzacchi et at. (2003) p. 176. 
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There are also a number of measures of performance over time that are only based on 
long-run averages. Hence, these measures say nothing about variations between 
seasons, and cannot therefore be seen as measures of performance persistence. 
However, if a team has a relatively low or high average win percentage, this might 
indicate high performance persistence. Examples of this kind of measure can be found 
in Quirk and Fort (1992) who calculate the distribution of lifetime i0nn percent, 
summarizing each team's win percent over T seasons, and then divide by T. They also 
measure standard deviation of the lifetime win percent. and compare the actual 
standard deviation with an idealized standard deviation. Eckard (1998,2001) measures 
the variance of the teams' cumulative win percentage oi'cr a given period of time. 
2.5.3. Prize Concentration 
In a simple league context, prize concentration is the concentration of championship 
winners. Several of the measures of win dispersion can also be used to measure the 
concentration of championship winners, such as Lorenz curves (see, for example, Quirk 
and Fort, 1992; Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999), Gini coefficients (Quirk and Fort, 1992, 
Fort and Quirk, 1995) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (Gerrard, 2004b). Further, 
Eckard (1998,2001) uses the relative Herfindahl-Hirschman index to calculate the 
concentration of championship winners. Eckard (2001) measures the championship 
concentration, defining the team with the highest win percentage in the regular season 
as the champion. Eckard calculates the relative HHI as Actual HHI minus Expected 
HHI with Expected HHI calculated on the basis of every team having an equal 
probability of winning the championship every season. 
Other measures of prize concentration include counting the number of'championships 
for selected teams (Rottenberg, 1956) or all teams in the league (Quirk and Fort, 1992). 
Further, championship winners can be calculated as the share of either the number of 
years in the league (Quirk and Fort, 1992) or over a given number of seasons (e. ". 
Szymanski and Kuypers. 1999; Gerrard, 2004b). Buzzacchi et at. (2003) first count the 
number of different teams gaining the highest Win percentage in any individual season 
over a given period of time, and then calculate a Gini type index. Dobson and Goddard 
(2001) use a measure of championship concentration based on the distribution of 
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championship points with three points for winning the championship, two points for 
second place and one point for finishing in third position. 
; 1) 
3. Competitive Balance in a Complex League Context 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 showed that even in the simple league context competitive balance is 
multidimensional. This chapter focuses on a real-world approach to league structures in 
the context of competitive balance. In general, these leagues are more complex than the 
league systems presented in Chapter 2. At least four main issues have to be taken into 
account when looking at differences between a simple league and more complex league 
systems. These are that rankings are not only based on matches won, that leagues might 
have a match schedule other than the (pure) round-robin system, that leagues consist of 
more than a regular season tournament, and the promotion and relegation system. 
One of the characteristics of actual league systems is that they are generally multi-prize 
structures, which has significant implications for the notion of competitive balance. In 
this respect, the concept of competitive intensity will be introduced. This concept is one 
of the key outcomes of this thesis and is introduced to allow for the impact of the prize 
structure on the degree of competition in a sports league. The level of competitive 
intensity for a specified league is affected by institutional changes in league structures, 
such as changes in promotion and relegation mechanisms and qualification to UEFA's 
European club tournaments (i. e. the UEFA Champions League and the UEFA Cup). 
The first part of this chapter will focus on the most typical elements that differ from a 
simple league system. The second part is based on prizes and competitiveness, 
including the concept of competitive intensity, and examines how the prize structure 
influences competitive balance. 
3.2. Relegation-Promotion Systems 
One of the assumptions in the simple league context is a closed league with the same 
teams competing against each other season after season. However, the team 
composition of real-world leagues tends to change over time due to reductions and 
expansions in the number of teams, as well as changes resulting from the relegation- 
promotion system. 
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The open league, organised as a merit hierarchy system with promotion and relegation, 
is an important aspect of the organization of many European team sports (see, for 
example, Szymanski and Ross, 2000). 69 A report from the European Commission (1998, 
p. 4) states that "the system of promotion and relegation is one of the key features of the 
European model of sport". 70 This way of organising team sports in Europe, where the 
best teams move up and the weakest teams move down the hierarchy on basis of 
sporting performance (even though exceptions happen through relegation as a 
consequence of administrative punishment), will lead to a natural hierarchy, where the 
best teams will operate in the top division, while weaker teams will "find" their place 
further down in the hierarchic system. 71 It also allows the possibility for newly 
established teams to enter at the lowest level and then be promoted to a higher level on 
the basis of sporting achievement. In principle, a team established today, starting at the 
lowest division in its domestic league, could, after a number of promotions, eventually 
qualify and win the UEFA Champions League. In this system it is difficult, even 
impossible, for teams to claim monopoly control over its territorial area. Noll (2002) 
emphasises that neither the Football League nor the Football Association in England 
recognize territorial rights. However, for both of these arguments, promotion and 
relegation systems are not necessarily the only requirements. For example, the 
professional league system in English football has a relegation and promotion system 
within the four tiers (open league), but earlier it was nearly closed when it came to 
automatic promotion into the English Football League from the next tier in the football 
pyramid. For example, Noll (2002) shows that the Football League in England was 
effectively a closed league between 1932 and 1950 with no team relegated from the 
72 bottom division (i. e. Division 4) during that period. 
The NAML are closed with changes in league composition only occurring by agreement 
of the current teams. 73 League memberships (and expansions) are "determined by the 
award of franchises" (Dobson and Goddard, 2004, p. 361), or as "the gift of the existing 
69 Andreff and Staudohar (2002, p. 39) use the expression "unique to European leagues". However, 
promotion and relegation is for example also a part of football in Latin-American leagues. 
° See www. sport-in-europe. com/SIU/HTML/PDFFiles/EuropeanModelofSport. pdf. This is also 
emphasised in the 2004 Magazine for education and culture in Europe about the European Union and 
Sport (ec. europa. eu/dgs/education_culture/publ/pdf/mag/23/en. pdf). 
71 Fort (2000) claims that the system for franchise movements creates the same output in the NAML. 
72 See chapter two in Dobson and Goddard (2001) for more information about teams entering the English 
Football League. 
73 Fort (2000) argues that US College football has a relegation and promotion system, beside that 
qualification and not qualification for playoff could be regarded as a promotion and relegation form. 
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members" (Szymanski and Ross, 2000, p. 2). The NAML represent the highest level in 
a fixed hierarchy. 74 
Compared to a simple league, a promotion and relegation system will have three direct 
implications on competitive balance. First, on basis of sporting and financial incentive 
effects, is it hypothesised that, ceteris paribus, win dispersion will be better. Second, the 
turnover in league composition over time creates complications for comparisons of 
measures of cross-seasonal competitive balance. Third, the real-world complexity 
creates of the need to produce additional measures of competitive balance beyond those 
needed for the simple league context. 
The key factor, when analysing differences between closed and open leagues, with 
regards to win dispersion, is the sporting incentives for weaker teams, and hence also 
financial effects. Relegation has, in general, both sporting and financial disadvantages 
compared to continuing in the (top) division. It is expected that the various stakeholders 
in a professional sports team, such as fans, owners, players, coaches etc., gain higher 
(sporting) utility from participating in the highest level division. Generally, the financial 
effects from relegation are expected to be negative due to reductions in the general level 
of gate attendances and the lower value of broadcasting and other image rights. 75 In a 
share price event study, Dobson and Goddard (2001) estimate the impact on English 
football teams of relegation and promotion. On average, they find that the next trading 
day's share price increases by about 22.5 percent if a team gains promotion to, or avoids 
relegation from, the FA Premier League. There is an average downward price 
adjustment of 15.6 percent when teams are relegated or fail to win promotion. The 
greater the financial difference between the tiers in a merit hierarchy, the stronger the 
expected incentive effects on team performance. 
76 
Even weaker teams that are out of contention for the championship have incentives to 
improve their ability to win matches in an open league (see, for example, Noll, 2003: 
Szymanski, 2003b: Szymanski and Ross, 2000). Szymanski (2004) claims that the open 
-' This might be helped by franchise movement or threatening about moving. The financial strongest area 
will attract the teams in the NANIL. and hence bring the major leagues into the highest level (sec Fort, 
2000). 
Ho\\e\er. Noll (2002) shows that this is not necessarily supported empirically, applying data from the 
English FA Premier League (and First Division) from the 1990s. 
tics, for example. Deloitte (& Touche) reports (such as the Deloitte & Touche annual re\ le\% of football 
finance August 000). 
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league system will "reduce the variance of within-season win percentages" (p. 32), and 
relates this to calculations of NSQF ratio by Kipker (2000), Forrest and Simmons 
(2002), and Szymanski (2003b). This ratio "seems much smaller in European soccer" 
(p. 32). Further, Noll (2002, p. 173) uses a "simplified model of a sports league, which 
is initially developed by El-Hodiri and Quirk (1974)", and shows that "the equilibrium 
spread in team quality in the top league is lower than it would be in a league of the same 
teams with fixed membership" (p. 175). This happens because teams in an open league, 
in which the higher division is more profitable, will, in general, seek higher quality than 
in fixed (closed) leagues. Therefore, one would, according to Noll (2002), expect win 
dispersion in the open top divisions in European football to be better than in the closed 
NAML, ceteris paribus. 
In addition to the incentive effects, open leagues might, through their dynamics, also 
achieve better win dispersion compared to closed leagues (in a simple league context) as 
a consequence of the weakest team(s) continually being replaced by the potentially 
stronger team(s) from the second level. As long as the promoted teams are stronger than 
the relegated teams, the dynamic will improve competitive balance at the top division, 
ceteris paribus. 
According to the general quality of leagues, this might have consequences for the 
expected win dispersion difference between open and closed (in a simple league 
context) leagues. According to Noll (2002), a system with extremely lucrative 
international matches, such as the UEFA Champions League, should adopt a relegation 
and promotion system. This fact is concluded by Noll (2002): 
Hence, it makes sense to adopt a system that, all else equal, produces stronger teams. 
Thus, adoption of promotion/relegation is much like an arms race: Conceivable, all 
teams and top leagues would be better off without it, but once one nation adopts the 
system, the others have a financial incentive to follow. 
Szymanski and Ross (2000) also emphasise the quality effect, and claim that a reason 
for this is that open league teams have greater incentives to invest in quality players 
than teams in a closed league. Further, they argue that better competition in the open 
league will increase consumer welfare compared to a closed league. However, it can be 
questioned if higher quality among the better teams only is driven by the relegation and 
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promotion system above some threshold, if it is only the very high expected payoffs for 
better teams in post-seasonal tournament that provide sufficient incentives for 
investment in high quality squads. 
Noll (2002) finds hypothetical departures from the expected win dispersion 
"advantages" for open leagues. One is the case of a promoted team that merely seeks to 
capture the temporary economic rent from membership of a higher quality league 
without investing in the higher playing quality required to have a realistic prospect of 
maintaining the team's status in the higher division. Such a team is likely to increase the 
degree of win dispersion in the higher division. Another is that if the top division 
consists of all the best teams, the promoted teams will, by definition, be weaker than the 
relegated teams, and hence will increase win dispersion. Note that these effects will 
only be temporary, since one would expect the relegated team(s) to be promoted the 
following season (or the promoted team improves its playing squad to be competitive). 
The literature77 comparing open leagues to closed leagues suggests that as well as 
having higher playing quality (see, for example, Noll, 2002; Szymanski and Ross, 
2000), open leagues are likely to be weaker financially due to higher wage costs for the 
less competitive teams. 78 In addition, open leagues tend to have a smaller top division 
(Noll, 2002). 79 Some argue (see, for example, Andreff and Staudohar, 2002) that a 
cross-subsidisation policy in closed leagues is potentially more able to distribute 
revenues equally among the teams. However, the promotion and relegation system in 
European leagues does not necessarily preclude product and labour market restrictions 
although the incentives for the bigger teams in the bigger leagues to be competitive in 
the UEFA tournaments militate against such restrictions. Extensive cross-subsidisation 
is more likely in the smaller European football leagues. Sweden, for example, had a 
uniform distribution of revenues from broadcasting deals. 
Promotion and relegation has an impact on uncertainty of outcome (see, for example, 
Sloane, 1971; Jennett, 1984; Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999). This is due to the 
According to Noll (2002) there has been little research on this field, mentioning only the ýýork by Hall 
ct al. (2002) and Sly manski and Ross (2000). Fort (2000) claims that many of the institutional differences 
between the structure in European and North American team sports are small in real. 
Noll (2003. p. 550): "... promotion and relegation s stem probably reduces profits, especially among 
the best teams in the top league. Promotion and relegation increase the value of the best players to teams 
that are in battle for either promotion or relegation. " 
° This is also claimed in Szymanski (2001b). 
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increased degree of match significance as well as the improvement in the win dispersion 
created by the incentive effects for weaker teams competing to avoid relegation. 
Szymanski (2004, p. 32) claims that a system with relegation and promotion also 
"... promotes uncertainty". 
The above arguments on the competitive balance effects of promotion and relegation are 
mainly concerned with the win dispersion dimension. There has been little focus on the 
effects of performance persistence from the relegation and promotion system, other than 
as suggested explanations of empirical results (Szymanski and Smith, 2002: Buzzacchi 
et al., 2003). Intuitively, weaker teams might reduce their probability of relegation by 
over investing in players and operating with a wage-revenue share above a viable limit. 
In other words, such teams "play lotto" where the prize is to stay in the division and the 
downside is to be relegated with financial problems. This type of behaviour is likely to 
increase the volatility of team performance over time, and hence reduce performance 
persistence. 
Implications for Existing Competitive Balance Measures 
The NSQF ratio can be applied in an open league system, without modification, because 
the measure is only related to within season outcomes, and is hence not tracking the 
performance of specific teams across seasons. Since this measure allows for changes in 
the number of matches played in the league, it is robust to expansions and reductions in 
the number of teams in the league over time. It can therefore both be used to compare 
competitive balance across leagues and within leagues over time. On the other hand, 
there are major difficulties in measuring performance persistence and prize 
concentration in a multi-divisional open league as teams move between divisions and 
may compete for different prizes in different seasons. Measuring prize concentration in 
lower divisions is particularly difficult since, by definition, winning the prize (i. e. 
promotion) means that the team will not be competing for that particular prize in the 
following season. This is one reason why studies of competitive balance in European 
football have tended to focus only on the top tier. The general problem of converting, 
closed league competitive balance measures to open leagues is the higher frequency of 
alternation of teams in the top division in an open league. In addition, relegated teams 
move into a "new" division. Directly transferring competitive balance measures applied 
in closed leagues, especially performance persistence measures, to open leagues, can 
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hence be inappropriate. For example, the components of the measures by Eckard (1998. 
2001) and Humphreys (2002) relating to performance variation for a given team over 
time are very difficult to transform for use in open league systems. 
Both Spearman 's rank correlation coefficient (SRCC) and the Kendall 's rare based on 
the continuous participation of the same teams in a repeated tournament. They therefore 
have to be modified in a system with relegation and promotion (see also Groot, 2008). 
For a given season, they measure the correlation between the current and previous 
season rankings. In a closed league (without expansions/reductions), the teams 
competing in the previous season (t-1) are exactly the same as in the current season (t). 
On the other hand, in an open league system, a number of the teams at the bottom of the 
standings at the end of previous season are replaced by promoted teams prior to start of 
the current season. Because of the changes in divisional team composition across 
seasons, these measures must be modified for application in open leagues. One 
approach is to replace the teams relegated at the end of the previous season by the 
promoted teams in the rankings of top division for the previous season. This approach is 
illustrated in the following example, using a ten team league with the bottom two teams 
automatically relegated at the end of each season: 
Season t-1 
Top Division 
1. Team 1 
2. Team 2 
8. Team 8 
9. Team 9- Relegated 
10. Team 10 - Relegated 
Second-Level Division 
1. Team A- Promoted 
2. Team B- Promoted 
Modified season t-1 
1. Team 1 
2. Team 2 
8. Team 8 
9. Team A- Promoted 
10. Team B- Promoted 
For each season, for example the SRCC is calculated as the correlation between the end- 
of-season rankings in the current season, with the modified rankings for the previous 
season with the newly promoted teams treated as if they had finished bottom of the top 
ISIO division in the previous season. ` However, promotion and relegation procedures differ 
"' I prcfer this ex ante ranking of the promoted teams instead of using the cx post procedure in Groot 
(2008). Groot's internal rankings between the promoted teams (from season t-1) are a function of the final 
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between leagues (as well as within leagues over time). The worked example above is 
only applicable to leagues with automatic relegation. Some leagues, such as the 
Norwegian, use a combination system with the bottom two teams relegated 
automatically but the third bottom team qualifies for a relegation/promotion playoff 
together with the third best team from the second level division. If the league above has 
a similar system, the example above can be modified as follows: 
Top Division 
8. Team 8- Play-Off 
9. Team 9- Relegated 
10. Team 10 - Relegated 
Second-Level Division 
1. Team A- Promoted 
2. Team B- Promoted 
3. Team C- Play-Off 
If the third team in the second-level division wins the relegation promotion playoff, it is 
suggested that this team is treated as the lowest ranked team in the modified season t-1 
rankings: 
8. Team A- Promoted 
9. Team B- Promoted 
10. Team C- Promoted via Play-Off 
An alternative method to deal with the relegation and promotion system in the 
calculation of for example the SRCC is to eliminate the promoted team(s) in the(ir) first 
season in the top division. 
Expansions and reductions of teams in an open league can also be dealt with by both of 
the alternative methods above. It might be more difficult to deal with expansions in 
closed leagues, such as the NAML. Three alternatives might be considered: 
1. The method used by Daly and Moore (1981), which is to exclude the expansion 
teams from the calculations. They only analyse performance persistence by 
calculations based on the "original teams". 
2. As in the alternative method for dealing with a promotion-relegation league above, 
exclude the performance of these teams in its first season (when they have no 
previous season ranking) but include them thereafter. 
3. Use a predicted previous season ranking for the expansion teams. One obvious 
assumption is to treat the expansion teams as the weakest teams. This is consistent 
standing in season t. In the example above. team A could be ranked either nine or ten in Groot's 
"modified season t-I", based on the final table in season t. in comparison with team B. 
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with historical experience of expansion teams who generally perform poorly in their 
first seasons (Eckard, 2001). If the expansion occurs because of the merger of two 
previously independent leagues, there are two possibilities. For example the SRCC 
can be calculated separately for the teams in the two constituent leagues after the 
merger, by continuing to rank the teams as if they formed two separate leagues. 
Alternatively a single composite ranking of the teams for the seasons prior to the 
merger can be created using win-ratios to allow the calculation of a comparable 
combined-league SRCC before and after the merger. 
As shown in the previous chapter, Gerrard (1998) uses a number of correlation 
measures to capture performance persistence. These measures are applied in an open 
league (English football) by ignoring newly promoted teams. This is done for the 
measures of average positional changes, average win ratio changes and the M-index, 
while both relegated and promoted teams are included in the calculations of the D- 
index. 
The Gini coefficient measure used by Buzzacchi et at. (2003) is also constructed for an 
open league system. The idealized number of top k ranks must be modified to allow for 
increases in the number of teams in the division over time. 
Specific Measures Constructed for Open League System 
Another approach to the analysis of competitive balance in a promotion and relegation 
system is to construct new measures specifically focusing on the teams involved in 
promotion and relegation. If there is perfect competitive balance in the top division, the 
newly promoted teams should have the same probability as the other teams in the 
division of achieving any given sporting outcome. The alternative hypothesis is that 
newly promoted teams are competitively weaker. Analysis of the performance of 
promoted teams can shed light on trends in the difference in sporting performance 
between tiers. This is very topical because European football leagues are increasingly 
concerned with the widening financial gap between teams in the top and lower divisions 
and the existence of so-called "yo-yo" teams. 
` A greater frequency of these teams 
might indicate an increased gap between the two tiers, so that it is more difficult for 
newly promoted teams to survive in the higher division. This kind of analysis extends 
81 Teams being too strong to stay in the lower division, but too weak to survive in the higher dig loon. 
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the "normal" use of the competitive balance concept in European football. where it is 
the top division in the league that is usually analysed. 
Gerrard (1998) suggests a number of measures relevant for promotion and relegation, 
such as comparisons of the length of tenure of teams in the top division, the average it-ill 
ratio in the first season in the top division for ne't'ly promoted teams, the relative 
performance of promoted and established teams, and the successful newtwly promoted 
teams over a given period of seasons, where successful is defined as win ratio > 0.5. In 
a perfectly balanced league, newly promoted teams should have the same probability of 
a win ratio above the mean as teams continuing in the top division. 
Frick and Prinz (2004) measure the relative performance of promoted and c'stahlished 
teams by comparing average points scored for newly promoted teams with the average 
points for the other teams in the top division, and similarly, by putting a variable for 
newly promoted teams as one of the explanatory variables in a fixed effect panel data 
model, where point score (using league rankings yields similar results) is the dependent 
variable. 
The growing frequency of yo-yo teams may be measured by the survr%, al rate for 
promoted teams (Gerrard, 1998) compared to the relative frequency of newly promoted 
teams remaining in top division after n seasons (see also Frick and Prinz, 2004). 
Further, Frick and Prinz construct a fixed effect logit model with relegation as the 
limited dependent variable and being a newly promoted team is one of the independent 
variables. They also use a Cox proportional hazard model, analysing survival of 
promoting teams through having "the spell duration" (i. e. the number of season in the 
division since the team's most recent promotion) as the dependent variable with a 
number of independent variables including being a newly promoted team. 
An alternative measure is an n season relegation ratio for promoted teams. This 
generalizes the measure of survival rate for promoted teams by measuring the actual 
survival rate relative to a theoretical benchmark of the idealized rate of relegation of 
newly promoted teams under conditions of perfect competitive balance when both 
newly promoted and continuing teams have the same probability of being relegated. For 
example, for the first season after promotion, the relegation probability for all teams 
should be R N. where R is the number of teams to be relegated, while N is the total 
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number of teams in the division. Expanding to a two-season period, the relegation 
probability for the second season, with regards to the probability for teams to stay in the 
division during the first season, is [1-(R/N)]*(R'N). Below, the ratio measure is the 
actual number of promoted teams that within two seasons are relegated, against the 
theoretical benchmark, and can be defined as: 
Two season relegation ratio for promoted teams 
= Actual number / {(R/N)[2R-(R2/N)] } 
This formula is a simplification, where the number of teams to promote is equal to the 
number to be relegated (R is both related to the number of teams to promote and to 
relegate). However, empirically, the formula can easily be made more complex to 
capture both differences in the number of teams to promote and to relegate, as well as 
playoff systems related to promotion and relegation. 
If there is perfect competitive balance, one could also expect that over a longer period of 
time, newly promoted teams should have the same relative frequency of post-seasonal 
qualification and championship titles as continuing teams. For example, the English FA 
Premier League of today consists of 20 teams. This means that if this league was 
perfectly (ex ante) competitive balanced, each team has 1/20 probability of winning the 
championship. Since three teams are promoted each season, the expected probability for 
a newly promoted team to be the champion should be 3/20. The same principle can be 
used for qualification to the UEFA Champions League. Currently, the top two at the end 
of the season are automatically qualified for the UEFA Champions League, while the 
teams finishing third and fourth enter the UEFA Champions League 3rd qualifying 
round. In a perfectly balanced league, each team should have 1/5 probability of reaching 
the top four, and hence there is a probability of about 51 % that one of the top four 
should go to a promoting team, implying that on average, every second season a newly 
promoted team should finish in the top four in the league. 82 
3.3. Rankings Not Based Solely on Matches Won 
Many leagues have systems for valuing results that are not only based on matches won. 
One major difference between leagues is whether or not the score systems allow for tied 
Calculated on basis of [1- (17,17,20 * 16i 19 * 15/ 18 * 14 17)]. 
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(or drawn) matches. Tied matches are typically allowed in the various codes of football 
(except American Football) as well as ice (and field) hockey and handball. 
Leagues allowing tie matches need to extend the valuation system beyond that allowed 
for in the simple league context. Historically, European (association) football has 
mainly used two different systems for valuing draws. The (2,1,0) score system was 
adopted by the Football League in England at its start in 1888 with wins awarded two 
points, a draw treated as a "half-win" with one point to each team, and a loss valued as 
zero. The current (3,1,0) score system with three points for a win gives a relatively 
lower value for draws (1/3 of a win compared to 1/2 of a win). However, there are 
several cases in European football of deviations from these two main svstems.,? 
There has been little research of the effects on competitive balance from changes in the 
point score system in a league, including the effect of allowing for tied outcomes. 
However, there are several studies of the impact of changes in incentive effects, for 
example overtime play in the NHL (Abrevaya, 2004; Easton and Rockerbie, 2005, 
Shmanske and Lowenthal, 2007). Easton and Rockerbie (2005) and Shmanske and 
Lowenthal (2007) also analyse the effects of whether matches are between teams in the 
same or different divisions and conferences. Shmanske and Lowenthal find that when 
playing against teams from same conference, there is an increased probability of a tied 
game (statistically significant for the home team, but not significant for the away team). 
Recently, Haugen (2008) has analysed theoretical effects of changes from the (2,1,0) 
system to the (3,1,0) system on basis of game theory both related to playing strategy and 
competitive balance. 84 His theoretical results suggest weaker competitive balance after 
changing point score system. 
The other main issue in the context of competitive balance is how to treat a drawn 
outcome in comparisons between leagues with and without draws. In general, win 
dispersion is expected to be lower in leagues with draw outcomes, compared to leagues 
with only xN in-loss outcomes, ceteris paribus. If a match has to be played until a winner 
is decided, with the same form of play as in regular time (i. e. no shoot-outs or other 
constructed tie-breaker mechanisms), the better team will have a higher probability of 
winning the match than the weaker team. Hence, one would anticipate the "final result" 
S. 1 Scr, for example. \\ \v-ww. rsssf. com. 
', 4 Based on game theor . 
Brocas and ('arrillo (2004), among others, also discuss playing strategy in 
relation to values of wins in football (three versus two points). 
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distribution of "previous tie matches" to be skewed (towards the better teams) if there is 
overtime play. This follows Cain and Haddock (2006) who analyse major league 
baseball where the game continues indefinitely with extra innings until one team wins. 
It would be expected that the NSQF ratio should be lower in leagues with tie matches. 
There is a number of possible ways to treat draws in win dispersion measures. One 
approach is to use point percentage. In the case of the (2,1,0) scoring system. win and 
point percentages will be equal (Cain and Haddock, 2006; Fort, 2007). Under other 
scoring systems, such as the (3,1,0) system, point percentage will capture the relative 
value of wins and ties correctly. An alternative approach is to ignore tie matches, and 
hence calculate win percentages only on the basis of matches «-on or lost. The idealized 
standard deviation will then need to be calculated using the number of "relevant" (i. e. 
won/lost) matches which will be lower than the actual matches played. A third 
approach, which seems to be the most popular in analysing European football, is to 
ignore the different values of wins, ties and losses, and transform them into a 
(100%, 50%, 0%) system (i. e. win percentage, where ties are treated as half wins). In this 
case, the actual standard deviation is not affected by changes in scoring systems. More 
general, this case can be extended to a given share of wins. A fourth possibility is to 
relate measures of the actual point structure (Cain and Haddock, 2006; Fort, 2007). 
Another possible complication is that the valuation of drawn matches might be 
dependent on a period of overtime when teams are tied at the end of regular time. 
Leagues may weight wins achieved in overtime differently from wins in regular time, 
such as in the top division in the Norwegian ice hockey league (www. hockey. no). 
Leagues also differ in how they treat byes when there are an odd number of teams, 
implying that one team has no scheduled match in each round of matches. Normally 
leagues ignore byes in the calculation of points, ensuring that every team has the same 
number of byes. However, the National Rugby League in Australia awards two points 
for a bye, the same as for a win. Although this does not affect the league standings 
(since all teams have the same number of byes in a season), it affects the calculation of 
win dispersion measures and creates difficulties when comparing competitive balance 
across leagues. 
In summary, compared to the win-loss outcome in the simple league context, real-world 
leagues have two main issues to further take into account when it comes to determining 
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rankings: the range of match of outcomes and the relative values of these outcomes. 
These issues have been discussed recently by Cain and Haddock (2006) and Fort (2007) 
in relation to the NSQF ratio. 
Multiple Outcomes and the NSQF Ratio 
The NSQF ratio was originally designed for leagues without (or with very few) tied 
matches. It is based on win percentage, where a win is equal to 1 (100 0) and a loss is 
equal to 0 (0 %), and the expected outcome of each match is 0.5 (50 %). This is equal to 
the definition in the simple league context. In other words, the simple league NSQF 
ratio is related to the following valuation system: 
NSQF = 
ASD(100%, 0%) 
ISD(100%, 0%) 
where ASD is the actual standard deviation in a league that is based on two outcomes; 
win or loss, and where a win is valued 100 %. The comparable system is given in the 
denominator. Usually, one would have named it ASD(1,0), but because of the recent 
discussion in Cain and Haddock (2006) and Fort (2007), it is appropriate for this thesis 
to use the values in percent, to divide it from points. 
When including the NHL in their analyses, Quirk and Fort (1992) have "transformed" 
this measure to also include leagues where ties are more usual (even if it is less usual 
than in European football in general). Measures based on win percentage/win ratio have 
typically treated tied matches in European football as half-wins (Cain and Haddock, 
2006). This seems straightforward for the (2,1,0) system and can easily be converted to 
a (I 00%, 50%, 09,, o) system. On the other hand, Cain and Haddock (2006, p. 33 1) claim 
that this "is generally inappropriate", and show that the NSQF ratio is higher when 
applying the three point score into the calculation of the ratio (because lower ISD). 
Calculating the actual standard deviation in a (100° o, 50%, 0%) system is 
straightforward. The potential problem for the NSQF ratio in leagues with tied games is 
how to calculate the idealized standard deviation. Typically, the ties are ignored in the 
idealized standard deviation in analyses of the competitive balance ratio in European 
football. This creates a potential problem, since the scope of the measure in the actual 
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standard deviation differs from the idealized, as can be shown in the following 
formulas: 
NSQFv-J, 
Us = 
NSQ 
Drax, s 
ASD(100%, 0%) 
ISD(100%, 0%) 
ASD(100%, 50%, 0%) 
ISD(100%, 0%) 
However, although this is not a problem when comparing the NSQF ratio between 
European football leagues, it does create difficulties for cross-Atlantic comparisons 
between European football leagues and NAML (at least the MLB, NBA and NFL) since 
the way tied matches are treated in the idealized standard deviation will affect NSQF 
ratio comparisons. As mentioned earlier, the potential problem is that drawn outcome 
possibilities should reduce the expected distribution of outcomes, and hence give these 
leagues a lower NSQF ratio than if draws were taken into account in the idealized 
standard deviation: 
1SD(100%, 50%, 0%) 
NSQF = ISD(100%, 0%) 
< NSQF = 
ASD(100%, 50" o, 0%) 
ISD(100%, 50%, 0%) 
The NSQF ratio might be seen as overestimating the win dispersion in European 
football, because it ignores one of the outcomes and thus underestimates the idealized 
standard deviation. If an idealized league (i. e. perfect competitive balance) is 
conceptualised as a uniform distribution of match results (i. e. equal probability of win, 
tie and loss) then the alternative idealized standard deviation will be This tie 6m 
adjusted idealized standard deviation is smaller than the original idealized standard 
deviation with two outcomes in the NSQF ratio. 86 
A uniform distribution of the three outcomes is arbitrary, but can be justified as 
representing maximum uncertainty of match outcome and hence be consistent with 
perfect competitive balance. However, this might not be a straightforward case, because 
Expected outcome is 0.5. Var( 1.0.5.0) =l '3, \(1-0.5) -I 3x(0.5-0.5)- -I 3x(0-0.5)- = L6. 
Sec Fort (22007) Ihr more about the relationship between the idealized standard dex iation, the `SQF 
ratio and different point score systems. This \\ ill also be discussed later in this section. 
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the expected outcome of a match with three outcomes in a league, where all teams are 
of equal playing strengths, could very well be argued to be tied (Bourg', 2004). In this 
discussion one might also take into account that there are significant differences in 
scoring systems/scoring frequencies between different sports. The latter will lead to a 
greater number of non-tied results in those sports, where the number of scores is much 
higher than in, for example, European football, even if the teams in both sports could be 
of approximately equal ex ante sporting quality. In general, there are two issues in an 
idealized (perfect balanced) league in this setting: 
1. The expected probability of wins should be equal to the probability of losses, and 
hence that in a (1,0.5,0) score system, the expected outcome of each match is 0.5 (a 
draw when three outcomes). 
2. The expected probability of a tie is difficult to decide. It is dependent on the 
distribution of different scores. Given a normal distribution of the scores, with E(x) 
= 0.5, it must be the size of the 0.5 area that determines the ex ante probability of 
tied matches. On one side one can argue, as above, that all three outcomes should be 
equal. However, on the other side, if there is equal sporting quality, although a tied 
match is expected, matches could also end as wins/losses within a given confidence 
interval. The importance of stochastic variation in match outcomes is in part a 
function of the game structure in different sports. 
An alternative approach is to use the simple league context as base, where each team 
has 50 ° ýý probability of winning and 50 % probability of losing. When team A and team 
B play against each other, the following outcomes from the different states are given: 
i WAWB, WALB, LAWB, L,. \LB} 
Since an equal outcome for both teams results in a draw, the following results are given: 
W. \WB = draw, W, -ALB = win 
for A, L. \WB = loss for A, and L-LB = draw. This means 
that the probability distribution for team A, when playing team B, is 25 % on win, 50 O ,o 
on draw, and 250o on loss. 
Cain and Haddock (2006) have a different approach to the theoretical problems of 
including tied matches into the measure of idealized standard deg iation, claiming that (p 
33 1): "... the theory of equal ignorance does not generate a probability before the fact 
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for a win-loss versus a tie. That is an empirical question". In other words, Cain and 
Haddock (2006) use ex post calculations to determine point 2 above. They calculate that 
about 25 % of the matches in the two highest level divisions in English football are tie". 
and therefore come up with an alternative idealized standard deviation in the NSQF 
ratio, 87 on the basis of (3/8-2/8-3/8) probabilities to J. 75 xm, given the (2,1,0) point 
system. 88 
Cain and Haddock (2006) solve the "tie problem" by calculating the percent of matches 
that actually have ended as ties. However, to justify the use of the idealized standard 
deviation, the (ex ante) perfect competitive balance should be used as base. The actual 
number of tied matches cannot be more than an indication of the ex ante outcome 
probabilities. One problem is that the share of tied matches varies from league to league 
and across seasons. A relevant question is therefore, why is the English top and second 
level division used to find the "proper" share of tied matches" The English top division 
is not the most competitively balanced in Europe (see Chapter 4). Would they have used 
a different percentage if they had used the Italian league, where the draw share is more 
than 30 percent, as base, or do they mean that different percentages for different leagues 
should have been applied? Another feature of the English top division is that the 
percentage of tied matches is higher after the Second World War (25.9 %, own 
calculation) compared to that over the whole history of the division (24.59 %, source: 
Cain and Haddock, 2006). Would they have used 26 % if their analysis was only based 
on post Second World War data? This is arbitrary. If it is necessary to draw-adjust the 
idealized standard deviation, one should apply a less arbitrary approach, so it could be 
possible to apply the measure in similar leagues. Therefore, the statement about 
theoretical and empirical issues, when it comes to tied matches in Cain and Haddock, 
has to be questioned. Is it not problematic to apply observed results in a measure for 
perfect competitive balance, when we know that leagues typically are not perfectly 
balanced? On the other hand, using observations, such as in Cain and Haddock (2006), 
can be relevant for indicating the relevance of tied matches. Based on my calculations, 
less than ten percent of matches end as draws in handball in Norway and Denmark. 
"' As is confirmed in Fort (2007), Cain and Haddock (2006) use the idealized standard de% Tation both 
about \\hat Quirk and Fort (1992) denote the idealized standard deviation and what this thesis calls the 
NSQF ratio. In table 7.1 in the 1992 edition, Quirk and Fort explain that the Ratio = Actual Standard 
De iation/ Idealized Standard Deviation. See Fort (2007) for further discussions. 
8 "\ Note, as is described in Cain and Haddock, that the idealized standard deviation is differently 
calculated under a point score system (multiplying with 
Tm ) than if percentages are used (dividing on 
Vi» ). This is followed up later in this section. Var(, 1,0) = 3,8\(2-1)2 - ? -8x(1-1 )2 -3 8x(0-1)' =34. 
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Hence, it is more likely that a European football match ends as a tie than a handball 
game. '9 Taking these relations into account, deciding the idealized standard deviation 
might be even more difficult, and perhaps the method by Cain and Haddock is the better 
solution. However, the expected probability for ties in a team sport might be generated 
from a function that consists of variables, such as the length of the match, the score 
frequency, the characteristics of play, and so on, into a set of score probabilities. 90 
Since the methods above satisfy the requirement that the probability of wins and losses 
are equal, none of them can be rejected on logical grounds as possible measures of 
idealized standard deviation in a three outcome league. "Absolute" perfect win 
dispersion is different from the "expected" perfect win dispersion within a normal 
distribution. One might argue that in a league with "absolute" perfect competitive 
balance, all games should end as a draw. However, even if all teams are equal in 
sporting quality, luck, critical incidents, the structure of the matches etc., will affect 
results, and these factors should be more relevant the more limited time there is to make 
the final score (such as Cain and Haddock discuss in the context of baseball). Therefore, 
one would expect that even in a situation of perfect "sporting quality" across the teams, 
many matches will not end as ties. Using the normal distribution with the draw as the 
mean outcome seems most appropriate, but when is the deviation from the expected 
value big enough to result in a win/loss outcome? In other words, what is the expected 
number of drawn matches in a league that consists of teams of equal sporting quality? 
Given a realistic range of possible match outputs, the predicted number of wwwins! losses 
in sports may be highest, even if the individual probabilities for drawn matches are 
high. 
A difference between the original idealized standard deviation in the NSQF ratio and an 
alternative idealized standard deviation that aims to capture the possibility of tied 
matches is that the win-loss idealized standard deviation only has one point reflecting 
maximum win dispersion, which is when the number of wins is equal to the number of 
losses for all teams in the league (assuming that all teams play the same number of 
games). In a situation that allows for tied matches, there are multiple possible levels of 
maximum points depending on the number of tied matches, since all situations where 
the number of wins is equal to the number of losses will give maximum win dispersion. 
According to Koning 0000), Stefani (198 3) analyses predictabilitics of match outcome across different 
sports. 
0') Further discussion about probabilities for draw matches is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Cain and Haddock argue that probabilities cannot be determined theoretically. But as 
argued above it is doubtful if it is appropriate to use empirical calculations in a "tie 
adjusted idealized standard deviation". The question remains: is it necessary to find a 
"tie adjusted idealized standard deviation" for comparing competitive balance ratios 
between different types of leagues? Is it enough to be aware of the effects on 
competitive balance of three outcome matches, compared to the traditional use of the 
NSQF ratio? A starting point is to consider the two uses for the NSQF ratio: 
1. A measure for comparing win dispersion within a league over time and/or between 
leagues, where different numbers of matches is taken into account. 
2. A measure for indicating the deviation of the actual sporting outcome from the 
expected outcome of a league, consisting of teams having equal playing strengths 
(i. e. ex ante perfect win dispersion given balanced match schedule91). The NSQF is 
therefore a measure to indicate the level of the sporting quality balance. 
These two points seem to be used indirectly in Cain and Haddock's descriptions of the 
tie-adjusted NSQF ratio. Related to the first point they claim that (p. 331): "... it 
becomes especially problematic for cross-league comparisons where one league (such 
as soccer) experiences a large number of ties while another (such as baseball) plays each 
game until there is a winner". They also relate their discussion to the second point 
where the NSQF ratio (p. 331): "... seems unobjectionable as a measure of parity. A 
subtle difficulty arises, however, if their measure is used to examine parity within a 
league that awards points to ties... ". 
The NSQF ratio is excellent for the first purpose, regardless of league structure. The 
ratio is constructed as a measure that can be used to compare competitive balance in 
different leagues and within leagues with different number of matches played during 
time. In other words, there is a need for a "benchmark" to measure against when doing 
competitive balance comparisons, in line with, for example, financial ratios when 
91 If perfect (ex ante) sporting quality balance, it is expected ex ante perfect win dispersion regardless of 
playing schedule. Therefore it might look unnecessary to require balanced schedule. The problem 
is that 
perfect ex ante win dispersion might also be achieved for a league without perfect ex ante sporting 
quality, but as a consequence of unbalanced match schedule. For example in a league with eight teams, 
where four of them are much better than the four other teams, and the (ex ante) sporting quality within the 
two groups are equal, perfect (ex ante) win dispersion should be expected, if the matches are only played 
between teams within the two groups. 
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comparing financial performances between companies. Using a simple league as the 
base for this benchmark is one solution. No league satisfies all the attributes of a simple 
league system, which is not the aim. The purpose is to measure how far away the 
different leagues are from "the benchmark", and then apply these results for 
comparisons across and within leagues over time. 
The second purpose of the competitive balance ratio is to calculate how far away these 
leagues' actual competitive balance is from what should be seen as the idealized 
competitive balance given perfect (ex ante) quality balance. It is doubtful how %vell this 
purpose can be satisfied by the NSQF ratio without several adjustments, even in leagues 
with binominal outcomes. There are many ways in which leagues are organized, and 
leagues in general deviate from at least one of the attributes of a simple league system. 
These deviations might therefore affect the relationship between the distribution of 
sporting quality between the teams in a league (ex ante sporting quality balance) and the 
distribution of sporting outcome. Applying the (ex post) distribution of sporting 
outcome to indicate the (ex ante) sporting quality balance in a league is much more 
complex than that reflected in the idealized standard deviation part of the NSQF ratio. 
Tied matches, score systems, playing schedule, incentives (transfers and risk-taking 
behaviour as regards expenditure on playing talent) created by the possibility of being 
relegated, incentives in relation to drafting, and incentives after secured playoff place 
are examples of relevant factors that should have been taken into account. It therefore 
looks very difficult to apply the NSQF ratio as a perfect measure for comparing the 
sporting quality balance across leagues (but it will of course give a useful indication). 
This is confirmed in Utt and Fort (2002) when constructing a theoretical perfect 
competitive dominance measure that takes into account factors such as tournament 
structure. 
However, the latter method might provide an alternative for reflecting the sporting 
quality balance, using a benchmark for imperfect competitive balance, as is done in the 
Goossens' index (Goossens, 2006) and in the adjusted Gini coefficient by Utt and Fort 
(2002). These measures will be affected by drawn matches in the "actual" part of the 
calculation, but not in the "idealized" part. However, Utt and Fort (2002) show there are 
still many similar difficulties. 
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Differences in the level of restrictions on product and labour markets have received 
most attention as an explanation of why win dispersion differs between leagues. This 
thesis seeks to expand the list of possible of determinants to include league structure, 
and the possibility for tie matches. Tied matches will reduce the expected standard 
deviation compared to the idealized (benchmark) league. Similar effects might be found 
in the structure of the NAML, where leagues are divided into different conferences and 
the match schedule deviates from a full round-robin schedule. For example, in an 
unbalanced-schedule league, where the stronger teams are scheduled to play more 
frequently against other stronger opponents, a better competitive balance would be 
expected. The possibility of tied matches is not the only structural issue that affects the 
expected (end-of-season) competitive balance in sporting leagues. 
In the NSQF ratio it is the distribution of sporting outcome (win dispersion) in the 
league that is the focus. When this distribution is better in European football than in the 
NAML, adjusted for the number of games played, the NSQF ratio should capture this, 
because it is actually this distribution that is of interest to most stakeholders. If the 
standard deviation of sporting outcome is better in Europe, this should be reflected in 
the ratio, even if tied matches are one of the determinants. By adjusting the idealized 
standard deviation for the possibility of tied matches, the better distribution of actual 
sporting outcome will be absorbed into the idealized standard deviation. This may be 
misleading because it adjusts for only one specific structural deviation from the simple 
league context, while other leagues may have other structural differences that affect 
competitive balance, but are not being controlled for in the modified measure. 
In summary, the original NSQF ratio seems to be an appropriate solution as a measure 
for comparing end-of-season win dispersion across leagues, and over time within 
leagues. The effects of tied matches on the sporting outcome is reflected rather than 
ignored in the NSQF ratio. However, the ratio might not be perfect as an accurate 
measure of sporting quality balance (but is appropriate as an indicator). 
Cain and Haddock (2006) also focus on the scale of the valuation system. This is 
followed up in the discussion by Fort (2007). Motivated by the point score svstems in, 
for example, European (English) football, a number of scenarios are applied to show 
that the NSQF ratio is affected by these issues. They both demonstrate that, for 
example, a NSQF ratio in the (2,1,0) point system increases the ratio's value, compared 
7ý 
to converting it to a (100%, 50%, 0%) system. On the other hand, Fort (2007) shows that 
NSQF is equal when using percentage of both (1,0.5,0) and (2.1,0), and he also claims 
that the results from the percentage converted (3,1,0) are close to similar. In addition. 
the correlation between the measures, both based on percentages and absolute points-, is 
close to one. Fort finds it difficult to choose a preferred system when it comes to 
calculations of the NSQF ratio, at least for analyses over time, because of the nearly 
perfect correlation between the different approaches. However. when it comes to fan 
expectations and NSQF ratio as a measure for uncertainty of outcome, Fort emphasises 
that (p. 648-9): 
.... the "right" measure is the one that most precisely captures the impact of 
outcome uncertainty on fan demand; both the level of that uncertainty and its 
behavior over time are important to that end (Fort & Maxcy, 2003). For fan 
demand estimation, then, there is a justifiable suspicion that the (1,0.5,0) 
approximation only imprecisely captures the impact of outcome uncertainty on 
fan enjoyment and, hence willingness to pay....... A similar suspicion seems 
justified when addressing the incentives inherent in, say, moving to (3,1,0) as a 
replacement for (2,1,0)........ But once this literature moves on to the impacts of 
different point allocation schemes on fan demand, absolute point versions of 
RSD may more precisely capture fan enjoyment. 
According to Fort, if absolute point score was included in the calculations for the NHL, 
the NSQF ratio would have been 17 % higher, and for European football 15 % higher. 
Fort (p. 650) emphasises that this is the contribution of Cain and Haddock: 
But that is about all that can be said given the C-H article. Over time, absolute 
point measures and percentage measures of RSD all yield identical changes. So 
there is nothing in the C-H article to suggest that previous finding about the 
behaviour of competitive balance over time using any measure of RSD need to 
be revisited. 
It is worth looking more closely at the assumptions behind some of the calculations in 
(? 007). I disagree with Fort's 0007) the articles by Cain and Haddock (2006) and Fort 
equation (1), when referring to Cain and Haddock (2006) page 332. lSD(1,0.5.0) 
x in . 
because it seems that he is applying the binomial case mentioned in Cain 
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and Haddock. Following the ex post match outcome percentages applied in Cain and 
Haddock, I suggest that the ISD(1,0.5,0) in Fort should have been: 
ISD(1,0.5,0)adj = (3 / 16) xm 
because (3/8)x(1-0.5)2 + (2/8)x(0.5-0.5)2 + (3/8)x(0-0.5)2 = 3/16. 
This is important, because it can now be shown that there are no scale problems related 
to the NSQF ratio, as long as scales are similar among the different outcomes. 
Proof: Since ISD(2,1,0) = VQ / 4) xm, it follows that the scale differences between 
ISD(2,1,0) and ISD(1,0.5,0)adj is: 
J(-3/4) 
-z J(-3/16) 
Fort shows that ASD(2,1,0) = 2.000 x ASD(1,0.5,0). Hence is NSQF(2,1,0) _ 
NSQF(1,0.5,0). 
This is also robust for other combinations of win, draw and loss percentages as well. For 
example 1 /3 probability for each outcome will give ISD(2,1,0) = (2 / 3) x m, while 
ISD(1,0.5,0) = V(I / 6) xm, which means that ISD(2,1,0) =2x ISD(1,0.5,0), and hence 
that NSQF(2,1,0) = NSQF(1,0.5,0). 
In his equation 9, Fort (2007, p. 646) suggests a constant relationship between 
N SQF(3,1,0) and N SQF(1,0.5,0). But the given relationship is difficult to predict 
because there are different scales of the values involved. While the wins are tripled in 
absolute value, the absolute value is only doubled when it comes to draws. The 
relationship between the two ratios will therefore vary by the share of matches ending as 
draws and wins for the different seasons. This problem can be illustrated by calculating 
the scale differences in Table 2 of Fort (p. 647). For the English Premier League in 
1997 98, the (3,1,0) score system is about 16 °ö higher than for the (1,0.5,0) score 
system, while the difference is only 10.4 O ,o in the next season. 
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It is worth taking into account that the calculations in the examples by both Cain and 
Haddock (2006) and Fort (2007), when comparing different solutions for the first 
season of the English football league, show differences in point score systems and point 
percentage systems. These articles focus on differences in the NSQF ratio, without 
explaining why they appear in the calculation (Table 1 for Cain and Haddock and Table 
I in Fort). There is a logical reason for the differences, because both articles include 
draws in the idealized standard deviation for points, but not when calculating the NSQF 
ratio for the point percentage. If the latter group of calculations had also included draws 
in the idealized standard deviation, the NSQF ratios would have been equal. In addition, 
Fort is also differentiating in the use of draw in the idealized standard deviation, when 
comparing (1,0.5,0) and (2,1,0) point score systems, where the former is calculated 
without draws in the idealized standard deviation, while it is included in the latter. 
Therefore, it is no surprise that the point system for (1,0.5,0) is equal to the point 
percentage NSQF ratio for both the (1,0.5,0) and (2,1,0) systems, since they are all 
calculated without draws in the idealized standard deviation. W'e'hen it comes to the point 
percentage, Fort emphasises that he follows note number four in Cain and Haddock, 
suggesting 0.5/. J as the idealized standard deviation. This is the standard deviation 
without taking into account drawn matches (equal to the description of the idealized 
standard deviation for a win-loss outcome league in Quirk and Fort, 1992). If, for 
example, Fort had used the same system when it comes to draws in the idealized 
standard deviation for both absolute points and point percent, the plots in his Figure 2 
would have been similar for all seasons. 
Table I in Fort (2007) has the following calculations: 
, VSQF(1,0.5,0) = 
which is equal to: 
. 4SD(1,0.5,0) 
ISD(1,0) 
, VSOF(100° o, 5 0" o. 0° o) _ 
. ASD(100%, 
50%, 0%) 
ISD(100%, 0° o) 
both for point percent systems for (1,0.5,0) and (2,1,0), while these are different from: 
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, VSQF(2,1,0) = 
ASD(2,1,0) 
ISD(2.1,0) 
as is also the reason for the difference between absolute point and point percentage on 
the (2,1,0) score system in Table 1 in Cain and Haddock. The same explanation can be 
given for the following difference between the absolute point and point percentage score 
systems in Cain and Haddock: 
ASD(100%, 33 ' %, 0%) 
NSQF(100%, 33 3 %, 0%) = ISD(100%, 0%) 
NSQF(3,1,0) = 
ASD(3,1,0) 
ISD(3,1,0) 
The explanation that absolute point score and point percent NSQF are equal for a given 
score system can be done by following in Fort (2007), Cxm=x irr , where C= 
variance to the "unity structure" (own interpretation) of the league. The latter can for 
example be (1,0.5,0) and (1,1/3,0). is therefore equal, both for ISD(points) and 
ISD(percents). Since the point score system is a scale H of a given unity system, the 
following relationship can be shown: 
ISD(points) = H, xCx in =Hxx vfm 
ISD(points) =Hxmx ISD(percent), where ISD(percent) = -ýC /-Jm 
Since ASD(points) =Hxmx ASD(percent) [same scale]: 
NSQF(points) = NSQF(percent) 
In other words, comparing a (2,1,0) system with a (1,0.5,0) system, either in points or in 
percentage, given that draws are included in the idealized standard deviation, give" the 
same NSQF ratio, and is therefore not related to any scale problem when it comes to 
measuring \\, in dispersion in leagues. However, there are still problems to take into 
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consideration. First. there might be a scope problem related to whether or not a draw 
should be included into the idealized standard deviation. as discussed earlier in this 
section (where I argue for not including it). Second, there are scale problems when 
comparing the (3,1,0) system with the other two other systems, because of the relative 
weaker valuation of draws. Note that NSQF (3,1,0) = NSQF (1.1,3,0) points =\ tiQF 
(I 00%, 33 l/3%, 0%), but the level of the ratio will here too be affected by inclusion of 
draws in the idealized standard deviation. 
Multiple Outcome and Implications on Other Competitive Balance Measures 
Some of the other measures shown in Chapter 2 are originally designed on basis of 
point score (from leagues that allow for tied matches). This is the case for: 
- Gerrard's (1998) concentration ratio 
- Michie and Oughton's (2004) five club concentration ratio (C) and H Index of 
Competitive Balance (HICB) 
- Koning's (2000) concentration ratio 
- Seasonal Gini coefficients based on the cumulative number of points by the 
teams and the cumulative proportion of teams (Gerrard, 1998) 
- End of season points for the winner (Gerrard, 1998) 
- End-of-season point percent difference between the winner and the runners up 
(Gerrard, 1998)92 
- Haugen's (2008) competitive balance measure, where maximal competitive 
balance is given by each match ending as a draw 
- Groot's (2008) surprise index 
Instead of using win percentage, Szymanski and Kuypers (1999) apply a measure for 
seasonal uncertainty that is based on the league's end-of-season points' aiverage 
standard deviation. Changes in the number of teams and changes in the point system 
can be taken into account by adjusting seasonal mean points received by the teams, i. e. 
the ccodfficient of vvariation. Koning (2000) also measures win dispersion by standard 
deviation of points. Further, Koning applies a model that takes into account changes in 
home advantages over time and is invariant to changes in the point score system, as well 
°' Demmert (197 3) also uses the differences between the tirst and the second place (number of gimes), 
but in a different manner (as an absolute quality measure for the single teams). 
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as it allows for draws. Competitive balance is calculated by estimating the standard 
deviation of teams' quality. 93 
3.4. Post-Season Tournaments 
In the context of competitive balance, the tournament structure for deciding the 
championship winner is relevant. This can be explained by a simple example. Given a 
league with only one prize - the championship, performance incentives and the 
competitiveness within the league will be dependent on how this prize is won. 
Assuming that the best team is much better than the others, the interest for the league 
would be expected to be diminished, as described in the Louis-Schmelling paradox 
(Neale, 1964) and the Yankee-paradox (Vrooman, 1996). What would happen if this 
league ("one group league") introduced a championship playoff for the top four'? 94 First, 
the focus would be moved from the first to the top four places (although the effect of 
this change might be relatively small if the point scoring system in the playoff 
incorporates the points achieved in the regular season), with a special focus on the 
fourth place. Second, uncertainty as to which team will win the championship can be 
significantly increased if the championship is won after a knock-out system in the 
playoff. 
Real-world leagues are in general not unitary in structure, with some form of 
dependency between the regular season and other tournament(s). Generally, two main 
structures can be found. First, the regular season performance is the basis for 
qualification for a domestic post-seasonal playoff. This is the usual system for the 
NAML and for a number of European football leagues, as well as rugby league and 
rugby union in the UK and Australia. The second category of post-seasonal tournaments 
is related to a combination system, where domestic performance determines 
qualification for international team tournaments. In European football, this occurs 
through the system of tournaments organised by the UEFA, but similar systems also can 
be found in the other continents as well 
93 It is based on a statistical model to analyse results in football. More about modelling match results can 
be found in Dobson and Goddard (2001). The,, -also include literature re\ iew on this topic. Groot (2008) 
suggests home advantage to be a small, but positive contributor to improved competiti% e balance. Home 
advantage in the context of competiti\ c balance is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
°; See also Sivmanski and \'alletti (2005a) for effects of introducing a "second prize". 
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(en. wikipedia. org/wiki/List_of football_%28soccer%29_clubs), such as the South- 
American CONMEBOL Copa Libertadores and the African CAF Champions League. 95 
The number of competitions for the teams in European football leagues is therefore, in 
general, higher than for the teams in the NAML. Hoehn and Szymanski (1999) use the 
term multiple leagues to explain that European football has a duality at team level 
because they are involved at both domestic and international levels of competition 
(where league tournament in season t is played simultaneously with the "post-seasonal" 
UEFA tournaments, which are based on qualification from the domestic league and cup 
tournaments in season t-1). 
The UEFA competitions are, in general, highly valued by teams, both in sporting and 
financial terms. This is especially true for the lucrative UEFA Champions League 
tournament. This is a pan European team tournament arranged by the UEFA. 96 
Although teams in European football leagues also qualify for the UEFA Cup and the 
UEFA Intertoto, the discussion below will be related to the UEFA Champions League, 
because it is the most significant of these tournaments, and that is has been more 
"structured" when it comes to qualification procedures. The qualification procedure for 
the UEFA Champions League is divided into a number of steps: 
1. The number of teams that can qualify from a member league is determined by a 
seeding system. 97 The highest seeded leagues are allowed a maximum of four teams. 
At the time of writing, the top four teams in the English FA Premier League will 
qualify for next season's UEFA Champions League "system", while in Norway only 
the league champions will qualify. 
2. The seeding system also determines at which round teams enter. In the case of the 
English FA Premier League, the top two teams qualify directly to the first group 
phase of the UEFA Champions League, while the teams finishing third and fourth 
95 The only international aspect by the NAML competitions, is, according to Andreff and Staudohar 
(2002), that NHL, MLB and the NBA includes teams cross-border (USA and Canada). However, Fort 
(2000) argues for similarities between the relationship domestic league and UEFA tournaments with the 
structure of the college sports in USA (see p. 436). 
% According to Solberg (2004), a high share of the TV revenues goes to the teams. UEFA only keeps 25 
percent of these revenues compared to 90 percent of the TV revenues from the UEFA European 
championship for national teams. A reason for this difference is the external threat to create a European 
Super League. The Italian Media partner had these plans at the end of the 1990s (see, for example, Hoehn 
and Szymanski, 1999). 
97 It is depending on teams' performance in the UEFA tournaments. For example, only leagues ranked as 
number 15 or higher have the possibility to have two teams in the UEFA Champions League (p. 39 in the 
Regulations of the UEFA Champions League, 2007/08, see www. uefa. com/newsfiles/19071. pdf). 
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enter the third qualifying round, the final qualifying round prior to the first group 
phase. The league champions in Norway currently enter in the second qualifying 
round. 
3. The UEFA member league's seeding system is announced in advance so that teams 
in for example the English FA Premier League know at the start of the domestic 
league season how well they require to perform to qualify for the UEFA Champions 
League. 
Entry into post-season tournaments represents prizes for league performance. Hence, 
prize concentration measures in these leagues should be extended to cover not only 
championship winners, but also qualification for post-season tournaments. For the 
NAML, this means including measure(s) of the concentration of playoff appearance for 
teams, in addition to the traditional measures of performance persistence, win dispersion 
and concentration of overall championship winners. Hadley et al. (2005) apply a 
Markov process model to measure the relationship between across season competitive 
balance and post seasonal playoffs in the MLB, by comparing turnover rates prior to 
and after the M LB strike in 1994. 
In European football, a key question related to post-season play in the context of 
competitive balance is whether the UEFA Champions League affects the sporting 
quality balance among the different (domestic) member leagues. As relegation gives 
incentives to perform better (and hence incentives to invest in more playing quality) 
because of the fear of sporting and financial disadvantages, parallel incentives will exist 
bettering the upper part of the league. All teams qualifying for the UEFA Champions 
League tournament experience a significant increase in revenue compared to the other 
teams in their league. The effects on competitive balance can be expected to be the 
opposite of those of relegation. Ceteris paribus, stronger incentives to invest in playing 
talent for the leading teams will tend to weaken competitive balance. If for example one 
or two of the highest drawing power teams from a domestic league qualify season after 
season, one would expect their financial dominance to be higher than without the UEFA 
Champions League, and intuitively one would expect the "domestic" league's 
competitive balance to be negatively affected by this tournament. Lucrative financial 
and high sporting prestige post-season tournaments might also attract external investors 
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to high drawing power teams, and further widen the distribution of financial resources 
and the gap between the "attractive" teams and the other teams. 98 
The examples above are based on the strongest teams increasing the quality of their 
team, not only to compete for the domestic championship, but also to increase the 
probability of qualification for financially lucrative post-season tournaments, such as 
the UEFA Champions League. This has been analysed by Hoehn and Szy nanski 
(1999). The incentive for the most successful teams in domestic leagues to quality' for 
European level tournaments concentrates the distribution of playing talent within those 
leagues. Another issue, as emphasised in Barros et al. (2002), is that promoting 
competitive balance in one competition (e. g. the domestic league) might weaken the 
competitive balance in other competitions (e. g. UEFA Champions League). 
Another interesting aspect, going beyond the original discussion in Sloane (1971), is the 
consequences for the regulation policy of domestic league of any concern with the 
international competitiveness of the best teams in the league. If one league has more 
restrictive rules than others, its teams might be less competitive than competitors in pan 
European tournament, ceteris paribus. This effect is likely to be much more important 
now in the post-Bosman era than at the time Sloane wrote the article, when there was a 
much more restrictive labour market in European football with limits on both within- 
league free movement of players out of contract as well as restrictions on player 
movements between leagues. 
So although Downward and Dawson (2000) claim that the uncertainty of outcome 
hypothesis provides clear support for cross-subsidisation policies, such actions are more 
problematic in European football, because the redistribution of resources will impact on 
the competitiveness of the stronger teams in both domestic and European tournaments, 
and it is possible that the uncertainty of outcome effects may run in different directions. 
This is also suggested in Noll (2002), who concludes that the "arms race" effect 
(especially in the UEFA Champions League) might also obstruct domestic leagues in 
effectively introducing salary cap. This kind of regulation might reduce the playing 
quality for the best teams, since the labour market in the EU (including associated 
`'K Perhaps this is what can be seen during the last seasons in English football, but it can also be related to 
a possibility to change the rules for distribution of media revenues to mad be be more performance based, 
or c\ en more extreme: to individual deals. Such situations might increase the difference between high 
drawing power teams and other teams in the league, and hence further \ý orsen the competiti\ e balance. 
ýý ýý 
members) is open. Further. Sandy et al. (2004) emphasise that the invariance 
proposition will not be valid if the effects of a valuable playoff are introduced (p. 98): 
If the chance to be in the limelight of post-season play was more valuable to the 
fans in the small market team because it was less common for them, introducing 
the post-season playoffs to the model would overturn the invariance results: that 
is, it would change the competitive balance. The model with post-season play is 
more complicated to diagram because it requires a discontinuity (i. e. a jump in 
the marginal revenue function due to reaching the threshold of wins for post- 
season play). To be realistic, the model would have to include uncertainty 
because the threshold would depend on winning percentage of many other 
teams. 
These considerations by Sandy et al. suggest that the prize structure in complex league 
structure might affect competitive balance through incentive effects. 
European football currently combines an integrated cross-European tournament 
structure (i. e. the UEFA Champions League) and an integrated international labour 
market. The financial situation in the domestic leagues is an important determinant for 
how well teams from a specific member league perform in the UEFA Champions 
League. This can create different incentives for different member leagues. At least two 
main questions arise: 
1. Will the best teams in the different domestic leagues put pressure on the other 
teams, through the governing body, to protect their competitive advantages in order 
to maintain their international competitiveness? 
2. Will the governing bodies want the bigger market teams to be successful in their 
league to increase the probability that these teams perform well in the Champions 
League'? There are two reasons for governing bodies favouring the bigger market 
teams beyond any "political" pressure from these teams. First there is a financial 
incentive. The governing body receives "solidarity payments" from UEFA on basis 
of performance in the UEFA tournaments. In the 2002 03 season Norway received 
F659.315 (one team in the UEFA Champions League) and Scotland X475,913 (no 
teams in the UEFA Champions League) in solidarity payment, compared to 
¬357,228 for Norway (no teams in the UEFA Champions League) and E 1.156,167 
8 ), 
for Scotland (2 teams in UEFA Champions League) the next season. 99 Second, 
members of the governing bodies may gain utility from the prestige of having 
team(s) from their league competing in the UEFA Champions League. 
If governing bodies are concerned with ensuring the international competitiveness of 
their stronger teams, this can lead to domestic leagues preferring individual TV deals 
rather than collective deals that involve greater redistribution of income away from the 
stronger teams to the weaker teams (Solberg, 2004). It can also lead to other measures 
that favour the stronger teams domestically such as changes to the match schedule. ' 00 
The potential problem for a team budgeting with uncertain revenue from the UEFA 
Champions League is that revenues become more directly dependent on sporting 
performance. If such a team fails to qualify for a financially lucrative tournament, a 
significant share of the predicted revenues will be lost, causing possible financial 
difficulties. These financial problems can be temporary if the team qualifies for the 
tournament next time or the team has a cost policy where salary costs are performance- 
related to a significant degree. "Underperformance" over a number of seasons can lock 
teams into a vicious circle of decline experiencing a series of cumulative financial and 
sporting crises. Performance persistence in domestic leagues can be weakened at least in 
the short term if high revenue teams lose the financial advantage from qualifying for 
European tournaments. 
On the other hand, a bigger league, where a number of teams secure playoff 
qualification at an early stage, might find that these teams do not perform as strongly as 
when playoff qualification remains undecided. Larsen et al. (2006) suggest that this 
might happen because teams rest some of their better players. They further hypothesise 
that teams with no chance of qualifying might use their last games to evaluate younger 
talented players. These factors might lead to reduced contest legitimacy (Gerrard, 
2004b). However, leagues having within-league post-season playoffs usually have some 
99 Sources: www. uefa. com/uefa/Keytopics/kind=16384/newsId=80851. html, 
www. uefa. com/uefa/news/Kind=4096/newsId=219264. html and 
www. uefa. com/competitions/ucUhistory/index. html. 
10° For example, in England, teams competing in the UEFA Champions League or the UEFA Cup are 
awarded a bye into the third round of the League Cup tournament. In addition, without having any 
suspicions, incitements might increase the probability of unethical biases when selecting teams for fair 
play prizes, because it can lead to qualifications for the UEFA Cup for better teams in a weak sporting 
season (see for example www. uefa. com/newsfiles/536640. pdf). This prize is based on both quantitative 
and qualitative variables (for Norway, see, for example, www. fotball. no/t2. aspx? p=58240&cat=51834). 
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incentives for already qualified teams to be fully competitive through to the end of the 
season. This can be the prize of winning the regular season tournament or divisional 
tournaments, as well as making the playoff schedule dependent on regular season 
performance with better performance in the regular season rewarded by a better seeding 
in the playoffs and a more favourable playoff schedule. An example of advantage in 
playoff seeding can be found in the Australian National Rugby League in many seasons. 
especially until the middle of the 1990s. For example in 1973. when the top five teams 
(out of 12) from regular season qualified for the semi-finals. the structure was as 
follows: 101 
Minor Preliminary Semi: Rank 4- Rank 5 
Major Preliminary Semi: Rank 2- Rank 3 
Major Semi: Rank 1- Winner Major Preliminary Semi 
Minor Semi: Loser Major Preliminary Semi - Winner Minor Preliminary Semi 
Preliminary Final: Loser Major Semi - Winner Minor Semi 
Grand Final: Winner Major Semi - Winner Preliminary Final 
Even if the definition of competitive balance given by the Blue Ribbon panel on 
Baseball Economics (Levin et al., 2000) was argued to be difficult in Chapter 2, it is 
very interesting in the context of post-season tournaments, since post season play is 
used as benchmark. This means that in a league consisting of post-season playoff, 
perfect competitive balance should give all teams the same probability to qualify. The 
Report emphasises the continued domination of the playoffs by few big market teams, 
and that this represents a significant threat to the economic future of the MLB. 
Post-season tournaments can also be held for poorly performing teams, such as 
relegation playoffs in some European football leagues. Relegation procedures can affect 
incentives, and this in turn impacts on win dispersion. If the bottom three teams are 
automatically relegated in a given top division, with a big gap between the fourth and 
third weakest teams, they would not have "anything to play for" in the final part of the 
season. If the same top division had a system where the third weakest team went to a 
relegation playoff. the teams at the bottom would still have "something to play for". 
and, hence, incentives to perform well would be higher than in the case of an automatic 
relegation system. These incentives due to relegation playoff could improve «in 
101 This is based on the follo""ing reference: stats. rleague. comrl seas 1973. html. This i: dittcrent from the 
scheduling method in the Scottish Premier League for the ti\ c "play off' matches. as 
is according to 
Lenten (2007, p. 2) based on: ".... a pragmatic method to determine a "fair" distribution of home and 
away matches". 
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dispersion. If several of the weakest teams have to compete in a rele, ation playoff to 
retain their current divisional status, this would have similar incentive effects as a 
championship playoff for the stronger teams at the top of the league. 
Measures 
Results in the UEFA Champions League can be applied for reflecting competitive 
balance across leagues in Europe. For example, Gerrard (2004b) analyses the 
distribution of nations represented in the semi-finals of this tournament, and found that 
the share of Big Five (i. e. England, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) teams increased 
from 65 percent to 95.8 percent between the periods 1992 93 - 1996/97 and 1997/98 - 
2001/02. In the latter period only one team from outside the Big Five managed to reach 
the semi-finals of the UEFA Champions League. 
Hadley et al. (2005) develop a Markov process measure for playoff qualification. This 
"state-dependent model" (p. 382) has two states: winning (i. e. qualification) or losing 
(i. e. non-qualification). Persistence is defined as the same state occurring in two 
consecutive periods. Lewis et al. (2007) measure the expected relative frequency of 
playoff qualification if all teams have an equal probability of qualification. Lee (2004) 
focus on the difference in performance between the team in the last qualifying and the 
closest non-qualifying team. 
Alternatively, the mean win ratio for the qualified teams can be compared with either 
the mean win ratio and/or the highest win ratio among the teams that do not qualit'V. But 
there are potential problems with these calculations as that they might be difficult to 
compare, both within and between leagues, because of variations in the number of 
teams in the leagues in different seasons, as well as changes in the number of teams that 
can qualify for the playoffs. Playoff procedures changed frequently during the period of 
analyses of these studies. 
Because of structural changes in relation to playoffs in the NAML (see Lewis et al., 
2007), measuring playoff concentration is not straightforward for these leagues. One 
way to compare between and within leagues over time is to follow the same procedure 
as the NSQF ratio, which is to compare with the expected distribution in an idealized 
situation. This procedure can be applied to the HH1 as a measure for the concentration 
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of playo» qualifiers. The idealized HHI is calculated using the binomial distribution 
with equal probability of qualification. 
I suggest that the idealized HHI should be computed by calculating the probability of 
playoff qualification for each team in any given season. These probabilities are 
aggregated for each team for the given analysis period to show the expected number of 
playoff qualifications for each team given perfect competitive balance. The "actual 
HHI" for the given period is then computed. The actual HHI based on the distribution of 
playoff contestants over the period can be compared with the corresponding idealized 
HHI. This form of the HHI will be called the GK PO-ratio (Gerrard-Kring stad Playoff- 
ratio): 
GK PO-ratio = Actual HHI/Idealized HHI 
Because the HHI will put relatively more focus on the concentration of teams qualifying 
for the playoffs, an alternative measure is suggested. This is based on the root of the 
aggregated squared differences between the actual number of playoff places for a given 
team and its expected number of places over a given period of time under conditions of 
equal probability of playoff qualification: 
r=, V 
PO deviation ={ (Actual number of playoffs; - Idealized number; )-}°''/N 
where i= team number 1,2,....., N. This alternative measure has relatively more 
weighting on the non-qualifiers, and this weighting is higher the more playoff places 
that are available. Both measures are related to differences between actual playoff and 
the idealized qualifications. 
3.5. Unbalanced Match Schedule 
One of the features of the simple league structure in Chapter 2 is a pure round-robin 
tournament representing, a perfectly balanced match schedule. This has been the system 
used in England since the formation of the Football League in 1888. Each team plays 
ý^ 
against each other the same number of times, home and away. 1()l This is the norm in 
many European football leagues, but there are a number of exceptions. For example, in 
the current system in the Scottish Premier League, each team plays every other team 
three times during the regular season play. 103 Perfectly balanced match schedules are 
not norm in the NAML. It is only in the NBA that all teams meet each other during a 
season. Noll (2003, p. 532) describes an unbalanced schedule as a league where "each 
team plays some teams more than others". On this basis, all NANIL have unbalanced 
match schedules. In the context of competitive balance, the NFL's approach of making 
the current season's match schedule dependent in part on performance in the previous 
season (with better performing teams being matched up more frequently with other 
strongly performing teams) is particularly noteworthy. 104 Lenten (2007) claims that the 
match schedule in the NHL and MLB is unbalanced with teams being scheduled to play 
more frequently against "local rivals" (p. 20). Lenten (2007) also notes that teams' total 
travelling distance is also a determinant in the match schedule. There are also 
unbalanced match schedules in Australia in both the AFL (i. e. Australian Rules 
Football) and the NRL (i. e. rugby league). According to Lenten (p. 6): "... the 
unbalanced schedule is somewhat a bone of contention to many fans, especially since 
the ensuring of high-drawing matches being played more often is given priority over 
team-quality equalisation in designing the fixture. Nevertheless, these leagues persist 
with the unbalanced schedule, since they are happy with the current number of teams 
and season length". Lenten (2007) comments that the unbalanced schedule is nothing 
new, and was common for many years in English country cricket. 
In European football, some leagues are arranged such that each team plays other teams 
three times during the season. This can be called a partial round-robin system, where the 
number of home and away matches between two particular teams is unequal. In the 
competitive balance context, the key issue is whether the distribution of home field 
advantage is random or allocated on the basis of team performance to improve the 
(expected) distribution of sporting outcome. 
102 Among the reasons to play this way might be to capture the well-known home field advantage. More 
about home field advantage Can be found in for example Koning (2000), Dobson and Goddard (2001), 
and Forrest et al. (2005). 
'()" Lenten (2007) defines the structure of the Scottish league different from this thesis. hý defining it as 
unbalanced match schedule instead of post season play off when it comes to the last part of the season (the 
fi c matches in either the "Championship" League or in the "Relegation" League) (see p. 2 and 3 in 
Lenten). 
'`u \laxcv and \londello (2006. p. 347) define "imbalanced schedule" as a situation where "teams with 
similar records from the previous season play each other". 
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Comparing the definitions in Chapter 1 of competitive balance and sporting quality 
balance, it is clear that if an unbalanced match schedule in a tournament can affect the 
relationship between the distribution of sporting quality and sporting outcomes, the 
distribution of sporting outcomes is more appropriate as a general definition of 
competitive balance, with the distribution of sporting quality and the match schedule as 
two of the causal drivers of competitive balance. 
If the tournament match schedule provides an advantage for the weakest teams, and 
hence a disadvantage for better teams, one would expect the distribution of outcomes 
(e. g. end of season table) to be narrower than the distribution of sporting quality. 
Unbalanced match schedules can be seen as akin to a handicap system in horse racing or 
golf. 
Another issue of relevance for competitive balance is that the revenue distribution might 
be affected by (an unbalanced) match schedule. For the better teams, both opponents of 
higher sporting quality and improved match uncertainty will increase demand, although 
eventually reduced chances of obtaining sporting success might weaken the demand. 
For the weaker teams, both increased probabilities of sporting success and increased 
match uncertainty will tend to be positively related to increased demand, but on the 
other hand, weaker opponents will tend to be negatively correlated with attendance. It is 
possible that the demand effects of unbalanced match schedules may actually increase 
revenues for the stronger teams but have little overall impact on the revenues of weaker 
teams. Thus an unbalanced match schedule might only improve competitive balance in 
the short run and perversely actually worsen it in the longer run through the financial 
benefits to the stronger teams. '05 
Suppose that an unbalanced schedule is introduced to improve the competitive balance 
in a league, and that the championship winner is decided on the basis of a championship 
playoff. This means that the highest ranked teams at the end of the regular season 
qualify for the championship playoff. Ceteris paribus, the unbalanced schedule should 
now increase the possibility for weaker teams to qualify for the championship playoff. 
However, given profit maximizing behaviour by the stronger drawing teams, one would 
'"` According to Lenten (2007). Paul (2003) and Paul et al. (2004) are analv: ing effects on attendance 
from unbalanced match schedule in NHL and MLB, but these eiiccts might be different from the analyse' 
abo\ e because these leagues are unbalanced \% ith regards to local rivalry, and not from , porting qualit\. 
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expect that these teams would invest more in playing talent to secure playoff 
qualifications (given that the playoff is profitable, and that incentives will increase as 
the expected payoff rises). For simplicity, assume that the strongest teams would prefer 
no change in the degree of competitive balance in the regular season (in order to 
maintain the same probability of qualification for the lucrative playoff), so that it would 
be expected that the sporting quality of the stronger teams would increase compared to 
the weaker teams. The conclusion from this simple analysis would be that the win 
dispersion in the regular season would continue to be approximately the same, while the 
sporting quality balance would be worsened with no improvement in the probability of 
weaker teams qualifying for the playoff. The concentration of championship winners 
could be even stronger. In other words, the "total competitive balance" (that takes into 
account both within and across seasons) might be worsened (as will the profit among 
the strongest teams, ceteris paribus). This can be called the "unbalanced match schedule 
paradox". ' 06 
Analysing the effects of unbalanced schedule on competitive balance is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but intuitively the expectations are that there is likely to be some 
impact in a league where sporting quality differs between the teams. In a league where 
all teams are of equal sporting quality, the match schedule should not affect competitive 
balance, provided either that there is no home field advantage, or that teams play the 
same number of home and away matches if home field advantage exists. 
Implications for Competitive Balance Measures 
Defining competitive balance by sporting outcome implies that competitive balance 
measures such as the NSQF ratio do not need to be adjusted for an unbalanced schedule. 
Instead an unbalanced schedule can be treated as a possible explanatory factor for 
differences in competitive balance between leagues and/or over time. 107 
An C'. x ten. ion of the Goossens index might be a possible measure to better show the 
relationship between ex ante quality balance and ex post comparable win dispersion 
measure. This is because this measure uses the perfect competitive dominance as 
benchmark, and can be applied in a situation where teams are ranked ex ante and 
""6 Depending on the exact design of the match schedule. 
107 Sec Lenten (2007) for further references to a number of studies concerning these issue:. 
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adjustments are done with regards to the given match schedule. This is exactly what Utt 
and Fort (2002) suggest, including unbalanced match scheduling and interdivisional and 
interleague play, following Fort and Quirk (1997). for (within seasonal) competitive 
balance comparison using the Gini coefficient. Ltt and Fort (2002, p. 372) consider this, 
to be very complex to apply to the MLB. 
3.6. Prizes in Professional Team Sports 
Szymanski (2003c) argues that prizes are widely accepted among both economists and 
the general public as an incentive driver in individual sports, but are seldom considered 
as such in team sports. However this is only the case if prizes are defined only as direct 
financial rewards based on performance. 108 In the case of professional team sports, it is 
more appropriate to widen the notion of prizes to include sporting prizes such as 
championship titles, playoff qualification, promotion and retention of divisional status 
(i. e. avoidance of relegation) (see Gerrard, 2006b), as well as financial prizes. The 
specific structure of sporting prizes is a key characteristic of a complex league with 
important implications for competitive balance. The prize structure has two main 
impacts on competitive balance: (direct) demand effects and incentive effects. The 
demand effects relate to the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis and match significance. 
Demand is not only driven by the closeness of individual matches, but also the 
closeness of the competition for the various tournament prizes. The demand effects 
depend on the fan motivation, and are hence likely to be related only to sporting prizes, 
whereas the incentive effects for team owners, coaches and players are likely to depend 
on both sporting and financial prizes. 
The first step in this analysis is to identify the prizes in league tournaments. This topic 
has been largely ignored in the literature on team sports. The analysis of prizes in sports 
has largely been in the context of individual sports such as tennis and golf, where the 
prizes are largely financial apart from the sporting prize of winning the tournament. 
"The golf economy is one of the few examples of a pure prize economy" (Scully. 2002. 
p. 235). Financial prizes directly linked to tournament performance in many individual 
""' It looks like tiro manski in various articles (Szv manski, 2002,2003h. 2003c) focuses on the direct 
financial part of prizes. and maybe therefore uses the term promotion when a team promotes from the 
second to first le%el, and the term relegation (or penalty - Szymanski. 2003c; SzNmanski and Valletti, 
2005b) is used for relegating teams (as ot'course are the usual terms) instead of using prizes as terms. 
I loww ev er, the term "prize of first draft pick" is used in Szymanski (2003c, p. 61). This the, will 
categorise all these issues as prize:. 
91 
sports are the principal income source for the competitors. In contrast, the prize 
structure in many team sports is much more complex and much less financially driven. 
This is highlighted by Szymanski (2003b, p. 1169): 
While most individualistic sports offer substantial financial prizes to the 
winners, this is usually not the case in (professional) team sports. The team that 
wins a league championship may receive a cup, and team members may receive 
substantial bonuses, but the owners of the team in general stand to gain little or 
no direct monetary gain (i. e. prize money) from winning a championship. 
Further, Szymanski (2003b) emphasises that "participation in the playoff or final stage 
can be extremely valuable, and also that sponsorship income and merchandising are 
likely to be substantially increased by winning a championship, and that these factors 
will impact on decision making in much the same way as an explicit prize" (p. 1169). In 
a footnote, Szymanski also emphasises that (p. 1169): "Unlike a prize, the value of 
merchandising and related opportunities tends to differ between teams (e. (,,. because 
market sizes differ) and hence this kind of incentive promotes asymmetry". This 
incentive asymmetry is relevant in the context of competitive balance, because if there 
are prizes that are especially valuable for given teams, these teams will have an 
incentive to increase investment in playing talent compared to other teams. 
Extending the concept of the prize structure in professional team sports leagues can be 
done by following the suggestion of Szymanski to include different rewards, sporting 
and financially that teams can achieve by sporting performance. 
The most general difference in the prize structure between leagues is the difference 
between the open and closed leagues. In European football, characterised by a 
promotion and relegation system, one of the most significant prizes for weaker teams is 
avoiding relegation and retaining the team's current status in the merit hierarchy. 
Currently, only one of the top divisions among the members in the UEFA is closed, the 
San Marino league. 109 In contrast, the NAML are all closed leagues, where participation 
is not dependent on (recent) sporting performance. In closed leagues, such as the 
I Oy From the 1996! 97 season the league has bean closed (see, for example, 
en. \\ ikipc(lia. org, \\-iki/Campionato_Sammarinese_di_Calcio and wvwvw. rsssf. com). 
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NAML and Australian Rules Football, there are prizes for weaker teams through the 
drafting procedures. 
The "rookie drafting" is a system that regulates the recruitment of new players into a 
league. According to Andreff and Staudohar (2002, p. 39) it is "a characteristic of the 
American system", but it is also used in other leagues as well, such as in . -Australia. 
Rottenberg (1956) describes the "draft or selection rule" as a system that gives players 
in lower classification leagues the possibility of moving to a higher classification 
league. In general, the reverse-order-of-finish draft system allocates playing talent such 
that the worst-performing team in the previous season will be the first to pick a new 
player in each round of the draft (see, for example, Eckard, 2001. Fort, 2006a). It was 
introduced in the NFL in 1936 with the intention of improving, competitive balance (see, 
for example, Fort and Quirk, 1995). The other NAML adopted the draft system later. ' 10 
Since the team that picks the first player will have an advantage compared to the other 
teams, the draft system can be considered as a "sporting prize". "' However, the draft 
system is a sporting reward but not one that impacts on immediate sporting performance 
directly (unlike relegation), although a favourable position in the draft may yield 
positive sporting (and/or financial) benefits in the future, as described in Grier and 
Tollison (1994). 
There are different ways of organizing a draft system. For example, a weighted lottery 
can be used to decide the order in which teams make their draft picks. Analysing the 
NBA and the use of different systems for drafting, Taylor and Trogdon (2002) find 
empirical support for tournament theory that a system of a "pure" reverse-to-order draft 
gives incentives for teams out of play-off contention to underperform at the end of the 
season in order to obtain a better draft position. This would also be the case with a 
weighted (as opposed to a uniform) lottery system for drafting. 2 The design of a draft 
system can affect the incentives for winning among the weaker teams in a league. In a 
perfect reverse order drafting system, there are incentives for teams to perform poorly. 
These perverse incentives are inconsistent with contest legitimacy (Gerrard, 2004b). In 
the competitive balance context, these incentives might actually lead to a worsening of 
110 NB. \ in 1949. \ILB in 1965. and NHL shortly after (see, for example, Quirk and Fort, 1992). 
111 This is done despite that Rottenberg (1956, p. 249) claims the advantage to be "Iargclý illusory". 
112 For example has the NHL (in 2005) an "Entry Draft- procedure that is based on a weighted lottery 
s\ stem (www ww. nhl. com). 
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ex post competitive balance since underperformance among the weaker teams will 
widen the win dispersion. 
An interesting alternative possibility for organising the draft system is to have some 
form of "draft playoff' in which the weaker teams out of contention for the post-season 
playoff qualification would compete to win a better position in the draft picks. This 
would increase the incentives for these teams to be the best among the weakest, and 
should reduce the incentive differences between weaker teams in open and closed 
leagues. The significance of the reduction would be a function of the strength of the 
prize difference between the leagues. The prize for not being relegated would always 
tend to be much greater than any of the alternative prizes available to the weaker teams 
in a closed league. Hence, ceteris paribus, an open league will generate better 
competitive balance than a closed league. "3 The impact of relegation in open leagues 
and draft systems in closed leagues provide two clear examples of how competitive 
balance can be affected by incentive effects of the league's prize structure. 
A review of studies in Szymanski (2003b) measuring the effects on competitive balance 
after introduction of a draft system shows mixed results with cases of both insignificant 
and significant improvement. ' 4 These empirical results indicate that the positive long 
term effects on competitive balance more than offset any negative incentive effects of 
reverse-of-order draft incentive in regular season play. 
The other main difference in league structure is whether prizes are decided on the basis 
of sporting performance within the regular season or a post-season tournament 
(qualification for which is a prize in itself). A closed league with no playoffs has only 
one prize, the championship, while a league with a championship playoff has two prizes 
- qualification for the playoff, and winning the playoff (i. e. the championship). 
One example of (direct) performance based financial prizes in European football is the 
performance based allocation of income from the collective selling of broadcasting 
rights in the FA Premier League in England. Szymanski (2003b) discusses how 25 
percent of media revenues are based on performance, with the Premiership champions 
receiving twenty times as much as the team finishing in last place. According to for 
11' Sec Stvmanski (2003b) for further discussion. 
114 These studies are Daly and Moore (1981), La Croix and Kawaura (1999), Fort and Quirk (1995). and 
Grier and Tollison (I 994). 
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example Szymanski (2003c), it is based on the following formula for a 20 teams league: 
Broadcasting prize = f[(21-r)/210], where r is the rank in the final standing. 115 
Elsewhere in European football there are other examples of performance based financial 
prizes such as in the UEFA Champions League and the Scandinavian Royal 
League' 6.117 
Based on the discussions above, prizes in the context of professional team sports can be 
divided into two types. Financial prizes are direct financial rewards based on sporting 
performance, while sporting prizes are prizes awarded on the basis of sporting 
performance, and are not "directly" financial. Sporting prizes in professional team 
sports generally consist of the championship, merit qualifications (promotion, 
qualifications to post-seasonal tournaments) and avoiding relegation. ' 18 In addition, 
more favourable future playing schedules and drafting rights can also be regarded as 
sporting prizes. Financial and sporting prizes are not independent, since they are both 
based on sporting performance. They may also have financial consequences through the 
impact on future sporting performance, but are not necessarily overlapping each other. 
Importantly, sporting prizes in team sports are hypothesised to be a demand driver, due 
to uncertainty of seasonal/tournament outcomes, as shown in Jennett (1984), 119 and 
hence have financial effects for the teams. 
As argued above, prizes can affect incentives for sporting performance, and hence either 
ex ante competitive balance and/or ex post competitive balance. At the ex ante level, 
prizes can affect incentives related to the relative quality of a team, if certain teams can 
expect to profit more than others from the prize structure. For example, the introduction 
115 More generally: (N+1-r) / [(N+1)*0.5N]. 
. 16 See for example: int. royalleague. com/page. aspx? id=97 and www. uefa. com/newsfiles/19071. pdf. 
117 An interesting interview emphasises that performance based financial prizes can be a motivating factor 
for a team. The coach for the Norwegian team Odd Grenland claims in a newspaper interview 
(pub. tv2. no/nettavisen/sport/tippeliga/oddgrenland/article474072. ece) that to be number eight (out of 
fourteen) should be a motivating factor for the team at the end of the season because that will give the 
team a two week period of training at La Manga in Spain during the winter for free instead of only one. 
According to the coach, this should be very important because the team is the one with lowest revenue in 
the league (in the 2005 season). 
118 There are also places in these tournaments that will be won by performance in domestic cups. For 
example, the teams in the FA Premier League in England compete in two domestic tournaments in 
addition to the league. This is the League Cup and the FA Cup (prizes here are UEFA cup participation). 
In addition, financial prizes are also won by performance in these cup tournaments. See the following 
web pages: www. football-league. premiumtv. co. uk/staticFiles/4f/7a/0,, 10794-96847,00. pdf, 
www. thefa. conVTheFACup/TheFACup/NewsAndFeatures/Postings/2007/06/FACupPrizeFund and 
www. thefa. conVTheFACup/TheFACup/NewsAndFeatures/FAC-Cardiff UEFACup. htm. 
"9 Demand studies show that match/championship significance is a significant variable (see, for example. 
Jennett, 1984; Downward and Dawson, 2000; Dobson and Goddard, 2001 for reviews). 
95 
of the financially valuable UEFA Champions League may have changed the im estment 
policy of some (high drawing power) teams, compared to other teams, and hence 
contributed to a deterioration in the sporting quality balance in the league. 
In summary, sporting performance is rewarded by a number of prizes in professional 
team sports. These prizes may have financial value, but the value can differ 
significantly, both with regards to the given team's attributes (such as drawing power). 
and with the sporting status of the prize. For example, there is only a relatively small 
financial difference between finishing first and second in the English FA Premier 
League, but a huge difference in prestige between these two outcomes. This relationship 
and the typical prizes in professional team sports can be summarised as follows: 1 ýo 
Prestige Trophies 
Merit Qualification 
Sporting Performance 4 Future Match Schedule - Financial Value 
Draft Picks 
Financial Prizes 
In sports, prizes can be defined as tournament payoffs for a certain sporting 
performance. Prizes (sporting and financial) should be split into two types for 
professional team sports: graded and threshold prizes. Graded prizes can be defined as 
prizes where payoff is a direct function of sporting outcomes. One example is the 
performance based part of broadcasting revenues for teams where the deals are 
collectively negotiated, such as in the English FA Premier League. Future (season t+ 1) 
match schedule might also be categorised as graded if it is based on (the reverse of the) 
performance in this season (t). 
Threshold prizes are rewarded on basis of reaching a certain limit (threshold) in sporting 
output. Merit qualifications, such as continuing (no relegation) in the division and 
qualification for post-season play, are examples of threshold prizes. Winning the 
championship (prestige trophies) is another example of this kind of prize. 
Each prize category in this overview can be treated as graded and'or threshold prizes. 
For example, the classification of draft picks is related to the system in the given league. 
A pure reverse-order system is graded, while a combination of reverse-order among the 
I '" Direct financial effect,, from different prize and league structures will not be discussed in this chapter. 
ex en if closed leagues may ha-, e financial advantages for the teams due to incenti\ e eft'ccis 
in a league 
with relegation (scc, for c anlple, Szv manski, 2003b: Sz manski and Ross. 2000). 
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upper half and uniformly weighted lottery among the bottom half combines the graded 
and threshold prize systems. 
In general, all prizes (including sporting prizes) can be related to financial value. The 
financial value for a prize can be split into two parts: certain payment (direct financial 
value, such as broadcasting revenues) and future payment (indirect financial value, such 
as payoff from qualification to the UEFA Champions League, and negative future 
financial effects from relegation). Hence each team faces a prize payoff function in 
relation to performance: 121 
PPO, (r) = f(r) + gi(r) 
where: 
PPO; (r) = the prize value for team i related to its sporting outcome r. 
f(r) = financial payoff from graded prizes, as a function of sporting outcome r. 
g; (r) = financial payoff from threshold prizes for team i as a function of sporting 
outcome r. It is related to (present value of) future financial payoff from winning 
a threshold prize, such as qualification for UEFA Champions League. 
Note that a significant difference between the NAML and European football systems 
appears when it comes to the course of PPO; (r). In European football all prizes are 
upward driven, with break points (avoid relegation, UEFA Champions League), so the 
better sporting outcome the higher value, both sporting and financially for a given team. 
This structure of prizes can be called monotonic, and differs from the NAML system, 
where prizes are both upward and downward driven. These leagues have this two-way 
non-monotonic prize system, because additional to the upward prizes, both draft pricks 
and future schedule might be positive related to weaker sporting performance. Another 
difference between these two continents is that a given team in European football can 
only win one domestic prestige trophy within a league tournament - the championship. 
In NAML the tournament structure makes it possible for a given team to compete for 
121 Further, the difficulties of prizes in teams sports are emphasised in Szymanski (2003b, p. 1169): "One 
might hope to see future research attempt to quantify the \ alue of prize like elements in the dit'ferent team 
sports. ' 
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more prestige trophies, such as being a division winner and a conference winner in the 
context of the same tournament. 1 22 
Prize concentration in perfect competitive balance can be related to a distribution of 
prize winners with the following expected outcome for each team: 
E(team; ) = (z*t)/N 
where: 
E(team; ) = expected number of times that the i`h team will win a specific prize. 
z= the number of winners of a specific prize in any given season (z =I for the 
championship but z>1 for post-season tournament qualification). 
t= the number of seasons. 
N= number of teams in the league. 
In addition to having the possibility for measuring success-failure ratios on every single 
prize in a league, the existence of both positive and negative valued prizes in for 
example European football leagues gives an opportunity to create a new prize driven 
measure based on the difference between teams that are successful (win positive prizes) 
and teams that fail (are punished by negative prizes). By successful is meant a team 
winning a positive sporting prize, such as qualification for a European tournament, 
while relegation represents a failure prize. In addition to success and failure prizes, 
European football leagues have what could be called neutral prizes, which is to retain 
the current status. If, for example, the difference between success and failure prizes is 
small, this can indicate a high level of competitiveness. A measure can be called the 
"success prize - failure prize ratio": 
(Performance marginal success team - Performance marginal fail team) 
Average league performance 
123 
Win percentage marginal success team - Win percentage marginal fail team 
`, t uropean teams can also win multiple prestige trophies in a , ingle season, but by competing in 
multiple separate tournament. 
Adjustment is not necessary because the average is 0.5. 
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3.7. Competitive Intensity 
The current literature on competitiveness in professional team sports has not yet fully 
recognised the significance of real-world multi-prize complex tournaments. Zimbalist 
(2003a), Quirk and Fort (1992), Bennett and Fizel (1995). and Gerrard (2004b) describe 
competitive balance as a complex concept. Both Bennett and Fizel (1995) and Quirk 
and Fort (1992) emphasise that the competitive balance concept "refers to a number of 
aspects of competition". In Chapter 2 this complexity was considered in the context of a 
simple league structure in regard to time (ex ante and ex post) and the three dimensions 
(win dispersion, performance persistence and prize concentration). The current chapter 
has extended the consideration of the complexity of competitive balance arising from 
the complexity of tournament and prize structures. 
Including multiple prize structures into the term competitive balance will make it even 
more complex than the multi dimensional focus in Chapter 2, and perhaps too complex 
to be operational. Hence, it might be appropriate to use a straightforward definition of 
the competitive balance concept that reflects the consensus that competitive balance 
refers to the distribution of the sporting outcomes among the teams in a 
league/tournament. Note that this consensus view does not preclude using the 
distribution of prizes as indicators of competitive balance. But I suggest that we should 
treat competitiveness relative to the league's prize structure separately from the 
competitive balance concept. Typically in European football, as, for example, in the 
English FA Premier League, the multiple prize system creates a series of "sub- 
tournaments". In the NAML there are several aspects relating to tournament structure, 
such as qualification procedures for playoffs and the differences in league structures. 
These aspects can all be included in a new concept called competitive intensity, defined 
as the degree of competition IVithin the ii'hole prize structure of the league/tournament. 
The differences between the concepts of competitive balance and competitive intensity 
can be shown using the English FA Premier League as an example. Competitive 
balance reflects the differences in sporting outcome among all teams in the Premier 
League, while competitive intensity will (give a picture of the intensity of 
competitiveness for the different prizes (or sub-tournaments) within the league. For 
European football this means that competitive intensity is a concept that tries to capture 
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a league's overall competitiveness with regards to championship. direct entry to the 
UEFA Champions League, entry to UEFA Champions League qualifying rounds, 
qualification for the UEFA Cup, and avoiding relegation. 
It is possible that the Premier League has a weaker competitive balance as a 
consequence of increased dispersion of sporting quality among the teams, but at the 
same time competitive intensity may have been improved, due to a changed prize 
structure, such as the increased number of teams qualifying for the UEFA Champions 
League. 
In the FA Premier League, the measures of competitive balance in all three dimensions 
show weakened competitive balance over the last 20 years, but, contrary to the 
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, fan interest measured by gate attendances has 
increased substantially. The NSQF ratio has increased from an average of 1.44 in the 
period 1986/87-1995/96 to an average of 1.61 in the next ten season period. The average 
Spearman's rank correlation coefficient has increased between the two periods from 
0.44 to 0.62. In addition, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index on championship winner 
concentration has increased from 0.2 to 0.38. All these measures are consistent in 
indicating that competitive balance in the English top division has weakened during this 
period. ' 24 However, over the last 20 seasons, the average attendance has increased by 
more than 70 percent, even with admission prices having risen significantly. Of course, 
there are a number of factors affecting attendance, and for the English top division one 
of these may be greater exposure through TV coverage. The quality of the league has 
also risen significantly in the post-Bosman period with a significant influx of top 
foreign players. 1 25 
However, even if there are a number of external factors that have affected the interest 
for the league, other elements have changed as well. At the start of the period referred to 
above, teams from the English top division were excluded from the UEFA team 
tournaments; they are now fully involved again and a significant presence in the final 
knockout stages of the tournaments most seasons. In addition, structural changes in the 
UEFA Champions League and the UEFA Cup have tended to be advantageous for 
''' More detailed empirical results on competitive balance in the FA Premier League and other leagues 
will be presented in later chapters. 
125 The global football market, as described as one of the element,, in Andreff and Stadudohar', ý (2002) 
MCMN1(i model, can be seen as a characteristic for the current F: \ Premier League. 
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teams from the biggest leagues, such as the FA Premier League. Previously, only one 
team (i. e. the league champions) could participate in the UEFA Champions Cup. 
Currently the top four teams from the English FA Premier League may now enter the 
UEFA Champions League. As a consequence, the structure of the English top division 
has changed significantly during these twenty seasons - from a time where two prizes 
were awarded; the championship and the prize to stay in the division, to the current 
prize structure where teams in addition to these two prizes can qualify for UEFA 
Champions League directly, win entry to the UEFA Champions League qualifications, 
qualify for the UEFA Cup and UEFA Intertoto cup. The competitive intensity has been 
increased due to the more complex prize system, and this may have offset the effects of 
the reduction in competitive balance on the uncertainty of outcome and the 
enjoyment/excitement of attending and watching games (see also Sandy et al., 2004). 
Match significance in a simple league context is only related to the championship. In a 
complex league system, the number of matches of significance for prize outcome will 
usually be higher, ceteris paribus, because teams will also have matches of significance 
for playoffs and relegation. For example Cairns (1987) claims that because of 
restructuring the Scottish football league in 1975, more matches became significant 
("counted", p. 262) in relation to the championship, qualifications for European 
tournaments and relegation. Because uncertainty of outcomes at seasonal level in 
complex league systems will be related to a number of prizes, match significance will 
depend on the prize structure. In other words, the number of prize significant matches is 
likely to be greater in a complex league system, ceteris paribus. 
The way of interpreting uncertainty of outcome on seasonal/tournament level in Jennett 
(1984) has many similarities with the competitive intensity concept. Jennett claims that 
only focusing on the playing strength among the teams in a league might be too narrow 
to represent uncertainty at the seasonal/tournament level, because it is not capturing 
enough of the relationship between uncertainty and attendance, particularly the utility 
that spectators derive from matches that are significant for "the overall championship 
race" (p. 179). More specifically, the basic idea behind competitive intensity is related 
to Jennett's championship and relegation significance variables. Competitive intensity 
will capture these conditions, and reflect the number of prizes, their importance and the 
intensity around each prize. 
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Competitive balance and competitive intensity are not strictly independent concepts. 
Intuitively, competitive balance will affect competitive intensity because, ceteris 
paribus, a league with better competitive balance is expected to have more intense 
competition for the different prizes. However, this relationship is not unambiguous. If a 
league's sporting outcomes are concentrated around two poles, the top prizes and the 
relegation battle, the win dispersion will be wide but there will be a high level of 
competitive intensity. Since competitive intensity is strongly related to a tournament's 
prize structure, competitive balance is only one of the dependent variables driving the 
level of competitive intensity: 
Cl = f(prizep, CB, u) 
where: 
prizep = prize,, prize.,....., prizep, the different prizes should be weighted on 
basis of its relative importance. 
CB = competitive balance, which is assumed to affect the competition among the 
prizes. 
u= others variables affecting competitive intensity. 
There are at least two advantages of introducing the concept of competitive intensity. 
First, it allows the competitive balance concept to be defined in a more limited and 
straightforward way. Second, it focuses more attention to the leagues' prize structure. 
The challenge remains to find appropriate aggregate measures for competitive intensity 
that take into account all prizes/outcomes of a league, the level of uncertainty of 
outcome for each, and degree of importance. The approach adopted here is a more 
disaggregated one, focusing on the measurement of the degree of competitive intensity 
for individual prizes. 
In the NAML, the large number of divisions potentially increases the degree of 
competitive intensity, because a team's relative performance is dependent on both the 
teams in its own division, as well as the general standing in its conference. This might 
increase the level of match significance and competitive intensity related to winning the 
division, winning the conference, and qualifying for the playoffs. Competitive balance, 
on the other hand, is more independent of the tournament and prize structure, apart from 
any incentive and schedule effects. as discussed above. 
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From the perspective of competitive intensity, the unbalanced match schedule might 
affect the intensity through creating more matches of significance around the prize, and 
possibly also more intense competition around the prizes, because more teams are 
fighting for the different prizes. 
The three key elements in the competitive intensity equation above can be summarised 
by "the competitive balance circle", as shown in the following figure: 
CBýPS 
cI 
Figure 3.1: The competitive balance circle 
The first element of the circle is related to competitive balance (CB) in a simple league 
context. The next element captures the multiple prize structure (PS) and the limitation 
of competitive balance as a means of reflecting the overall competitiveness of a 
tournament relative to all prizes, and hence the development of the concept of 
competitive intensity (CI) as the third element of the circle. But, as discussed above, the 
incentive effects created by the prize structure and the competitive intensity for each 
prize will in turn impact on competitive balance, taking the relationship full circle. 
These issues will now be explored empirically in the second half of this thesis. 
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4. Empirical Analyses of Competitive Balance across Leagues 
4.1. Introduction 
The most popular measure of competitive balance, the NSQF ratio, gives a picture of 
competitive balance related to a so-called idealized league, where all teams are assumed 
to have the same probability to win the tournament. Given the assumptions of the 
calculations of the idealized league, as shown in Chapter 2, an analyst vtvill be able to 
calculate how far away a given league's competitive balance is from the ideal. 
Additionally, a league's governing body might also want information from other 
leagues for comparing competitive balance across leagues, as well as analysing how its 
"relative" competitive balance has changed over time. 
This chapter's purpose is to empirically give a detailed picture of competitive balance in 
the football leagues in Europe, in addition to comparisons with other leagues. The 
current literature of competitive balance has mainly focused on competitive balance in 
the bigger leagues. For European football this means the top divisions for the Big Five 
leagues. The motivation for this chapter is to empirically measure competitive balance 
for all member leagues of the UEFA. Due to the great differences in such as the size 
between different European football leagues, they will be categorized in different 
groups in the presentation in this chapter. This categorisation of leagues makes it 
possible to extend analyses beyond the recent literature, and analyse whether the Big 
Five leagues are representative for competitive balance in European football, or if there 
are systematic differences between different groups of leagues. 
The general picture of competitive balance will be related to the three dimensions 
described earlier. In other words, for each league, competitive balance is measured both 
with regards to win dispersion, performance persistence and prize concentration. This 
should take into account a criticism in Szymanski (2003b) that only focusing on win 
dispersion (standard deviation) will be too narrow, and will not take into account 
variation across seasons. The three basic dimensions ýti ill be measured by the NSQF 
IN 
ratio, the SRCC and the HHI on championship winners. These measures are among the 
most popular within their dimension. 126 
Prize concentration can be measured in two «avs. First, the distribution of 
championship winners is a generally applicable, since all competitions have an overall 
winner. Second, in professional team sports, qualifying for playoffs can also be 
categorised as prizes, and playoff concentration is an alternative to championship 
concentration. For example, all the NAML have post-seasonal playoffs. In European 
football this part of the dimension is not straightforward. All UFF. -A member leagues 
have some kind of post-seasonal playoff, since performance in regular season can be 
used for domestic championship playoffs and/or qualification for the international 
UEFA team competitions (that can be seen as a post-season play). The last part of this 
chapter will apply complex league system measures related to multiple match outcomes, 
post-seasonal qualifications in some leagues, and promotion and relegation issues. 
4.2. Literature Review 
Empirical analyses of competitive balance have been part of the literature of the 
economics of professional team sports. This literature includes descriptive analyses of 
competitive balance in leagues, and in the beginning it focused on the NAML, both 
related to single league analyses and comparisons with other major leagues. Rottenberg 
(1956) counted the number of championships won by the best teams, and showed 
imbalance in both AL and NL. Quirk and Fort (1992) compare competitive balance 
within and between the NAML over time. Vrooman (1995) summarizes his findings of 
differences in competitive balance in the MLB, NBA and NFL (p. 985): 
Clearly the NFL is the most competitively balanced, MLB is slightly less 
competitively balanced, and the NBA is the least competitively balanced of the 
three leagues. These estimates of competitive balance..... are corroborated by 
every recent study.... 
More recently, similar analyses have been extended to other leagues as well. In Europe, 
the focus has been on (European) football leagues, both related to "single league trends" 
t'`' This means that for example the Kendall's r will not be used, c en though it according to Groot (2008, 
p. 15) is "relatively easy to grasp how this measure is calculated". 
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over time, comparisons with other European leagues, as well as to NAIL. Examples of 
empirical studies of competitive balance in European football can be found with 
Szymanski and Kuypers (1999), Hoehn and Szymanski (1999). Koning (_'000). 
Szymanski (2001), Dobson and Goddard (2001), Szymanski and Smith (2002 ). 
Buzzacchi et al. (2003), Gerrard (1998,2004b, 2006a). Bourg (2004), Dejonghe (2004). 
Cain and Haddock (2006), and Groot (2008). An interesting observation is found in 
Gerrard (2004b), showing that the Big Five leagues seem to have better competitive 
balance. 127 
When comparing competitive balance between NAML and a number of European 
football leagues, both Szymanski and Smith (2002) and Buzzacchi et al. (2003) 
emphasise that the competitive balance indications are dependent on how the concept is 
measured. Average within-seasonal measures, usually the NSQF ratio, typically find the 
open leagues in European football to be better balanced than the closed NAM L, 
although Buzzacchi et al. find a trend towards similarity during the sample period. The 
latter can be explained through a negative trend on average for the European football 
leagues, while at the same time the NAML on average had a trend in the opposite 
direction, except from the 1970s. However, this is only partly confirmed in the 
calculations by the NSQF ratio in this thesis. For the Big Five leagues there are 
indications of a negative trend. For NAML there is only slight improvement, but the 
distance between the leagues is still significant (in favour of Big Five). Note that the 
comparison of competitive balance in three NAML (the MLB, NFL and NHL) with four 
European football leagues (Italy, Spain, Portugal and England) over thirty years in 
Szymanski and Smith (2002), find the NSQF ratio to be pretty similarly balanced on 
average on both sides of the Atlantic. ' 2ý 
Performance persistence, or dynamic competitive balance, ' 29 that is related to season to 
season changes in performance among the teams, is better in NAML measured by 
Buzzacchi et al. (2003) and Szymanski and Smith (2002). They conclude that the closed 
NAML are better balanced over time than the open European football leagues. 
Szymanski and Smith also emphasise that even if more teams are included in the top 
divisions in European football over a number of seasons, the across season competitive 
12' Four of the Big Fi\ c leagues are historically among the highly competitive group of leagues (when 
ranking 16 Western European leagues into three groups of competitive balance). 
Ho\\ ever, the calculations in Szymanski and Smith (2002) differ from Buzzacchi et al. (2003). The 
latter is equal to what is used in similar calculations in this thesis. 
ý'`' This term is for example used h\ S/\ manski and Smith (2002) and Buzzacchi et al. (2003). 
106 
balance seems to be better in the closed NAML. The calculations in this thesis do not 
support this general conclusion, except from the last twenty seasons of the sample, 
where NAML is slightly better. 
In general, Szymanski and Smith (2002, p. 122) describe the consequences of the 
structural differences between European football leagues and NAML by using the 
expressions "equality of opportunity" and "equality of outcomes". The first is related to 
that the European leagues are open for all teams, but are in general dominated by only a 
few. The second expression is related to the closed NAML that are not open to all, but 
where the teams that are included "have a fair chance of competing at the highest level. " 
Buzzacchi et al. (2003) give a preference of which of these two ways to measure 
competitive balance should be most weighted (p. 182): "We believe that the dynamic 
measure presents a better picture of competitive balance than the static measure". The 
differences between the NAML and European football leagues are characterised in 
Szymanski and Smith (2002, p. 109) as the difference between "the more cartelised 
North American leagues" and "the more 'competitive' European leagues". ' 30 
4.3. Data and Methods 
Presenting empirical data on competitive balance within European football is not 
straightforward. By June 2006, the UEFA consisted of 52 member associations. These 
are: 131 
Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Belarus, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, England, 
Estonia, F. Y. R Macedonia, Faroe Islands, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lichtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, 
130 See, for example, Hoehn and Szymanski (1999), Buzzacchi et al. (2003) and Szymanski (2004) for 
further description and overview over structural differences between the NAML and European football 
leagues. 
131 Later in 2006 Montenegro went out of the Serbia and Montenegro association. Montenegro created its 
own association that became a provisional member from the 5th of October 2006 
(www. uefa. com/magazine/news/kind=16/newsid=469287. html), and became a full member in 2007 
(www. uefa. com/footballeurope/countries/association=92853/index. html). Serbia continued as a separate 
association. Since these changes happened after the end of the sample period of this thesis, they do not 
affect the analyses. 
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Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Ireland, Romania. Russia, San %Iarino, 
Scotland, Serbia and Montenegro. Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden. 
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and Wales. 
All of these UEFA members have their own league, except Lichtenstein, where the 
teams play in the Swiss league. ' 32 In addition to the leagues given above, a number of 
former associations have been dissolved as a consequence of the restructuring at 
national level in Eastern Europe. These are the associations from Soviet Union, East 
Germany, West Germany, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. 
The number of European football leagues included in the sample are the "current" 
(2005/06) 51 leagues of member associations, plus the four "old" leagues in the Soviet 
Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The total number of European 
football leagues covered during the sample period is therefore 55 leagues (Germany and 
West Germany are treated as one entity' 33) 14 
Two problems appear in analyses of comparisons of competitive balance over time 
across European football leagues. First, there is a significant group of leagues without 
UEFA membership during the whole sample period, particularly leagues in Eastern 
Europe. Second, leagues have undergone structural changes during the sample period, 
and some of these league structures do not fit with the measures used in this chapter. An 
example here is (West) Germany before the restructuring to the 1963/64 season, where 
the league was divided into five geographical divisions, with championship playoffs. 135 
It is difficult to calculate definitive results on the NSQF ratio and the SRCC under this 
structure. 16 Therefore, complete comparisons of competitive balance between the 
UEFA member leagues cannot be made for the whole sample period. 
The sample period in this part of the thesis is sixty seasons (the post Second World War 
period), from 1946(/47) to 2005(/06). It is therefore possible to combine different 
periods over time, such as six periods of ten seasons, four periods of 15 seasons and two 
132 There are also leagues ww here some teams participate in other leagues, such as that San Marino has one 
team in the (professional) Italian league (en. \\ ikipedia. or(, wiki/San_Marino_Calcio), and Wales has 
teams in the English league (ww, ww- w. football-league. premiumtv. co. uk, pagc'Home 0 10794,00. html). 
Iii This is following the UEFA (wtiwww-wiw. uefa. comiuefa aboutuefa, matchassociations, association=47. html). 
4 There is also a number of European football leagues organised in associations outside the LFFA. 
These are not included in the sample of the thesis. These leagues can be found at %vww. rssst'. com . 1" See for example wvwvw f-arehiv. de . 
``' in general, analyses of championship ww inners will be independent of structure. 
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periods of 30 seasons. In this chapter the choice is to concentrate on ten season periods. 
which might be seen as arbitrary. However, since this will make it easier to put the 
"new" leagues in Eastern Europe into position to be included in the last period, it makes 
sense not to use too long periods. In addition, the latter period can include consequences 
of the Bosman verdict and changes in the UEFA Champions League structure. 
It is useful to "categorise" different European football leagues for the purposes of 
analysis. The Big Five leagues in European football is a generally accepted grouping. 
The analyses below will extend the categorisations of leagues on the basis of both 
location, date of formation, and financial size (as measured by average league 
attendances in the top division). 137 Additional to the European football leagues, the 
NAML are included for comparison purposes. The different groups are (additional to 
Big Five): 
- 2WE = Netherlands, Turkey, Scotland, Portugal and Belgium 
-3WE= Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Austria and Greece 
- EEW = Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Albania 
- EEO = Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Yugoslavia 
- SOV = Soviet Union, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Georgia, Azerbaijan, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Armenia and Moldova 
- CZE = Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic and Slovakia 
- YUG = Yugoslavia, Croatia, Serbia-M., Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and F. 
Y. R 
Macedonia. Bosnia-Herzegovina is only included in the championship winner 
concentration measure. 
- GER = East Germany, West Germany and Germany 
- MEL A= Andorra, San Marino, Israel, Northern Ireland, 
Malta, Faroe Islands, 
Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Iceland, Luxemburg and Wales 
- MEL B= Northern Ireland, Malta, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, 
Iceland and 
Luxemburg 
- NAML = NBA (National Basketball Association), 
MLB (Major League Baseball), 
NHL (National Hockey League), and the NFL (National Football League) 
Analyses are not limited to the time after federations has joined the UEFA. This 
includes for example Israel and Faroe Islands. 
137 Source: \\ \v \\. cLiropean-football-,, tati,, tic,,. co. ulc/'attn. htm. 
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According to Fort (2006a, 2007), it is important to calculate competitive balance for the 
leagues where the matches have been played. This is relevant for the \ILB where the 
teams are divided into two leagues, the American League (AL) and the National League 
(NL). Until recently, the teams only played their matches within its own league (and no 
cross-league matches). However, the World Series (playoff) is based on both NL and 
AL. 
The data on football leagues is collected from the rsssf. com, and from websites linked 
from rsssf. com. The analyses from European football leagues will only be on the top 
divisions. For the NAML, data is collected from their websites: nhl. com, nba. com, 
mlb. com and nfl. com, and from ESPN. com. 
The empirical analyses will mainly focus on three issues. These are trends in 
competitive balance over the sample period within each group of leagues, comparisons 
of competitive balance between the different groups of leagues, and relationship 
between measures of the three basic dimensions. In addition, some of the leagues within 
groups will be highlighted. In other words, analysing a league's competitive balance 
requires a range of points to consider: 
1. Cross-sectional comparisons to indicate the level of one league's competitive 
balance in comparison to other leagues. 
2. Time series 
a. Comparing a specific league over time to indicate eventual trends over time in 
competitive balance. The statistical tests applied in this chapter are t-tests on 
basis of differences between two means (see, for example, Triola and Franklin, 
1994). 
b. Across leagues. Comparing one league's trends over time with other leagues' 
trends. 
3. Comparisons in the three dimensions of competitive balance. 
Some calculations will be done for periods consisting of less than ten seasons. Because 
the use of average values of each league, adjustments/weightings should not be required 
for win dispersion and performance persistence. However, HHI is adjusted for "missed" 
seasons. 
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The main focus in this chapter is to provide a survey over competitive balance across 
and within leagues over time. The first part will concentrate on what can be seen as the 
three main measures in this thesis: 
- End of season) win dispersion: NSQF ratio, where wins are given the valtic I. and 
draw matches are treated as half wins. The idealized standard deviation is not 
adjusted for the possibility for draw matches. 138 In other words: 
[ASD(100%, 50%, 0%)]/[ISD(100%, 0%)]. 
- Prize concentration: HHI of the championship winners. 
- Performance persistence: SRC C (from season to season), based on the method to ex 
ante rank promoted teams (see Chapter 3). 
The second part is related to more specific measures applied in complex league 
structures. This will only be done for a number of leagues. 
4.4. Empirical Results 
4.4.1. Win Dispersions 
The NSQF ratio indicates the spread of sporting outcome among all teams in a league. 
A higher ratio reflects a relatively wider spread in the sporting outcome, and hence 
weaker competitive balance. As shown in Chapter 2, a ratio of one indicates perfect 
competitive balance in relation to what is defined as a simple league. 
As described earlier in this chapter, win dispersion has not been calculated for a longer 
period in all European football leagues. This is taken into account in the different 
groups. For example in the Big Five group, Germany is not included in the win 
dispersion calculation in the first two periods. To avoid eventual distortion in 
comparisons over time, win dispersion excluding Germany is also calculated for all 
periods. The same principle is followed for the other groups. T-tests are done within 
each group from period to period. The null hypothesis is assumed to be no change in 
competitive balance, while the alternative hypothesis is that there is a change in 
13S Sec the discussions in Chapters 2 and 3 
competitive balance. In such a broad analysis. there are no prior beliefs on the direction 
of change in competitive balance, ' 39 so the tests are two-sided. In addition to the general 
comparisons over time and across leagues, there are also other general issues of special 
interest such as the impact of the introduction of the UEFA Champions Cup, expansion 
of UEFA Champions League, free agency (i. e. the Bosman ruling), and the split from 
bigger to smaller leagues in Eastern Europe. The first should be related to differences 
from period (I) to (II), while the other changes mentioned above are relevant for the 
difference between period (V) and (VI). For the restructured leagues in Eastern Europe, 
comparisons will be done between period (VI) and the previous period. The results on 
win dispersion are shown below: 
Table 4.1: Ten-season win dispersion measured by the NSQF ratio in European football 
and NAML from 1946(/47) - 2005(/06) 
1946/47- 
1955/56 
I 
1956/57- 
1965/66 
II 
1966/67- 
1975/76 
III) 
1976,77- 
1985/86 
(IV) 
1986 87- 
1995,96 
(V) 
1996 97- Sign 
2005 06 
(\'I) 14VI 
Big F. ex. Germ. 1.26 1.34 1.34 1.41 1.44 1.49 
Big Five 1.26 1.34 1.32 1.42* 1.42 1.49 
2WE ex. NL/Tur 1.49 1.69 1.73 1.78 1.82 1.81 
2WE 1.49 1.59 1.68 1.65 1.79 1.81 
3WE ex. Greece 1.45 1.50 1.37 1.46 1.38 1.47 
3WE 1.45 1.50 1.45 1.47 1.41 1.56 
Norway 1.38 1.34 1.31 1.21 1.30 
* 
1.41 
EEW 1.57 1.32 1.30 1.21 1.41 1.67 
EEO 1.48 1.23* 1.19 1.29 
SOV ' 1.57 1.49 1.29 1.25 2.23 
CZE' 1.38 1.18 1.00 1.16 1.55 
YUG' 1.59 1.18 1.18 1.06 1.74 
GER' 1.27 1.56 1.46 
MEL A 1.82 
MEL B 1.47 1.58 1.56 1.62 1.73 1.73 
NAML 2.09 2.03 2.15 2.02 1.97 1.99 
Significant changes between consecutive periods are indicated by asterisk, where '# 
indicates significant on five percent level and * on ten percent level (two-sided). The last 
column shows significant differences between the first and last period. 
1 Not tested for significant differences. 
As a group, the Big Five leagues have, during the last 60 seasons, weakened their win 
dispersion little by little, from period to period. In overall, from the first to the last 
period, the difference is from 1.26 to 1.49 (weak significant). The ratio is not affected 
by includingiexcluding Germany, but the significance is stronger. Compared to the first 
period, which has the lowest ratio, it is the competitive balance in the periods from the 
middle of the 1970s to present that is significantly weakest. When including Germany. 
139 This is done in Chapter 6 when analysing single leagues (England and Norx% a% ). 
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the weakened win dispersion from period (III) to period (IV') is also significant. The 
insignificant (t-value = 1.14) weakened win dispersion between period (I) and (11) might 
indicate some negative effect on competitive balance, as a consequence of introducing 
UEFA team tournaments. The negative trend in the last thirty seasons might be related 
to commercialization, broadcasting and media, respectively, and creation and extension 
of the UEFA Champion League. 
Much of the same trend can be found in the second tier of the Western European 
leagues, but at a weaker level of win dispersion (higher NSQF ratio). The Turkish and 
the Dutch leagues are not included in the first period. 
On average, the 3WE leagues show a different trend, by moving a little bit up and 
down, and the last period is very similar to the first period. However, no significant 
difference between the periods can be found. This tier has a NSQF ratio that indicates 
better win dispersion than for the second tier, and compared with the Big Five at the end 
of the data period, these ratios are almost equal. However, early in the sample period, 
the 3 WE leagues had weaker win dispersion than the Big Five leagues. The 2WE 
leagues are always weaker balanced than the 3WE leagues. 
Among the Eastern European leagues that have existed during the whole sample period 
(EEW), the ratio has a U-form over the sample period. In the last period, among the 
Western European leagues, only the second tier has weaker NSQF ratio than these 
Eastern European leagues. Except from period (I), the last period is significantly weaker 
than the other periods, and especially the last three periods seem to have a negative 
trend. The changes between these periods are significant (period (IV) to (V) and (V) to 
(VI)). 
The "old" Eastern European leagues have among the lowest NSQF ratios (best 
balanced) from period (II) to period (IV). Introduction of UEFA team tournaments 
might have had a different impact on win dispersion in the Eastern Europe leagues 
compared to the Big- Five leagues. At least, all of these leagues improve «in dispersion 
from the first to the second period. 
One of the most interesting results in this analysis emerges from the restructuring of the 
leagues in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. In the context of competitive balance, the 
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political changes in this part of Europe give a unique opportunity to analyse the 
consequences of radical changes in the size of leagues. For win dispersion. the results 
are very strong. Average win dispersion is much weaker in the last period, when 
averaging (equally weighting) the "new" leagues, than in the periods where these 
leagues were parts of a bigger system. The effects on the NSQF ratio from the merger of 
the West and East German leagues are more difficult to interpret, except that the value 
in the last period is lower than in period (IV). If the difference between period (III) and 
(IV) is part of a trend towards weaker competitive balance, then the merge might be 
seen as positive in relation to win dispersion. 
Also, the minor leagues operating during the whole sample period (MEL B) show 
weakened competitive balance in the win dispersion dimension, but only the difference 
between periods (I) and (V) is significant. The general level of competitive balance is 
slightly better than the second tier leagues, but when including more leagues in the last 
period (MEL A), the average is almost equal to the second tier leagues. 
The general level of win dispersion in the Norwegian league, compared to the other 
leagues, is in the upper half during all periods. In addition, there is a U-form pattern in 
competitive balance over time in Norway, where the period around 1980 has the lowest 
value of the NSQF ratio. No significant differences between the periods are found. 
In addition to Norway, a number of the other leagues will be shown below. First, 
competitive balance among the Big Five leagues is presented: 
Table 4.2: Ten-season win dispersion measured by the NSQF ratio in the Big Five 
leagues from 1946/47 - 2005/06 
1946/47- 1956/57- 1966/67- 1976,77- 1986/87- 1996 97- Sign 
195 56 1965/ 66 1975/76 1985/86 199-596 2005 06 
I) (II) III) (IV) (V) (VI) 1-*VI 
E -: ngland 1.14 1.34 1.44 1.46 1.44 1.61 
Spain 1.30 1.39 1.21 1.33 1.47 1.38 
Italy 1.42 1.41 1.46 1.39 1.54e 1.67 
France 1.20 1.24 1.22 1.45" 1.30 1.30 
Germany 1.26 1.45 1.35 1.46 
Significant changes between consecutive periods are indicated by asterisk, where 
indicates significant on five percent level and * on ten percent level (two-sided). The last 
column shows significant differences between the first and last period. 
No significant difference between period (III) and (VI). 
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During the last sixty seasons, the English top division had its strongest win dispersion 
period in the first ten season period. It is significantly better than all other periods. In 
addition, the last period (VI) has weakest win dispersion. 140 The French league is 
usually among the best balanced among the Big Five leagues, but the ten season period 
from the mid-70s to mid-80s, was an exception. This period is also significantly weaker 
than all the other periods. The Italian league is among the weakest balanced in all 
periods, and the last period is the weakest. It is difficult to find any trends of win 
dispersion in the Spanish league. The same can be said about the German league. These 
results are relatively similar to Bourg's (2004) estimates for parts (1980/81-1999 00) of 
the sample period used in this chapter, as well as for the surprise index in Groot (2008). 
As shown earlier, the general level of «win dispersion is weaker in the second tier of 
leagues in Western Europe. The table below shows the win dispersion for these leagues. 
Table 4.3: Ten-season win dispersion measured by the NSQF ratio in the 2WE leagues 
from 1946(/47) - 2005/06 
1946/47- 1956/57- 1966/67- 1976/77- 1986/87- 1996/97- Sign 
1955/56 1965/66 1975/76 1985,86 1995 96 200 06 
I) II (III) (IV) (V) (VI) I4VI 
Netherlands 1.41 1.99 1.75 1.73 1.89 
Scotland 1.56 1.77' 1.86 1.99 1.99 2.07 
Portugal 1.70 1.89* 1.84 1.84 1.72 1.64 
Belgium 1.19 1.41 1.50 1.50 1.75 1.73 
Turkey 1.49 1.20" 1.18 1.79" 1.75 1 
Significant changes between consecutive periods are indicated by asterisk, where " 
indicates significant on five percent level and * on ten percent level (two-sided). The last 
column shows significant differences between the first and last period. 
1 Significant increased win dispersion between period (II) and (VI) on five percent level. 
By looking at each of the second tier European football leagues, interesting results can 
be found. For example, the Dutch league had a significant shift in competitive balance 
from period (II) to period (III). From the middle of the 1960s to the middle of the 1990s, 
the trend looks rather positive (reduced index). However, the last period (VI) had a 
significant reduction of competitive balance. These results are consistent with Koning 
(2000) and Groot (2008). 
Amon, the other second tier leagues, the Scottish is among the weakest balanced in the 
first half of the sample, and has the highest index of these leagues in the second half. 
The trend looks negative, and different restructurings have not changed this trend. 
'ý Possible explanations will be anal} sed in Chapter 6. 
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Another interesting observation is that the Turkish league had a significant strong 
negative shift in competitive balance from the middle of the 1980s. 
As found in previous studies. competitive balance in NAML differs between the 
different sports. This is also shown in the table below: 
Table 4.4: Ten-season win dispersion measured by the NSQF ratio in the NAML 
leagues from 1946(/47) - 2005(/06) 
1946/47- 1956/57- 1966/67- 1976/77- 1986/87- 1996 97 - Sign 
1955/56 1965/66 1975/76 1985/86 1995e96 2005 06 
I II III (IV) (V) (VI) 1--)%'l 
AL 2.80 2.09** 1.83 1.73 1.59 2.05 
NL 2.23 2.09 1.81 1.73 1.68 1.80 
MLB 2.46 2.04 1.78* 1.81 1.62 1.90** 
NBA 2.32 2.55 2.71 2.43 2.96** 2.77 
NFL 1.60 1.56 1.70 1.51 1.48 1.54 
NHL 1.99 1.96 2.42** 2.32 1.82 ** 1.74 
Significant changes between consecutive periods are indicated by asterisk, where -- 
indicates significant on five percent level and * on ten percent level (two-sided). The last 
column shows significant differences between the first and last period. 
These results confirm that the National Football League (NFL) has the best win 
dispersion among the major leagues in all periods. However, the win dispersion in NFL 
is still weaker than for the average Big Five leagues, but the difference is smaller in the 
second half of the sample. Except from the period from the mid-60s to mid-70s, the 
ratio has been relatively stable. In the MLB, both leagues have much of the same trends, 
but in the periods with weaker win dispersion, the tendency has been that the American 
League (AL) is weaker balanced than the National League (NL). The NBA is the 
weakest, or second weakest, balanced in all periods, and especially in the last two 
periods (V and VI) the win dispersion in this league is much wider than for the other 
leagues. Win dispersion in the NHL has an inverse U-shape and seems to be in a 
positive trend in the second part of the sample. 
The improvement in win dispersion in the first part of the sample for the \ILB can be 
related to franchise moves, introduction of reverse-order-of-finish rookie draft in 1964, 
and the virtual disappearance of cash sales of star players (Quirk and Fort, 1992). 
According to Quirk and Fort these factors had a greater (absolute) impact on 
competitive balance than the negative effects of subsequent league expansions. 
Interestingly, in light of the 1994 strike in the MLB, both leagues seem to have weaker 
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win dispersion in the post strike period (significant for the AL). This is consistent with 
the CBR measure of Humphreys (2002). 
4.4.2. Championship Concentration 
High concentration of championship winners is an indication of low turnover of top 
teams in a league, and represents one of the dimensions of competitive balance. The 
table below shows the empirical results of championship winners, measured by the HHl 
among the different groups of leagues. 
Table 4.5: Ten-season championship concentration measured by the HHI in European 
football leagues and the NAML from 1946(/47) - 2005(/06) 
1946/47- 
1955/56 
I 
1956/57- 
1965/66 
II) 
1966/67- 
1975/76 
III) 
1976/77- 
1985; 86 
(IV) 
1956%87- 
199596 
(V) 
1996/97- Sign 
2005/06 
(VI) I- VI 
Big Five 0.20 0.27 0.34 0.33 0.30 0.39 
2WE ex. Turkey 0.39 0.34 0.50 0.36 0.54" 0.42 
2WE 0.39 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.51 0.43 
3WE 0.36 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.32 0.44 
Norway' 1,4 0.41 0.21 0.28 0.22 0.42 0.82 
EEW 0.38 0.43 0.36 0.26 0.32 0.34 
EEO 0.27 0.33 0.32 0.34 
SOV4 0.38 0.24 0.40 0.19 0.40 
CZE4 0.26 0.36 0.36 0.20 0.37 
YUG2.4 0.26 0.34 0.28 0.28 0.37 
GER' 0.17 0.26 0.29 0.48 0.52 
MEL A 0.31 
MEL B 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.34 0.25 0.31 * 
NAML; 0.32 0.44 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.21 
Significant changes between consecutive periods are indicated by asterisk, where +; 
indicates significant on five percent level and * on ten percent level (two-sided). The last 
column shows significant differences between the first and last period. 
1 Adjusted for eight championships in period (I) and nine in period (II). 
2 Inclusive Bosnia-Herzegovina (1996/97-2005/06). 
z MLB - World Series winners, NBA - Playoffs winners, NHL - Stanley Cup winners. 
NFL - NFC Championship Game winners between 1946 and 1965, and Super Bowl 
winners from 1966. 
4 Not tested for significant differences. 
The general conclusions, on basis of the calculation of the HHI for the Big Five leagues 
during the sample period, are that the index was significantly better in the first period 
than the last, which might be reflecting a long run (negative) trend. Compared to other 
groups of leagues, including the NANIL, the Big Five leagues had in general (much) 
lower index in the beginning of the sample period. 
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There is much variation in HHI from period to period, and therefore difficult to find 
trends. In Western Europe, the second tier has the highest HHI, except in the last period, 
which indicates that these leagues might have a higher degree of dominant team. For 
leagues that have split, the same tendency as for win dispersion appears, where 
concentration is much higher on average in the last period than the previous average 
results. 
In general, the championship concentration has been relatively stable in the NANIL 
since the middle of the 1960s, and this level of the HHI is, on average, much lower than 
for the European leagues. The extension of post-seasonal championship playoffs may 
account for this difference. However, the Norwegian league had a (limited) post- 
seasonal playoff in the first period (I), and has a higher HHI than many of the other 
periods without playoff. These results might indicate that the introduction of the 
European Cup probably had very little significant impact on the distribution of finances 
between the teams in the Norwegian top level, which was based on pure amateurism 
before 1984. Another interesting result from the Norwegian league is the very high HH I 
in the last period (VI), as a consequence of the dominance by one team. 
The dynasty period for Rosenborg BK might have been positively affected by the prize 
money becoming more significant. In 1995, Rosenborg BK won a fourth consecutive 
domestic championship and qualified for the UEFA Champions League. The sporting 
strength was now supplemented by a significant increase in the team's financial 
strength, and the team continued to win the domestic championship every season, until 
Valerenga (Oslo) broke their run in the 2005 season. Apart from 2003, Rosenborg BK 
qualified for the UEFA Champions League all these seasons, including the 2005 season. 
Dynasties will tend to be reflected in higher HHI. Therefore it is appropriate to go 
further into some of the groups presented above (similar as for the win dispersion 
measure). Below, the HHI for the Big Five leagues is presented: 
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Table 4.6: Ten-season and 30-season championship concentration measured by HHI for 
the BiLy Five leagues from 1946, '47 - 2005/06 
1946/47- 1956 57- 1966/67- 1976,77- 1986 87- 1996,9-- 1946 47- 1976 11- 
1955/56 1965-66 1975/76 1985 86 199-5 96 2005 06 11) ,5 76 20UU5 () 0 
(1) (II (III (IV) (V) (\"I) (VII) (ý"III) 
England 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.52 0.20 0.38 0.10 O. 2O 
Spain 0.26 0.54 0.42 0.26 0.42 0.30 0.34 0-7 
Italy 0.22 0.28 0.22 0.40 0.32 0.42 0.20 cº. -S 
France 0.22 0.22 0.54 0.20 0.30 0.32 0.11 0.14 
Germany' 0.16 0.14 0.34 0.28 0.26 0.5-1 0.08 00. -1) 
Adjusted for nine championships in period (I) and 29 in period (VII) 
After the Second World War, especially two periods have had dynasties in English 
football. Around 1980, Liverpool FC was the dominating team. After the formation of 
the English FA Premier League in 1992, Manchester United had a dynasty period. Both 
these periods (IV and VI) have much higher level of the HHI than the other periods. In 
general, the HHIs in the latter part of the data sample (VIII) are much higher than in the 
first half (VII). Also for the other leagues, HHI differs between the different periods. 
Only Italy has not had a period where HHI is higher than 0.5. 
Real Madrid became the first winner of the European Cup in the 1955-56 season. This 
was a knock-out tournament for the league champions of the UEFA member 
associations. The format changed in 1992, when it became the UEFA Champions 
League (with Marseille as the first winner), but still only open to championship winners 
(www. uefa. com/competitions/uclihistory/index. html). Prior to the 1997/98 season two 
teams could qualify from the highest ranked leagues. This was increased by the addition 
of two teams from the 1999/00 season (based on uefa. com). The European Cup for 
championship winners and the UEFA Champions League formats might affect the 
domestic competition if the prize money is significant. This has been more significant 
after the introduction of the UEFA Champions League. The increased HHI between 
period (I) and (II) in the Big Five leagues, after the changes in the pan-European 
tournaments, is mainly driven by Spain. 
The structural change in the (West) German league system had a negative influence on 
the HHI. The use of championship playoffs prior to the formation of the Bundesliga was 
associated with a greater dispersion of championship winners, similar to the experience 
in the NAML. 
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For the second tier leagues in Western Europe, the HHI for the different leagues is 
presented in the table below. 
Table 4.7: Ten-season and 30-season championship concentration measured by HHI for 
the WE2 leagues and Norway from 1946(/47) - 2005(/06) 
1946/47- 
1955/56 
I 
1956/57- 
1965/66 
(II 
1966/67- 
1975/76 
(III) 
1976/77- 
1985/86 
(IV) 
1986 87- 
1995 96 
(V) 
1996 97- 
2005 06 
(VI) 
1946 47- 
1975 76 
(VII) 
1976 77- 
2005 06 
(%. III) 
Netherlands 0.12 0.22 0.38 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.16 0.119 
Scotland 0.36 0.32 0.68 0.36 0.82 0.50 0.29 0.40 
Portugal 0.54 0.46 0.68 0.36 0.52 0.42 0.45 0.39 
Belgium 0.54 0.36 0.30 0.30 0.42 0.30 0.14 0.31 
Turkey1 0.38 0.34 0.38 0.36 0.46 0.34 0. -0 
Norway` 0.41 0.21 0.28 0.22 0.42 0.82 0.14 0.4 
' Adjusted for eight championships in period (II) and 18 in period (VII). 
2 Adjusted for eight championships in period (I), nine in period (II) and 27 in period 
(VII). 
Many of these leagues have the characteristic that a certain number of teams dominate 
the leagues season after season. For example in Portugal, during the whole sample 
period, three teams shared all but one championship (SL Benfica, 25, FC Porto 18, 
Sporting CP, 16), with Boavista FC in the 2000/01 season being the only other team to 
win the Portuguese league in the last 60 years. Also for the other leagues, particular 
teams have had a dominant share of the total championships, such as Celtic and Rangers 
in the Scottish league. This is also reflected in the calculations of HHI for the second 
tier of Western European leagues, where only two periods in the Dutch league (I and II) 
had a HHI lower than 0.30. Note that also HHI has a negative change between period 
(11) and (III) in this league, similar to the results from win dispersion. 
As indicated above, it seems like the distribution of championships in general for the 
NAML had a positive shift on the HHI from period (II) to period (III). Therefore, it is 
appropriate to have a closer look at the different major leagues, as is presented in table 
4.8. 
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Table 4.8: Ten-season and 30-season championship concentration measured b% HHI for 
the NAML from 1946(/47) - 2005(/06) 
1946/47- 1956,57- 1966/67- 1976 77- 1986 87- 1996 97- 1940 47- 1976 -7- 
1955/56 1965, '66 1975/76 1985 86 1995 96 2005 06 19 %5 76 2005 ßl6 
(I II (III (IV) %') (VI) (VII) - (VIII) " 
MLB' 0.40 0.28 0.18 0.12 0.14 0.24 0.16 0.01 
NFL 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.26 0.18 0.10 0.10 
NBA 0.32 0.82 0.24 0.22 0.28 0.24 0.2 3 0.1-71 
NHL4 0.36 0.46 0.34 0.36 0.18 0.19 0.29 0.1-11 
' Adjusted for nine championships in period (V) and 29 in period (VIII). 
2 For the NFL, Championship winners NFL (1946/47-1975'76). 
3 For the NFL, Super Bowl winners (1976/77-2005'06). 
4 Adjusted for nine championships in period (VI) and 29 in period (VIII). 
The NFL has a relatively low level of HHI in all periods. For the other leagues, more 
variation appears, but typically, the highest level of HHI is at the first two periods. The 
NBA in the second period (II) had a dominating team (Boston Celtics), winning nine 
out of ten finals. The team lost its domination, which is the main reason for the change 
in concentration mentioned above. NHL seems to have had a (positive) shift from 
period (IV) to period (V). In general, the two last periods (V and VI) for all NAML 
have relatively low HHI, indicating high spread of championship wining teams. The 
differences between the leagues are relatively small, especially for the last period, with 
only 0.06 as the highest difference (between MLB and NFL). For the MLB, the 
championship winner concentration is higher in the post-strike period than the previous 
period, and follows the results from win dispersion. 
Comparing period (VII) and (VIII), the NAML have increased the turnover of 
champions between the two halves of the sample (MLB, NBA and NHL), or been stable 
(NFL). Except from the French league (which has a dynasty tendency at the time of 
writing up this thesis), other West European leagues shown above have a much lower 
turnover than the NAML, when looking at the last thirty seasons (period VIII). 
4.4.3. Performance Persistence 
In general, greater changes from season to season in performance for teams are seen as a 
sign of better competitive balance. The table below summarises performance 
persistence, measured by the SRCC, for the European football leagues, as well as 
for the 
NAM L, after the Second World War. 
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Table 4.9: Ten-season performance persistence measured by SRCC for European 
football leagues and the NAML from 1946(-47) - 2005(/06) 
1946/47- 1956/57- 1966/67- 1976 77- 1986 87- 1996 97- Sign 
1955,56 1965/66 1975'76 1985,86 1995,96 2005 06 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) Iýý'I 
Big F. ex. Germ. 0.46 0.50 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.5 11-11 
Big Five 0.46 0.50 0.51 0.56 0.54 0.5 
2WE ex. NL/Tur 0.57 0.64 0.66 0.73 0.62*e 0. ý, ) 
2WE 0.57 0.60 0.67 0.66 0.64 0.63 
3WE ex. Greece 0.53 0.49 0.44 0.49 0.43 0.5 2 
3WE 0.53 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.48 0.55 
Norway 0.46 0.40 0.28 0.41 0.34 0.48 
EEW 0.42 0.63** 0.59 0.48 0.54' 0.61 
EEO 0.52 0.56 0.58 0.60 
SOV2 0.56 0.66 0.53 0.48 0.60 
CZE2 0.54 0.46 0.61 0.57 0.53 
YUG2 0.72 0.57 0.64 0.52 0.60 
GER2 0.47 0.73 0.53 
MEL A 0.60 
MEL B 0.46 0.51 0.50 0.59* 0.63 0.6- 
NAML' 0.57 0.60 0.62 0.59 0.48 0.50 
Significant changes between consecutive periods are indicated by asterisk, where ** 
indicates significant on five percent level and * on ten percent level (two-sided). The last 
column shows significant differences between the first and last period. 
' SRCC in NAML are calculated on basis of rank, using on win percent in the given 
season. If two teams have the same win percent, the rank is further decided on basis on 
ranking in division. Washington Senators is split into two; numbers I and II. This means 
that from 1960 to 1961 Washington Senators (I) is relocated to Minnesota Twins, while 
Washington Senators (II) is treated as a new team. 
Regarding Dallas Texans I and Baltimore Colts, "NFL considers the Texans and Colts 
to be separate teams" (en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Indianapolis_Colts). In addition, new 
teams are treated as lowest ranked in the previous season (for calculation purposes). 
2 Not tested for significant differences. 
It is not easy to find general trends from the calculation of performance persistence in 
European football. Most of the differences between the periods are insignificant. Even if 
it seems like most of the groups have higher value (more persistence) on the 
Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (SRCC) in the last period (VI) compared to the 
first (I), only the EEW and the MEL B groups of leagues get this increase to be 
significant. The latter of these seems to be the only group of leagues with a kind of 
trend (towards higher persistence). The NAML might have a small positive shift 
between period (IV) and (V) (insignificant). 
Also for performance persistence, the second tier leagues in Western Europe have 
weaker values than the other Western European leagues, as well as in comparison to 
most of the other groups of leagues. Relatively similar values between the Big Five and 
third tier are found. It does not seem that going from one bigger league to averaging 
1'' 
smaller leagues in Eastern Europe has the same negative effect on performance 
persistence, as for the other dimensions of competitive balance. 
As for the other measures, for some of the groups the different leagues are presented 
below. 
Table 4.10: Ten-season performance persistence measured by SRCC for the Big Five 
leagues from 1946/47 - 2005/06 
1946/47- 1956/57- 1966/67- 1976/77- 1986 87- 1996 9- Sign 
1955/56 1965/66 1975/76 1985,86 1995,96 2005 06 
I II III (IV) (V) (VI) I-)VI 
England 0.35 0.36 0.51** 0.48 0.44 0.62 " 
Spain 0.62 0.63 0.56 0.67 0.55* 0.59 
Italy 0.45 0.57 0.70** 0.59* 0.66 0.64 
France 0.42 0.44 0.39 0.47 0.49 0.47 
Germany 0.41 0.62** 0.58 0.5 3 
Significant changes between consecutive periods are indicated by asterisk, where *. 
indicates significant on five percent level and * on ten percent level (two-sided). The last 
column shows significant differences between the first and last period. 
1 No significant difference between period (III) and period (VI). 
There are variations in SRCC over time for the different Big Five leagues. Especially 
the English, and maybe also the Italian, have indications of negative shifts in SRCC 
over the periods (insignificant between first and last period for Italy), while the other 
leagues seem to be more "stable" over time, without particular trends. 141 For England, 
the latter period has significantly higher performance persistence than any of the other 
periods. In general, the French league has lowest or second lowest persistence in all 
periods. These results look relatively consistent with Groot (2008). 
Table 4.11: Ten-season performance persistence measured by SRCC for the WE2 
leagues from 1946(/47) - 2005/06 
1946/47- 1956/57- 1966/67- 1976/77- 1986/87- 1996 97- Shmn 
1955%56 1965/66 1975 76 1985/86 1995/96 2005 06 
I) II III) (IV) (V) (V1 1-)V1 
Netherlands 0.51 0.73 0.66 0.68 0.76 
Scotland 0.63 0.64 0.68 0.76 0.69 0.56 
Portugal 0.61 0.71 0.71 0.78 0.64" 0.62 
Belgium 0.48 0.58 0.58 0.64 0.51 0.59 
Turkey 0.56 0.65 0.46" 0.67" 0.64 
Significant changes between consecutive periods are indicated by asterisk, where 
indicates significant on five percent level and * on ten percent level (two-sided). The last 
column shows significant differences between the first and last period. 
Significant difference from period (II) to period (VI) on 1 percent level. 
2 No significant difference from period (II) to period (VI). 
"' Possible e\planations %% ill be analysed in Chapter 6. 
I?; 
For the second tier of leagues in Western Europe, it is difficult to find any clear trend 
during the sample period. Significant deviations between some of the periods seem to 
be more "randomly distributed", such as period (II) in the Dutch league. Some of these 
leagues have had periods with very high performance persistence, where SRCC has 
been above 0.70. Looking at the second part of the data sample, there might be 
indications that the Scottish and the Portuguese leagues are in a trend towards weakened 
persistency (improved competitive balance). The Belgian top division seems to be the 
one with lowest persistence in this tier of leagues. The performance persistence for the 
Dutch league is consistent with Groot (2008). 
It might be interesting to compare Big Five leagues and second tier leagues in the last 
period (VI). England has higher performance persistence than Scotland. Apart from 
France and the Netherlands, the values are relatively equal between the leagues 
categorised in Big Five and second tier. 
Performance persistence in the different NAML is presented in the table below: 
Table 4.12: Ten-season performance persistence measured by SRCC for the NAML 
from 1946(/47) - 2005(/06) 
1946/47- 1956/57- 1966/67- 1976/77- 1986/87- 1996/97- Sign 
1955/56 1965/66 1975/76 1985/86 1995,96 2005/06 
I) II) III) (IV) (V) (VI) I--)VI 
AL 0.70 0.73 0.35 0.55 0.25 0.61 
NL 0.67 0.55 0.55 0.45 0.22* 0.42** 0. * 
MLB 0.70 0.67 0.54* 0.54 0.26** 0.53** 
NBA 0.43 0.66* 0.65 0.57 0.71** 0.62 
NFL 0.46 0.40 0.591 0.51 0.41 0.29* 
NHL 0.68 0.67 0.72 0.75 0.55*1 0.55 
Significant changes between consecutive periods are indicated by asterisk, where 
indicates significant on five percent level and * on ten percent level (two-sided). 
Also for the NAML, it is difficult to find clear trends, even if there might be indications 
of a significant shift in the NHL between period (IV) and period (V) (but period (VV) is 
not significantly different from period (I) and period (II)), and the NFL has in the last 
four periods been in a positive trend, from 0.59 in period (III) to 0.29 in period (VI). 
The baseball leagues are also, for this competitive balance dimension, weakened in the 
last decade. This might be surprising, since the strike in 1994 resulted in both luxury 
taxes and more revenue sharing, but it follows the results from both win dispersion and 
championship concentration. 
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4.4.4. General Comments 
There is a significant division between the Big Five leagues and other leagues with 
regards to competitive balance. This is interesting when comparing European football 
leagues and NAML, because typically, the Big Five leagues are over-represented in 
samples analysing European football, and might therefore give a skewed picture of the 
general competitive balance in European football. Compared to the averaged within- 
seasonal NSQF ratio, it seems like the European Big Five football leagues have better 
win dispersion than the NAML, while the new leagues in the former Soviet Union have, 
on average, weaker win dispersion. These findings adjust the general opinion of the 
difference in competitive balance between the continents. Comparisons between NAML 
and Big Five on performance persistence show only small differences, from a situation 
where the Big Five is slightly better in the beginning of the period to a trend where 
NAML is slightly better than the Big Five at the end of the period. Prize concentration 
is better (more dispersed) in NAML. 
4.4.5. Competitive Balance in European Football in the Last Decade 
The following table shows the calculated values and rankings of competitive balance for 
each European football league during the last period of the data sample; 1996(97)- 
2005(/06). In general, based on rankings, the level of competitive balance is stated as A 
to E, where all have ten leagues, except from HHI that has 11 on rank C. This means 
that the top ten ranking is graded A, while the ranking from number 11 to 20 is graded 
B etc. This is done for each of the three competitive balance measures. 
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Table 4.13: Overview over competitive balance in three dimensions in European 
football leamues over the neriod 1996(/97) - 2005(/06) 
League NSQ F SRCC HHI League NSQ F SRCC HHI 
Albania 1.621 B 0.582 C 0.420 D Kazakhstan 2.304 E 0.553 B 0.240 A 
Andorra 2.218 E 0.634 D 0.220 A Latvia 2.728 E 0.536 B 0.820 E 
Armenia 2.506 E 0.632 D 0.320 C Lithuania 2.413 E 0.780 E 0.420 D 
Austria 1.656 C 0.615 D 0.200 A Luxemburg 1.842 C 0.616 D 0.420 D 
Azerbaijan 2.133 E 0.544 B 0.291 B Macedonia 1.842 C 0.588 C 0.220 A 
Belarus 2.078 D 0.652 E 0.150 A Malta 2.084 E 0.829 E 0.300 B 
Belgium 1.729 C 0.594 C 0.300 B Moldova 2.341 E 0.728 E 0.460 D 
Bosnia-Herz N/A N/A 0.180 A The Netherlands 1.886 D 0.760 E 0.460 D 
Bulgaria 2.060 D 0.772 E 0.300 B Northern Ireland 1.723 C 0.509 A 0.280 B 
Croatia 1.545 B 0.533 B 0.460 D Norway 1.406 A 0.478 A 0.820 E 
Cyprus 2.157 E 0.762 E 0.340 C Poland 1.509 A 0.507 A 0.400 C 
Czech rep 1.465 A 0.588 C 0.540 E Portugal 1.640 C 0.618 D 0.420 D 
Denmark 1.573 B 0.590 C 0.340 C Romania 1.573 B 0.597 C 0.380 C 
England 1.615 B 0.624 D 0.380 C Russia 1.603 B 0.522 B 0.440 D 
Estonia 2.548 E 0.751 E 0.322 C San Marino 1.859 D 0.499 A 0.220 A 
Faroe Islands 1.829 C 0.589 C 0.280 B Scotland 2.071 D 0.560 B 0.500 E 
Finland 1.457 A 0.410 A 0.280 B Serbia Mont. 2.022 D 0.611 D 0.420 D 
France 1.304 A 0.471 A 0.320 C Slovakia 1.626 B 0.465 A 0.200 A 
Georgia 1.987 D 0.400 A 0.360 C Slovenia 1.565 B 0.649 E 0.580 E 
Germany 1.456 A 0.533 B 0.520 E Spain 1.381 A 0.594 C 0.300 C 
Greece 2.023 D 0.730 E 0.820 E Sweden 1.289 A 0.517 A 0.180 A 
Hungary 1.608 B 0.575 B 0.200 A Switzerland 1.434 A 0.395 A 0.280 B 
Iceland 1.233 A 0.547 B 0.280 B Turkey 1.748 C 0.635 D 0.460 E 
Ireland 1.638 B 0.634 D 0.260 B Ukraine 1.905 D 0.526 B 0.580 E 
Israel 1.719 C 0.576 C 0.320 C Wales 2.030 D 0.579 C 0.540 E 
Italy 1.671 C 0.638 D 0.420 D 
There are big differences between the best and the weakest leagues, when it comes to 
competitive balance, for all three dimensions. The best balanced European football 
league, when taking into account all three dimensions for the last decade, is the 
Swedish. This is the only league to be ranked A in all three dimensions, while Slovakia, 
Switzerland and Finland have A in two dimensions and B in the third. At the bottom, 
Greece, Lithuania and Moldova have two E's and one D. When it comes to the Big Five 
leagues, the French (A, A, C) and the Spanish (A, C, C) are best balanced, while 
Germany is in the middle (A, B, E). Weakest are the English (B, D, C) and the Italian 
(C, D, D). Norway is one of the leagues having the same pattern as Germany, with one 
dominating team, and the two other dimensions are well balanced (A, A, E). 
Three of the leagues have had relatively extreme dynasties during the sample period. 
These are the Norwegian (Rosenborg BK), the Latvian (Skonto Riga) and the Greek 
(Olympiakos). These leagues have all one team winning all championships, but one. An 
interesting observation can be made looking at the NSQF ratio for these three leagues. 
While both Greece and Latvia have a ratio above two, and Latvia has the weakest ratio 
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of all European football leagues, the picture for the Norwegian league is the opposite, 
since only nine leagues have had better ratio on win dispersion. Also on performance 
persistence, Norway is at the A level. An interesting observation in this table is that the 
league with the weakest average NSQF ratio and HHI, Latvia, actually is much better 
balanced when the SRCC is used as measure. These differences illustrate the 
importance, as indicated earlier, of taking different dimensions into account when 
categorising a league's competitive balance. More thorough analyses of the single 
leagues are required to get a better overview over the reasons why the different 
measures give these results. 
4.4.6. Multiple Match Outcomes 
Many leagues divide from the simple league context by having multiple outcomes. Tie 
matches are a relatively frequent outcome in European football. From the examples in 
the table below, it seems like more than 20 % of the matches end as ties. 
Table 4.14: The percent of matches ending as ties in a number of European football 
League I Period I Tied matches (%) 
Big Five leagues 
England 1946/47-2005/06 25.9 % 
Germany 1963/64-2005/06 26.0 % 
Spain 1946/47-2005/06 24.4 % 
Italy 1946/47-2005/06 32.1 % 
France 1946/47-2005/06 26.4 % 
Other selected European football leagues 
Turkey 1959-2005/06 29.1 % 
Scotland 1946/47-2005/06 22.8 % 
Portugal 1946/47-2005/06 24.0 % 
Netherlands 1956/57-2005/06 25.8 % 
Sweden 1946/47-2005 25.7 % 
Norway 1948/49-2005 23.5 % 
Among the European football leagues above, the Scottish has the lowest rate (22.8 %) 
of tied matches, while close to a third of the matches in the Italian top division have 
ended without a winner. Explanations of the differences in the share of tied matches 
between leagues are beyond the scope of this thesis. 142 
142 This can be an interesting topic in a joint research with football science. Is it a result from differences 
in the traditional way of playing football (differences in playing style between leagues)? Finding 
indicators of the "traditional style of play", for example by measuring the number of goals scored, 
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Point score systems have also differed between leagues, as well as within leagues over 
time. The traditional (2,1,0) score system in European football was the general system. 
until the 1980's, when some leagues started to use alternative systems. England 
introduced the (3,1,0) system into its league in the 198L82 season. and during the 1990" 
all leagues have converted to this system. By the 2005(/06) season, all UEFA member 
leagues operate the (3,1,0) point score system. 143 Therefore, how to treat the scoring 
system in the NSQF ratio is a significant topic for European football. Below, score 
systems from some of the leagues (during the sample period) are presented. 
r1r r- r ." ii . 
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League 2,1,0 system 3,1,0 system Others 
Big Five leagu es 
England Until 1980/81 1981/82 onwards 
Germany(W) Until 1994/95 1995/96 onwards 
Spain Until 1994/95 1995/96 onwards 
Italy Until 1993/94 1994/95 onwards 
France Until 1972/73,1976/77-1987/88, 1988/89,1994/95 1973174-1975/76 
1989/90-1993/94 onwards 
Other selected European. football leagues 
Turkey Until 1986/87 1987/88 onwards 
Scotland Until 1993/94 1994/95 onwards 
Portugal Until 1994/95 1995/96 onwards 
Netherlands Until 1994/95 1995/96 onwards 
Sweden Until 1989 1990 onwards 
Norway Until 1986 1988 onwards 1987b 
Sample period: After Second World War. 
a Wins by three or more goals = 3, other wins = 2, draws= 1, losses = 0. 
b Wins = 3, draw and shoot-out winner -2, draw and shoot-out loser = 1, losses =0. 
From Chapter 3, recall that the NSQF = ASD/ISD. According to Quirk and Fort (1992) 
and Cain and Haddock (2006), ISD(100%, 0%) = 
0.5 
=1 Assuming a three match 
m 4m 
outcome with uniform probabilities, the discussions in Chapter 3 showed that 
ISD(100%, 50%, 0%) =1 Given that ASD is based on the (100%, 501o, 0° O) 76ri 
approach, the relative difference between the NSQF with and without tie-adjusted ISD 
xvill be: 
incentives by score sy stems (offensive detensiv e play ), and the general level of competitive balance 
cakcr competiti' e balance due to greater differences between the teams and less drwý matches) might 
be relevant starting points of such anale sis. 
14 ', Based on m\ observations on the data sample for this thesis. 
12 
NSQF[ISD(100%, 50%, 0%)]uniform / NSQF[ISD(100%. 0° (j)] 
ASD . -i. 
SD 
__%1.2247. 1 Y\f 
4m 6m 
In other words, when using uniform probabilities in the ISD, the values are about 22.4-17 
percent higher than the traditional calculations of the NSQF ratio in, for example. 
European football. If applying the ('/4-'/2 -'/4) probabilities, the relative difference is 
1.414. 
These effects are shown in the table below, when comparing the "traditional" NSQF 
ratios between the English top division, based on different ways of measuring the 
idealized standard deviation, and the American League (AL) and the National League 
(NL) in the MLB. 
Table 4.16: Comparison of NSQF ratios in the MLB and the top division in English 
football for alternative valuation of draw outcome 
MLB English top division in football 
AL NL Alt I Alt II Alt III 
1976/77-85/86 1.743 1.728 1.465 1.794 2.072 
1986/87-95/96 1.588 1.685 1.440 1.763 2.036 
1996/97-05/06 2.053 1.799 1.615 1.978 2.284 
Alt I= ISD(l 00%, 0%); Alt II = ISD(100%, 50%, 0%)unifonn; 
Alt III = ISD(I 00%, 50%, 0%)(, 1, _ý1, _-' , ). 
As can be seen in the table above, by applying ISD(100%, O%), the NSQF ratio for the 
English league has a better win dispersion than the NL and the AL (Alt 1). However, 
when applying the tie-adjusted ISD, these differences are "wiped out", indicating a 
relatively similar level of win dispersion in the English top division and the MLB (for 
Alt II). For Alt III the result is opposite. 
The "tie adjusted" NSQF ratio, calculated by Cain and Haddock for the top two 
divisions in English football, follows the pattern above, and is higher than the 
"traditional" ratios (their figure 2). In other words, when including ties as a match 
outcome in the idealized standard deviation, it is expected to improve (smaller 
dispersion), and hence, to increase the "adjusted" NSQF ratio (showing weaker win 
dispersion). However, Cain and Haddock do not comment on this important part of their 
results, and instead focus on explaining the time-series development in the different 
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leagues. It would have been interesting to see Cain and Haddock's comments on a 
cross-sectional comparison, because their method of calculating the ("tie adjusted") 
NSQF ratio is an empirical innovation. The time-series changes in the NSQF ratio will 
also be reflected in the "traditional" NSQF ratio. The results from the tie-adjusted 
NSQF ratios above and Cain and Haddock (2006) indicate that tied matches in 
European football might be one of the explanations of better win dispersion for (some 
of) these leagues. By changing the way of calculating the idealized standard deviation, 
the general view that European football leagues are better balanced (i. e. better win 
dispersion) than the NAML (except the NFL) might need to be reconsidered. 
4.4.7. Playoff Concentration 
The simple league measure for prize concentration earlier in this chapter was only 
related to championship winners. In this section, prize concentration will be expanded 
to concentrate on championship playoffs in NAML and Australian rugby, as well as for 
qualifications for "post-seasonal" UEFA Champions League among the Big Five 
leagues in European football, and the Scandinavian Royal League. The last two are 
chosen instead of leagues with championship playoffs in Europe because, as will be 
shown in Chapter 5, including championship playoff appears to be just a temporary 
"experiment" for many leagues, with only the San Marino league having had a 
continuous system over the analysed period. Therefore, it seems to be difficult to find a 
period that is suitable for comparative analyses with sports on other continents. But 
increases in number of teams from some leagues qualifying for the UEFA Champions 
League, although a relatively new phenomenon, provide possibilities for analysis for the 
last ten seasons. 
Both NAML and Australian leagues have long traditions of post-seasonal championship 
playoffs. This gives opportunities to apply prize concentration measures related to 
complex league systems. The analyses below will be done by applying HHl for 
championship playoff concentration in the four NAML and two leagues in Australia. 
Applying the measure on the NAML, at least three issues have to be taken into account. 
First, the number of teams qualifying for the playoffs differs, both between leagues and 
within leagues, over time. Second, the number of teams in the different leagues has 
increased during time. Third, league tournament structure has changed significantly 
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over time in all leagues. Therefore, the "pure" HHI has to be adjusted, as shown in 
Chapter 3, into the GK PO-ratio. Also the PO-deviation measure will be used in these 
analyses. 
4.4.7.1. North American Major Leagues 
The GK PO-ratios for the playoffs in NAML are shown in the two tables below. 
Table 4.17: Ten-season distribution of playoff qualifiers in the NAML measured by the 
GK PO-ratio 
League 1966/67- 1976/77- 1986/87- 1996/97- 
1975/76 1985/86 1995/96 2005/06 
NFL' 1.830 1.380 1.295 1.282 
MLB2 2.641 2.241 1.750 2.003 
NBA 1.326 1.248 1.276 1.203 
NHL3 1.300 1.160 1.143 1.307 
' NFL is included AFL prior to the merger; ` No playoff in 1994; 'No competition in 
2004/05. 
Table 4.18: Five-season distribution of playoff qualifiers in the NAML measured by the 
GK PO-ratio 
66/67- 
70-71 
71/72- 
75/76 
76/77- 
80-81 
81/82- 
85/86 
86/87- 
90-91 
91/92- 
95/96 
96/97- 
00-01 
01/02- 
05 06 
NFL' 2.192 2.067 1.925 1.426 1.630 1.527 1.444 1.474 
MLB2 2.835 3.840 3.865 1.885 2.326 2.763 2.173 2.340 
NBA 1.420 1.396 1.350 1.274 1.365 1.341 1.393 1.323 
NHL3 1.220 1.364 1.286 1.184 1.096 1.267 1.459 1.377 
' NFL is included AFL prior to the merger; ` No playoff in 1994; ' No competition in 
2004/05. 
MLB has the highest playoff concentration in all periods. When using the ten season 
period, the post strike period is more concentrated than the previous period. This is 
consistent with Hadley et al. (2005). The NFL seems to have had a shift towards more 
dispersion of qualifying teams from the early 1980s, compared to the previous periods. 
The NHL is best balanced in the first three periods, while both NFL and NBA are 
slightly better in the last period. The NBA and NHL are relatively- similar during the 
whole sample period, while the NFL is also at the same level in the two last decades. 
Actually, the NBA is the best balanced in the last part of the sample. This is surprising. 
related to general competitive balance calculations earlier in this chapter, and might 
make one reconsider the relatively unambiguous view on competitive balance in the 
NBA. Instead, the prize concentration might rather be a problem in the `ILB. This is 
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interesting in relation to the Blue Ribbon panel on Baseball Economics for Major 
League Baseball, which focused on playoff qualification as the principal indicator of 
competitive balance. This is another indication that reflecting competiti\ e balance 
through a single measure is difficult. Not only must the three simple league dimensions 
be taken into account, but additional information related to complex league structure 
might also be relevant pieces in the total picture of competitive balance. 
Related to the discussion in Chapter 3, one obvious determinant to analyse when it 
comes to drivers for playoff concentration, is whether leagues with relatively few 
playoff places are treated appropriately by this measure. If the share is low, it means 
that dominating teams bias the distribution relatively more compared to the idealized 
distribution, because in the GK PO-ratio the actual HHI is calculated only on teams 
qualifying, while the idealized takes into account all teams in the league. The two tables 
below show the number of playoff places as a proportion of the total number of teams in 
a league for each major league over each ten-year and five-year period, respectively. 
Table 4.19: Ten-season relative number of playoff places compared to the total number 
of teams in the NAML 
1966/67- 1976/77- 1986/87- 1996i97- 
1975/76 1985/86 1995/96 2005/06 
NFL' 0.284 0.364 0.397 0.386 
MLB2 0.149 0.171 0.168 0.270 
NBA 0.545 0.584 0.611 0.548 
NHL3 0.609 0.740 0.699 0.560 
' NFL is included AFL prior to the merger; ` No playoff in 1994; ' No competition in 
2004/05. 
Table 4.20: Five-season relative number of playoff places compared to the total number 
of teams in the NAML 
66/67- 
70-71 
71/72- 
75/76 
76/77- 
80-81 
81/82- 
85/86 
86/87- 
90-91 
91/92- 
95/96 
96/97- 
00-01 
01,02- 
05,06 
NFL 0.260 0.308 0.329 0.400 0.371 0.423 0.395 0.377 
MLB` 0.130 0.167 0.156 0.185 0.154 0.185 0.274 0.267 
NBA 0.597 0.506 0.541 0.626 0.640 0.584 0.552 0.544 
NHL3 0.643 0.585 0.716 0.762 0.762 0.645 0.584 0.533 
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The MLB has a much lower share of teams to playoffs, while both NBA and NHL have 
more than half of the teams to playoffs. This means that domination in \ILB will be 
more highly weighted than domination in the NHL, because of the use of squared 
differences. The correlation, both in total and within each league, in relation to the share 
l2 
of teams to playoff and the GK PO-ratio, might give further information on these 
relationships, and is presented in the table below. 
Table 4.21: Five- and ten-season correlation coefficient between the GK PO ratio and 
the relative number of playoff places compared to the total number of teams in the 
NAML 
Five-season 
correlation 
Ten-season 
correlation 
NFL -0.949 -0.990 
MLB2 -0.465 -0.400 
NBA -0.318 0.020 
NHL3 -0.844 -0.940 
NAML -0.834 -0.842 
' NFL is included AFL prior to the merger; ` No playoff in 1994: z No competition in 
2004/05. 
There is a strong correlation between the number of qualifying teams and the index in 
the NAML, which confirms the expected relationship. In particular, the NFL and the 
NHL have a strong correlation between the index and the numbers of teams that qualify 
for playoffs. On the other hand, the correlation is smaller in the two leagues with results 
that might look unusual, the MLB and, especially, the NBA (where the latter has no 
correlation). The table below presents the calculations based on the alternative measure 
(PO deviation) from Chapter 3. 
Table 4.22: Ten-season distribution of playoff qualifiers in the NAML measured by PO 
deviation 
1966/67- 1976/77- 1986/87- 1996/97- 
1975/76 1985/86 1995/96 2005/06 
NFL 13.159 11.956 11.091 10.866 
MLB2 7.331 8.829 5.571 11.908 
NBA 9.577 13.548 14.779 12.936 
NHL3 9.367 11.240 9.039 13.396 
' NFL is included AFL prior to the merger; ` No playoff in 1994; ' No competition in 
2004/05. 
This measure can be adjusted by the number of participants (teams) in the league during 
the specific period, where one team might have ten observations during a period of ten 
seasons (adj. PO deviation). The results are presented in table 4.23. 
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Table 4.23: Ten-season distribution of playoff qualifiers in the NAN/ML measured by the 
adjusted PO deviation over the period 1966(/67 - 2005(06) 
1966/67- 1976/77- 1986/87- 1996/97- 
1975/76 1985/86 1995 96 2005 06 
NFL' 0.051 0.043 0.039 0.035 
MLB2 0.032 0.034 0.023 0.040 
NBA 0.062 0.060 0.056 0.044 
NHL3 0.068 0.056 0.039 0.052 
' NFL is included AFL prior to the merger: ` No playoff in 1994: 3 No competition in 
2004/05. 
Table 4.24: Five-season distribution of playoff qualifiers in the NAML measured by the 
adjusted PO deviation over the period 1966(/67) - 2005(/06) 
66/67- 71/72- 76/77- 81/82- 86/87- 9192- 96 97- 011,02- 
70-71 75/76 80-81 85/86 90-91 95%96 00-01 05 06 
NFL 0.056 0.063 0.060 0.050 0.055 0.057 0.047 0.045 
MLB2 0.036 0.057 0.052 0.034 0.035 0.037 0.054 0.057 
NBA 0.086 0.071 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.071 0.064 0.0 55 
NHL3 0.072 0.077 0.071 0.071 0.052 0.059 0.070 0.060 
' NFL is included AFL prior to the merger; ` No playoff in 1994; ' No competition in 
2004/05. 
These results are different from the previous analyses. The MLB is now relatively better 
balanced, and has a better relative distribution in the first three periods, while the NFL 
has the best index in the last period. In general, the NBA and the NHL are worst 
balanced. As indicated, these results might be driven by the number of teams to qualify 
for playoffs. 
4.4.7.2. Australian Leagues 
As an alternative, two leagues from Australia are chosen for the championship playoff 
(semi-finals) analyses. These leagues are the Australian National Rugby League 
(ARL/NRL)'44 and the Australian Rules Football League (VFL/AFL). 
'4, They are, in 
general, organised as closed one division leagues. 146 The top k teams qualify for 
championship playoffs, called semi-finals, where the match schedule is based on a 
seeding system related to the regular season performance. On policy, these leagues 
might be closer to the NAML. as they for example are closed. The following tables 
144 More information about this league can be found at wWv\V. nrl. com. 
145 More information about this league can be found at ww ww ww. atl. com. au. 
140 F'cept from the 1997 season. when the : IRL had a rival competition from the Super League. More 
information about the "Super League ww ar" can be found in for example 
en. \\ ikipcdlia. or_g ww iki, Australian_Rugby_League and related links. 
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show the number of teams qualifying for playoffs and the total number of teams in the 
leagues over different time periods. 
Table 4.25: Ten-season descriptive data on playoffs in Australian leagues over the 
period 1966/67 - 2005/06 
1966/67- 
1975/76 
1976/77- 
1985/86 
1986,87- 
1995 96 
1996 97- 
2005 06 
VFL/AFL - teams to PO 44 50 60 80 
VFL/AFL - teams total 120 120 144 160 
VFL/AFL - PO share 0.367 0.417 0.417 0.500 
ARL/NRL - teams to PO 43 50 53 86 
ARL/NRL - teams total 118 126 158 167 
ARL/NRL - PO share 0.364 0.397 0.335 0.51 
Table 4.26: Five-season descriptive data on playoffs in Australian leagues over the 
period 1966/67 - 2005/06 
66/67- 
70-71 
71/72- 
75/76 
76/77- 
80-81 
81/82- 
85/86 
86/87- 
90-91 
91,92- 
95196 
96,97- 
00-01 
01,02- 
05,06 
VFL/AFL - #PO 20 24 25 25 25 35 40 40 
VFL/AFL - #tot 60 60 60 60 68 76 80 80 
VFL/AFL - PO sh 0.333 0.400 0.417 0.417 0.368 0.461 0.5 0.5 
ARL/NRL - #PO 20 23 25 25 25 28 46 40 
ARL/NRL - #tot 58 60 60 66 74 84 93 74 
ARL/NRL - PO sh 0.345 0.383 0.417 0.379 0.338 0.333 0.495 0.541 
Both leagues have a pattern where the number of teams participating in the leagues has 
increased during time, as well as the number of teams reaching playoffs (semi-finals). 
Also the share of teams to playoffs has increased over time, and is at the end of the 
sample period at 50 percent in the VFL/AFL and 54.1 percent in the ARL/NRL. In 
general, the differences between the two leagues are much smaller than in the analyses 
of the NAML. The calculations from the GK PO-ratio are presented in the tables below. 
Table 4.27: Ten-season distribution of playoff qualifiers in Australian leagues measured 
by the GK PO-ratio over the period 1966/67 - 2005/06 
1966/67- 1976/77- 1986/87 - 199697- 
1975/76 1985/86 1995/96 200510 6 
VFL/AFL 1.624 1.570 1.336 1.191 
ARL/NRL 1.782 1.553 1.549 1.474 
Table 4.28: Five-season distribut ion of playoff qual ifiers in Australian leagues 
measured b y the GK PO-ratio over the period 1966/67 - 2005 06 
66 67- 71/72- 76/ 77- 81182- 86 87- 91/92- 96 97- 01,02- 
70-71 75,76 80-81 $5'86 90-91 95-96 00-01 O5 O6 
VFL/AFL 1.980 1.792 1.555 1.795 1.758 1.369 1.297 1.340 
ARL NRL 2.083 1.701 1.555 1.608 2.000 1.946 1.729 1.257 
13 1 
The Australian leagues have much of the same pattern as the NA `I L in playoff 
concentration. This is both related to time and level. Except from the 1990s. when the 
VFL/AFL seems to be much better balanced, the two leagues are relatively equal in the 
concentration ratios. 
As for the NAML, the alternative playoff measure is also applied for the Australian 
leagues, and is presented below. 
Table 4.29: Ten-season distribution of playoff qualifiers in the NAML measured by the 
adjusted PO deviation over the period 1966/67 - 2005/06 
1966/67- 1976/77- 1986/87- 1996,97- 
1975/76 1985/86 1995/96 2005/06 
VFL/AFL 0.084 0.084 0.061 0.058 
ARUNRL 0.091 0.074 0.057 0.062 
Table 4.30: Five-season distribution of playoff qualifiers in the NAML measured hy the 
adiusted PO deviation over the period 1966/67 - 2005/06 
66/67- 71/72- 76/77- 81/82- 86/87- 91,92- 96 97- 01 02- 
70-71 65/66 80-81 85/86 90-91 95: 96 00-01 05,06 
VFL/AFL 0.095 0.103 0.090 0.102 0.085 0.069 0.075 0.073 
ARL/NRL 0.101 0.093 0.090 0.076 0.083 0.073 0.077 0.059 
The pattern between the Australian and the NAML are relatively similar when it comes 
to trends, but for this measure, the general level is higher in the Australian leagues. 
Taking into account the two measures of playoff concentration, there might be 
indications that the Australian leagues have a slightly higher concentration than the 
NAML. 
4.4.7.3. UEFA Champions League Concentration 
As mentioned earlier, it is much more difficult to analyse the prize to qualify for post- 
seasonal play in European football than in the NAML. However, because the UEFA 
Champions League has increased the number of teams that can qualify for the 
tournament beyond the domestic league champions, there is now an additional 
important sporting prize in the domestic leagues to be analysed. This mainly affects the 
bigger leagues, since the most of the smaller leagues, such as the Norwegian, are still 
limited to one qualifying team. The following analyses about UEFA Champions League 
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concentration will therefore only concentrate on the biggest leagues in European 
football (Big Five), in a ten season period. The table below presents descriptive 
statistics related to UEFA Champions League in these leagues. 
137 
'C 
O 
9.4 V 
0 
a) 
V 
V 
ap 
V 
a4 
0 E 
V 
w~ 
a vaý 
ýo 
aý w 
0 
w 0 
b 
1 
.a 
H 
ýO 
O 
'/1 
O 
O 
N 
Oý 
.ý 
tý vp 
00 In M rn NNN- "-" "-" 00 ON 
TÖ 
Ao In ... N. -. .... -. pp . - vý0 
OÖ 
U 
MNN---- -ý -O M N- 
Oý+O 
72 
== Cd U ° " 
1 ` . - 
O O> -- fV vl v1 "-" "-" "- "ý 
.r 
M NO M 
od 
ýp v1 N 
Oý O 
N 
N ON 
OO 
'ý ý^ InIn---NNN000OO ýN[ý 
0° Uö 
Co r. JD 0 CU 
oU 
ý ý `° c° ý 
too_ 
`° U a is a iU ic a rý Q> Ca oG c2 > a; 0 
ö 
Z 
Q', M l- rN M- "o N 00 
M 00 
ch O 
i 
N 
V1 O vl V1 N ON l- 
OÖ N 
ýMNNMý. -+O '0000 
I ZÖ . - ºýI Cý O 
c0 aU 0 Uo 
ý "ý H 0ý 
> «; N0 - ýo U ci Q0 äUJ 
ODD v1--N -N -M NO00 
M 00 
V1 NNO O- O --ý --ý M V1 ON 
OO 
Q. 
In M --- - "--ý --ý OO NO O\ 
rºý 
`/ 'b r. 
^ö q = 
g U° 
k. e- p . u u -2 
cýmm2Xx-(A>rn F0 - 1' 
C. ' O 
v1 NV1OM "- N NON 
h 
OO 
" 
ce v)- . -.. -... -. p M MO 
c 
\ O .... \ - 
w 
N 'O U Uo 
m 
> oU 
0 
"-" NMC v1 e r- 00 Oý - 
x 
M 
As can be shown from the overview over teams qualifying for the UEFA Champions 
League for the different leagues, the number of teams differs both between the two five 
season periods and between leagues. This is because of general expansions of teams to 
the tournament during the period, and that UEFA league rankings decide the number of 
teams to this post-seasonal play. Based on these data, the calculated GK PO-ratios are 
presented in the following table. 
Table 4.32: Five- and ten season distribution of possible UEFA Champions League 
qualifiers in Big Five leagues measured by the GK PO-ratio over the period 1996 97 - 
2005/06 
1996/97- 
2000/01 
2001/02- 
2005/06 
1996/97- 
2005f06 
England 6.131 4.673 5.593 
Italy' 3.808 5.132 4.344 
Germany 4.150 4.241 4.017 
Spain 5.017 3.756 4.408 
France 2.977 4.498 3.714 
1 It is not taken into account that after the 2005/06 season a scandal resulted in 
relegation of the winner, and also that the runners-up got penalties (however, the 
runners-up was still given a qualification place for the UEFA Champions League). 
Based on the ten season period, the English league is relatively more concentrated than 
the others, and the French is the least concentrated. However, when looking at the two 
five season periods, they have opposite trends. Note that the GK-PO concentration 
ratios for European football are much higher than for both the NAML and the 
Australian leagues. 
The alternative measure (PO-deviation) for European football, represented by the Bieg 
Five leagues, adjusted by the number of observations during the analysis periods, is 
presented below. 
Table 4.33: Five- and ten-season distribution of possible UEFA Champions League 
qualifiers in Big Five leagues measured by the adjusted PO deviation over the period 
199697 - 2005,06 
1996'97- 
2000,, '0 1 
2'001/02- 
2005.06 
199697- 
2005'06 
England 0.354 0.571 0.833 
Italv" 0.301 0.598 0.702 
Germany 0.409 0.340 0.6 Th 
Spain 0. I95 0.414 0.737 
France 0.14 3 0.302 0.395 
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For the ten season period. the same relationship between the leagues can be found by 
the alternative measure. For the smaller periods, the results can differ from the other 
measure (as for the English FA Premier League). Similar to the GK PO-ratio, the 
alternative concentration ratio suggests much more concentration at the top of the 
European football leagues than for the leagues in the other continents analysed here. 
As for the NAML, the correlations between the GK PO-ratio and UEFA CL-share are 
calculated in table 4.34. 
Table 4.34: Correlation coefficients between the GK PO-ratio and the share of teams to 
possibly qualify for the UEFA Champions League in the Big Five leagues over the 
period 1996/97 - 2005/06 
Five-season Ten-season 
correlation correlation 
Big Five -0.1038 0.0947 
The conclusion from this simple correlation analysis is that the GK PO-ratio in 
European football is not correlated with the share of teams that qualify for the 
tournament. 
In their analysis of the domination by the top teams in European football, Hoehn and 
Szymanski (1999) use a sample period of 1991-1997 for England. During this time 31 
different teams competed in the top division; the number of European competition 
places in the period was 32, and 13 different teams appeared in European competitions 
(including the UEFA Cup and the UEFA Cup Winners' Cup). The top seven teams 
accounted for 81 percent of these European appearances, with 48 percent by the top 
three teams. 
Regarding newly promoted teams and qualifications for the UEFA Champions League, 
for example the English FA Premier League had none of these teams qualified for this 
tournament during the ten season period. 
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4.4.7.4. Scandinavian Royal League 
Because of the foundation of the Scandinavian Royal League (RL), '47 there is another 
opportunity to measure prize concentration for the domestic Scandinavian football 
leagues. The top four teams, based on the end-of-season table, play in this international 
post-seasonal tournament. Since the qualification structure is fixed, this seems, 
intuitively, to be a better "yardstick" to measure prize concentration than a combination 
including both qualifications for the UEFA Cup and the UEFA Champions League for 
these leagues. Descriptive data from the three domestic leagues, for the period where 
the Scandinavian Royal League has existed, is presented below. 1-411-1 
Table 4.35: Descriptive data and analysis of the concentration of teams qualifying for 
the Scandinavian Roval League over the period 2O(O3 )04 - 20(06 )07 
Norway 
Teams 2004- 
2007 
Sweden 
Teams 2004- 
2007 
Denmark 
Teams 2003'4- 
2006 7 
1 Välerenga IF 3 Djurgärdens IF 3 FC Kobenhavn 4 
2 SK Brann 3 IFK Göteborg 3 Brondby IF 3 
3 Lillestrom 3 Halmstads BK 2 OB 3 
4 Rosenborg BK 2 IF Elfsborg 2 FC Midtjylland 2 
5 Viking 1 Kalmar FF 2 AaB 2 
6 Stabxk I AIK Solna 1 Viborg FF 1 
7 Tromso IL I Hammarby IF FF 1 Esbjerg fB l 
8 Start 1 Helsingborgs IF 1 
9 Lyn Oslo 1 Malmö FF 1 
GK 2.273 2.288 2.444 
PODev 0.293 0.230 0.4O3 
These results suggest that the Danish league has highest playoff concentration. 
Evidence is related both to FC Copenhagen, as the only participant in all seasons, and a 
smaller number of teams being qualified for the Royal League in total. The post- 
seasonal Royal League qualification concentration ratio is based on four seasons, and 
can therefore only be treated as an indication of concentration. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the difference between failure prize and success prize, the 
success prize - failure prize ratio, might be an indicator of the competitiveness of a 
league. Applying qualifications for the Scandinavian Royal League as the success 
14' See royal lcague. coill . 
"' The season 200(617 is included, e\ en though the tournament was cancelled. Howe\ er, the cancellation 
\\ as a realm after the domestic leagues \\ ere finished. 
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criteria and relegation (including the relegation playoff) as the failure prize threshold in 
the domestic leagues, the results are given in the tables below. 
Table 4.36: Marginal points (pts) to qualify for the Royal League (RL) and to relegate 
(Rel) over the neriod 20(03/)04 - 20(06/)07 
Norway Sweden Denmark 
Marg. pts Marg. pts Marg. pts Marg. pts Marg. pts Nlarg. pts 
to RL to Rel to RL to Rel to RL to Rel 
2004 40 27 41 28 57 27 
2005 42 30 43 30 53 25 
2006 44 29 42 22 54 
-6 2007 44 27 40 23 58 25 
Table 4.37: Marginal win percent (WP) to qualify for the Royal League and to relegate, 
and the success prize - failure prize ratio (S-F ratio) over the period 20(03/)04 - 
20(06/)07 
Norway Sweden Denmark 
Marg. Marg. S-F Marg. Marg. S-F Marg. Marg. S-F 
WP to WP to ratio' WP to WP to ratio' WP to WP to ratio' 
RL Rel RL Rel RL Rel 
2004 0.538 0.385 0.153 0.577 0.423 0.154 0.621 0.288 0.333 
2005 0.577 0.423 0.154 0.596 0.423 0.173 0.576 0.288 0.288 
2006 0.615 0.423 0.192 0.596 0.346 0.250 0.591 0.303 0.288 
2007 0.615 0.365 0.250 0.577 0.346 0.231 0.621 0.288 0.333 
' Success-failure ratio based on difference in win percentage. 
Also by this measure, Denmark is weakest balanced, and confirms the descriptive 
statistics presented in the previous table. The two other leagues have a negative trend, 
where the two last seasons have greater difference than the two first periods. 
4.4.8. Relegation-Promotion 
One measure that can be applied in open leagues is the suggested rate of promoted 
teams to be relegated within two seasons, as presented in Chapter 3. The table below 
shows the indexes for the Big Five leagues and Norway from European football, for a 
period of 40 seasons. 
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Table 4.38: Two-season relegation ratio for promoted teams in Big Five leagues and 
Norway over the period 1966(/67) - 2005(/06) 
1966(/67) - 
1975(/76) 
1976(/77) - 
1985(/86) 
1986(87) - 
1995(/96) 
1996(, 67)- 
2005(-06) 
England 1.301 1.049 1.563 2.042 
France 1.108 1.866 1.361 1.6-1-1 
Germany 2.169 2.181 1.816 1.636 
Italy 2.298 1.962 1.306 1.534 
Spain 1.722 1.964 1.521 1.91- 
Norway 1.167 1.573 1.649 1.542 
There is much variation from period to period, but a number of trends can be found. 
First, the top division in England has, from the mid- 1970s, gone from having the best 
ratio, almost equal to the idealized probabilities, to a situation where promoted teams 
have more than twice the likelihood of relegation, compared to the expected shares in an 
idealized league. This is consistent with the general negative trend of other measures of 
competitive balance in the English top division. Interesting in relation to the increased 
gap between the two highest level divisions in English football from the middle of the 
1980s, is that it coincides with the bigger differences between these divisions when it 
comes to broadcasting revenues (see also Chapter 6). 
Italy and Germany have better ratios in the latter half of the sample than in the first half, 
when these leagues are worst balanced. The most recent period shows that France, 
Germany, Italy and Norway have similar ratios, while England and Spain have larger 
ratios indicating a bigger competitive gap in these two leagues between the top two 
divisions. 
Summarising the empirical results in this chapter, NAML has in general weaker win 
dispersion than European football leagues. However, win dispersion has increased in the 
biggest Western European leagues, where six out of ten are significant. Only the NBA 
follows this pattern in the NAML. Comparing different groups of leagues, there is a 
tendency for bigger leagues to have a better win dispersion in European football, 
especially identified by comparing old Eastern European leagues with the average of the 
new smaller leagues. Moreover, comparing the smaller Western European leagues with 
the bigger gives the same pattern. However, the relationship between league size and 
win dispersion is not unambiguous, because of the relatively weak NSQF indexes in the 
second tier leagues (2WE). 
1-4 
Even if the Big Five leagues have significantly increased their championship 
concentration, opposite of the pattern in the NAML, the results are in general le,, clear 
for this and the performance persistence dimension of competitive balance. In `general, 
championship concentration and performance persistence are calculated to be better in 
the NAML than European football leagues in the last decade of the sample. Also for 
playoff concentration, the results are better for the NAML than the Big Five leagues'. III 
general, the upper part of the Big Five leagues is more concentrated than both the 
Scandinavian football leagues and the two selected Aussie leagues. The results also 
show that in some European leagues, competitive balance varies between the different 
dimensions, such as for the Norwegian league in the last decade, and that most 
measures indicate worsened competitive balance in the English top division over the 
sample period. 
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5. The Determinants of Competitive Balance across Leagues 
5.1. Introduction 
Chapters 2 and 3 went through conceptual issues on competitive balance and how it 
might be measured, both in a simple and in a complex league context. Chapter 4 gave 
an empirical overview over the level of competitive balance within and across both 
single leagues' and groups of leagues, as well as including empirical analyses by 
measures directly related to complex league structure. This chapter will focus on 
determinants of differences in competitive balance, especially across European football 
leagues. 
Analyses of possible factors affecting competitive balance between the member leagues 
of the UEFA have a different challenge compared to similar analyses between the 
NAML. While the differences between the NAML to a large extent have been explained 
by differences in the level of market regulations, such analyses have rarely been done in 
Europe. One explanation is that the leagues among the UEFA members are relatively 
similarly organised, with few restrictions on "free market" based open leagues. The 
challenge is thus to find a different perspective to analyse differences in competitive 
balance between the leagues in the UEFA area. 
The number of teams in the top division, rules for relegation, the number of teams 
qualifying for play-off etc., are issues that governing bodies have to take into account 
when deciding the tournament and prize structure. Effects of structural changes and 
differences in competition, in the context of competitive balance, will also be included 
in a cross-sectional regression analysis of determinants for differences in competitive 
balance across all European football leagues. The last part of the chapter will discuss 
championship playoff in the context of competitive balance in European football. 
5.2. Literature Review 
Even if many empirical studies on competitive balance has been related to single 
leagues (Berri et al.. 005), there are also a number of studies comparing competitive 
balance across leagues. The table below dives an overview over some of these studies. 
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The first contributions used different NAML as basis for this research. From the end of 
the 1990s comparisons among European leagues (usually football) ha. e become more 
usual as well. Comparing competitive balance in European Football leagues with 
competitive balance in NAML is also part of this literature. 
Table 5.1: Overview over literature concerning differences in competitive balance 
across leagues 
Authors 
Quirk and Fort (1992 
Fort and Quirk (1995 
Vrooman (1995) 
Team sports 
NAML: NBA, MLB, NFL, NHL 
NAML: MLB, NBA, NFL, NHL 
NAML: MLB. NBA. NFL 
Hoehn and Szymanski (1999) Football: Italy, Germany, Spain, England 
Szymanski and Kuypers (1999) Football: England, Scotland, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands 
Dobson and Goddard (2001) Football: England, Scotland, Spain, Italy, France, Germany 
Szymanski and Smith (2002) Football: Italy, Spain, Portugal, England 
NAML: NFL, MLB, NHL 
Buzzacchi et al. (2003) 
Bourg (2004) 
Lee(2004) 
Gerrard (2004b) 
Dejonghe (2004) 
Football: England, Italy, Belgium 
NAML: MLB, NFL, NHL 
Football: France, Gen-nativ, England, Spain, Italy 
Baseball: MLB, JPBL (CL, PL), KPBL 
Football: 16 Western European leagues 
Football: Spain, Italy, England, Germany, France, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Scotland, Belgium 
Berri et al. (2005) Football: MLS, North American Soccer League, France, Spain. 
Germany, Italy, England 
American football: Canadian Football League, Arena Football 
League, NFL, AFL. 
Hockey: NHL, World Hockey Association 
Baseball: MLB 
Basketball: NBA, American Basketball Association 
Szymanski and Valletti (2005b) Football: England 
NAML: MLB 
Gerrard (2006a) Football: England, France, Germany, Italy, Spain 
Groot (2008) Football: England, France, Germany, Italy, S ain, the Netherlands 
Generally, the results from these studies suggest that competitive balance differs across 
leagues, as is confirmed through the analyses in Chapter 4. The literature explaining 
differences in competitive balance across leagues focuses either on NA, ', VIL, a.,,, for 
example Quirk and Fort (1992), or on the difference between NA\TL and European 
football leagues, as in for example Szymanski and Smith (2002). There has been little 
analysis of the determinants of the differences in competitive balance between European 
football leagues. The literature has focused on comparisons across a sample of leagues, 
rather than analysing the determinants of these differences. However, Bourg (2004) 
suggests differences in the distribution of revenues from sale of broadcasting right,, as 
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an explanation for different levels of competitive balance among the Big Five 
leagues. 149 
Differences in competitive balance between European football leagues and \. A\IL have 
usually been explained in two ways. First, open leagues (i. e. merit hierarchies with 
promotion and relegation) in European football are seen to be advantageous for 
competitive balance in Europe in contrast to the closed leagues in Northern America. 
Second, the generally greater extent of regulations in NAML is seen as an advantage to 
these leagues, compared to European football. Note that the first point is related to win 
dispersion. Buzzacchi et at. (2003) and Szymanski and Smith (2002) find different 
results when it comes to performance persistence. 
Differences in competitive balance between the NAML have, to a large degree, been 
explained by differences in regulations. However, when it comes to comparisons 
between the NHL and the NBA, Quirk and Fort (1992) apply a different approach, since 
differences in institutional rules are small and the teams have often used the same 
arenas. They therefore explain the differences in competitive balance between the NHL 
and the NBA on basis of "tumultuous" (p. 249), since the level of "expansion, 
contraction, and movement of league franchises" (p. 248) during the history of these 
leagues are different. Berri et al. (2005) focus upon a different approach, and follow 
Schmidt and Berri (2003) in applying the "Gould hypothesis". Schmidt and Berri (2003, 
p. 692-3) refer to the Gould hypothesis found in "the works of evolutionary biologist 
Stephen Jay Gould (1986; 1996) and economist Andrew Zimbalist (1992a; 1992b). 
Specifically, these authors argue that an expanding population of athletes would 
influence the convergence of team performance". Related to the NBA, Berri et at. find 
the lack of tall high quality players in the NBA as an explanation of the weak 
competitive balance in the NBA. 
Fort and Quirk (1995) focus on revenue sharing policy when describing general 
differences in competitive balance between the NAML. A problem they explicitly 
emphasise is that within-league changes in the level of sharing have not been significant 
enough to allow empirical testing of the impact of changes in revenue sharing policy, 
related to possible changes in competitive balance. However, by comparing sharing 
141' Bourg (2004) analyses competitive balance over twenty seasons in the Big Five leagues in Europe and 
claims that (p. 5): "The position of each country can be explained by the more or less interdependent 
economic organization, operating mainly through the regulating function of broadcasting rights. " 
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rules in the different leagues, they find that because of historic opposition to more equal 
sharing of gate and local TV-revenues in the NHL, MLB and NBA, these leagues have 
much less sharing than in the NFL, which historically has been much more open to such 
regulations. Further, Fort and Quirk (1995) claim that these differences might explain 
why the NFL has less disparity in "drawing potential" (p. 1289) than the other NA\1L. 
Hence, the revenues among the teams in NFL differ less than for the other leagues, as is 
confirmed by using Gini indexes. Fort and Quirk (1995) find that the index for the NFL 
is much lower than for the other leagues for the period 1991-1994, followed by the 
NHL, MLB, and finally the NBA as the weakest competitive balanced league. This is 
similar to predictions in Vrooman (1995), based on different institutional arrangements, 
such as payroll caps and factors affecting the revenue elasticity of winning (revenue 
sharing, the shared revenue as a proportion of all revenue, and the length of the season). 
Vrooman expects that the NFL should have best competitive balance, NBA least 
balanced, while the MLB should have moderate competitive balance. ' These results 
are supported by Sandy et at. (2004, p. 178) claiming: 
... 
in North America, larger market teams have dominated in baseball and 
basketball. Smaller market teams have had success in the National Football 
League, but this league shares the largest population of its wealth (Atkinson, 
Stanley, and Tschirhart, 1988; Mason, 1997). 
5.3. Differences in Competitive Balance between European Football 
Leagues 
Generally, most of the focus in the literature, when it comes to determinants for 
competitive balance, has been on two issues. The first is differences in drawing power 
(market size) among the teams in a league (see, for example. Fort, 2000; Gerrard, 
2006b). The other significant part is related to possible effects on competitive balance 
from intervention on the free market, such as product and labour market restrictions . 
15' 
This view follows the three points that, according to Szymanski (2003b), have been 
used in antitrust defences in U. S. court,, (p. 1153): 
150 The NHL ww as not included in this analysis. 
'`' These issues are consistent w% ith "S2" and "S 3" in Barron et al. (2002. p. 3), with the statement in 
Sand\ et al. (2004) p. 178: "Virtually all leagues have debated the two primary tactics to ensure some 
le el of competiti\ e balance: (l) talent sharing: and (2) revenue-sharing". 
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1. Inequality of resources leads to unequal competition. 
2. Fan interest declines when outcomes become less uncertain. 
3. Specific redistribution mechanisms produce more outcome uncertainty. 
In addition to these relationships, this thesis will also focus on possible incentive effects 
from prizes and league structure. These effects seem to be a minor part of the literature, 
even though a number of contributions have been related to relegation issues. in the 
context of competitive balance. In general, Gerrard (2006b, p. 34) claims that: 
"Economic theory demonstrates the possible impact of the corporate objectives of teams 
(i. e. wealth-maximisation or utility-maximisation), playing talent supply conditions, 
tournament structures including prize structures, and league regulations on the 
competitive balance of tournaments". These issues will be treated in the following, 
while, for example, the influence from technology and field conditions on competitive 
balance (Sanderson, 2002) is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The basic competitive balance course in professional team sports can next be explained 
by the following model: 
Distribution of drawing power - Revenue distribution - Distribution of wages 
4 Distribution of playing and coaching talent - Competitive balance 
Given balanced match schedule, a league's competitive balance should fully reflect the 
distribution of sporting quality among the teams (sporting quality balance). The sporting 
quality balance is based on teams' ability to pay wages for the players. The stronger the 
correlation is between player (and coaching) quality and wages, the stronger the 
relationship between the distribution of wage costs and competitive balance should be, 
ceteris paribus. " 2 The ability for teams to pay wages depends on their revenues. Hence, 
one expects a high correlation between the revenue balance among the teams in the 
league and competitive balance. Theoretically, perfect competitive balance should 
therefore be achieved if all teams were located in areas with equal revenue potential (l: l- 
Hodiri and Quirk, 197 1). However, equal revenue potential is not easily determined in 
practice. A natural proxy might be the size of the population for a team. 
' 52 Kahane (2003) focuses on the balance of payroll when describing competiti% c balance. E% en if Kahane 
lists a number of advantages tör this this thesis regards it as a determinant (driver) for eompetiti\ e 
balance. 
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Generally, population is found to be a strong significant demand driver in professional 
team sports (Cairns et al., 1986; Downward and Dawson, 2000; Dobson and Goddard, 
2001; Borland and Macdonald, 2003). 153 However, differences in revenues among 
teams might also be related to other factors. Such factors can, according to Sanderson 
and Siegfried (2003), be differences between locations when it comes to the willingness 
to pay to have a successful team' 54 and the preferences for winning. 155 Szymanski and 
Kuypers (1999, p. 263) claim that the "core level of support" of teams is related to both 
history and geography, where the latter is defined as the "catchment population and 
number of other clubs in the area". Empirical difficulties related to measuring teams' 
market size, or catchment area, are discussed in Dobson and Goddard (2001), 1 56 by 
referring to Dobson and Goddard (1992), and a number of factors are mentioned as 
indicators. These can be put into three main areas - demographic, socio-economic and 
historical, where the latter is related to historical records, traditions and long term 
sporting success. Especially for European football, it is important to include other 
factors than just population, because sporting success'57 and history of a team are 
significant contributors, and that the relative importance of geography might have been 
reduced compared to history, due to modern communications (Szymanski and Kuypers, 
1999). 158 One would also, intuitively, expect the relationship between population and 
revenues to be weaker in European football leagues than in NAML, because the 
distance between competing teams are normally much smaller (see, for example, 
Dobson and Goddard, 2004). Summarized, the revenue distribution among the teams in 
a European football league is a function of their drawing power (a term applied by, for 
example, Hoehn and Szymanski, 1999; Dobson and Goddard, 2001), and is, hence, the 
basic determinant for a league's level of competitive balance. 
153 Another advantage might intuitively be that teams from larger populations should have higher 
probability of being demanded by high level talents, who would prefer to play for "their" team, if 
expecting a positive correlation between population and the number of high level talented players. This 
can be both monetary in the sense of reduced living costs, but also immaterial variables such as playing 
for the team the player is supporting, and living in the area where the players' friends live. Analyses of 
these immaterial advantages are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
154 According to Sanderson and Siegfried (2003) this willingness might be dependent on the alternative 
opportunities on recreation, entertainment and/or cultural amenities. 
15 Sanderson and Siegfried (2003) use Porter (1992) as reference. 
156 See also Dobson and Goddard (2004). 
157 See, for example, Cairns (1987). 
'sR The former coach of Rosenborg BK claims that Rosenborg BK, when qualifying to the top division in 
the Norwegian league for the first time for the 1960/61 season, became popular among others because of 
the style of the team, young up and coming players playing attractive offensive football (Eggen and 
Nyrenning, 1999). 
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During the history of professional team sports, cross-subsidisation methods have been 
popular tools, aiming to weaken the relationship between the distribution of drawing 
power and the level of competitive balance. Among the motives for introducing and 
keeping these regulations is the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis. In other words, 
through pro competitive balance cross-subsidisation policy. one expects increased 
demand through the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, ceteris paribus. Sloane (1971) 
claims that this may "justify" the sports leagues' use of it, even if cross-subsidisation in 
general is criticised by economists (see also Jennett, 1984). According to Downward 
and Dawson (2000), one can, therefore, say that the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis 
promotes cross-subsidisation policies. However, to achieve the proposed effects on 
uncertainty of outcome, it is required that cross-subsidisation policy has positive effects 
on competitive balance. The literature of the economics of professional team sports has 
concerned effects from cross-subsidisation policy both theoretically and empirically. 
This chapter will only focus on competitive balance effects. 159 
The main focus on regulations in a competitive balance context is related both to policy 
affecting the distribution of revenues among the teams and on restrictions on the labour 
market. Revenue sharing policy (regulations on the product market) is mainly divided 
into two categories; the traditional gate revenue sharing policy and the modern media 
revenue sharing policy. Regulations on the labour market are related to the player 
transfers, wages, player recruitments, and closed labour market. Since many of the 
labour market regulations are similar between the leagues in "modern" European 
football, they will not be included in the model for determinants for differences in 
competitive balance in European football. 
On the product market, revenue sharing has a long history in professional team sports. 
Motivations for justifying a revenue sharing system might be divided into two parts; 
reduced financial divergences among the teams and what this thesis will call 
"reasonableness". The latter refers back to the peculiarities of team sports, and that two 
teams are required to produce a match (see, for example, Rottenberg, 1956; Neale, 
1964). A broader revenue sharing system among the teams in a league can also be 
15" Other effects might be a general financial benefit for the weaker teams both in relation to mone% 
redistribution (from wealthier teams) and as a consequence of reduced bargaining power for player: 
(benefits all teams). This can for example increase the probability that they will stay in business (Dobson 
and Goddard. 2001). These arguments refer back to the starting period of both Major League Baseball 
(Rottenberg, 1956) and English football (Sz% manski and Kuypers. 1999). 
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justified, because the league in itself might be a main revenue driver for all teams 
(Gerrard, 2006b). 
Already at the beginning of the National League in 1876, the ticket price was equally 
shared between the home and away team (Fort and Quirk, l995. p. 1286). According to 
Barros et al. (2002), gate (and merchandise) revenue sharing has played a minor part of 
the economics of European football, even though it has been a part of the history of for 
example English and Norwegian football. However, both these leagues have removed 
the gate sharing between the home and away teams. This chapter will not concern gate 
sharing as a significant determinant for differences in competitive balance between 
European football leagues. 
Historically, revenues from broadcasting deals were limited, both as a consequence of 
weak competition among TV suppliers, which often were public broadcasters in a 
monopoly situation (see, for example, Barros et at., 2002), 160 and that the fear of 
substitution effects (potential spectators at the stadium are watching matches on 
television) among governing bodies reduced the interest to televise these matches. 
Deregulation in the market for broadcasting in Europe during the 1980s (see, for 
example, Jeanrenaud and Kesenne, 2006) seems to have created a significant (positive) 
shift in the demand for broadcasting rights. In addition, the consequential expanded 
level of compensation for these rights has (probably) further increased the interest from 
governing bodies to sell the product to broadcasters, since possible substitution effects 
now could be (over-) compensated. 161 Moreover, positive spill-over effects from 
television on merchandising, sponsors and promotion (in a marketing context) of teams 
and the sport have forced changed behaviour among leaders of teams and governing 
bodies. Especially from the 1990s, innovative infrastructure among broadcasters have 
created a further positive shift in the demand curve for broadcasting rights, and hence 
inflated prices even more. 162 
Solberg (2004) defines sports rights as (p. 378): "the rights to broadcast from a sporting 
event, most commonly within specific geographical areas. " According to Solberg, the 
16" See for example Barros et al. (2002) for discussions about these issues. They also refer to a number of 
relevant studies. 
"" This is described in the analyses of the effects on demand from the second (1993'94) season of the first 
deal between the BSkv B and the English FA Premier League hý Baimbridge et al. (1996). 
162 Solbci-_g (2004 p. 182-6) and Gratton and Solberg (2004,2007) provide overview over the l. uropean 
TV landscape. 
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sports rights can further be split into different groups of products, such as live 
broadcasting and highlights. In addition, for example football rights have been a driver 
for developing pay television in Europe (Jeanrenaud and Kesenne, 2006). The methods 
for constructing and organising the deals differ substantially between the members of 
the UEFA. This means both the framework of the deals (individual in contrast to 
collective deals) and the general contents of the contracts (e. g. the percent to be equally 
distributed). The rights are sold in three general ways; collective sale, 163 individualistic 
sale, and combinations of these two. Collective sale of broadcasting rights is still most 
common and is now the major revenue sharing source in many European football 
leagues. ' 64 
With collective sale of broadcasting rights, the revenues are distributed among the 
teams in a way that is expected to be narrower than for individualistic sales. This is 
emphasised in Jeanrenaud and Kesenne (2006), claiming that the individual deals are an 
advantage for the big-market teams, and hence lead to a weaker distribution of 
broadcasting revenues among the teams. '65 Empirically, this can be shown in for 
example Bourg (2004), who analyses the broadcasting deals in all Big Five leagues and 
claims that the differences in constructions have expanded the domination among the 
dominating teams in Italy and Spain. This is emphasised by calculating the ratio for 
differences in the earnings for the team receiving the highest amount and the club 
receiving the lowest amount of money from broadcasting. The ratios (ranges) are "1.7 in 
France, 2.2 in England, 2.6 in Germany, 5.3 in Spain, and 6.3 in Italy" (p. 9). 166 This is 
consistent with the findings of Solberg (2004), who compares the differences between 
the collective deal in the English FA Premier League and the individualistic deal in 
Italian Serie A. However, according to Jeanrenaud and Kesenne (2006), Tonazzi (2003) 
emphasises that individual broadcasting deals not necessary weaken competitive 
balance, if an appropriate revenue redistribution mechanism from bigger to smaller 
teams exists. 
163Jeanrenaud and Kesenne (2006) use the expression "joint selling". They refer to a number of 
advantages of this type of selling the broadcasting rights, such as lower transaction costs and increased 
Possibility to buy a complete package for a whole season. 
64 Downward and Dawson (2000, p. 169) claim that: "By implication, the skewed nature of television 
revenues in European sport would seem to suggest that a lack of competitive balance, which historically 
seems to be the case, would be either, at a minimum, consolidated or, at a maximum, accelerated". 
165 Jeanrenaud and Kesenne (2006) use Scully (2004) as reference. 
'66The ratio for England is consistent with Sandy et al. (2004). 
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In NAML, the history of significant revenues from sale of broadcasting rights is much 
longer than in Europe. In general, the national rights are distributed uniformly among all 
teams (some exceptions for expansions teams), while the way to treat local TV-revenues 
vary between the leagues. Theoretical analyses of competitive balance consequences 
from broadcasting revenues have been split into two in NANIL. Equal sharing of 
national TV revenues should not have any effect on competitive balance. since the 
payment is not related to the teams' playing success (Fort and Quirk, 1995), while 
sharing of local TV revenues might have positive effects on competitive balance (Fort 
and Quirk, 1995). However, the deals when it comes to sale of broadcasting rights differ 
across the Atlantic, and these theoretical results might not be directly transferred to 
European football. In a number of European football leagues, parts of the distribution 
from collective revenues from sale of media rights are based on sporting 
performance. 167 According to Szymanski (2001,2003c), this should promote 
competitive balance. 
Professional leagues across countries and sports both have similarities and differences 
in relation to prizes and tournament structures. A number of differences can be found in 
relation to tournament structure and organization between the NAML and European 
football leagues (Hoehn and Szymanski, 1999). 168 For example, the major leagues are 
closed, while the European football leagues are generally open. The effects of prize and 
tournament structures on competitive balance have generally not received much 
attention, at least not in European football (Barros et al., 2002). However, there have 
been analyses of competitive balance effects from promotion-relegation (Hoehn and 
Szymanski, 1999; Noll, 2002,2003), expansions (Fort and Quirk, 1995, Schmidt, 
2001), reduced number of teams (Cairns, 1987), post-seasonal play (Sandy et at.. 2004; 
Bourg, 2004; Goossens and Kesenne, 2007) and point score systems (Cain and 
Haddock, 2006; Fort, 2007; Haugen, 2008). In addition, Lee and Fort (2005) and Fort 
and Lee (2007) among others use different structural changes in analyses of their break- 
point analyses of the NAML. Utt and Fort (2002) recognise that the playing schedule 
system in the MLB might affect competitive balance in the description of perfect 
competitive dominance, while Ross and Lucke (1997) explain changes in competitive 
balance also from changing to divisional play in the ; EILB. Szymanski (22003b) discusses 
17 According to Sand,, et al. (2004) the only performance based revenues is from sale of broadcasting 
riýhts related to qualifications for playoffs. 
1' An o% er\ ie over "common" elements in the N. ANIL and European football can be found in 
Szv manski (2003h. p. 1150-2)- 
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optimal size of leagues, and claims that this has been a relevant issue in the major 
leagues, while in European football it is an issue that "have never risen" (p. 161). 
5.3.1. Model 
Based on the discussions above, analyses of determinants for differences in competitive 
balance between leagues in European football require a different approach than for 
NAML. This is based on three major groups of differences between the leagues- on each 
side of the Atlantic. The first group of differences is related to non-sporting variables. 
such as demographic and economic factors. The differences in these variables are 
relatively small when comparing the NAML, because they operate in the same area. On 
the other hand, there are significant variations among these variables at the macro level 
between the members of the UEFA. The second group is related to market regulations 
in the leagues. In general, the differences in competitive balance between the NAML 
have, to a large extent, been explained by significant variations in regulations between 
the leagues. In Europe, the situation is quite different, since the differences in the level 
of market regulations are very limited between the different members of the UEFA. 
Therefore, market regulations provide limited explanation of the differences in 
competitive balance between European football leagues, with the possible exception of 
differences in the distribution of the money earned by sale of broadcasting rights, as 
indicated in Bourg (2004). The third group is related to prize and tournament structure. 
While these are relatively similar across the NAML, there seems to be larger 
divergences among European football leagues. 
Analysing the determinants for differences in competitive balance between the different 
members of the UEFA will be done by first analysing possible determinants for 
dispersions of drawing power from a macro level. This will be done through including 
explanatory variables for the distribution of drawing power among the teams. Next, the 
structure of revenue sharing through TV/media deals will be analysed. while the last 
group of variables will concern prize and tournament structure. '69 
The framework of the cross-sectional analysis is based on the following model: 
Table 2 in Bourg (2004) p. 8 summarizes con%ergences and divergences in the organization of 
professional team sports in Europe. 
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Figure 5.1: Overview over factors affecting competitive balance between European 
football leagues 
Geographic/Demographic Variables170 
Many studies claim that the most important determinant in a team's drawing power is 
the population in the "supporting zone" for the team. Because this is an analysis on the 
macro level, general variables are applied in comparison to within-league analyses. Two 
issues will be focused on in this part; market size and the distribution of population 
within the different leagues (countries). The first is based on the assumption that a 
bigger market size for a sport increases the distribution of drawing power among the 
teams, ceteris paribus. The second is based on the fact that fans have high tendency to 
support teams from their home area, and the following hypothesis can be drawn: the 
greater distribution of the population there is throughout the country, the better 
competitive balance there will be. Moreover, population might be a reflector for the 
Gould hypothesis, where a larger population can be hypothesised to bring a higher 
number of talented players to share among the teams, ceteris paribus. However. this 
possible relationship between population and competitive balance might be much 
weaker after the Bosnian ruling, due to the open labour market in the EU. 
The obvious demographic variable to use for total market size is population. For 
example, Lee (2004) uses population as a measure of market size, when comparing 
1" Literature based on urban studies could be relevant for this group of variables, but it is seen a, be,, ond 
the scope of this thesis. 
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attendance in different leagues. In this chapter's cross-sectional model, the total 
population (POP) for the country of the league is used. In addition, there are variables 
that might be more specific in reflecting the distribution of population within a league. 
In other words, better competitive balance is expected in countries with a more equal 
spatial distribution of the market. Relevant variables are: population density 
(POPDENS), population of the largest city (LARGCITY), population of the largest city 
as a share of the total population, measured by dummy variables (LARGSHAIZE > 0.25: 
SMALLSHARE < 0.1), 171 and percentage size of the agricultural sector (AG RI). 
Population of the largest city as a share of the total population might reflect that the 
population is concentrated around this city, and hence predict a lower competitive 
balance. The size of the agricultural sector will also tend to reflect population density 
(with more agrarian-based economies tending to have lower population density). Hioh 
percentage of agriculture might therefore indicate more equal distribution of the 
population within a league. 
Economic Variables 
The next group of variables is economic variables. More highly economically developed 
countries are hypothesized to have more equal spatial distribution of the market. In 
addition, this variable might also be positively correlated with determining the market 
size of a league. Lee (2004), when comparing attendance between NL and AL in MLB, 
the Central League (CL) and the Pacific League (PL) in the Japanese Professional 
Baseball League (JPBL), and the Korean Professional Baseball League (KPBL). uses a 
variable based on per capita GDP. I will use the per capita GNP as a variable (GNP) to 
reflect the economic size of the country. The percent of agriculture (AGRI) might also 
reflect economic development, and will, in this case, have the opposite expected sign, 
compared to the population explanation above. 
Sporting (Historical) Variables 
Sporting variables may reflect at least two issues, hypothesised to be relevant in the 
context of competitive balance. First, the general sporting quality of a league is 
expected to be positively correlated with competitive balance. Second, the general 
ý'ý The split into dummy variables fits better than just applying a continuous variable. 
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market size for a league is not only reflected by the population and, eventually. 
economic conditions, but also from historical sporting traditions. 
The sporting quality of a league in European football can be measured by comparing the 
sporting level of the teams of the league. The current system of European team 
tournaments, such as the UEFA Champions League, includes a seeding sv'stem that is 
league based, and this is applied as a measure for the level of sporting qualify in the 
league (UEFARANK). 
The market size of a league is also determined by how popular the sport is. It is 
expected that more popular sports (measured by spectator demand) will tend, ceteris 
paribus, to generate greater supply of playing talent. The variable used is the FIFA rank 
system for national teams (FIFARANK). The age of the league might also reflect the 
popularity of the sport, but this can also be affected by political changes. However, the 
age of the league can be relevant in the context of competitive balance, if it is expected 
that developed leagues are better balanced, ceteris paribus. This hypothesis is supported 
by the findings in Lee (2004), who concludes that there is a higher degree of uncertainty 
of match and playoff outcome in developed leagues than in developing leagues. 
Because of the structure of observations for this variable, a dummy variable is preferred 
to identify newer members of the UEFA (UEFAlate). An association becoming member 
in 1988 or later is defined as young. 
Revenue Sharing 
The model for analysing determinants for differences in competitive balance across 
leagues in European football also includes revenue sharing. However, the relevant 
variables for revenue sharing in these leagues are based on broadcasting deals. Because 
of lack of information, variables for broadcasting rights will be treated in a second step 
of the model, in residual analyses in the Big Five leagues. 
Prize and Tournament Structure 
Additional to the macro level variables suggested to proxy leagues' distribution of 
drawing power, the focus on prizes and tournament structure in this chapter gives the 
opportunity to include variables at the micro (single league) level. It might be 
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reasonable to expect that aspects of tournament structure, such as championship 
playoffs and the relegation system, might affect the level of competitive balance in a 
league. 
The challenge is to include appropriate variables into the competitive balance equation. 
For championship playoffs, a dummy variable (ChPO) takes the value of one, if the 
league has had championship playoff during the periods analysed. For relegation, the 
difference between leagues is related to the number of teams that are involved in 
relegation systems, either through automatic relegation or through relegation pla`'off. 
Two variables will be used in this analysis. The first is the number of teams to 
automatically relegate in relation to the number of teams in the league (AuRel nr). The 
hypothesis is that competitive balance is expected to improve, as the higher share of 
teams to be automatically relegated increases. Second, since many of the European 
football leagues also include relegation playoff in their relegation procedure, a variable 
that uses the total number of teams involved in the relegation process as share of the 
total number of teams in the league (AuPoRel_nr), is included. The hypothesis is based 
on the same as the previous variable. 
Most European football leagues use what can be called a pure round-robin match 
schedule, where all teams meet each other twice, once at home and once away. 
Deviation from this system might affect competitive balance, if weaker teams get 
advantages from the match schedule, compared to better teams. The dummy variable 
(PureRR) has the value one for leagues using pure round-robin, and zero otherwise. 
The last variable is related to the size of the league by the number of teams (A\'teams). 
Even if the measures for win dispersion and performance persistence take into account 
the number of teams in the league, the size of the league might have further effects on 
competitive balance. Ceteris paribus, one might expect that the more teams there are in 
the league, the weaker the competitive balance, because weaker teams are expected to 
be included as the league increases its number of teams. This should worsen the win 
dispersion. 
As is shown earlier, point score systems might affect some of the competitive balance 
measures, in addition to possible effects on competitive balance through sporting 
incentive effects. Except for Albania in the 1995/96 season, who only had two points 
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for a home win (but three for an away win), all member leagues of UEFA operate with 
the (3,1,0) point score system during the sample period. No difference between the 
leagues should emerge because of point score system in the cross-sectional analysis 
presented below, and this is therefore omitted from the model. 172 On basis of the 
discussion above, the model for analysing the determinants for differences in 
competitive balance across leagues in European football is shown in the following 
equation: 
CB; = ßl + P2POP; +f 3POPDENS; + ß4LARGCITY; + 05LARGSHARE; + 
06SMALLSHARE; + ß7AGRI; + ß8GNP; + (39UEFARANK; + ß1oFIFARANK; + 
1 11 UEFA1ate; + ß12ChPO; +P 13AuRe1_nr; + (314AuPoRel_nr; +ß 15PureRR; + 
ß 16AVteams; + c1 
5.3.2. Data and Descriptive Analyses 
The data in this study is collected from a number of sources. Economic and geographic 
data are found in the World Factbook, 13 McCoy (2002), www. world-gazetteer. com, 
and www. nationmaster. com/graph-T/geo_pop_den/EUR. Sources on sporting data are 
www. uefa. com, rsssf. com, www. uefa. com/uefa/keytopics/kind=64/newsid=38404. html 
and www. fifa. com/worldfootball/ranking/. Competitive balance is calculated annually 
for 50 of the 52 members of UEFA in two periods (five and ten seasons), within the 
following sample period of ten seasons: 1994(/95)-2004(/05). 174 The five season 
analysis is based on the last part of this period; 1999(/00)-2004(/05). The variables are 
presented in table 5.23 and 5.24 in the appendix of this chapter. 
Competitive balance is calculated for the three dimensions used throughout the thesis. 
The NSQF ratio, SRCC and HHI are calculated for all leagues. A difficulty is the choice 
of appropriate timeframe for these variables, because in general, within-seasonal 
competitive balance varies considerably between seasons. Cross-season averages are 
172 However, effects from changes in point score systems on competitive balance are possible in the time- 
series analyses in Chapter 6. Also differences in corporate objectives is difficult to differ between leagues, 
but will be discussed in Chapter 6 too. 
173 www. odci. gov/cia/publications/factbook/index. html. 
174 As the only UEFA member, Liechtenstein does not have its own league, and can hence not be included 
in the data sample (teams from Lichtenstein play in the Swiss league). In addition, the structure of the 
league in Bosnia-Herzegovina complicates calculations of competitive balance, and is also omitted from 
some of the analyses in this chapter. 
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used to eliminate random fluctuations over time. Also many of the independent 
variables used in this analysis, such as population, are relatively stable in the short run. 
The number of seasons is arbitrary, and is for the NSQF ratio and the SRCC on ten and 
five seasons, while the HHI is only based on ten seasons. 
For general comments about competitive balance in European football, see Chapter 4. 
However, one aspect is relatively clear, that among the weakest balanced leagues 
(NSQF ratio) are young (and smaller) leagues from the former Soviet Union. Among 
the members of the UEFA in this analysis, 27 leagues have been members from the 
foundation of the association; while as many as 22 of today's members in the data 
sample entered the organisation after 1987.175 In other words, the data might give 
indications of great divergence in age, and hence, the history and tradition, of different 
European football leagues. 
The member leagues of the UEFA have a wide dispersion of all kinds of variables at 
macro level, since they in general (but not all) are independent nations. One example of 
the wide disparity in a variable at macro level is the population for each league. The 
extremes are about 144 millions citizens in Russia, while the population in San Marino 
is less than 30,000 citizens. The mean population for a league in European football is 
16.37 million citizens. However, it is obvious from the data that the population in a 
number of leagues is relatively high compared to the rest. Ten of the leagues have a 
population above 20 million citizens, while 19 of the leagues have a population above 
ten million citizens. Since as many as 32 out of the 51 leagues (including Bosnia- 
Herzegovina) have a population that is less than ten million citizens, the median might 
give more appropriate information of the typical population in an average European 
football league; 5.42 million citizens. This means that most of the leagues in European 
football are relatively small, but at the same time, there are a number of leagues that are 
much bigger than the others. 
Also for the population density, variations across European countries are wide, from 
Iceland as the lowest, with 2.7-, to Malta, with 1,192.51 people per squared kilometre. 
Among the bigger leagues, the Netherlands have a population density of 466.45 and 
Fngland of 380.40, while Russia has 8.61 and Spain has 78.43 people per square 
kilometre. The population of the biggest city relative to the total population of the 
175 Including Liechtenstein. 
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country varies from Iceland (0.53), Armenia (0.44) and Latvia (0.40) to Ukraine (0.06), 
Poland (0.04) and Germany (0.04). 
In addition, the agriculture percent differs considerably between the leagues, from 
Albania having a percentage of 47.5 to Luxemburg with only 0.5 percent in the 
agriculture sector. ' 76 Differences in economic development can be shown using a 
variable of GNP per capita. Also this variable varies significantly between the different 
leagues in the UEFA area, from Luxemburg having $ 55,100 to Moldova having $ 
1,800. 
Revenue Sharing in European Football - Broadcasting Rights 
At least two measurement problems are related to broadcasting revenues in the cross- 
sectional analysis across European football leagues. These are changed distribution 
during the periods to be analysed and lack of information in a significant number of 
leagues. ' 77 
Differences in broadcasting revenues across the teams in a league might be based on a 
number of sources. A main difference between leagues, as well as within some leagues 
over time, is the structure of the broadcasting deals; are deals collective and/or 
individual? According to Andreff and Bourg (2006), the top division in Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain 178 operated with individual deals in the 2002/03 season. Andreff and 
Bourg calculate that the Gini coefficient for the TV rights in Serie A in Italy increased 
from 0.211 to 0.430, between 1998/99 and 1999/00, as the league went from collective 
to individual deals. Note that the calculation of 0.430 is related to the non-pooled share 
of the rights. 
There can also be general differences when it comes to the share of the deals that are 
equally distributed. Andreff and Bourg show that the "solidarity share" in the French 
league went from 91 percent in 1998/99 to an expected 50 percent in 2003/04. Another 
176 Because of missing information of this variable in San Marino and Andorra, this chapter will use 
arbitrary percentages of agriculture percent in these leagues. 
177 It might be that this part should have been named even broader, because there are examples that it is 
not only broadcasting rights that are shared between teams in a league. Internet and other media revenues 
might also be included in the packages that are shared between teams. 
1 78 Broadcasting deals in Spain are based on a mixed system, as they are both individual and collective 
(Gratton and Solberg, 2007). More information can be found in TV Sports Markets (2006). 
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source for differences in the distribution of broadcasting revenues can for example be 
shown in table 3.2 in Andreff and Bourg (2006), where they split between broadcasting 
rights in relation to free to air, pay-TV, pay per-view and international rights. The 
method for distribution of these revenues may differ between the different parts of the 
broadcasting rights. 
Differences are also related to both the absolute level of broadcasting revenues179 and 
from these revenues' share of the total revenue for different teams in different leagues 
(Andreff and Bourg, 2006), and to differences in sports between countries (Jeanrenaud 
and Kesenne, 2006). 
Descriptive data for residual analyses, related to the distribution of revenues from 
broadcasting rights in the second part of the cross-sectional analysis, is based on the 
calculations of the range (as a ratio) between the team with the highest level of these 
revenues, compared to the team with the lowest amount of broadcasting revenues 
(Andreff and Bourg, 2006). 
Table 5.2: Range ratios of broadcasting revenues from table 3.6 in Andreff and Bourg 
(2006) 
Index Season Spain Italy Germany England France 
Range ratio 2000/01 5.3 6.3 2.6 2.3 1.8 
These results seem to have relatively high correlation with the level of 
redistribution/solidarity percent among these leagues. 
Number of Teams 
As mentioned before, there are a number of differences in the organisation of the 
leagues in European football and NAML. This is also related to league structure, both 
with regards to the number of teams and the number of divisions at horizontal level. In 
European football, the number of groups in the top tier is usually one. All UEFA 
member leagues, except from San Marino (where the top division is split into two 
groups with seven teams in Group A and eight teams in group B), had this structure in 
the -'004(, 
'05) season. However, the size of the top division varies across these leagues, 
as shown in table 5.3'. 
"' Gerrard (2006b) provides a discussion of the main factors affecting the media value of team 
tournaments. 
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Table 5.3: The number of teams in top divisions in European football in 2004( 05) 
Number of 
teams 
League 
20 England, France, Italy, Spain 
19 Kazakhstan 
18 Azerbaijan, Belgium, Germany, The Netherlands, Portugal. Turkey, 
Wales 
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Greece, Hungary, Northern Ireland, Romania, Russia, Serbia- 
Montenegro, Ukraine 
14 Cyprus, Finland, Norway, Poland, Sweden 
12 Denmark, F. Y. R. Macedonia, Israel, Luxembourg, Scotland, Slovenia 
10 Albania, Austria, Faroe Islands, Georgia, Iceland, Malta, Republic of 
Ireland, Slovakia, Switzerland 
8 Andorra, Armenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova 
In the cross-sectional regression analysis later in this chapter, the number of teams 
during the analysis period (ten or five seasons) is averaged for each league. 
NAML are organised differently, compared to European football leagues, both with 
regards to the number of teams and the number of (horizontal) groups at top level. 
These leagues have under groups (conferences) that are again split into divisions, which 
are all at the same horizontal level. The MLB, NBA and the NHL consist of 30 teams. 
These leagues are split into two conferences of three divisions. Each division in the 
NBA and the NHL consists of five teams (= 15 teams in each conference). MLB does 
not have the same symmetry since one division has six and another has four, additional 
to the four with five teams. This means that one conference (American League - AL) 
has 16 teams, and the other (National League - NL) has 14 teams. The NFL has 32 
teams, as are divided into two conferences of 16 teams each from four divisions of four 
teams each. 
In summary, the top division in European football leagues is much smaller than the 
NAML. Even though the number of teams is higher in NAML, the market size for each 
team is in general much higher. Sandy et al. (2004) claim that this might be one of the 
reasons for the generally weaker financial position of European teams. 
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Relegation Systems 
In the 2004(, 05) season, all member leagues of the UEFA operated with relegation 
systems, except for the closed league in San Marino. There are three procedures in 
European football when it comes to relegation system. First, there is automatic 
relegation. By automatic relegation is meant that the teamiteams at the bottom of the 
end-of-season regular season is/are relegated to the next (lower) level division without 
any options. The second system is relegation through a two-step procedure of 
"qualifying" for relegation playoff, and with the poorest performing team (s) in this 
playoff being relegated. The third system is a combination of these two methods. Table 
5.4 shows the number of teams to be automatically relegated in European football 
leagues that have only automatic relegation in the 2004(/05) season. 
Table 5.4: Overview over the European football leagues having only automatic 
relegation in the 2004(/05) season 
I team Armenia, Austria, Republic of Ireland, Slovakia 
2 teams Albania, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Russia 
3 teams Bulgaria, Cyprus, England, France, Germany, Greece, Portugal, Romania, 
Serbia-Montenegro, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, Wales 
4 teams Azerbaijan 
Total 28 leagues 
After the 2004 season it was decided not to relegate the team due to expansion. 
The other usual relegation system is a combination of automatic relegation and 
relegation playoff. The organization of the number of teams to automatically relegate 
and the number of teams to relegation playoff vary across the UEFA member leagues in 
the 2004(/05) season. An overview is provided in the table below. 
Table 5.5: European football leagues having combined relegation systems in the 
2004(, 'OS) season 
I team auto +I team playoff Estonia, Faroe Island, Finland, Latvia. \loldova. 
Northern Ireland, Poland, Switzerland 
I team auto +2 teams playoff Belarus 2 
2 teams auto +1 team playoff Norway, Sweden 
2 teams auto +2 teams playoff F. Y. R. Macedonia, Georgia' 
3 teams auto +I team playoff Kazakhstan 
No automatic relegation in 2004 due to expansion. 
2 The two teams qualifying for playoff played against each other. 
z This is based on the 1003 04 season, because the next season had no playoff as a 
consequence of two teams being excluded prior to its start. 
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Among the top divisions in European football leagues, relegation systems only based on 
playoff (no automatic relegation), either include second level division teams or only 
consist of top division teams. For both systems, the starting point score in the playoff 
differs between leagues. Some have the starting point score independent (zero points) of 
regular season, while others have the start position dependent on regular season 
performance. 
For relegation playoff only consisting of teams from the top division; no European 
football leagues arranged this system where the starting point was independent on 
regular season performance (ignoring eventually match schedule influence) in the 
2004(/05) season. However, Azerbaijan used this method in the season 1998/99, when 
four teams went into playoff, and two of them were relegated. ' 80 Most of the leagues 
using relegation playoffs that only include top division teams have a starting point that 
is dependent on performance in regular season. The table below shows these leagues for 
the 2004(/05) season. 
Table 5.6: European football leagues having a relegation system only based on top 
division teams in the 2004(/05) season 
Number of teams into 
playoff 
Number of teams to 
relegate 
Points from regular 
season 
League 
8 2 100 % Luxemburg 
6 1 100% Scotland 
6 1+1 100 % Slovenia 
4 2 50% Malta 
' The bottom team from each of the two relegation playoff groups was relegated. 
2 This is in principle. However, in practice, three teams were relegated due to financial 
problems this season. Consequently, the second least team in the relegation playoff 
escaped from a new relegation playoff (against the runners-up in the second level 
division) and the league was reduced from twelve to ten teams. 
As indicated in Chapter 3, this thesis defines the Scottish Premier League as a league 
with a regular season (with unbalanced match schedule, see table 5.11 below) and post- 
seasonal playoff for both the championship and for relegation. The Scottish league is 
therefore included in the table above. 
The other general way to arrange relegation playoff (without automatic relegation) is to 
also include the better teams from the second level division(s). Through this kind of 
180 Anticipating that the bottom four teams were going to the relegation playoff, and that bottom two in 
the relegation playoff should relegate. However, one of the teams (number 13 of 14) withdrew after the 
first stage, and did not participate in the playoff. Therefore only three teams participated, and of these 
three teams only one relegated. 
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playoff, the best teams will win participation in the next season's top division, while the 
other teams will be members of the lower level division(s). This kind of system, with 
independent starting point ftom performance in the regular season, was used in one 
European football league for the 2004(/05) season, the Netherlands. The bottom two 
teams from the top division, together with six teams from the second level divisions, 
competed for two places in the Eredivisie (top division). No leagues in the 2004(/05) 
season used a structure in which the starting point is not independent ftom regular 
season. However, Finland came into this category in the 2002 season, when four teams 
from the top division and two teams from each of the second level divisions met to play 
for six places in the top division (expansion). The starting point was based on a bonus 
point system, where number nine in the top division got three points, number ten got 
two points, number 11 one point and number 12 zero points. In addition, the winners of 
the second level divisions also had one bonus point, while the runners-up had zero 
points. 
In the cross-sectional regression analysis later in this chapter, the number of teams in 
each category is averaged over the analysis periods. 
In Latin-America a number of leagues operate with a different method in deciding 
which teams to relegate, compared to European football leagues. Relegation is decided 
on performance, not only from the current season, but also from earlier seasons, in 
leagues, such as in Argentina (2004/05), Columbia (2004) and Mexico (2004/05). 
Analysing effects from these relegation systems are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
As can be seen from the overview above, there is a number of ways to structure the 
movements between the tiers in open leagues. The relegation system in leagues can also 
be used in relation to changing the number of teams participating in the top division. 
Note that teams can also be relegated as a consequence of administrative penalties, 
which might have been more relevant in European football, after the introduction of the 
so-called UEFA licence. '8' 
181 The Norwegian football league for women has a club licence system, and after the 2005 season a team 
(Asker FK) was relegated for not justifying certain requirements for passing through the licence system. 
In the Italian league, Juventus was relegated after the 2005/06 season as an administrative penalty. More 
about the UEFA licence can be found at www. uefa. com, and more specific for the UFEA club licence 
system by 2005: www. uefa. com/newsfiles/358508. pdf. 
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Championship Playoffs 
Another main difference in league structure is related to the way the championship 
winner is decided. More precisely, does a certain league have post-season championship 
playoff, or is the championship winner decided only on basis of regular season play? 
The existence of championship playoff in European football differs between leagues. 
Some of them, such as the English top division, have never had the championship 
winner decided after playoff, while it is a part of the current system across the border, in 
the Scottish league. 
The structure of championship playoff diverges, both between leagues and within 
leagues over time. In general, there are three main differences in the structure across 
leagues. These are differences in how the championship playoff tournament is played, 
the number of teams to championship playoff, and the relationship between the regular 
season and the playoff. The latter might vary from total independency to full transfer of 
the regular season score. Bonus points at the start of the playoff is another way to Value 
regular season differences. In addition, some leagues operate with seeding systems on 
basis of regular season performance. 
Below, an overview is presented, showing the European football leagues that have used 
some kind of championship playoff in its leagues structure during the period 1995('96) 
- 2004(/05). 
1 2 This is also the basis for categorisation of the championship playoff 
dummy variable, applied in the cross-sectional regression analysis. The table below 
consists of the 26 out of 51 European football leagues that had at least one season with 
championship playoffs during this period. This table also includes information of the 
type of championship playoff that is played, if it has league or knock-out format. 
This limitation might "hide" that some leagues have had restructurings close to this period, such aý the 
Irish league that had (the last) championship playoff in the 199 3 94 season, and will hence not he treated 
as a league with championship playoff in the 1995(96)-2004( 05") period. 
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Table 5.7: Overview over European football leagues having a championship playoff 
system over the period 1995(/96) - 2004( 05) 
League 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
(/96) (/97) (/98) (/99) (/00) (/01) /02) (/03) (/04) (05) 
Andorra L L L L L 
Armenia L 
Azerbaijan L L L 
Bosnia-H ko ko L (--) L 
Bulgaria L 
Croatia L L L L 
Estonia L L L 
Finland L L L 
Georgia L L L L L 
Hungary L L L L 
Israel L 
Kazakhstan L 
Latvia L L 
Lithuania L 
Luxemburg L L L L L L 
Macedonia L 
Malta L L L L L L 
Moldavia L 
N. Ireland L 
Poland L 
San Marino ko ko ko ko ko ko ko ko ko ko 
Scotland L L L L L 
Serbia Mont L 
Slovakia L 
Slovenia L L 
Switzerland L L L L L L L L 
Sum 10 6 5 6(--) 7 10 12 11 8 6 
L= League system (might include the final as a knock out game). 
ko = Knock out system. 
(--) = Cancelled playoff. 
While all NAML have annual post-seasonal championship playoffs, these kinds of 
playoffs have only been a feature of some of the European football leagues, and then 
often only for a limited period of time. Only one league in European football operated 
with a championship playoff during the whole sample period - San Marino. Bosnia- 
Herzegovina also had a championship playoff with a knock out tournament system in 
the 1995/96 and 1996/97 seasons. All other championship playoffs in European football 
in the period 1995(, '96)-2004(/05) are league based. In general, the playoff structure in 
European football is therefore different from the NAML. where playoffs are arranged as 
knock-out tournaments. 
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The second difference in the championship playoff system is the number of teams that 
qualify for championship playoff. In the actual sample period, the number of teams to 
qualify for post-seasonal championship playoff varies among the European football 
leagues. This is shown in the table below. 
Table 5.8: The number of teams to championship playoffs in European football leagues 
over the period 1995(/96) - 2004(/05) 
Number of teams to League (seasons with deviating structure in brackets) 
championship playoff 
from regular season 
4 teams (one regular Andorra, Luxembourg and San Marino (+ the winner of the 
season group) second level division - 1995/96) 
5 teams Moldova and Croatia (1995/96) 
6 teams Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, F. Y. R. 
Macedonia, Finland (1996), Georgia, Hungary, Israel, 
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Malta, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Serbia- 
Montenegro (Yugoslavia), Slovakia and Slovenia 
8 teams Finland, Lithuania, Poland and Switzerland 
From two groups in Georgia (top four in each group - 1999/00), Hungary (top six 
regular season in each group - 2000/01), Poland (top four in each group), and 
San Marino (top three in each group) 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995/96 and 1996/97: This championship playoff was a 
smaller type, a championship final between the winners of the 
two groups in the league (in the championship of Republic 
"Srpska", while the "Muslim" championship is not included in 
this championship playoff). 
1997/98: Championship playoff based on top four from the 
Muslim top division + top two in the Croat league (no teams 
from Republic of Srpska). Playoff: Two groups of three teams, 
where the winners went into a championship final. 
1999/00: Championship playoff based on top five from the 
Muslim top division + top three in the Herceg-Bosna league 
(no teams from Republic of Srpska). Playoff: Two groups of 
four teams, where the winners went into a championship final. 
The qualification procedure in the NAML is much more complicated than in European 
football, since the system for qualifying for playoff is related to relative performance, 
both within the division and within the conference (league). Below, a short overview 
over the qualification procedures for the championship playoffs for the different NA `I L 
is presented. 
Tahle', 9- Qualification procedure for chamoionshin olavoffs in the NAIL 
League: Teams to qualify for championship playoffs: 
NFL Divisional winners + two best records in each conference = 1' teams 
MLB Divisional winners - best record in each league =8 teams 
NBA, NHL Divisional winners + five best records in each conference = 16 teams 
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In Australian leagues (VFL/AFL and ARL IRL), the system is more similar to the 
European football leagues, when it comes to the structure of the regular season. since it 
is based on one league/division. 
The third general difference among the leagues, when it comes to championship playoff 
systems, is the relationship between regular season and the playoff. This means the 
strength of the dependency between sporting performance in regular season and the 
starting point (seeding) in the following post-seasonal playoff tournament. Also here, 
great variation between leagues in European football can be observed. This relationship 
is related to both match scheduling and starting score. The following table shows the 
different relationships between the stages in European football leagues that have had 
championship playoff in the period 1995(/96) to 2004(/05). 
Table 5.10: Relationship between regular season and starting point for championship 
olavoffs in European football leagues 
Relationship between League 
regular season and 
playoff 
Independent Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Only affecting the San Marino 
playoff schedule 
_points"------------ 
"Bonus 
-------- - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
- All points Andorra (2001/02-2005/06), Armenia, Croatia (2000/01), 
F. Y. R. Macedonia, Finland, Hungary (2001L 02-2003/04), 
Israel, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Moldova, 
-------------------------------- 
Northern Ireland, Scotland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
- 50 0 ýº of the points Bulgaria, Croatia (1997/98-1998/99), Estonia, Georgia, 
-------------------------------- 
Malta, Poland and Switzerland 
-------- -- ------------------------------------------------ 
- Other amount of Andorra (2000'01 - 1/3 of the points) 
_points ---------------- -------- ----- ----- ----- -- -- -- ---- --------------------------------------------------------- -- 
- Bonus points on basis Hungary (2000/01), Croatia (1995/96) 
of standing of the 
regular season y7 --------------------------- 
- Combinations 
_------------------------------------------------------------- Serbia-Montenegro: A bonus point combination, where the 
standing in the regular season gives certain number of bonus 
points to the qualified teams, in addition to more bonus points 
on basis of the number of points received in the regular 
season 
- Points (only) against Azerbaijan 
the other teams that are 
qualified for the 
playoff 
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This overview of the relationship between regular season performance and 
championship playoff shows that in most of these leagues teams bring (all) their regular 
season points into the playoff. The second most popular method is to include 50 percent 
of the points. This type of relationship between the regular season and the playoff 
differs significantly from the NAML system, where this kind of relationship is much 
weaker. However, connections between regular season and post-seasonal play, otT, 
beyond just qualification, can also be found in the NAML, where seeding procedures 
decide both which teams to meet in the playoff and home field advantage. Seeding 
systems are also a part of the Australian leagues. 
Introducing a championship playoff, such as in the Scottish league, where the teams 
bring all points from regular season into the championship playoff, might not affect 
competitive balance at all. ' 83 Changes in incentive effects in the regular season should 
be limited, apart from possibly the teams around the last qualification place (number six 
out of 12 in the Scottish league). Neither should the distribution of championship 
winners over time be affected, because the only difference from a "normal" round-robin 
tournament is that the teams in the upper part of the table will meet each other one more 
time (equal for all the qualifying teams). Also for performance persistence, it is difficult 
to envisage any direct consequences. However, this might be the dimension that is most 
affected because of potential financial rewards from qualifying for the championship 
playoff, which over time might "create" a group of teams qualifying regularly, season 
after season, and hence increase the performance persistence (weaken the competitive 
balance). '54 In such a situation, greater difference between the better and the weaker 
half of teams might appear, and as a consequence, weaken win dispersion and 
performance persistence. On the other side, increased risk-taking behaviour as regards 
expenditure on playing talent among second and third tier teams in the division might 
increase the likelihood for more variations in performance across seasons. Calculations 
in Chapter 4 show that average performance persistence is lower in the last decade in 
the Scottish top division, compared to earlier periods. 
18` In other words, the championship winner \ý ins on basis of the number of points recei%ed after 33 
regular matches +5 playoff matches = 38 matches in total. 
"" One of the main financial bonuses of qualifying for the championship playoff in the Scottish Premier 
League is another lucrative home match against one of the Old Firm teams (Celtic and Ran,, crý ). 
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Match Schedule 
Another area of tournament structure that might affect competitive balance (and 
competitive intensity) is whether the match schedule is balanced or unbalanced. Pure 
round-robin (one home and one away match against all teams in the division) is the 
normal in regular seasons of European football. However, there are exceptions from this 
format. First, there are teams playing four times against each other (two matches home 
and away), and second, that some leagues operate with the teams playing three times 
against each other. For the season 2004(/05), the table below shows the European 
football leagues that are among these two groups. 
Table 5.11: European football leagues where teams met each other more than twice in 
the 2004(/05) season 
Number of regular 
season matches: 
League: 
3 Denmark (12 teams), F. Y. R. Macedonia (12 teams), Israel (12 
teams), Scotland (12 teams) 
4 Albania (10 teams), Estonia (8 teams), Georgia (10 teams), Latvia 
(8 teams), Lithuania (8 teams), Moldova (8 teams), Ireland (10 
teams), Slovakia (10 teams), Switzerland (10 teams) 
Related to balanced or unbalanced league structure, the only difficult point might be 
related to the home field advantage. In other words, for leagues where teams meet each 
other three times, a crucial question is if home field is decided randomly in the "third" 
part of the tournament, or if it is based on sporting performance. If the latter, it might be 
categorised as unbalanced schedule, and can be relevant in the context of competitive 
balance. Note that the leagues where the teams play each other four times (two matches 
both home and away) have a balanced match schedule. 
The league structure in San Marino is unique in European football. For the 2004 05 
season, the playing schedule was based on round-robin for a `given team's group, plus 
one match against each of the teams from the other group. This means that one team 
from group A plays 12 matches within its group (of seven teams) and eight matches 
against teams from Group B (eight teams). The eventual imbalance here could ha\ c 
appeared if the home field advantage was related to sporting performance regarding 
matches against the teams from the other group. 18, 
's; Howw, e% er. in San Marino the teams do not have their OWW n home fields. The fields are randomly chosen 
from a t; ivc: n number of stadiums (en. \% ikipedia. org wiki Camp ionato_Sammarine,, c_di_CaIcio). 
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In the cross-sectional regression analysis below. the leagues that have had "pure" round 
robin all seasons in the analysis period are given the value one in the dummy variable, 
while the other leagues have this variable valued zero. 
The system for playing schedule differs significantly between European football leagues 
and the NAML. In the context of competitive balance, playing schedule might be a 
relevant determinant, at least in the NFL, where 2/16 of the matches are based on results 
from the previous season. The match schedule for each team in this league is presented 
in the table below. 
Table 5.12: Match schedule in the NFL over the seasons 2002 - 2009 
One home and one away match against the other teams in its division 6 matches 
All teams in another division in its conference, rotating in a three year cycle 4 matches 
All teams from a division in the other conference in a four-year cycle 4 matches 
Two intra conference matches based on previous season's performance' 2 matches 
Total number of matches for each team in the NFL 16 matches 
Source: www. nfl. com/schedules/tv/2006_ opponents (which was later removed, 
therefore see en. wikipedia. org/wiki/National_Football_League for an up-to-date 
reference by April 2008). 
1 If first place last season, these two matches go against the two other first place teams 
from the two divisions that are not played against in its conference this season. The 
same for the second, third and fourth placed team. 
For example the NHL has a different form of match schedule. For the 2005/06 season, 
this is shown in the table below. 
Table 5.13: Match schedule in the NHL for the 2005/06 season 
Own division: 5 teams meet each other eight times (home=away) 32' matches 
Intra conf. - other div.: Against the ten teams four times (home=away) 40 matches 
Inter conf.: 5 home games against teams from one designated division and 10 matches 
five away games against teams from another designated 
division (annual rotation) 
Total number of matches for each team in the NHL 82 matches 
Sources: «, «, wtiw. cbc. caisports, indepth/cbaifeatures/schedule_changes. html and 
en. \t-ikipedia. org/wikirNational_Hockey_League. 
The Norwegian ice hockey league had for the 2004'05 season "bonus matches" that 
came in addition to the "regular" balanced schedule, where all teams played four times 
against each other (36 matches). '"' The six bonus matches were split into three periods 
of two matches (one home and one away), which were decided on basis of the current 
ý"' Source. ýý"ýýýý. hock- c\. no (nmore specific, www. hockey. noit2. asp'? p=X916&x=l&a=1051 59). 
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standing prior to those matches. The two first bonus matches were played after round 
nine in the "regular" system. It was the "neighbour-teams" in the league standing that 
played one home and one away match against each other (number one against number 
two, number three against number four etc. ). The same system was repeated after 18 
regular matches (+ two bonus matches) and 27 regular matches (+ four bonus matches). 
One problem here might come from the "six point matches" as in the Norwegian ice 
hockey 2004/05, if one team wins all these matches, the system might actually worsen 
the (ex post) competitive balance. '87 
5.3.3. Result 
Based on 50 of the 52 UEFA members (except Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lichtenstein), 
cross-sectional OLS regression analyses are done, analysing the model as is described 
earlier in this chapter. The results are presented in table 5.14. 
The cross-sectional regression analysis is based on three main steps. First, all 
hypothesised determinants are included in the basic regression, except from a variable 
on the distribution of revenues from sale of broadcasting rights. The correlation matrix 
among the independent variables is presented in table 5.15. It shows that high 
correlation can be found between some of them, such as between population in a 
country and the number of citizens in its largest city (0.858). The correlation between 
the UEFA and the FIFA ranking is close to 0.7, and between the UEFA ranking and 
population of the largest city about 0.6. The size of the league has a correlation to the 
UEFA ranking of about 0.65. Among league structural variables on five season 
averages, both championship playoff and relegation, and the number of teams and pure 
round-robin tournament, have a correlation higher than 0.6. In other words, the general 
model presented for each of the three fundamental dimensions might have some 
tendency of multicolinearity. Therefore the second step is to follow a general-to-specific 
strategy (see, for example, Doornik and Hendry, 2006a), where variables with t-ratios 
less than unity are dropped, as long as the goodness of fit is not reduced and the 
diagnostics remain insignificant. Third, broadcasting rights are specially treated in post- 
regression analyses of residuals. 
187 There was a discussion about the bonus system in a Norwegian newspaper winter 2005. One claims 
that the reason for the introduction was that the league was too unbalanced, and that the bonus system 
should be a method to improve (ex post) competitive balance (www. adressa. no). 
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Looking first at the ten season average NSQF ratio (column I and II in table 5.14). four 
variables stand out as significant determinants. Initially, it is these four that have t- 
values above unity in the general regression (column I), and they are all significant in 
the second step procedure (column II) for explaining differences in within-seasonal 
competitive balance between the European football leagues. The sign of these Variables 
(per capita GNP, the percentage of the agricultural sector, the FIFA rankin,. and a 
dummy variable for largest city as a share of total population) are as expected. The 
proposed explanations of the key results from the ten season average NSQF ratio are 
discussed in the following. 
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Higher per capita GNP improves competitive balance because of a bigger shared league 
market. A greater size of the agricultural sector might indicate that the population is 
more dispersed. The dummy variables related to the largest city as a share of the total 
population, give at least two interesting results. If this share is relatively low, it does not 
affect competitive balance significantly, while in the leagues where this variable is 
relatively high, it has a significant negative effect on competitive balance. A relatively 
big share of the total population in the largest city can therefore indicate that teams from 
these areas are more likely to dominate the league. The FIFA ranking can be interpreted 
as an indicator of the size of the football market, as is again likely to increase 
competitive balance. It is the only sporting variable of significance, when applying ten 
seasons average (column I and II). This means that neither the points achieved in the 
UEFA ranking system for the teams of a particular league, nor the age of the league, 188 
can significantly explain the differences in win dispersion among the member leagues in 
the UEFA. The results suggest that variations in prize and tournament structure do not 
significantly affect competitive balance, measured by ten season averaged NSQF ratio. 
The other variables are highly insignificant, and are hence not among the explanatory 
variables for explaining differences in ten season averaged within-seasonal competitive 
balance among the leagues in Europe. Compared to the descriptive results, where the 
Big Five leagues, on average, seem to be better balanced than other leagues, the 
insignificance of the total population variable might be surprising. Regression analysis, 
replacing the population variable with dummy variables for small and large total 
population leagues, does not change this conclusion. In other words, the total population 
for the different leagues in European football is not an important determinant for 
explaining differences in win dispersion, given the other variables in the regression 
analysis. 
Reducing the number of seasons in the average NSQF ratio to five, which means the 
period from 1999('00) to 2004(/05) (column III and IV), all population variables are 
insignificant. On the other hand, t-ratios are greater than one for the biggest city's share 
of the total population, both when this share is big and when it is small. Signs on these 
coefficients are consistent with hypothesis. The agriculture percent also follows this 
pattern, as insignificant, and the sign is still positive related to competitive balance. 
"' Using the initial membership year in the UEFA doe: not change this conclusion. 
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Different from the ten season period analysis. is that tournament structure seems to be 
more determining for the level of win dispersion. by t-values greater than unity. There is 
a tendency for leagues with higher number of teams to have weaker win dispersion, 
ceteris paribus, while a higher level of the share of teams to automatically relegate hay 
the opposite tendency. Changing one team to directly relegate with a relegation play off 
might have negative effects on win dispersion. Next, leagues having a pure round-robin 
match schedule have a tendency to have better within-season competitive balance than 
other leagues. Given the other variables, a league with championship playoff during the 
five seasons has significant better win dispersion than other leagues. The FIFA ranking 
and the GNP per capita are still strong significant determinants for differences in win 
dispersion across European football leagues, also in the reduced sample period. 
Measuring competitive balance by the SRCC (column V to VIII) gives a less clear 
relationship between the explanatory factors and the dependent variable, as can, for 
example, be found by the weaker F-tests (insignificant when including the whole range 
of possible explanatory variables). Except from the GNP per capita, and partly the 
championship playoff variable, the other significant results from the regressions based 
on performance persistence on ten season average (column V and VI)) as the dependent 
variable, differ from the win dispersion regressions. For example, population density is 
a strong significant determinant for differences in performance persistence between 
European football leagues, where the persistence increases with higher density. The ten 
season average SRCC might be more (positively) affected by an increase in the size of 
the population (t-value slightly higher than unity in the second regression (column VI)). 
The indications that the (relative) number of teams being relegated, also when including 
the number of teams to relegation playoff places, have a negative impact on the 
comparison of performance persistence (ten season average) among the leagues in the 
UEFA area, are surprising in relation to the hypothesis about a positive relationship 
between relegation and competitive balance. Since none of the other regressions found 
any significant relationship between competitive balance and relegation, this might 
reflect that the importance for the differences between leagues is not much related to the 
relative number of teams into relegation and relegation playoff. However, it is 
impossible to interpret the effects on competitive balance from including relegation 
(open leagues vs. closed leagues). As mentioned before, since only one European 
football league is closed, it might be that this variable is more significant when 
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analysing effects on competitive balance changes within leagues over time. This «-111 be 
done in Chapter 6. 
The results from the regressions based on SRCC averaged over five seasons (VII and 
VIII) confirm most of the findings of the ten seasons' average, except for the relegation 
variables. The results also show that variables related to the relative size of the biggest 
city are stronger determinants than in the ten season average performance persistence 
analysis. Higher relative size of the biggest city is (weak) significant increasing 
performance persistence, while small relative size of the biggest city is a (weak) driver 
for higher variation across seasons in sporting performance. Note that three of the 
variables in the reduced form have a t-value lower than unit. They are included because 
further reduction rejects diagnostics. However, a different specification with ter 
variables, also without violating the diagnostics, gives much of the same conclusions 
(column VIII). 
lt is difficult to find a good model for the relationships between differences in 
championship concentration and the hypothesised determinants for differences in 
competitive balance across European football leagues (column IX to Xl). This is 
confirmed by the diagnostics, for example showing much weaker R2 and weak F-tests. 
Because of significant failure in the diagnostics when applying HHI "directly" as the 
dependent variable (column IX), it is also transformed into the inverse in the final 
equation. This means that the higher level of the dependent variable, the better 
dispersion of championship winners in column X and XI. However, even by these 
transformations (and others as well) the F-tests are still not significant. 
The results from possible determinants for differences in championship concentration in 
column IX and X suggest that it increases by increased population and better FIFA 
ranking. These results are on odds with the hypotheses SM`-lgested for win dispersion. 
Even though the relative strong correlation between population and the size of the 
largest city, increased size of the latter variable increases the distribution of 
championship winners (significant in column X). Concentration is smaller in leagues 
where the biggest city is small compared to the total population (weak significant). 
Higher agriculture percent has a tendency to increase concentration, which is opposite 
from the results for win dispersion. 
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Residual Analysis in Relation to Differences in the Distribution of Revenues from 
the Sale of TV Rights among the Big Five Leagues 
The tables below show the estimated residuals of the Big Five leagues with the 
countries ranked by the range in the distribution of broadcasting revenues. Italy is 
ranked first, as the league with the highest range, while France, as the league with the 
lowest range, is on the bottom. 
Table 5.16: Residuals from the cross-sectional regression analysis based on will 
dispersion for the Big Five leagues 
NSQF10 all NSQ FIO_sig NS F5 all NSQF5 si 
Italy 0.1854 0.1480 0.2522 0.3217 
Spain -0.2289 -0.1424 -0.3982 -0.2917 Germany -0.0246 -0.0792 0.0053 0.0677 
England 0.0525 0.1123 0.1608 0.1887 
France -0.1186 -0.1517 -0.0273 -0.0723 
The relationship between the residuals in Italy, Germany and France and the range of 
the distribution of revenues from sale of broadcasting rights fits relatively well, and 
might indicate that the distribution of revenues from sale of broadcasting rights could 
have been a relevant variable in the cross-sectional regression analyses. On the other 
hand, the residuals for the Spanish and the English leagues do not follow this pattern. 
This might indicate that there is no general relationship and; or that these leagues have 
something that is not captured in the same degree by the general regression model. 
Table 5.17: Residuals from the cross-sectional regression analysis based on 
performance persistence for the Biz Five leagues 
SRCC 10 all SRCC 10 si SRCC5 all SRCC5 si 
Italy 0.0533 0.0729 0.1208 0.1361 
Spain -0.0100 0.0208 -0.0641 -0.0367 
Germany -0.0881 -0.0748 -0.0117 0.0014 
England 0208 -0 -0.0310 0.0257 0.0332 . France -0.0712 -0.1032 -0.0253 -0.0374 
For the ten season average of the SRCC, the ranking of the residuals follows the ranking 
of the distribution of revenues from sale of broadcasting rights, except from the 
relatively better results for Germany. For the five season average the pattern is closer to 
the NSQF ratios above in the general function form, while the reduced form correlates 
between the distribution of broadcasting rights revenues and performance persistence, 
except from Spain. 
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Table 5.18: Residuals from the cross-sectional regression analysis based on 
championship winner concentration for the Big Five leagues 
HH1 all 1/HHI all 1/HHI si 
Italy 0.0223 -0.5221 -0.3478 
Spain -0.1830 1.4817 1.6909 
Germany -0.0122 0.1265 0.2522 
England 0.1168 -0.9557 -1.1153 
France -0.0757 0.5873 0.4686 
As for the win dispersion, the ranking between Italy, Germany and France correlates 
between competitive balance and distribution of revenues from sale of broadcasting 
rights, and Spain and England deviate from this pattern. 
In summary, based on the Big Five leagues, there are some indications that differences 
in distribution of revenues from sale of broadcasting rights might be a significant 
variable in cross-sectional regression analyses of determinants for differences in 
competitive balance across European football leagues. For similar analyses in the future, 
it would be interesting to include this variable in the general analysis, as both the 
revenues to be distributed have become more significant in a higher number of leagues, 
and the distribution mechanisms have become more incorporated. 
5.4. More about Competitive Balance and Championship Playoffs in 
European Football 
A number of analyses focusing on possible relationships between competitive balance 
and championship playoffs in European football are presented below. The first part 
deals with comparisons of competitive balance in leagues without championship 
playoffs, compared to leagues with championship playoffs. The second part will 
concentrate on leagues that have had periods of both, and compare competitive balance 
in the different situations. 
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5.4.1. Competitive Balance and Changes in Championship Playoffs in 
European Football Leagues 
The high number of European football leagues makes it possible to investigate 
relationships between prize/league structure and competitive balance to a higher degree 
than in many of the other main team sports in the World. As shown before, during the 
period from 1995(/96) to 2004(/05), just over 50 % (26 out of 51) of the European 
football leagues had the championship winner decided after championship playoffs in at 
least one season. An interesting research question is, what drives leagues to introduce 
championship playoffs? In the context of competitive balance, this is of high interest. Is 
weak competitive balance a driver for restructuring tournaments? On basis of the 
argument that competitive balance is one of the factors that affect changes in prize and 
league structures, the following hypothesis is made: Championship playoffs is, to a 
larger degree, used in leagues with weak competitive balance. 
The hypothesis mentioned above is analysed by using the top divisions in 50 (51 for the 
HHI) of the 52 members of the UEFA. Following the structure of this thesis, 
competitive balance is calculated in three dimensions, using the measures applied earlier 
in this chapter. The competitive balance calculations for the win dispersion and 
performance persistence are made from the regular season data, and hence do not 
include post-seasonal playoffs. HHI is based on the championship winner (eventually 
after championship playoffs). The table below presents an overview of the calculated 
average values of the different dimensions of competitive balance. 
Table 5.19: Comparisons of competitive balance in European football leagues with and 
without chamnionshin nlavoffs over the period 1996097) - 2005( 06) 
NSQF SRCC HHI 
Average CB "playoff leagues" (25 leagues) 
Avera ge CB "non playoff leagues" (25 leagues) 
1.961 
1.641 
0.580 
0.594 
0.360 
0.409 
Difference 0.320 -0.014 -0.049 
Significant on one percent level (two-sided). 
1 The HHI is calculated on 26 playoff leagues (including Bosnia-Herzegovina). 
The results from the t-tests are interesting, where the «in dispersion seems to 
(significantly) differ between the leagues that are categorised as playoff leagues and the 
other European football leagues in the actual period of time. This result might 
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strengthen the hypothesis that weaker competitive balanced leagues have an increased 
probability (for governing bodies) to introduce championship playoffs. However, since 
performance persistence and championship concentration are relatively equal in the two 
groups of leagues, this is only related to one dimension of competitive balance. 
Further, analyses of the hypothesis that weaker win dispersion increases the probability 
for leagues to introduce championship playoffs can be done by regressions based on a 
dummy variable as the dependent variable. This binary variable is valued one if, during 
the period from 1995(/96) to 2004(/05), the league has had a period with championship 
playoffs (PO; ) and zero if not. Competitive balance (CB; ) is the independent variable. 
The following model is presented: 
PO;: -- 01+ 02CB1 + £1 
The results from binary logit analysis for the different measures of competitive balance 
are presented in the table below. 
Table 5.20: Logit analysis of competitive balance as a playoff driver 
NSQF SRCC HHI 
Constant - 5.618 0.744 0.680 
(1.986) (1.636) (0.708) 
CB 3.135*** -1.267 -1.677 
(1.105) (2.745) (1.711) 
Observations 50 50 51 
Likelihood ratio test' 10.599*** 0.214 1.023 
Standard errors in parentheses.. ** Significant on one percent level. 
'Reference: Doornik and Hendry (2006b). 
The logit model confirms the observations above, that the probability of having 
championship playoffs is highly significant in leagues with greater win dispersion. 
The sign of the coefficient for performance persistence is negative (weaker performance 
persistence), but the coefficient has a t-value below 0.5, indicating that the probability 
for differences in performance persistence in leagues with championship playoffs, 
compared to leagues without, is highly insignificant. 
For the dispersion of championship winners, the t-value close to one for the HHI might 
give some indication that there is a higher probability that a league with less 
concentration of championship winners is among the leagues that have had 
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championship playoffs in the analysed period (opposite of the hypothesis). If the race 
for winning championships has a degree of sensitivity related to changes in tournament 
structure, this can be one possible explanation for the tendency in the results. The other 
is that the championship playoff in itself reduces the probability of creating dynasties 
for the champions. However, these hypotheses are not significantly confirmed in the 
calculations. 
The interesting results from win dispersion need further analyses, because there might 
be other determinants for the relationship between competitive balance and 
championship playoffs among European football leagues. One obvious control variable 
is the age of leagues, which varies a lot, due to consequences of changes in (sporting) 
policy (inclusion of smaller leagues) and the general structural changes in the Eastern 
Europe. The argument for changes in league structure in newer leagues can be that time 
might be needed to find an appropriate structure. According to Sandy et al. (2004), 
instability is a general characteristic in new industries. The logit model above is 
therefore extended by the dummy variable UEFA, which is used for categorising the age 
of the league on basis of the membership year in the UEFA. New leagues are valued 
one, if membership in the UEFA is 1988 or later, and zero, if membership is earlier. 
This gives the following model: 
PO; = ßl + ß2CB; + ß3UEFAº + £i 
The empirical results from the binary logit analysis are presented in the table below. 
I able J. Z 1: Logit analysis of competitive balance and age as playo 
NSQF SRCC HHI 
Constant -4.559 0.082 0.023 
(2.172) (1.892) (0.816) 
CB 2.197* -1.592 -2.354 
(1.244) (3.186) (1.986) 
UEFA 1.676** 2.245*** 2.392*** 
(0.740) (0.690) (0.71-) 
Observations 50 50 51 
Likelihood ratio test 16.083#* 12.900*** 15.067#«* 
ff drivers 
"s _.. Standard errors in parentheses. Significant on one percent level; Significant on 
five percent level; Significant on ten percent level. 
By including the control variable for age, win dispersion is now only a marginally 
significant determinant of a league having championship playoffs. Performance 
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persistence is still not a statistically significant predictor for determining the probability 
that a league has had championship playoffs or not in the given period. The t-value of 
the HHI index increases slightly when including the dummy variable. representing the 
age of the league. In other words, an insignificant increased probability of being a 
championship playoff league can be expected in leagues with more dispersed 
concentration of championship winners. This is the opposite of the findings for «in 
dispersion. 
Compared to the calculations without controlling for age, it is the win dispersion that 
has the greatest difference between the models. When including age, it is only 
significant on a ten percent level, while it is on a one percent level without the control 
variable. However, the win dispersion level is still indicated to be a relevant variable for 
changing league structure into championship playoffs. When it comes to the age of the 
leagues, the hypothesis about more instability in the new leagues is highly significantly 
confirmed. 
Even if the results from the logit analyses are confirmed in a probit model (not included 
in the thesis), they must be carefully interpreted. First, they do not say whether a season 
with playoff is better, worse or equally balanced, compared to seasons without playoffs. 
Second, the data do not divide between leagues, where one season was with playoffs, or 
if all seasons had this system. Third, the playoffs might in themselves affect competitive 
balance, for example through incentive effects, and by a changed structure. The latter 
can be a possible determinant, if championship playoff is introduced in leagues with 
less concentration of championship winners. In addition, the time period for the 
analyses is arbitrary. 
5.4.2. Analysis of Championship Playoffs as Regular Season Competitive 
Balance Determinant 
The results from the logfit models above indicate that leagues with weaker win 
dispersion are more likely to include championship playoffs than other leagues. An 
obvious follow-up research question related to incentive effects on competitive balance, 
from the inclusion of championship playoffs, is: does the level of competitive balance 
differ in seasons with championship playoffs compared to seasons with no playoffs' 
I 
A difficulty in this kind of analysis in European football is that the relationships 
(incentive effects) between championship playoff and regular season competitive 
balance might be affected by the structure of the championship playoff. In some 
systems, one will expect regular season competitive balance to be relatively unaffected. 
while others might bring significant incentive effects, affecting regular season 
competitive balance. The incentive effects in regular season might be related to both if 
(parts of the) points won are transferred to the post-seasonal championship playoff, or 
if, eventually, seeding systems are related to regular season performance. 
T-tests will be applied for five football leagues in Europe over a period of 35 seasons 
[ 1970(/71)-2004(/05)] to analyse if regular season competitive balance is affected by 
inclusion of championship playoffs. The football leagues in Sweden, Denmark, 
Luxembourg, Austria, Switzerland and Scotland all meet the following requirement: 
one top division in all seasons and significant period(s) with and without championship 
playoffs. 
As shown earlier in this section, there are differences in the structure of the 
championship playoff systems in European football. The structure for the championship 
playoffs in the actual leagues are presented in the table below. 
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Table 5.22: Structure of championship playoffs in a number of European football 
leaL, ues 
League: Playoff systems: 
Sweden 1982-1984: Top eight (of 12 teams) to PO quarter finals. 
1985-1990: Top four (of 12 teams) to PO semi finals. 
1991-1992: Top six (of ten teams) to PO. Starting point: Halt of the 
points from regular season. Six teams play ten matches. 
Switzerland 1976/77-1978/79: Top six (of 12 teams) to PO. Starting point: Half of 
the points from regular season. Six teams play ten matches. 
1979/80: Same as previous season, except that the total number of teams 
is 14. 
1987/88-2002/03: Top eight (of 12 teams) to PO. Starting point: Half of 
the points from regular season. Eight teams play 14 matches. 
Luxembourg 1987/88: Top four (of 12 teams) to PO. Starting point: Half of the points 
from regular season. Four teams play six matches. 
1988/89-1993/94: Top six (of ten teams) to PO. Starting point: Half of 
the points from regular season. Six teams play ten matches. 
1999/00-2004/05: Top four (of 12 teams) to PO. Starting point: All 
points from regular season. Four teams play six matches. 
Denmark 1991/92-1994/95: Top eight (of ten teams) to PO. Starting point: Half of 
the points from regular season. Eight teams play 14 matches. 
Austria 1985/86-1987/88: Top eight (of 12 teams) to PO. Starting point: All 
points from regular season. Eight teams play 14 matches. 
1988/89-1992/93: Top eight (of 12 teams) to PO. Starting point: Half of 
the points from regular season. Eight teams play 14 matches. 
Scotland 2000/01-2004/05: Top six (of 12 teams) to PO. Starting point: All points 
from regular season. Six teams play five matches. 
Among these leagues, only the Swedish league has knock-out tournament championship 
playoffs (except in the 1990 and 1991 seasons). As shown earlier, the normal systems 
for championship playoffs seem to be a strong relationship between regular season point 
score and playoff league tournament, where either half or all points are brought into the 
playoff league tournament. 
Below are shown average values of competitive balance during the analysis period of 35 
seasons, dividing between periods with and without championship playoffs. Differences 
are tested by t-tests, based on the statistical null hypothesis and two-sided alternative 
hypothesis. The latter is chosen because incentives relevant for competitive balance are 
not clear in these leagues. The overview includes competitive balance calculations from 
the three dimensions used in this thesis. Note that the HHI is adjusted to take into 
account the number of seasons to be calculated. It can be called the relative HHI: rH Hl 
= HHI/perfect HHI, where perfect HHI means HHI in a situation where no teams win 
more than one championship (perfect competitive balance). given the number of seasons 
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to be calculated. Higher rHHI hence means a relatively higher relative concentration of 
championship winners. 
Table 5.23: Comparisons of competitive balance when championship playoffs or not 
League NSQF SRCC rHHI 
Sweden Playoff 1.21 0.39 3.91 
No playoff 1.30 0.50 3.67 
t-values 1.135 1.478 
Switzerland Playoff 1.31 0.48 4.50 
No playoff 1.76 0.63 3.40 
t-values 4.791*** 1.976* 
Luxembourg Playoff 1.72 0.62 2.69 
No playoff 1.64 0.57 9.64 
t-values -0.786 -0.726 
Denmark Playoff 1.24 0.57 1.00 
No playoff 1.42 0.44 4.81 
t-values 0.987 -1.061 
Austria Playoff 1.58 0.54 3.00 
No playoff 1.61 0.60 4.78 
t-values 0.182 0.764 
Scotland Playoff 2.23 0.50 2.60 
No playoff 1.93 0.69 11.87 
t-values -1.818* 2.330** 
Scotland Playoff 2.23 0.50 2.60 
No playoff 1.92 0.49 3.40 
t-values -2.829*** -0.174 
Significant on one percent level; Significant on five percent level; * Significant on 
ten percent level. Two-sided t-tests. 
1 From 1971-2004/05. 
2 Alternative calculations over equal periods: 1995/96-1999/00 and 2000/01-2004/05. 
Because of the low number of seasons with championship playoffs in the Scottish 
league, and that the value of the rHHI for the non-championship playoff period (because 
of strong domination) is very high, an alternative comparison period is also presented. 
The results differ between the leagues. Competitive balance is significantly better when 
measured by the NSQF ratio and the SRCC in the periods of championship playoffs in 
Switzerland. In Scotland, different directions can be found in these two dimensions. 
There are different responses in the different leagues also for the rHHI. Luxemburg, 
Denmark, Austria and Scotland have all better rHHI when championship playoffs are 
used. One would also expect the Swedish league to be included in this group, since most 
of the championship playoff tournament was structured as knock-out competitions, but 
the values of rHHI is rather slightly the opposite. 
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The significant increased win dispersion together with lower performance persistence in 
the Scottish league, after including post-seasonal playoffs (also playoffs for the weakest 
half of the regular season), are interesting results. An intuitive explanation can be that 
the better teams are given an opportunity to increase the revenue stream, compared to 
the weaker teams, and hence, widen the dispersion of the quality among the teams. The 
increased level of variance in performance over seasons might be related to an increased 
level of financial risk-taking behaviour among the middle of the table teams, and hence, 
give increased variation. It might also be that some teams, who miss out on the 
championship playoff, but who are already safe from relegation (because all regular 
season points are transferred to the playoffs) lose motivation in the latter part of the 
regular season. On the other hand, calculations from the alternative comparison periods 
in the Scottish league might suggest that this is a result from a longer trend (towards 
less persistence), consistent with the results in Chapter 4. Further analyses of possible 
determinants for these results are seen as beyond the scope of this thesis. However, a 
number of factors relevant in time series of competitive balance will be discussed in 
Chapter 6. Note that these analyses might also be affected by incentive effects related to 
qualifications to the UEFA tournaments. 
5.5. Appendix 
Variables used in the analyses in Chapter 5 are presented in the two tables below: 
191 
Table 5.24: Competitive balance in three dimensions for the seasons 1995(/96) - 2004(/05) 
NSQF 
lOs 5s 
SRCC 
lOs 5s 
HHI 
lOs 
Albania 1.579 1.969 0.611 0.604 0.540 
Andorra 2.222 2.088 0.614 0.712 0.240 
Armenia 2.547 2.605 0.619 0.630 0.260 
Austria 1.750 1.562 0.639 0.595 0.200 
Azerbaijan 2.142 2.253 0.601 0.565 0.360 
Belarus 2.039 2.133 0.632 0.759 0.223 
Belgium 1.745 1.877 0.594 0.632 0.300 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.180 
Bulgaria 2.033 2.173 0.737 0.830 0.240 
Croatia 1.546 1.556 0.592 0.515 0.460 
Cyprus 2.129 2.149 0.769 0.706 0.380 
Czech Republic 1.496 1.477 0.589 0.546 0.520 
Denmark 1.583 1.636 0.571 0.597 0.360 
England 1.580 1.657 0.612 0.602 0.460 
Estonia 2.381 2.846 0.733 0.852 0.380 
F. Y. R. Macedonia 1.804 2.056 0.596 0.587 0.240 
Faroe Islands 1.786 1.770 0.572 0.481 0.260 
Finland 1.437 1.583 0.392 0.631 0.360 
France 1.283 1.269 0.468 0.413 0.240 
Georgia 2.030 2.051 0.434 0.651 0.460 
Germany 1.412 1.464 0.476 0.568 0.420 
Greece 2.031 1.969 0.710 0.793 0.680 
Hungary 1.569 1.427 0.559 0.528 0.220 
Iceland 1.247 1.100 0.514 0.404 0.300 
Israel 1.781 1.697 0.608 0.610 0.260 
Italy 1.631 1.683 0.669 0.649 0.360 
Kazakhstan 2.248 2.200 0.506 0.547 0.260 
Latvia 2.660 3.020 0.362 0.933 1.000 
Lithuania 2.338 2.438 0.797 0.772 0.420 
Luxembourg 1.828 1.770 0.617 0.491 0.420 
Malta 2.136 1.919 0.832 0.799 0.340 
Moldova 2.421 2.446 0.709 0.817 0.420 
Netherlands 1.879 1.911 0.759 0.785 0.420 
Northern Ireland 1.730 1.863 0.499 0.606 0.240 
Norway 1.457 1.385 0.465 0.460 1.000 
Poland 1.558 1.514 0.515 0.600 0.320 
Portugal 1.654 1.625 0.648 0.584 0.420 
Republic of Ireland 1.602 1.538 0.623 0.679 0.300 
Romania 1.520 1.348 0.567 0.502 0.380 
Russia 1.645 1.547 0.537 0.532 0.420 
San Marino 1.775 1.875 0.446 0.540 0.220 
Scotland 2.076 2.228 0.495 0.503 0.520 
Serbia-Montenegro 2.023 1.886 0.604 0.671 0.460 
Slovakia 1.618 1.409 0.506 0.239 0.220 
Slovenia 1.566 1.374 0.694 0.668 0.580 
Spain 1.381 1.341 0.605 0.567 0.240 
Sweden 1.236 1.307 0.491 0.515 0.160 
Switzerland 1.357 1.407 0.437 0.401 0.280 
Turkey 1.784 1.743 0.665 0.584 0.420 
Ukraine 1.890 1.929 0.505 0.522 0.680 
Wales 2.009 1.984 0.549 0.614 0.540 
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Table 5.25: Basis for independent variables in the cross-sectional reQreesinn analvci,. 
Population Pop. 
density 
Pop Larg. 
city 
GNP/ 
capita $ 
Agri- 
% 
UEFA 
coeff. 
UEFA 
member 
FIFA 
ranking 
Albania 3544808 122.79 270000 4500 0.475 1.831 1954 89 
Andorra 69865 146.53 25000 19000 0.010 0 1996 147 
Armenia 2991360 120.04 1322000 3900 0.234 2.165 1993 112 
Austria 8174762 98.37 2072000 30000 0.035 23.375 1954 68 
Azerbaijan 7868385 91.85 1700000 3400 0.141 1.165 1994 114 
Belarus 10310520 50.10 1700000 6000 0.111 3.416 1993 90 
Belgium 10348276 336.82 1122000 29000 0.019 28.5 1954 16 
Bulgaria 7517973 74.13 1188000 7600 0.114 18.665 1954 34 
Croatia 4496869 82.91 765200 10700 0.079 18.625 1992 20 
Cyprus 775927 81.61 195300 19200 0.041 10.165 1962 98 
Czech Republic 10246178 130.72 1233000 15700 0.031 27.95 1993 6 
Denmark 5413392 126.36 1326000 31200 0.020 17.375 1954 13 
England 49558800 380.40 6962319 28200 0.008 58.34 1954 8 
Estonia 1341664 32.60 499000 12300 0.049 1.665 1992 67 
F. Y. R. Maced. 2071210 81.37 448600 6700 0.113 3.497 1994 92 
Faroe Islands 46662 29.35 13100 22000 0.270 1.165 1992 126 
Finland 5214512 16.89 1163000 27300 0.043 7.208 1954 40 
France 60424213 108.09 9600000 27500 0.027 43.468 1954 2 
Georgia 4693892 72.69 1400000 2500 0.205 5.666 1992 93 
Germany 82424609 234.86 3337000 27600 0.010 51.132 1954 12 
Greece 10647529 81.86 3100000 19900 0.067 36.782 1954 30 
Hungary 10032375 110.31 2017000 13900 0.033 12.79 1954 72 
Iceland 293966 2.72 156000 30900 0.092 3.498 1954 56 
Israel 6199008 282.82 2200000 19700 0.028 23.999 1992 50 
Italy 58057477 192.96 4300000 26800 0.022 62.311 1954 10 
Kazakhstan 15143704 6.30 1300000 7000 0.077 0.5 2002 135 
Latvia 2306306 36.44 921000 10100 0.045 6.665 1992 53 
Lithuania 3607899 54.98 553000 11200 0.061 3.998 1992 103 
Luxembourg 462690 165.92 81800 55100 0.005 1.332 1954 153 
Malta 396851 1192.51 99000 17700 0.030 2.998 1960 128 
Moldova 4446455 133.67 765000 1800 0.210 5.832 1993 108 
Netherlands 16318199 466.45 1150000 28600 0.025 33.498 1954 4 
Northern Ireland 1696600 124.97 274000 23000 0.015 1.498 1954 124 
Norway 4574560 14.42 507467 37700 0.025 19.575 1954 42 
Poland 38626349 126.79 1609000 11000 0.031 21.625 1954 25 
Portugal 10524145 107.86 1971000 18000 0.058 35.583 1954 17 
Rep. of Ireland 3969558 52.74 993300 29800 0.050 3.331 1954 14 
Romania 22355551 96.96 2130000 6900 0.131 12.957 1954 27 
Russia 143782338 8.61 9299000 8900 0.052 21.041 1954 24 
San Marino 28503 417.68 5000 34600 0.010 0 1988 162 
Scotland 5054800 64.87 577869 27000 0.023 30.375 1954 51 
Serbia-Mont. 10825900 103.06 1168454 2300 0.152 0 1993 41 
Slovakia 5423567 110.58 448292 13300 0.059 9.332 1993 47 
Slovenia 2011473 97.28 263290 18300 0.030 13.665 1992 31 
Spain 40280780 78.43 4072000 22000 0.036 75.539 1954 3 
Sweden 8986400 21.69 755305 26800 0.020 17.591 1954 19 
Switzerland 7450867 182.94 984000 32800 0.015 26.25 1954 44 
Turkey 68893918 85.11 8141163 6700 0.117 28.991 1962 8 
Ukraine 47732079 82.51 2932000 5300 0.188 24.583 1992 61 
Wales 2918700 140.78 309000 23100 0.015 2.165 1954 65 
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6. A Time-Series Analysis of Competitive Balance in English 
and Norwegian Football 
6.1. Introduction 
The descriptive analyses of competitive balance in Chapter 4 indicate changes in 
competitive balance over time in the English top division. Changes in competitive 
balance in the top division in Norway have been less significant, except for 
championship winner concentration. The pattern (for all three dimensions) for the 
Norwegian top division is more U-shaped, where competitive balance measures have 
better values in the middle of the sample period than both the first and the last periods. 
The main research question in this chapter is: what are the effects on competitive 
balance of changes in regulations and tournament/prize structure over time in two 
football leagues, the top divisions in England and Norway. These leagues from 
European football represent the currently most popular internationally (England) and a 
more average league (Norway). 
The relationships between product and labour market interventions and competitive 
balance are among the most popular issues in the literature of the economics of 
professional team sports, and can be traced back to the invariance proposition in 
Rottenberg (1956). Since then, a number of studies have analysed these relationships, 
both theoretically and empirically. However, even if the theoretical analysis has been 
done both in North America and in Europe, there is a lack of empirical evidence from 
European team sports. Especially after the introduction of free agency, as a consequence 
of the Bosman verdict in 1995, empirical analyses should also be relevant for European 
team sports. 
Changes in regulations and tournament/prize structure can have different sources. There 
are changes that are (only) related to the domestic governing body itself. This is for 
example typical for promotion and relegation systems. On the other side, a number of 
regulations are external to the domestic governing body, such as the number of teams to 
qualify for the UEFA Champions League, which is decided by an international 
governing body for the sport (UEFA). Labour market changes (e. g. the Bosman verdict) 
might be based on international regulations, while work permits are a matter for the 
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domestic authorities. In other words, changes can be made both within and outside the 
sport, and both at domestic and international levels. 
The time-series (regression) analyses in this chapter are mainly based on the win 
dispersion (NSQF ratio) and performance persistence (SRCC) dimensions of 
competitive balance. It is difficult using proper measures that reflect changes in the 
prize concentration, as a consequence of changes in regulation or structure of leagues in 
such analyses. The reason is that the measure for prize concentration uses up a high 
number of degrees of freedom (for example if using ten seasons as a period of 
measuring concentration, a lag of ten seasons would be required after each change in 
regression the time-series analysis), and is, therefore, omitted from the (time-series) 
regression analyses. However, the championship concentration (HHI) is applied in 
analyses based on averaging certain time periods and in analyses of moving averages. 
6.2. Literature Review 
Because of the lack of European evidence, the review of empirical studies is based on 
NAML. The consequences on competitive balance after the introduction of free agency 
in the MLB have been widely analysed. In general, the first generation of analyses were 
done by what Lee and Fort (2005, p. 158) call "short-term `cross-section' type 
approaches". Here, competitive balance prior to changes in, for example, the labour 
market (such as free agency) is compared to the post-period competitive balance. This is 
among others done in Scully (1989), Quirk and Fort (1992), Fort and Quirk (1995) and 
Eckard (2001). 
The next group of literature puts changes in labour market regulations. and also other 
structural changes, into time-series analysis. This is for example done in Maxey (2002), 
Maxcy and Mondello (2006), Lee and Fort (2005), and Fort and Lee (2007). 
More generally, the empirical literature analysing consequences of changes in 
regulations in the context of competitive balance can be split into three directions: 
1. Pre- and post period t-tests (eventually simple regression models). 
ý. Time-series regression analysis by including relevant variables. 
3. Structural break point analysis. 
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Most of the relevant literature from the first group comes from analyses of 
consequences from introducing free agency in the MLB. The ovvenview by Szymanski 
(2003b) shows that results on competitive balance are mixed, but if there are effects, 
more studies find these to be rather positive (i. e. improved competitive balance) than 
negative (table 3, p. 1160). 189 Using the MLB as an example, Schmidt and Berri (2003) 
emphasise that empirical results of changed institutional rules might be dependent on 
the time period of analyses. These analyses from the MLB show positive or neutral 
effects on competitive balance after the introduction of free agency, and confirm the 
general results of improvement in competitive balance in the MLB since the early 1960s 
in Schmidt and Berri (2003), referring to studies, such as Quirk and Fort (1992), Butler 
(1995), Vrooman (1995), Horowitz (1997), Schmidt (2001), and Schmidt and Berri 
(2001). Eckard (2001) summarizes the findings from the previous literature in the 
following way (p. 433): 
.... empirical work to date has produced results that generally are mixed in 
direction and statistically insignificant. Overall, Rottenberg's (1956) invariance 
proposition is supported, that is, free agency appears to have had no significant 
effect on competitive balance. 
In a time-series analysis of competitive balance in the MLB, Maxcy (2002) includes 
labour market dummy variables that might influence on competitive balance over time. 
Among these is a dummy variable for the period of free agency, and for periods 
reflecting "actions", such as owner collusion that might deviate from free agency 
behaviour. In addition, Maxcy uses both win dispersion and performance persistence as 
dependent variables, and the analysis is done over a longer time period (1951-1999). 
The effects on competitive balance of introducing free agency are in general either 
highly significantly positive (SRCC), or insignificantly positive (NSQF ratio). 
However, in the first period after the introduction of free agency (1976-1980, called the 
"reentry period" that is "capturing the effects of the reentry draft and implicit 
transaction costs" (p. 152)), the dummy variable outweigh this effect, indicating no 
change in competitive balance, compared to the pre free agency period for both 
methods. 
number of these analyses include effects from rookie drafting on competitive balance. Since this 
chapter concerns football in Norway and England, discussions on this free market inter% ention are 
limited. 
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Schmidt and Berri (2003) claim that the improvements in competitive balance are not 
related to market intervention (consistent with the invariance proposition). This is 
supported by Lee and Fort (2005, p. 159), using break point detection techniques""' for 
the sample period 1901-99 (based on two measures of competitive balance - the NSQF 
ratio and the excess tail percentages of the distribution of winning percents): 
Thus the draft, free agency, recent MLB expansion, and the growth in local TV 
revenue disparity do not coincide with shifts in competitive balance. Instead, we 
find statistically significant trends in improved competitive balance in each 
league over these time periods. This leads us to conclude that more gradual 
occurrences over time (more, and more geographically dispersed, population 
centres; diffusion of games through TV; and globalization of the talent pool) 
have played the dominant role in the behavior of competitive balance..... The 
technique employed cannot tell us whether this improvement trend is because of 
or in spite of MLB efforts intended to enhance balance.... 
Schmidt and Berri (2003) focus on the improvement of the size of playing talent and the 
Gould hypothesis (p. 703) in their explanations of the positive trend in competitive 
balance in the MLB. They show that the Major League Baseball has had several 
significant expansions. The first was the inclusion of coloured players (according to 
Schmidt and Berri, 2003, p. 696, Jackie Robinson broke "the color line" in 1947), and 
the second was the increased level of foreign players. Moreover, there have been 
changes in the general population. Schmidt and Berri (2003) claim on p. 696 that: "At 
the beginning of the 20`h century, when the people playing Major League Baseball were 
only white Northern American males, the population baseball could draw from was 
relatively small". Schmidt and Berri (2005, p. 415) conclude that: 
'9' 
The Gould hypothesis, therefore, argues that as the talent pool rises, greater 
player homogeneity should be observed. 
Further, Schmidt and Berri (2003, p. 693) conclude: 
19" 
: Anal,. scs of structural break points on (English) football are done 
by Palaciuti-Huerta (2004). but not 
on competitive balance. 
191 Schmidt and Berri (005) also show that the Gould hypothesis predicts a nonlinear relationship 
between population and competitive balance. See their page 415. 
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Overall, our results suggest that the driving force behind Major League 
Baseball's improved competitive balance has been increases in the population of 
players Major League Baseball can employ. Although there exist marginal 
evidence of an impact from institutional changes, these vary and are quite small. 
Hadley et al. (2005) concentrate their measure on competitive balance in the `I LB on 
comparison of persistence related to playoffs pre and post the strike in 1994. After the 
strike, a number of changes took place, such as luxury tax, increased revenue sharing 
and expansions in the number of teams to post-seasonal playoffs. Despite these 
restrictions, they find competitive balance to be weaker in the after strike period. This is 
consistent with the findings about playoff concentration in Chapter 4 in this thesis. In 
addition, Chapter 4 also found the same significant pattern for AL (insignificant for the 
NL) in win dispersion and for MLB in championship winner concentration and 
performance persistence (both AL and NL). 
Effects on competitive balance after changes in labour market regulations have received 
less attention in the empirical literature for the other major leagues in North America. 
However, a recent study by Maxcy and Mondello (2006) follows up the methods 
applied in Maxcy (2002) for these leagues. '92 The results are mixed, both with regards 
to league and measure. The estimated regressions cover the time period 1951-2004 in all 
leagues. In the NBA, competitive balance is insignificantly weakened by unrestricted 
free agency (based on both the NSQF ratio and the SRCC) compared to the initial 
period. The effects on competitive balance, as a consequence of salary caps, are 
dependent on measure. Both periods' competitive balances (1983-99 and 2000-04) are 
significantly weaker when using the SRCC compared to the initial period, while neither 
of these are significant for the NSQF ratio (however, the t-value for the first of the two 
salary caps periods is higher than one, negatively). The latter method confirms the 
findings in Fort and Quirk (1995). 
In the NFL, the introduction of unrestricted free agency (1958-1963) has a significant 
negative influence on competitive balance in the study of Maxey and %londello (? 006). 
The next period (1964-78, called the Rozelle Rule restricted free agency) is either weak 
A difference in the regressions in \laxcv and \londello, compared to \1awv (2002). is that \taxc,, 
(2002) includes the ctlects of rookie drafting into the regression analyses. 
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significant or close to significant weaker than the initial period, when using the NSQF 
ratio, while when using SRCC, competitive balance goes back to the initial level. 
However, in one of the models, performance persistence has a weak significant 
improvement in the period from 1994 to the end of the sample period (2004), where 
payroll cap and unrestricted free agency were allowed. Larsen et al. (2006) also find that 
the combination of free agency and salary caps might improve competitive balance 
(weakly significant under the dHHI measure and insignificant under the standard 
deviation measure). 
Maxcy and Mondello find the effects from introducing free agency in the NHL to 
(slightly) improve competitive balance when measuring competitive balance by the 
NSQF ratio. The restricted free agency period (1979-95) has a t-value higher than one 
and the unrestricted free agency in the period 1996-2004 exhibits a weakly significant 
improvement in competitive balance compared to the initial period. The performance 
persistence does not show any significant change. 
The most recent analysis of the other major leagues has been undertaken by Fort and 
Lee (2007, p. 530), and they conclude that: 
While LF "Lee and Fort (2005) (sic. )" found a positive trend in balance in M LB, 
we find no trend in the NFL or NHL and a negative trend in the NBA. 
Employing break point techniques, we find no detectable structural change in 
within-season competitive balance prior to 1966 in these three NALs. This is in 
stark juxtaposition to the earlier findings for MLB where no break point 
occurred after 1962. So, we hypothesize that in one league (MLB), factors like 
the equalization of population centres, game diffusion on TV, and 
internationalization of the talent pool have been important in the determination 
of competitive balance. But in two leagues these factors have not been important 
(NFL and NHL). And in one league (the NBA), where the trend is negative. an 
additional explanation may involve the short supply of tall people, suggested 
by 
Berri et al. (2005). 
These studies from the NAML show that there are different reactions 
in different 
leagues, when it comes to effect on competitive balance after changes in transfer market 
restrictions, as well as the response on different restrictions within single 
leagues. 
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Interesting in the context of this chapter, Maxcy and Mondello (2006) include the 
number of teams in the SRCC analyses. The effects on competitive balance are mixed 
across the leagues, but only the NBA shows a significant effect, indicating improvement 
in competitive balance. Also in the NHL the effects might be positive, but they are 
insignificant (t-value around one). For the NFL, the effects are rather opposite, with an 
insignificant decrease in competitive balance. 
Schmidt (2001) analyses the effects on competitive balance in the MLB as a 
consequence of expansions, and concludes that (p. 21): "The results from estimating the 
time-series behaviour of league Gini coefficients indicate that the rise in competitive 
balance began with the movement toward expansion, i. e. 1962 for the American League 
and 1963 for the National League. " However, these results might not be directly 
transferred to European football, because the procedures for expanding (or contracting) 
leagues are different. 193 In general, expansions and reductions of the number of teams in 
European football leagues are achieved through promotion and relegation based on 
sporting (not economic) criteria, namely, the previous season's rank. 
Expansion has also been used in other empirical analyses of competitive balance after 
changing labour market restrictions, as a control variable for measuring effects in 
competitive balance. This is for example done in Fort and Quirk (1995), using dummy 
variables (only) for the seasons of expansions. A problem with regards to broader 
analyses of effects on competitive balance, after changing tournament structure, is that it 
is difficult to come up with general conclusions based only on the first season after 
expansion. Most studies find that competitive balance, measured as the distribution of 
sporting success, does not change significantly, but if there are any effects, they are 
usually negative. This is confirmed by the calculation of win percentages for the new 
teams in their first season in Schmidt (2001), with the average win percentage for an 
expansion team in its initial season being 0.371. Next season "these teams improve their 
winning percentage by nearly 10 0-o" (p. 21, footnote 1). ""hen measuring competitive 
balance on basis of performance persistence, Butler (1995), Maxcv (2002), and Ivlaxcv 
and Mondello (2006) find that if there are effects on competitive balance. they are 
positive. Larsen et al. (2006) find that the expansion year has no effect on NFL, while 
" See Schmidt (2001) p. 2l for reasons why competitive balance might ha% e been impro\ ed in Major 
League Baseball, as a consequence of expansion. 
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the number of matches affects competitive balance significantly (strong) negative, as the 
number of matches increases from 14 to 16. 
Newson (1984), Dobson and Goddard (2001) and Fernandez-Cantelli and \leeden 
(2002) analyse effects of changing point score system, but these are not directly related 
to competitive balance. 194 It is therefore difficult to draw conclusions on competiti\ c 
balance from them, because the aggregate distribution of home and away wins and 
draws are used. They do not consider the changes in the distribution of these results. 
Fernandez-Cantelli and Meeden (2002) claim there is a hypothesis about reduction in 
draws, when going from a (2,1,0) to a (3,1,0) system. This might be supported by 
Palacios-Huerta (2004), who finds a break point in draws as the point score system 
changed in England. However, empirically this is not generally supported as they' 
(Fernandez-Cantelli and Meeden) find four out of ten leagues to have the opposite 
result. For a longer time period in England, a (slight) drop in draws might suggest that 
differences between teams have increased, but on the other side, the increased number 
of away wins improves the equality to home wins, which can be interpreted as positive 
in the context of competitive balance, if this means for all teams. However, if it means 
that the best teams now also win their away games, ceteris paribus, competitive balance 
is worsened due to the changed system. Comparing figure 1 in Palacios-Huerta (2004) 
and figures of competitive balance in the English top division later in this chapter, the 
frequency of draws and competitive balance might rather go in opposite directions, as is 
confirmed by calculating the correlation coefficient between the share of draws and the 
NSQF ratio (= 0.185) or the SRCC (= 0.336) for the whole sample period. 
Related to Chapter 3, little research has been done on the effects on competitive balance 
from changed point score system in European football at team level. However, the game 
theory approach in Haugen (2008), which he also finds empirical support for in 
England, Norway and Romania, suggests worsened competitive balance (win 
dispersion) after changing the point score system. On the other hand, this is not 
consistent with Newson (1984, p. 91), who has the impression "that teams seem to 
move more rapidly up and down the table". This may be descriptive indications of 
194 For example, Dobson and Goddard (2001) find the number of away goals and awa\ wins to incrca>e in 
Fngland, France. Germany and Spain in the period after introducing the (3,1,0) point score system, 
compared to the previous period. For the Scottish league, the number of wins was reduced. Thee rc: ults 
are not tested statistically . 
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decreased performance persistence, just after the introduction of the new point score 
system. 
The NHL changed its score system prior to the 1999/00 season (see. for example. 
Abrevaya, 2004; Easton and Rockerbie, 2005). Before this change. the score system 
was (2,2,1,0,0), where wins counted regardless of regular time or in overtime. One point 
was (only) given if there was a draw in both regular time and overtime, while a loss 
gave zero points, regardless of whether after regular time play or overtime play'. The 
new rule changed the number of points given, with a loss after overtime play awarded 
one point, i. e. (2,2,1,1,0) system". Both studies find that the changes in the overtime 
rules affect incentive effects. 195 This also happened, when an overtime rule was first 
introduced, prior to the 1983/84 season (Easton and Rockerbie, 2005). 
When it comes to whether post-seasonal playoffs affect regular season competitive 
balance, Larsen et al. (2006) find different results regarding the way to define 
competitive balance in the NFL. By using dHHI as a measure of competitive balance, 
the effects are negative, as the number of teams to qualify increases. 
6.3. Theoretical Framework and Rottenberg's Invariance Proposition 
While Chapter 5 concentrates on determinants for differences in competitive balance 
across leagues, this chapter will focus on competitive balance effects from changes in 
regulations and prize structure within leagues over time. Therefore, only parts of the 
model in Chapter 5 can be applied in this chapter. Variables describing prize and 
tournament structure changes are relevant also in this chapter, while variables at macro 
level are omitted. The extension of the model in Chapter 5 is therefore mainly made in 
relation to a wider range of regulations, because of (within-league) changes over time. 
In other words, the framework for the analyses in this chapter is based on a split 
between regulations on one side and tournament, prize structure on the other. 
Regulations are further categorized into labour market and product market. Regulations 
I "` Actually , another change also took place, since the overtime play 
is play ed h one player le' on the 
ice for each team. However, transferring the knowledge from Abrevava's (20104) analyses of the AHL 
(American Hockey League). \%, here the similar changes took place during the last part of the 1990s. it was 
the changed point scores for the losing team in overtime pla\ that was "responsible for the increase in the 
percentage of o,, ertinle games" (p. 298). 
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on the product market are gate revenue sharing and the distribution of revenues from 
collective TV-deals. 
Three main labour market restrictions have been part of the history of European 
football. These are transfer market restrictions, limitations in the number of foreign 
players, and wage restrictions. ' 96 Among the arguments for these restrictions are that 
wages will be lower, and hence that smaller teams can compete for the better players, 
while player reservation rules will increase the smaller teams' ability to retain their best 
players, or at least ensure smaller teams to receive (higher) compensation for the players 
if eventually transferred (to bigger teams). 
Historically, player transfers between teams have been strongly regulated, both in 
Europe and North America. 197 For example, player reservation systems'98 have 
"protected" teams against free movement of players at the end of their contracts, and in 
this way gave teams the right to retain their players and block their transfer to other 
teams or, if the team allows a transfer, to claim a transfer fee by way of compensation. 
In other words, in a player reservation system, a team still has a property right on the 
player's registration, even when the player is "out-of-contract". A free agency system, 
which is the current system in European football, implies that this property right only 
runs concurrently with the player's contract, and so that teams are, therefore, in general, 
unable to claim transfer fees for an "out-of-contract" player (apart from claiming 
compensation for training and development costs for younger players). 
During the history of professional team sports, movement of players across leagues has 
been restricted. In Europe, until the Bosman verdict, the number of players from outside 
the country was generally strongly limited (e. g. three players). 
199 One consequence from 
the Bosman verdict is free movement of players in professional team sports within the 
members and associated member countries of the European Union, and this labour 
196Many of the same restrictions have been part of the NAML, additional to, for example, rookie drafting 
systems and luxury taxes. Descriptions of the latter can be found in for example Fort (2003) and 
Marburger (1997). 
197 Overview over transfer systems can be found in for example Quirk and Fort (1992), Szymanski and 
Kuypers (1999), Dobson and Gerrard (2000), and Dobson and Goddard (2001). 
198 Schmidt and Berri (2003, p. 694) claim that: "..... the reserve clause was enacted in a secret meeting at 
the National League in 1879 (Eckard, 2001)". 
1" Also the tournaments arranged by the UEFA have had restrictions on the number of foreign players. 
For the 2007/08 season this is related to "locally trained" players, "club-trained" players and "association- 
trained" players. See the Regulations of the UEFA Champions League, 2007/08 Article 17 
(www. uefa. com/newsfiles/ 19071. pdf). 
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market can therefore be characterized as open. However. there are different practices 
when it comes to the different associations' behaviour to players outside Europe., '" One 
can therefore say that European football leagues have gone from being a relatively 
closed to a much more open labour market during the 1990s. 
Even if it is not directly involving revenue transfers, Downward and Dawson (21000) 
claim labour market policy can be treated as an indirect method to obtain cross- 
subsidisation, because it refers to the input market (the players). Further, they emphasise 
that this policy might not be that indirect, when looking at the sporting production 
process, since player expenses are a great share of a sporting team's costs (sec. for 
example, Scully, 1989; Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999; annual reports from Deloitte). 
Changes in labour market policy can therefore affect the teams' finances at a significant 
level. However, since playing success is a function of the players' sporting capacity, 
labour market policy might affect the distribution of playing talent, and consequently, is 
a more direct method of affecting competitive balance. 
Apart from governing body methods for interventions of free market solutions in 
professional team sports, competitive balance can be affected by owner objectives 
which may in some cases not correspond to profit maximisation. Kesenne (1996) shows 
that there is weaker competitive balance under win maximisation with a zero-profit 
budget restriction compared to profit maximisation. 201 
Rottenberg's Invariance Proposition 
The natural starting point in the theoretical analysis of competitive balance, from 
regulations on product and labour market, is the so-called invariance proposition from 
Rottenberg (1956). Szymanski (2003b, p. 1140) summarizes the main findings in 
Rottenberg: 
.... possibly the most 
important theoretical contribution to the analysis of team 
sports: the so-called invariance principle. This states that (a) changes in 
ownership rights over player services (such as the introduction of free agency') 
For example, the Norwegian Football Association increased the number of such play er> from two to 
three betöre the "()O7 season after pressure from the teams. 
2(" This could have been it >= k as shown in for example Kesenne (2006a), but the assumption of zero 
profit simplifies the analysis. 
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and (b) certain types of income redistribution (such as gate revenue sharing) will 
have no effect on competitive balance. 
Given certain assumptions, Rottenberg concludes that the distribution of players is 
unchanged between a free agency system and a reserve clause system. In other words, 
Rottenberg claimed that the regulation would not have any effect on the distribution of 
playing talent. 202 Rich teams would purchase the best players, regardless of transfer 
systems, under the assumptions of a player transfer market (see, for example, Cairns et 
al., 1986; Eckard, 2001). 
The literature finds the invariance proposition to be an example of the Coase theorem 
(Coase, 1960). 203 Noll (2006) claims that the invariance proposition is a special case of 
the Coase theorem (p. 28): "... that arises when transactions costs are unimportant. 
Unfortunately, the sports labor market is not an example of a market in which 
transaction costs can be ignored. " Rottenberg uses some of the following 
assumptions : 
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- Some teams have (much) larger revenues than others. 
- Free labour market (the players accept the highest offers). 
- Team objective is profit maximisation. 
- At some point, the marginal return might be negative, which can happen if a team 
gets too dominant, and therefore reduces the uncertainty of outcome and, hence, the 
attendance. 
According to competitive balance, the richest teams in a league would, assuming 
that they are profit maximising, prefer winning by close margin. Therefore, 
regardless to regulations, playing talent would be relatively equally distributed 
among the teams. 
202 The owners claimed that given a free market for players, the big market teams would buy the best 
players and concentrate the distribution of playing talent among league members, which would result in 
lower uncertainty of outcome and reduction in league attendances (Cairns et al., 1986). According to 
Rottenberg, there is an important difference between a free agency system and a reserve clause system, 
since parts of the value of the service for the player is kept by the selling team (the transfer fee), while the 
player would get the whole value in a free market system. The literature is consistent about this wage 
effect for players. 
203 See, for example, La Croix and Kawaura (1999). 
204 Noll (2006, p. 21-22) discusses the relationship between Coase theorem and Rottenberg's invariance 
proposition, and claims that: "Rottenberg's analysis is not correct without further assumptions... " (p. 22). 
205 
The diminishing marginal return on additional team victories (higher win percent) 
within a season was introduced by Rottenberg. This effect was also a key feature of the 
first formal model on sports league, developed by EI-Hodiri and Quirk (1971). Variants 
of models by E1-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) have been used to analyse effects of different 
regulations in the sport market, among others the distribution of playing talent, and, 
hence, the competitive balance. The effects of market regulations have been discussed, 
both theoretically and empirically, by contributors such as Quirk and Fort (1992 ), Fort 
and Quirk (1995), Vrooman (1995,1996,1997,2000), Hausman and Leonard (1997 ), 
Rascher (1997), Kesenne (2000a, 2000b), Dobson and Goddard (2001). and Fort 
(2003). According to the summary of Dobson and Goddard (2001), regulations in the 
sports market, such as salary caps, maximum wage, reserve clause and gate revenue 
sharing, are not expected to give better competitive balance than the free market 
solution. On the other hand, these regulations may have implications for the distribution 
in revenues between stronger and weaker teams, and between teams and players. 
Discussions of the Results from the Invariance Proposition205 
The assumptions behind the invariance proposition have created a debate. According to 
Cairns et al. (1986, p. 3 1), Sloane (1976b) claims that a basic problem with the 
invariance proposition is "that the attendance-depressing effect of domination by a 
single team is largely external". This is related to the two variables, playing success and 
uncertainty of outcome, in a situation where one team is dominating the league. For this 
team, the two variables will go in opposite directions, while, for the other teams, they 
are going in the same (negative) direction. Cairns et al. (1986) summarise this effect: 
In a two-team league this externality could be internalised as described by, 
Rottenberg, but in a many-team league this is less obvious. In terms of 
Rottenberg's example, teams C, D, E, F and so on may all enjoy benefits from 
the closer competition of B bidding for A's star player, but the market will fail to 
take these benefits into account. 
Sloane (1969,1971) argues against various assumptions in the proposition. Some of the 
arguments are summarised below: 
'°` Restrictions on the number of players in a squad (Rottenberg. 1956) will not be treated in this thesis. 
However, this might be relevant in the future, because there are associations putting different restriction" 
on the squads when it comes to for example local players. For Norwegian football, see w\k-ww . 
fotball. no. 
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- The profit maximising hypothesis among sports teams. Sloane claims that utility 
maximisation, given some financial constraints, might be a better assumption. 
- Inter-league tournaments. In Europe, but also in the NAVIL, there are lucrati% c 
inter-league matches, where qualification is based on sporting quality. 
- Only the rich teams are rich enough to sign the best players. 
- Players do not want to leave a successful team for a less successful one. 
- Sale of star players is unpopular among fans. 
Even in a reserve clause system there will be unequal distribution of playing talent, 
especially when allowing for inter-team sales of players. According to Cairns et at. 
(1986, p. 32), Sloane (1976a, 1976b) argues that competition after all will be closer in a 
reserve clause system, since it will "slow down the rate at which star players gravitate to 
wealthier clubs". 
On the other hand, Eckard (2001) shows that free agency might have a positive effect on 
the distribution of playing talent, compared to a reserve clause system. The argument is 
based on indications that the distribution of playing talent improved after introduction 
of free agency in MLB. The main reason for this hypothesis is that there "are 
diminishing marginal returns to each additional year's "production" of a championship 
calibre team" (p. 437). This is based on an argument related to an expected reduction in 
fan interest as the team continuously wins additional championships. Therefore, the 
team will have reduced incentives to continually bid for the best players, which is 
necessary for remaining at the top. 
The influence of the objective of the owners/team in theoretical models 
Sloane (1971) criticises the profit maximisation assumption in Rottenberg (1956) from a 
European football point of view. Traditionally, models from North America have 
mainly been related to profit maximising behaviour (E1-Hodiri and Quirk. 1971, Quirk 
and Fort, 1995), while models from European team sports have questioned this 
assumption and have also analysed alternative ownership purposes into the models, 
such as in Kesenne (various). In general, Noll (1982) shows that if teams' objective is to 
maximise the number of matches won, the player reservation system "prevents the best- 
financed team from acquiring the players whose contracts are the exclusive property of 
1 0, 
other teams, at least unless it obtains their acquiescence" (p. 387). On the other hand, 
Kesenne (1996) supports the invariance proposition, even for leagues where the owners 
are maximising wins, subject to break-even. However, Fort (2006b) claims that in this 
case, the "invariance principle need not hold" (p. 85). Compared to the profit 
maximising models, Kesenne (1996,1999,2006a) shows that competitive balance in a 
win maximising model is weaker. 
One phenomenon is that "special" owners contribute to an abnormal positive cash flow, 
through supporting the given team to achieve sporting objectives, rather than financial 
payback. A recent example is the so-called "Abramovich effect" for Chelsea FC in the 
English Premier League. 
Cost restrictions (salary/payroll caps, maximum wages)206 
A problem, when it comes to analyses of competitive balance effects from salary caps, 
is the number of variants in practice (Kesenne, 2002a). Theoretically, effects on 
competitive balance from introducing maximum wages are mixed. 
Fort and Quirk (1995) argue that, theoretically, perfect competitive balance may be 
achieved through salary caps in combination with the reverse-order-of-finish draft 
system. However, one problem is that there might be incentives for teams to move away 
from this situation. This is because, at this equilibrium point, the marginal value of 
talent for the large market team is higher than for the small market team in a 
hypothetical two-team league (Dobson and Goddard, 200 1). 207 Such a situation will 
motivate the large market team to buy player(s) from the small market team, and 
thereby diverge from the assumed effect of the salary cap restriction. Fort and Quirk 
(1995) claim that this is one explanation of the "ineffectiveness" of the salary cap in 
NBA, which is, according to Fort (2000), supported by Staudohar (1999), who finds 
that, on average, most teams have been above the cap in the 1990s. Vrooman (1995), 
206 Introduction of a salary cap system might include administrative problems, such as monitoring costs 
and enforcement problems (see, for example, Quirk and Fort, 1995; Fort, 2000). Rottenberg (1956) claims 
that a salary cap is not effective if there are possibilities for players to receive non-monetary goods, or 
that there are other ways to evade rules. Even if the system is working as anticipated, Rottenberg still 
claims that the players want to join the wealthiest teams. 
207 Dobson and Goddard emphasise that this solution is also inefficient in relation to maximising total 
league revenues (see also Quirk and Fort, 1992). This effect can be even stronger if the result is reduced 
TV rating, as a consequence of relatively weaker performance among the strong drawing power teams 
(Fort and Quirk, 1995). 
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among others, claims that because of zero marginal costs for talent (the cost, do not go 
up with winning percentages), the profit maximising solution will be at the point where 
the league maximises its revenues. Interpreting this view, the same equilibrium point as 
free agency competitive balance is expected, and, as a result, salary caps should have no 
effect on competitive balance. On the other hand, Kesenne (2000a) shows that a salary 
(payroll) cap improves competitive balance . 
20 Even if a consequence is that the market 
move away from Pareto optimum, Kesenne argues that it can be justified, because the 
market (and the owners of the bigger teams) may not take into account the reductions in 
negative externalities by improving competitive balance. Further, Kesenrle (2000a, 
2002a, 2007b) finds that including individual cap most likely brings competitive 
balance closer to the free market solution, which means weaker competitive balance 
than the "pure" payroll cap solution. 
Open labour market 
Assume that a two-team league has a total stock of talent equal to T, + T2. Given a 
closed labour market, the sum will be equal to unit, so if one team increases its stock of 
playing talent, the other must, by definition, decrease its number. This might be 
different in an open labour market regime, where one team can increase its stock of 
playing talent without affecting the other team (buying a player from outside the 
league), or that the other team can replace its loss of playing talent (after a within league 
transfer), by getting players from outside the league. These two examples give T, + T> > 
I after the changes. Therefore, compared to an open labour market, a closed labour 
market will, ceteris paribus, distribute playing talent more unequally. The reason is that 
acquisition of one extra talent does not necessary weaken the other team in an open 
market, so the effects on win ratio and revenue for the acquiring team will be less than 
in a league with a closed labour market. Hence, one can expect lower domination in an 
open labour market (Dobson and Goddard, 2001). Therefore, improved competitive 
balance is to be expected in domestic leagues in the post-Bosman period (more open 
labour market), compared to the pre-Bosman period (more closed labour market), 
ceteris paribus. However, this is not supported by theoretical models in Kýsennne 
(2007a), claiming no changes in competitive balance within leagues after opening the 
labour market. The market for players should also be bigger in an open market, as might 
also extend eventual competitive balance effects, as described in the Gould hypothesis. 
ý`ýý According to K scnnc (2007b) this also holds when assuming win maximisation. 
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What is important in this discussion is the structure of a league, and at which level the 
labour market is closed. In league systems organised as divisional merit hierarchy. such 
as in European football, a top division team may buy a player from a lower division 
team, and, hence, not affect the playing squad for other teams in its own division. A 
horizontal structure of a league has some of the same effects, such as in the NA\I L, but 
it might be dependent on match schedule. For example, transferring a player from a 
team in another conference will not affect the playing squad for the teams in ,, our own 
division. However, it can be of relevance in eventual playoffs. 
Gate revenue sharing policy 
If revenue sharing policy is successful in the context of promoting competitive balance, 
the revenue dispersion among the teams should be relatively better than the distribution 
of drawing power. According to Dobson and Goddard (2001, p. 130), revenue sharing 
policy in the NAML has been important with regards to "offsetting the basic 
inequalities in drawing power between teams". In Europe, revenue sharing seems to be 
less common, especially when it comes to gate sharing. 209 One reason might be weaker 
incentives for revenue sharing in open leagues (Szymanski, 2003b). However, even if 
European football leagues are open, incentives might be more driven by 
competitiveness in lucrative international UEFA tournaments than the relegation 
system. 
For example Quirk and Fort (1992), Fort and Quirk (1995), Vrooman (1995), Dobson 
and Goddard (2001), and Kesenne (2006a) analyse theoretically how revenue sharing 
affects competitive balance in a league with profit maximising owners. When assuming 
concave revenue functions (the analyses are based on a unitary league system, 
210 the 
same proportion of revenue sharing, and ignoring local TV revenues), competitive 
balance \\, ill be unaffected from gate revenue sharing. This is robust for an n-league 
model (when ignoring local-TV revenues) (Fort and Quirk. 1995). 
However, theoretical effects of gate revenue sharing policy, with regards to the 
distribution of playing talent, are dependent on the assumptions of the models (Kesenne, 
'')° See for example Table I in Buzzacchi et al. (2003). 
210 No playoffs. 
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2004,2005a, 2006a). Based on the same assumptions as in the models above, except 
from profit maximising behaviour, Kesenne (various) finds that revenue sharing, 
improves the distribution of playing talent in a league consisting of win maximising 
teams. Moreover, Kesenne (2006a) claims that competitive balance is improved 
regardless of specifications when win maximising behaviour, as is also shown in his 
many contributions. 21 1 Szymanski and Kesenne (2004) relax another assumption, the 
fixed supply of talent, and find revenue sharing to weaken competitive balance in a two- 
team model. In the discussion of the general model, Noll (2006) mentions that the 
concave revenue function can be "disturbed", because leagues create "winners-take-all" 
systems. 212 Noll uses England as an example, where the top teams can earn substantial 
revenues, by qualifying for pan-European team tournaments. According to Szymanski 
(2001), Szymanski (1998) argues that by changing the shape of the revenue functions to 
be convex (by increased win percent), weaker competitive balance can be expected, 
given certain assumptions. However, Sloane (2002) questions the realism in incentives 
related to the model by Szymanski. 
If all revenues in a league are transferred into a pool, which next distributes them 
equally among the teams, one would expect equalisation of playing talent among these 
teams, given a transfer market and profit maximization (Rottenberg, 1956, see also 
Cairns et at., 1986). However, this situation gives no incentives to win, and each team 
will try to minimise costs (Rottenberg, 1956). According to Cairns et al. (1986), Sloane 
(1980) claims the joint revenue will decline, because this will reduce attendance and the 
interest for the league. Sloane further claims that the resistance among the richest teams 
would also be a problem with such a policy. Kesenne (2005a) analyses effects where 
parts of each team's revenues go into a pool. The n-team pool-sharing system might 
have negative effects on competitive balance when profit maximising objectives, while 
it is positive when win maximisation. 
General com rents 
Dobson and Goddard (2001) summarize the theoretical implications of regulations in 
the sports market. 2 13 The main conclusion is that sports economists, in general. claim 
211 Sec also Kesenne (2006b). 
''' Noll uses Frank and Cook (1996) as reference on the "winners-take-all" stems. 
21' The theoretical literature concerning competitive balance is mainly developed by US sports 
economists. typically with NAMiL as models (Dobson and Goddard, 2001). 
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that a free market regime in a professional league will "maintain a reasonable degree of 
competitive balance" (p. 125). This is argued by the interdependence between the teams 
in a league, which should motivate the "richest" teams not to concentrate the playing 
talent too much, so that the league does not lose its "competitive viability" (p. 125). In 
other words, the teams in a professional sports league have an economic incentive that 
the league should not be too unbalanced, or that superior playing talents are 
concentrated in one or a few teams (see also Rottenberg, 1956). On the other hand, 
every team also has a financial motive to be better than the other teams in the league, 
according to El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971, p. 1306), because "gate receipts of the home 
team are an increasing function for the probability of the home team winning for some 
range beyond a probability of . 5". Moreover, positive financial payback from 
qualifications to post-seasonal tournaments might increase these motives. Szymanski 
(2003a, p. 471) shows that: 
The long-term nature of fandom in team sports has made the question of 
competitive balance central to policy analysis. Organizers of sports leagues, 
especially in the USA, have argued that to preserve the long-term interest in the 
game it is necessary to redistribute resources in such as a way as to ensure 
competitive balance. 
While most of the methods for promoting competitive balance are questioned, with 
regards to reaching their purpose, the regulations from governing bodies have, in 
general, positive financial effects for teams and owners. Therefore, researchers question 
what the governing bodies' real incentives are for introducing market regulations. 214 Are 
the competitive balance arguments given only as an excuse to cover their financial 
incentives for regulations? However, there is also an unanswered question why the NFL 
is the best balanced NAML, if regulations do not have any effects on competitive 
balance. Among the NAML, the NFL is the most regulated (see, for example, Sandy et 
al., 2004). 
Other theoretical effects on competitive balance, related to variables applied in this 
chapter, are presented in Chapter 5. In this chapter, Rottenberg's invariance proposition 
will be extended into changes in both regulations and structures. In this way, the 
214 This is emphasised in Balfour and Porter (1991, p. 10), who claim that "A major reason to question the 
competitive balance arguments comes from the fact that it is highly self-serving from the owners". 
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statistical null hypothesis will be applied for the analysed changes during the history of 
English and Norwegian football. The discussions will therefore only be related to 
deciding whether the alternative hypotheses are one- or two-sided. 
6.4. Changes in Regulations and Tournament/Prize Structure in the 
Context of Competitive Balance. The Case of the English Top Division 
The English football league tournament was established in 1888 (the 1888), 89 season), 
when 12 teams played a round-robin tournament (one game home and one game away 
against all other teams in the division). A win was valued by two points, a draw with 
one, while losing a game did not give any points at all. Preston North End became the 
first championship winner. Automatic relegation to a lower division was not `, ct 
introduced. However, the poorly performing teams were not assured of retaining their 
membership of the English football league, since the bottom four had to apply for re- 
election, even before the second division was implemented from the 1892,93 season. 
For a long period of time, the top division only had two prizes; winning the 
championship and avoiding relegation. In other words, knowing the many prizes that 
can be won by sporting performance in the current system of the English FA Premier 
League, the competitive intensity, ceteris paribus, was much lower at the start of the 
sample period in this analysis. 
The English league is well documented when it comes to changes, both in structural and 
regulatory variables, as will be presented in the following. 
6.4.1. Regulatory Changes in the English Top Division 
6.4.1.1. Changes in Labour Market Regulations 
The relationship between labour market policy and competitive balance has been central 
in the history of professional team sports (see, for example, Rottenber`g, 1956). It has 
been related to restrictions in the transfer market, on vage payment and on limitations 
on the number of foreign players in English football. Labour market restrictions are also 
21 
a part of the early history of the English football league. as shown in Green (195-', '. p. 
405): 
In fact, what The Football League set out to achieve as soon as humanly possible 
was first to fix a maximum wage, and then the offer of a reasonable rate of 
payment by a club sufficient to entitle it to place a player's name on the retain 
list. In this way it was hoped that the greedy clubs would be taught that nothing 
was to be gained by underground methods of inducement, and that if they 
wanted a player they must be prepared to pay a transfer fee sufficient to enable 
the denuded club of replenishing this strength. 
The labour market policy in the history of English football is interesting in the context 
of competitive balance, both because of a long period with maximum wages, but also 
because of a number of changes in the transfer system. 
Transfer Rules215 
Dobson and Gerrard (1999, p. 260) show that players in English football have to be 
"registered with the sport's governing bodies", to be given permission to play. Only one 
team can hold a player's registration at a certain point of time. If a player moves to 
another team, the player registration has to be transferred from the old to the new team. 
Player registrations are valuable for teams, and, for example, a market for transferring 
registrations (and hence players) appeared already in the early days of English football. 
Today, the transfer market is a natural part of professional football. For example, the 14 
top teams in the 2000 season in Norwegian football transferred 95 players into their 
teams from other teams (Ohr and Solum, 2001). According to Dobson and Gerrard 
(1999), after the introduction of the freedom of contract transfer system in 1978, per 
season average permanent transfers were 294, which is about 15 percent of the total 
number of registered full-time professionals in English football. 216 
'ý' The expressions used in the brackets below might not be the 'ot icial' terminology applied. but will be 
the terns used in this thesis. 
216 For more infi nnation about the number of transters in English football, see table I in Dobson and 
Gerrard. 
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The transfer market regimes have changed a number of times in English football. In 
1885, three years before the foundation of the English Football League (FL), 2 17 the 
English Football Association (FA) accepted professional football (Green, 1953). 21 8 As a 
part of this acceptance of professional football, the relationships between the employer 
(football team) and the employee (the player) were regulated, as a registration system 
for players (Green, 1953). From the Football Association Constitution of 1887, Green 
(1953) shows that paragraph 26 stated that all players had to be "annually registered on 
a form to be supplied by the Secretary of the Association" (p. 182). According to 
paragraph 25, transfers during the season were restricted; "No professional shall be 
allowed to play for more than one Club in any season without special permission of the 
Council of the Association" (p. 182 in Green, 1953), which meant that transfers could 
not, in general, be given during the season, but even more important for an academic 
discussion of this transfer system in the context of competitive balance, is that, as 
shown in Green (1953) in a discussion from 1899, players were free after the end of 
each season to "enter into an agreement with any club for the following season" (p. 
407). In other words, in the terminology applied in the current system of professional 
team sports, the initial transfer system in the English football league was a free agency 
system, which will be called "the FA free agency" in this chapter. 
This "transfer system", created by the Football Association, still remained during the 
first seasons of the Football League. It was not until the 1893/94 season that the 
Football League introduced its "own" registration system, the so-called "retain and 
transfer" system, 219 as an answer to the failure of getting agreements on wage 
restrictions (Green, 1953). This registration system was much more restrictive than the 
FA registration system. 220 Given certain conditions, a player was not free at the end of 
contract to choose an employer. In other words, a tight (one-sided) binding agreement 
between the team and the player limited a player's possibility to play for another team, 
as long as the current team wanted the player. A player was not allowed to play for 
other teams, if the former team did not release the "player registration". This transfer 
217 For more about the foundation of the English Football League in 1888, originally a union of 12 teams, 
see, for example, Green (1953). 
2I8 The English Football Association was established in 1863 (Green, 1953). 
219 The English Football Association was not happy with this system (Green, 1953). Green (1953, p. 406) 
emphasises that: "The fundamental difference between the outlook of the F. A. and the League in the early 
days was that while the former put the interests of the individual and his freedom first, the League set out 
from the beginning primarily to protect the club. Therefore it became a question of the `Individual' versus 
`the System'. " 
220 As can be read from the High Court case of Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club Ltd. and 
Others [ 1963], players needed to be registered both at the FA and the FL. 
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system was, according to Szymanski and Zimbalist (2005), very similar to the reserve 
clause that existed in the MLB at this time. It lasted until the High Court case``'' 
involving the Newcastle United player Mr George Eastham in 1963.2`22 
Eastham won the case against his former team, and the previous system was seen to "be 
an unreasonable restraint on trade" (Dobson and Goddard, 2001, p. 92). The new 
system, which can be called the "option-and-transfer" system, 223 was a modification of 
the former. New contracts had to be at least as good as the previous, both with regards 
to time (one or two years) and financially, if the team was to claim the rights to keep the 
player registration after the contract had expired (Sloane, 1969; Dobson and Goddard, 
2001). In other words, as described in Sloane (1969), the structure of the transfer market 
regime did not change much in the new system. 224 Further, McArdle (2000, p. 13) 
emphasises that: 
If the club was unwilling to do that, the original contract would continue to run 
until he was transferred. 
According to McArdle (2000), an independent Transfer Tribunal for arbitration was 
another consequence, if no agreement between team and player was made. McArdle 
therefore claims that (p. 13): "The days of clubs being able to bring players' careers to 
an end if they refused to accept whatever terms the club offered were over". 
The "option and transfer" system lasted until a new system named "freedom of 
contract" was effective from the 1978/79 season. It was, according to Szymanski and 
Kuypers (1999), introduced in April 1978.225 "Freedom of contract" was a further step 
towards free agency, even though it cannot be categorised as a free agency system. On 
one side, the freedom was established for the players, since they were now able to 
decide which team to play for, after contracts had expired. However, on the other hand, 
221 Mr Justice Wilberforce J. 's interpretation of the "retain and transfer" system can be found in the case 
Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club Ltd and others [ 1963] 3 W. L. R., p. 583-4. 
"`' Nawrat and Hutchings (1998) write the following for the 1960-61 season (p. 108): " .... 
Ministry of 
Labour on January 18, the League finally agreed to abandon the regulations that effectively tied a player 
to one club for life. The players' victory was finally confirmed when Eastham's case reached the High 
Court... ". 
223 From lecture notes by Gerrard (2000b) for the course "The economics and finance of Football" at the 
Leeds University Business School. 
224 See Sloane (1969) for more detailed descriptions. 
225 Nawrat and Hutchings (1998) p. 214 show that: "When the details finally emerged in April ........ 
John 
Lacy became of the first players to put the new process to the test when he moved from Fulham to 
Tottenham in July". This is from the 1977-78 season. 
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free agency was not "achieved" yet, because the freedom was related to the behaviour 
of the former team. If the former team offered a contract at least as good as the 
previous, the team could claim a transfer fee. This transfer fee could be decided after 
negotiation with the new team, or if no such agreement, the "case" would be sent to an 
"FA tribunal". If the former team was not able to offer the kind of contract described 
above, the player was free to move without transfer fees (on free transfer) (Dobson and 
Goddard, 1998,2001). 
This system lasted until the Bosman verdict was implemented in English football, which 
happened in two phases. First, from 1996 transfer fees for an out-of-contract player 
moving to a new team, were seen to be of "divergence" with "Article 48 of the Treaty of 
Rome for the freedom of movement of labour" (Dobson and Goddard, 2001, page 95). 
The direct result was that out-of-contract players moving across borders within EU/EU- 
associated countries could do so, without the former team claiming transfer fee, and that 
strict limitations of foreign players was cancelled for players from EU (included 
associated members). This was a significant change, also in English football, where the 
limitation had been three foreign players (Magee and Sugden, 2002). 226 The second 
phase is related to the introduction of the domestic part of the Bosman verdict in July 
1998 in English football. This stated that players of 24 years or older should now be free 
agents when the contract had expired (Morrow, 1999). 
Magee and Sugden (2002, p. 421-422) analyse international migration in professional 
football, with a focus on England. 227 Their explanations of the increased number of 
foreign players by the millennium change are, apart from the Bosman verdict, the 
significant improvement in revenues through the UEFA Champions League and media 
and sponsors. Based on different sources, trends in the share of foreign players in the 
different Big Five leagues can be presented: 
226 This was due to regulations from the UFEA (3+2 rule). See, for example, Pearson, G. (University of 
Liverpool FIG Factsheet) - www. liv. ac. uk/footballindustry/bosman. html, accessed by April 2008. 227 Magee and Sugden (2002) give an overview over typology for determinants for migration of players. 
They refer this terminology to Maguire (1996,1999). Further analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Table 6.1: The share of foreign players in the Big Five European football leagues in the 
1999/00 and 2004/05 seasons 
League 1999/00 -1004 05 
English FA Premier League 45 % (199899)- 56 % 
Italian Serie A 33% 31 0'0 
German Bundesliga 40 % 48 % 
French Ligue 1 23 % 38 % 
Spanish Primera Liga 40 % 29 00 
' Source is according to Magee and Sugden (2002): Massarella (2000). 
2 Source is according to Magee and Sugden (2002): Morgan (1999). 
3 Source: Gratton and Solberg (2007). They refer to football-europe. com. 
In other words, opening the borders between the different nations v ithin the European 
Union, when it comes to the labour market of professional team sports, led to 
expansions in the "population of athletes", 22 at least for the big revenue leagues, in the 
context of competitive balance. This is of interest in relation to the Gould hypothesis 
(Schmidt and Berri, 2003), described earlier in this thesis. 
The current transfer system (Bosman II) was introduced prior to the 200103 season in 
English football, and is based on an agreement between FIFA, UEFA and the EU. It is 
an adjustment to the "Bosman I", by formalising fees for younger players (under the age 
of 24), and a number of other restrictions for these players. Some formal statements 
about length of contract and age of players are agreed on as well (Gerrard, 2002). The 
greatest change is probably the introduction of the so called "transfer windows", which 
is the general time periods when players can be traded between teams (the immediate 
consequence was that almost all changes between teams happen during these time 
periods, and that very few trades are done in the other periods during the season (only in 
special circumstances)). 19 
As mentioned earlier, the null hypothesis is based on Rottenberg's invariance 
proposition, anticipating that competitive balance should be unaffected by changes from 
reserve clause option systems to free agency. The original theory is based on profit 
maximisation, but is, according to Kesenne (1996), also valid for leagues consisting of 
win maximising teams. The discussion below will, therefore, be related to the 
228 An expression used by Schmidt and Berri (2003). 
"`' Sec also www. thcia. com Features EnglishDomestic'Postings 2002/08 22801. htm. For the general 
FIFAtranstcr rules, sec: 
www. Gfä. conl mmdocument atlederation administration/regulations_on_the_Statu _and_transfer_of_Pla 
yers_cn_3 Z4l0. pdi. 
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alternative hypotheses. The alternative hypotheses for the different changes in transfer 
market regulations in the English football league are: 
1893/94 -H1: improved competitive balance from the introduction of the retain-and- 
transfer system - one-sided 
This alternative hypothesis is based on two relations. The first is the general 
opinion (not theoretical), claiming that the reserve clause improves competitive 
balance. Second, as shown earlier in this chapter, Sloane (1971) argues that a 
number of the assumptions in Rottenberg might not be valid in European 
football. 
1963/64 - HI: weakened competitive balance from the change to the option-and-transfer 
system - one-sided 
Based on the arguments used on the alternative hypothesis above, softening the 
transfer market restrictions should have a negative impact on competitive 
balance. 
1978/79 -HI: weakened competitive balance after introducing freedom of contract - 
one-sided 
As for the previous alternative hypotheses, a system that increases the players' 
rights at the end of a contract should further weaken competitive balance. 
1996/97 - HI: improved competitive balance from the international part of Borman I- 
one-sided 
As described earlier in this chapter, the first phase of the Bosman verdict had 
two consequences on the labour market in English football, free agency for 
international transfers within EUtEU-associated members and removed 
limitations of players from the same area. To my knowledge, the consequences 
of international free agency have not been analysed vet, and it is difficult to 
come up with an alternative hypothesis based on any direction (therefore two- 
sided). On the other side, the open border should increase the pool of available 
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talent, which is, according to the Gould hypothesis presented in Schmidt and 
Berri (2003), hypothesised to improve competitive balance (i. e. one-sided). This 
view should be even stronger, related to theoretical analyses of opening the 
labour market, as shown in Dobson and Goddard (2001). The combined effects 
should therefore lead to a one-sided alternative hypothesis - improved 
competitive balance. 
1998/99 - HI: weakened competitive balance as a consequence of the domestic part of 
the Bosman I- one-sided 
The international transfer system is unchanged, while domestic transfer 
regulations change from player reservations to free agency, and should, on the 
basis of the argumentation above, lead to a one-sided alternative hypothesis - 
weakened competitive balance. 
2002/03 - HI: change in competitive balance from Bosman II - two-sided 
The latest major change in the transfer market rule led to only minor changes in 
the relationship between team and player, where the most radical change (in 
practice) is the introduction of the transfer windows. Their effect on competitive 
balance are not analysed yet, and it is difficult to argue if this change will affect 
competitive balance in any direction. 
Maximum Wage 
Professional team sports have also put restrictions on teams' costs, mostly relatecl to 
wages. English football first introduced absolute maximum weekly wages for (single) 
players in 1901. Other European football leagues had even stronger restrictions on 
wages, because of their amateur status, such as in Norway. In the current situation of 
European football, restrictions on wages and costs are much more rare, especially in the 
top divisions. However, this topic is popular among the popular press when teams are 
under financial pressure, due to relatively high wage costs. However, incentive, " to be 
competitive with other leagues, and particularly for the better teams to be able to 
compete in high level on UEFA team tournaments, have probably limited the use of 
wage restrictions in European football. 
I20 
On the other side of the Atlantic, restrictions on costs have become more usual in the 
major leagues from the implementation of the salary cap system in the NBA at the 
beginning of the 1984/85 season (Fort and Quirk, 1995). 230 This salary cap has both a 
ceiling (maximum) and a floor (minimum), so the total wage expenditure for each team 
had to be in that range (see, for example, Dobson and Goddard, 2001; Fort and Quirk, 
1995). According to Andreff and Staudohar (2002), the NFL followed in 1994. In the 
1999-2000 season, the NBA introduced cap on individual player salaries as well. In the 
NHL, salary cap was introduced for the rookies in 1995 (Andreff and Staudohar, 2002; 
see also Staudohar, 1999). 
A justification for introducing maximum wage/salary caps is that the best talent will be 
affordable to all teams (see, for example, Sloane, 1969; Downward and Dawson, 2000), 
and therefore, it will enable small-market teams to be relatively more competitive '23 
1 
and, hence, be able to improve the distribution of playing talent in the league (Sloane, 
1969; Dobson and Goddard, 2001). 
The literature is confusing regarding the introduction of maximum wage in English 
football. Szymanski and Kuypers (1999)232 use 1900 as the starting point for the 
maximum wage. Buraimo et al. (2006, p. 30) apply 1904 as the year when the FA had 
"its sanctioning of a maximum wage.... ". 233 Others use 1901 as the starting point, such 
as Dobson and Goddard (2001) and Morrow (1999). This thesis will follow the latter, 
which is consistent with Green (1953, p. 408), describing the process around the 
introduction of the maximum wage. It was included in the Rules of The Football 
Association (Rule 32) from May 1901. In other words, the maximum wage was 
effective at the start of the 1901/02 season in English football. It lasted until 1961, when 
it was removed after pressure from "the Professional Footballers Association (PFA, the 
230 According to Fort and Quirk, the NBA agreement was signed in April 1983. 
231 Sloane (1969) refers to the Scottish League, where there was no maximum wage. The two Glasgow 
teams, Rangers and Celtic, had up to that time "together won the championship on no less than 41 
occasions. Yet in the case of the Football League, in 51 seasons, no first division club had won the 
championship more than six times, and only two clubs had achieved this record". 
232 See p. 89 and p. 251 in the 2000 edition. 
233 Szymanski and Kuypers (1999, p. 251 in the 2000 edition) claim that: "However, after some wrangling 
the FA finally agreed in 1904 to relinquish financial control of the game, standing back from the 
restrictive arrangements placed on players' transfers and wages. In many ways the FA preferred to stand 
above the marketplace and the League was quite happy to accept the respectability that the FA's 
patronage gave it. " 
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Players' trade union)" (Dobson and Goddard (2001. p. 92). `34 From 1947, a minimum 
wage was also introduced, due to "the National Arbitration Tribunal". According to 
Green (1953), the minimum wage was for players of 20 years or older, and was ý7 
during the season and £5 in the "close season". At the same time, the maximum wages 
rose to £ 12 and £ 10 for the same periods. Sloane (1969) claims that the governing 
bodies in English football intended that the maximum wage system would maintain 
competitive balance at a higher level than otherwise. According to Sloane (1969), the 
consequences of removing maximum wages were that players' average wage increased 
substantially in the following period, but also that the number of players in the whole 
league were reduced by 20 % in the following six seasons. Related to competitive 
balance, Sloane claims that after removing the maximum wage limitation "there has- 
been evidence of increased concentration, with clubs in large population centres 
becoming stronger in terms of both finances and results" (p. 186). Data from Szymanski 
and Kuypers (1999) and Dobson and Goddard (2001) show that: "Between 1961 and 
1974 growth in wages appears to have outstripped growth in revenues among both the 
larger and the smaller clubs, but growth in both revenues and wages was very much 
faster for the larger clubs than for the smaller" (Dobson and Goddard, 2001, p 92). 
The alternative hypothesis that a maximum wage system improves competitive balance, 
is found in Sloane (1969) as well as Fort and Quirk (1995) although the latter also 
includes a system of reverse-order-drafting as part of the argument. The alternative 
hypothesis for maximum wages is one-sided, positive for introducing and negative for 
removing maximum wages. 
6.4.1.2. Changes in Product Market Regulations 
As for many other leagues, regulations in the product market are mainly related to two 
relationships in English football: gate revenue sharing and the distribution of revenues 
from collective sale of broadcasting rights (and other rights). 
"i' This is also described in Nawrat and Hutchings (1998), stating that the maximum %\ agc :\ stem was 
abolished on January 9"' (1961). 
ýýý 
Revenue Sharing on Gate Revenues 
At the very start of the Football League, point 8 in the body of rules stated that (Green. 
1953, p. 127): "Each club shall take its own gate receipts, but shall pay its opponents a 
sum of £12". A fixed amount, equal to all teams, cannot be regarded as revenue sharing. 
since the total effect on the teams' revenues should be zero. In other word;, the English 
Football League started without a significant gate revenue sharing system. 
Gate revenue sharing became part of the sport later, and, according to Szymanski and 
Kuypers (1999), English football had gate revenue sharing between 1920 and 1983, 
based on 20 percent of a net between "minimum entrance fee fixed for each" and "the 
costs of staging the fixture" (p. 265). In addition, the English Football League had a 
"levy on gate receipts" (Morrow, 1999, p. 16), which went "to cover administrative and 
other joint expenses". This levy was four percent of the gate receipts. The percentage 
was reduced to three in 1986, and removed as the Premier League was introduced prior 
to the 1992/93 season (Morrow, 1999). 235 
The traditional opinion is that product market regulations should have a positive 
influence on competitive balance, because of better distribution of revenues among the 
teams in a league. However, theoretically, this view is only partly supported. For 
example, Fort and Quirk (1995) show that revenue sharing of gate receipts should, 
theoretically, have no effects on competitive balance, given profit maximising 
behaviour. In a league with win maximising teams, the theoretical effects are, according 
to Kesenne (various), different, with an expected improvement in competitive balance. 
Since win maximising is at least as realistic as profit maximising during the history of 
English football (Sloane, 1971), the alternative hypothesis is that revenue sharing 
should be expected to have a positive effect on competitive balance in the top division 
of English football. In other words, one-sided tests on both introduction and removal of 
gate sharing (positive for introduction and negative for removing) will be applied in this 
chapter. 
235 This levy on gate receipt is not included in the empirical analyses in this chapter. 
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Revenue Sharing from Collective Sale of Broadcasting Rights 
The current revenue sharing system in English football follows many other leagues in 
Europe, through a system where pooled revenues from sales of broadcasting rights are 
distributed among the teams in the league. From 1967 to 1986, all teams in the English 
Football (divisions one to four) shared these revenues equally (Szymanski and Kuv-l)ers. 
1999; Morrow, 1999). This way of distributing revenues changed in 1986, when the 
First Division received 50 % of the total value, the second division 25 'o, and the 
bottom two 12.5 % each. Within each division, the broadcasting revenues were still 
distributed equally among the teams (Szymanski and Kuypers. 1999). The restructuriml. 
of the English league football, when the FA Premier League broke away from the 
previous Football League system prior to the 1992 93 season, also included the start of a 
change in the sale of the broadcasting rights, as they, for the first time, were sold to "a 
smaller private company", the BSkyB. Interesting, from a competitive balance context, 
are the changes in the distribution mechanism. From this season, only a share 
(approximately 50 %)236 of the revenues from the sale of the broadcasting rights is 
distributed uniformly among all teams in the division (FA Premier League). The rest of 
the revenues were further divided into two equal parts, one on the basis of sporting 
outcome in the given season (based on the final standing), and the other on the basis of 
the number of appearances on TV. This system has been unchanged ever since. 
Revenues from sale of the broadcasting rights on the foreign market are equally 
distributed among the teams (Andreff and Bourg, 2006). 
The general opinion is that more concentrated distribution of the collectively earned 
revenues will weaken competitive balance. Kesenne (2006a, p. 47) claims that "In a 
win-maximization league, revenue sharing always improves the competitive balance 
whatever the specifics of the sharing arrangement. " On the other hand, Szymanski 
(2001,2003c) argues that more performance related distribution of these revenues 
promotes competitive balance. The alternative hypothesis in this chapter follows 
Kesenne, when assuming English football teams to be win maximising, and, hence, that 
more unequal distribution of revenues from sale of broadcasting rights weaken 
competitive balance from the 1992'93 season (one-sided). 
'" SL\ nlanski and Kuv-pcrs (1999) claim that in the 199T98 season, 45 percent of the total rcý enue, from 
the broadcasting rights went to all Premier League teams. ww hile f i\ percent ý\ as distributed among teams 
that are ne\\ lR relegated. Andreff and Bourg (2006) use 50 percent. 
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6.4.2. Structural Changes in the English Top Division 
In the following, a number of changes in tournament and prize structure, which might 
be relevant determinants for competitive balance in English football, are presented. 
The Number of Teams in the League and Relegation Procedures 237 
Already from the very beginning of the English Football League in 1888 89, the 
original rules included possible "punishment" for bad aggregate performance, because 
the bottom four teams at the end of the season had to apply for re-election (Green, 1953): 
Brown, 1995). According to Szymanski and Ross (2000), this system was adopted from 
country cricket and happened even before the league had a second division. Already in 
the original framework of the league, a second-class championship was mentioned 
(Green, 1953). As part of the creation of the Second Division from the 1892,93 season, 
a procedure to allow teams to move between the divisions was established, through 
what was called test-matches, also a term from cricket (Brown, 1995), between the 
bottom three in the first division and top three in the second division. 238 These were the 
equivalent of today's playoff matches. From the 1895/96 season, the bottom two teams 
in the First Division and top two teams in the Second division played test matches. 
According to Brown (1995), the test match system was replaced by the automatic 
promotion/relegation system (still bottom two from the First Division and the top two 
from the Second Division) from the 1898/99 season, because of lack of fairness or 
successfulness by the former. 239 
During the first period of the English football league, the First Division expanded 
several times. From the 1891/92 season, two more teams were added into the league 
(from 12 to 14 teams), which became 16 teams in the following season. The 1898/99 
season had an expansion of two teams. From 1905/06, the First Division consisted of 20 
teams, and this structure lasted until the 1919/20 season, when another two teams were 
23- In addition to the reterences mentioned in the text, also www. rsssi. com is used as source. 
238 See also \v-ww \w-. rsssf. cont cn`gpaul FLA 1892-93. html. 
'ý It is referred to the (second) test match between Stoke and Burnlc,, at the end of the 189- 98 seamn. 
%%-here the teams colluded to achieve a 0-0 match outcome, which gave both teams the right to play in the 
First Di\ ision the next season (en. wikipedia. ore wiki%The_Football_League. see also 
en. wikipedia. org wikii Football_Lea,, ue_Second_Di,, vision and \vwv«. rsssl'. com, engpaul FL. \ 
Q)8. html). 
ýý1 
added into the First Division. 24 Thereafter the tournament structure (2_1 gams and 
automatic relegation for the bottom two teams) was unchanged, until the 1973, '74 
season, when the number of teams automatically relegated increased by one, to three 
teams. This structure was unchanged until the 1986,87 season, when the fourth bottom 
team had to go into relegation-promotion playoff (with the bottom three teams 
automatically relegated). In the following season, the top division in English football 
was reduced to 21 teams. The relegation system from the previous season continued in 
the 1987/88 season and reduced the number of teams to 20 in the 1988,89 season, when 
the bottom three relegated automatically (only) became the standard again. In the 
1990/91 season two teams were relegated (automatically), and in the following season 
(1991 /92) the league returned to the 22 teams with the bottom three relegated 
automatically. This structure continued in the following two seasons, before the 1994 95 
season, when the number of automatically relegated teams increased to four. From the 
1995/96 season onwards the structure has remained unchanged with 20 teams in the FA 
Premier League, and bottom three relegated automatically to the second level division. 
Under conditions of perfect competitive balance, the effects of expansions should be 
neutral. However, if it is possible to rank the teams regarding sporting quality, 
expansions of teams in a top division, with promotion and relegation to a second level 
tier, will mean that a higher number of relatively weaker performing teams will 
participate in the top division. The expansion team(s) is(are) expected to be weaker, and 
not average team(s). Therefore, the alternative hypothesis is the following: 
Hi: Increased number of teams in the division has a negative impact on competitive 
balance in a promotion and relegation system - one-sided. 
Studies such as Szymanski and Ross (2000) and Noll (2002)241 conclude that relegation 
should, in general, have positive effects on competitive balance, when it comes to win 
dispersion. The main determinant is the incentive effects among the lower ranked teams 
to improve (also through increased financial risk-taking behaviour) the sporting quality 
of their squads. The hypothesis is therefore that improved win dispersion can be 
expected, both after the introduction of automatic relegation system in the English 
N This expansion of teams happened with a controversy. where the last team to be included. Arsenal. 
was only number ti\ e in the Second DiN ision in the previous season (1914 15) (Naww rat and HutchingN. 
1998). 
241 See also Noll (2003). 
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football league, as well as when the number of teams to relegate increases. The effects 
on performance persistence might be more difficult to predict, given the way it is 
measured in this thesis. If the promoted teams are of a higher sporting quality than the 
relegating teams, one will expect the short time effect to be positive, when introducing a 
promotion/relegation system. Further, one might argue that the marginal effect of 
including one more team to promote (and relegate) is diminishing, until the team that is 
replaced from the top division performs better than the promoted team. The following 
alternative hypothesis is therefore given: 
HI: Positive effect on competitive balance when increasing the number of teams to 
relegate - one-sided. 
Point Score System 
Prior to the 1981/82 season, another structural change in English football took place, 
when the scoring system was reorganised from the (2,1,0) system into the "modern" 
(3,1,0) point score system, and hence, reduced the value of playing draw matches 
compared to winning. 
The competitive balance measures applied in this chapter are not affected by changes in 
point score system. Therefore, eventually changes in the NSQF ratio, because of 
changes in point-score system, are connected to incentive effects among the teams. This 
is relevant in relation to the recent discussions in the literature (Cain and Haddock, 
2006; Fort, 2007) and in Chapters 3 and 4 in this thesis about effects of measuring 
competitive balance in leagues where draw is a realistic outcome, such as in European 
football. Based on the results from the NHL, where changed point score structure might 
have incentive effects, the same can be related to European football, when changing 
from (2,1,0) to the (3,1,0) system. 242 This is supported by Haugen (2008), finding 
negative effects on competitive balance both theoretically and empirically (win 
dispersion). Following Haugen, the alternative hypothesis is: 
242 Analyses from the NHL are different from English football, for example because a given NHL team 
plays against teams that are not in own division or in own conference, and from incentive effects from 
overtime play (see, for example, Abvrevaya, 2004; Easton and Rockerbie, 2005). Easton and Rockerbie 
further suggest that the "new overtime rule" in the NHL should improve competitive balance through 
better distribution of playing talent. 
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Hl: Negative effects on competitive balance because of changes in point score system - 
one-sided. 
Post-Seasonal Play 
One issue of high public interest in European football over the last years has been the 
introduction of the lucrative UEFA Champions League tournament. It allows the befit 
teams to have a revenue source that is not available for the weaker teams, and hence, 
this tournament might weaken competitive balance in the domestic leagues, because of 
wider within-league revenue distribution. 
By using qualifications for post-seasonal UEFA team tournaments as part of European 
football leagues' prize structures, qualifications to these tournaments can be treated 
more or less analogously to playoffs in the NAML, both when it comes to sporting : end 
financial incentives. 
Qualifications for these international European team tournaments have, in general, 
happened through sporting performance, mainly on basis of the final standings in the 
league. However, performance in the "FA Cup" and the "League Cup" has also led to 
qualification to the UEFA tournaments, as well as "fair play". Most of the rules, when it 
comes to the UEFA team tournaments, are decided outside the "domestic governing 
bodies". This chapter has made a simplification, by only focusing on the UEFA 
Champions Cup/Champions League, 243 partly because of the "complexity" of the 
qualifications for the UEFA Cup (as described above), and not least, the significance of 
the UEFA Champions Cup/Champions League. This is done, even though Cain and 
Haddock (2006), in their footnote 8 (p. 338), claim that the UEFA Cup has a greater 
influence on the NSQF ratio than the UEFA Champions League in regression analyses 
(which are not presented in their article). 
Historically, qualification for the UEFA Champions Cup was limited only to winners of 
the domestic league championship (as well as the winners of the tournament in the 
previous season). Hence the European Cup only affected incentives by increasing the 
value of winning the domestic league championship. This increased value was both 
'" The UEFA Champions Cup (commonly known as the European Cup) was the forerunner of the UEFA 
Champions League. 
ýýý 
sporting (because it allows playing in a tournament of higher prestige) and financial 
(because of expected 24-4 positive financial results from participating in the international 
tournament). Hence, the introduction of the UEFA Champions Cup may have had 
implications for domestic competitive balance. Sportingly, one would, intuitively. 
expect that the intensity of winning the Championship prize would be unaffected by the 
introduction of the Champions Cup, and hence, there was no impact on competitive 
balance, because the Championship was already the ultimate sporting prize to be won in 
the league. However, there might have been longer-run effects if participating (at least 
successfully) had a significant positive effect on these teams' financial situation. Given 
significant positive financial payoff from participating in this European team level 
tournament, one would expect increased investments in sporting squads by the better 
teams, in particular for the big market teams, who have the highest expected 
improvement in players' MRP. 245 The anticipated effects (which eilt increase with the 
financial payoff) on the different dimensions of competitive balance are: 
1. Win dispersion might increase (especially in the long-run) because of incentives for 
stronger teams to further invest in improved playing squads. This effect will be 
higher the stronger drawing power/revenue potential those teams have. Short time 
effects might be related to the sporting level of strong drawing power at the time of 
introduction. 
2. Performance persistence might first be decreased if strong market teams, due to 
(financial) incentives, have to "climb" on the sporting quality rankings. If the big 
market teams are already at the upper part of the league, even the short time effects 
might be rather small. On the other hand, increased risk-taking behaviour as regards 
expenditure on playing talent for increasing the probability of winning the prize and 
failing might create "yo-yo" teams, 246 who perform well but not well enough in 
some seasons, and then might have to spend the next number of seasons to 
"recover" (because of the possible financial requirement for a "fire sale" of players 
and then to build up a "new" team). This might lead to an increased level of 
volatility among some of the teams in the division. 
244 Since the UEFA Champions Cup was a knock out competition, the e\pccted financial eftccts had a 
high level of uncertainty, also for teams from English football. 
'4, NIRP = Marginal Revenue Product. See Scully (1974). 
'"' This terminolog> is usually used about teams moving up and down bet\\ een two divisions in a merit 
hierarchy-. Here, it is applied for teams within a certain division. 
?? 9 
3. It should increase the probability of creating a dynasty for high drawing power 
teams, because the financial reward increases the probability to further invest in 
high sporting quality squads for the best teams. 
The UEFA Champions Cup was reorganised into the UEFA Champions League in the 
1992/93 season. This led to significant increased financial payoffs and also, step bey 
step, to an increased number of teams qualifying from domestic leagues. At the time of 
writing this thesis, the top two teams in the English FA Premier League automatically 
qualify to the first round (i. e. group stage) of the UEFA Champions League. The next 
two teams enter the third qualifying round for the UEFA Champions League. However, 
the likelihood of these two English teams qualifying for the group stage is high, because 
of two elements. The first is a benefit from the seeding system, as a consequence of a 
general high sporting level among the teams from the FA Premier League that have 
participated in the UEFA team tournaments recently, and second, as a relatively high 
income league, the teams from the English FA Premier League are, in general, relatively 
strong competitively. At least two possible outcomes for competitive balance can be 
suggested from the expansion of the UEFA Champions League. First, a higher number 
of teams in the upper part of the sporting quality rank have the opportunity to receive an 
additional significant revenue source, and hence, the distribution of revenues should 
widen. The other is that more of the better teams can increase their probability of 
becoming a continuous participant in the UEFA Champions League. This is also 
confirmed in Hadley et al. (2005), who find that for a team participating in this season's 
playoff, the likelihood for this team to attend next season's playoff tripled, as the 
number of teams qualifying doubled in the MLB. On basis of this discussion, the effects 
on competitive balance, from the introduction of the UEFA Champions League, 
including its expansions, can be hypothesised to be: 
1. When (if) the strong market teams reach the higher positions, increased probability 
for staying there can be expected, because of the more significant positive financial 
payoff from participating in this tournament. In the long run, these teams can 
include revenues from continuously participating in the UEFA Champions League 
with high probability in their budgets, and therefore be able to reach the sporting 
quality threshold season after season. This will increase the difference in -sporting 
quality between these teams on the one hand, and the rest of the teams in the league 
on the other, and, as a consequence, widening the distribution of sporting outcome, 
2'N0 
as is suggested in the discussions by Groot (2008). There should, therefore, be a 
higher probability of finding a "few teams' dynasty" at the top of the league. 24" 
2. The direct consequence of this latter argument might be that it increases the 
performance persistence among the top teams (first tier of teams). However, higher 
financial rewards and a higher number of places for the UEFA Champions League 
qualifications may increase risk-taking behaviour among even more teams, in what 
could be called the second tier of teams in the FA Premier League. The 
consequences can be that the performance volatility from season to season, among 
these teams (second tier), gets higher. 248 This is because they now have increased 
possibility to qualify, but also that greater variance financially can lead to a higher 
degree of changes from season to season. In other words, the effects on performance 
persistence might be more dependent on where the teams are on the "sporting 
ranks". This means that increased performance persistence among the best teams 
can happen simultaneously with a higher level of volatility in the next (second) tier 
of teams. 
3. An interesting expected consequence of increasing the number of teams to qualify 
for the UEFA Champion League might be that the chances of creating a "one team 
dynasty" have weakened in the English FA Premier League. This is because it is not 
only the winner that can win a high amount of prize money, but also the second, 
third and fourth ranked teams. Hence, the financial advantage of winning the 
championship, compared to the closest opponents, has been reduced. It should 
therefore, based on the sporting success, be more difficult for one team to outrun the 
others at the top of the English FA Premier League. 
Another issue to take into account is that participating in a number of parallel 
competitions can increase the probability for injuries and limit the recovering time for 
players after matches, due to a tighter playing schedule. Hence, teams participating in 
UEFA competitions might have to invest in a higher number of high quality players, for 
keeping their level of sporting quality in the domestic league. These effects might slow 
247 Even if a number of these teams do not qualify for the UEFA Champions League, some of them will 
still get a "consolation prize" by qualifying for the UEFA cup. However, the revenues from this 
tournament are usually significantly lower. 
248 For example Leeds United qualified for the UEFA Champions League and got a significant increase in 
revenues, which were used to invest in better playing squad. However, by failing to qualify (together with 
other circumstances, such as "crisis" in the transfer market for football players) the additional costs were 
not met by the expected revenues. The team then had to sell players, which decreased the sporting level of 
the squad, and opened up for other teams to compete for the lucrative places (increased variation of 
sporting performance). 
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down some of the "positive" effects for these teams. as mentioned above, but can also 
increase the gap. Analyses of these issues are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
In a perfectly balanced league, post-season play should not have any effects on 
competitive balance. At the beginning of each season, an equal distribution of sporting 
outcome is expected. However, in a real-world league. one would expect that incentive 
effects in the upper part of the league may increase the win dispersion. The more 
significant the financial value of the prize, the greater incentives, and hence, the weaker 
win dispersion can be expected, as well as increased probability of championship 
concentration. However, the latter might be reduced if the number of teams qualifying 
increases. The general alternative hypotheses for the different changes in the UEFA 
Champions Cup/League in the English top division are therefore: 
HIA: Introduction of the UEFA Champions Cup has a negative effect on competitive 
balance. 
HIB: Extension of the number of teams qualifying for the UEFA Champions League has 
a negative effect on competitive balance, except for championship concentration. 
Since English teams started entering the UEFA Champion Cup, the following four 
periods are identified for the purposes of analysis in this chapter. These are (1) 1955 - 
1996 when the winner of the league qualified (and accepted it241) for the UEFA 
Champions Cup, excluding the seasons where the teams from England were banned 
from these tournaments; (ii) 1996 - 1998, when the top two teams were involved in the 
next season's UEFA Champions League: (iii) 1998 - 2001 when this increased to three 
teams; and (iv) 2001 - present, when a fourth qualification spot was added. It is only in 
the first and the last of these four periods that no other changes have happened at the 
same time. The 1996/97 and 1998/99 changes coincide with transfer market changes 
(international Bosman and domestic Bosman). For the practical purpose of the analyses 
in this chapter, the last team expansion involved in the UEFA Champions League will 
be treated together with the 200103 modification of the transfer system. The alternative 
hypotheses for these effects on competitive balance, from these joint changes are. 
''° Descriptions about English teams to join this competition. can be found in Wal\ in (2000, p. 169--0). 
Sec also ww \v \ý . uefa. com. 
. 
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1996/97: Mixed effects might be expected. where the open labour market can have a 
positive effect on competitive balance, while the increased number of teams to the 
UEFA Champions League has a rather negative effect. HI: Effects on competiti\ e 
balance - to-sided. 
1998/99: The alternative hypothesis is negative, both on the labour market, due to 
domestic free agency, and for the play-off, because of the increased number of teams 
that have the possibility to qualify for the UEFA Champions League. The following H 
is given: Negative effects on competitive balance from the 1998 99 changes - one- 
sided. 
2002/03 (2001/02): While the increased number of teams that might qualify for the 
UEFA Champions League will have a negative alternative hypothesis, the alternative 
hypothesis for the changed rules in the transfer market is two-sided. Putting these 
effects together will give the following Hi: Negative effects on competitive balance for 
these changes jointly - one-sided. 
Sporting Structure 
One of the more radical changes in the playing of football happened in 1925, when the 
three-player offside rule was changed into a two-player offside rule (FIFA. com). 250 
Walvin (2000) indicates two effects from the offside rule change that might be of 
interest in the context of competitive balance. First, the number of goals increased 
considerably, and second, as a consequence of this change, the 'stopper' centre-half 
was devised. This in turn led to tactical plans to by-pass the huge men who came to 
dominate the centre of the pitch" (p. 138-9). 2 1 
Considering the number of goals in an average match, the increase is highly significant 
for all three periods analysed below. From the season before to the season after the 
introduction, the average number rose from 2.58 to 3.69, an increase of around 43 
percent. Palacios-Huerta (2004) finds this to be a structural break in the time series. 
250 According to Nawrat and Hutchings (1998), the new offside rule %% is implemented in the English 
Football League from the 192 '26 season. 
251 Nawrat and Hutchings (1998) show that the Arsenal pla\ er Charlie Buchan argued für changing the 
tactical system, from the 2-1-5 to the 3- 3-4 system. 
2 
Table 6.2: The average number of goals per match before and after changing the offside 
rule prior to the 1925/26 season 
3-seasons 5-seasons 10-seasons 
Offside 25/26 Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
- Mean 2.561 3.706 2.628 3.715 2.790 3.675 
- Variance 0.006 0.011 0.012 0.009 0.044 0.031 
- t-value 14.922*#* 16.892*; # 10.217"* 
- -value one-s 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- Significant on one percent level. 
To my knowledge, the relationships between the number of goals scored in football 
matches and competitive balance are not very much analysed in the literature of sport 
business and economics. However, a recent contribution by Groot (2008) looks at goal 
scoring in this context. Groot claims that (p. 34): "Perhaps the most important feature of 
football contributing to CB is the quite low average number of goals scored...... 
Further, Groot refers to Ryder (2004a, p. 7; 2004b, p. 16-17), and claims that (p. 35): "a 
higher scoring context gives a better winning `resolution', while in a low scoring 
context, a superior team suffers more ties and losses due to bad luck than in a high 
scoring context". Groot claims that the reduction in the number of goals scored over 
time in the English top division has reduced the negative effects on competitive balance 
from an increased divergence in sporting quality among the teams. 
Additionally, the tactical change might be linked to the competitive balance literature. 
As is shown in the NAML, a reason why the NBA has a weaker competitive balance 
than the other leagues, might be related to the special type of players, or as described in 
Schmidt and Berri (2003), from a "small pool of talent" (p. 698). 2'2 If a player from 
such a limited pool of talent is more significant in the play after the changed offside 
rule, it might weaken competitive balance, since the MRP for these players will 
increase, and hence, they will be more demanded by the strong drawing power teams. 2 
On basis of this discussion, the alternative hypothesis for the effects on competitive 
balance, after the changes in the offside rule, is that: HI: The changes in offside rules 
weaken competitive balance - one-sided. 
"`` See also footnote 19 at page 698 in Schmidt and Berri (2003). 
Maximum wages and retain and transfer rules might weaken this effect, at least if the owners are 
maximising wins. 
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Other Factors 
Kesenne (various) shows effects on competitive balance from different team objectives. 
For example, competitive balance in a win maximising league is worse than in a profit 
maximising league. It might be that team objectives have changed during the anal% sed 
periods, and that changes might have happened differently across teams. These factors 
are difficult to include in the analyses of competitive balance in this chapter. The 
traditional view, as shown in Sloane (1971), is that sporting success is an important part 
of European football teams' objective function (at page 136 in Sloane), that also 
includes average attendance, health of the league and profit, subject to a 'given level of 
profit. However, during the 1990s, a number of teams from the FA Premier League 
were registered at the London Stock Exchange. One would expect these teams to be 
relatively more focused on financial performance (Gerrard, 2005). More recently, 
private owners have bought, and also removed some teams from the stock market. 
These team owners might have objectives that are less financially driven (at least at the 
team level, even if a total portfolio objective can be more related to joint profit 
maximisation), such as the "sportsman-owner effect" (Vrooman, 1997). 2 4 At the time 
of writing this thesis, it might very well be that the objective functions among some of 
the rich owners having taken over teams in England are more related to Sloane's (1971) 
suggestion, than pure profit maximisation. 
Another question that is difficult to fully include in this study is whether 
commercialisation of the football market affects competitive balance. The English top 
division has at least gone through changes, such as described in Andreff and Staudohar 
(2002) about the SSSL- and MCMMG-models. The increased level of money into the 
game from the commercial side of football has changed the financial situation in the 
English top division, also for non-TV revenues. The question is whether bigger teams 
have a relatively higher potential on payoff from matchday and commercial revenues 
(i. e. sponsorship, merchandising and other venue revenues), and consequently that this 
will increase the revenue divergence among the teams in the league. However, by 
including a variable for the foundation of the FA Premier League (1992), some of the 
effects described above can be included (and just strengthen the one-sided alternative 
hypothesis about weakened competitive balance), even if Koning (2000) show' that the 
'54 Sec Cairns et al. (1986) and Gerrard (2005) for literature review on objective function-, in profe'>ional 
team sports. 
ýý5 
effects of introducing shirt sponsorship in Dutch football from the 1981 82 season has 
not significantly affected competitive balance, but rather the general absolute quality of 
playing performance. On the other hand, Goossens and Kzsenne (2007) show 
theoretical effects on large market teams to be more dominant in a win maximising 
league after introduction of broadcasting and sponsorship revenues, when they are 
distributed in favour of these teams. According to Goossens and Kesenne, introducing 
the UEFA Champions League, together with an open labour market, further increases 
this domination. 
Other changes in sporting structure might also have effects on competitive balance. 
Gaviria (2000) focuses on the relationship between the popularity of more defensive 
play in the 1960s and negative shifts in the number of goals scored in England, Spain 
255 and Italy. The back passing rule, introduced in 1992, increased the effective time the 
ball is in play with about ten percent (Palacios-Huerta, 2004). Analysing these changes 
and effects on competitive balance are beyond the limit of this thesis, as is the role of 
referees in the context of competitive balance (Groot, 2008). 
6.4.3. Competitive Balance and Changes in Regulations and 
Tournament/Prize Structure in the English Top Division 
In this section, competitive balance is computed for all seasons (until 2005/06) in the 
English top division. The NSQF ratio and the SRCC are applied to calculate 
competitive balance shown in figure 6.1, which also includes an overview over time for 
changes in regulations and tournament structure, apart from changes in the number of 
teams and the variations in teams to relegate in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Below, figure 6.1 covers the entire sample of seasons in the top division of English 
football from the start in 1888! 89. It contains two Y-axes. The left hand side reflects the 
value for the NSQF ratio, while the Y-axis on the right hand side reflects the values for 
the SRCC. Lower values for both measures indicate improved competitive balance. 
Interpreting the overviews from the figure, it looks like the first period, after 
establishing the First Division, had a weaker competitive balance. while the era of 
'ýý Sec ww ww ww-. tifa. comiclassic football hiton lawihistor. laww-3. html. 
6 
maximum wages shows an improvement. Thereafter, especially after the Second World 
War, the general level of competitive balance seems to have become weaker, with the 
period after the relaxation of the labour market restrictions in the first part of the 1960s 
having a clear negative trend. Negative effects also seem to be the case in the period 
after the creation of the FA Premier League, which includes changes in the financial 
situation, the broadcasting exposure, the various transfer market changes, as well as the 
increased number of teams participating in the UEFA Champions League. 
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Removing revenue sharing does not seem to have negative effects on competitive 
balance, it looks rather positive. It might be that after a couple of seasons the 
performance persistence was reduced, after the increased number of teams to relegate. 
There is a positive correlation between the two measures of competitive balance. The 
correlation coefficient for the whole sample is 0.493, while it is slightly lower in an 
"after Second World War" sample period (0.467). These results indicate that variations 
in competitive balance are tending to go in the same directions for both dispersion and 
persistence. 
Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics on the NSQF ratio and the SRCC in the English top 
division 
Descriptive NSQF ratio SRCC 
data Whole per After SWW Whole p er After SWW 
CB 1.282 1.407 0.375 0.460 
Std dev 0.289 0.252 0.205 0.167 
Minimum 0.642 0.858 -0.070 0.109 
Maximum 1.992 1.992 0.777 0.777 
Correlation 0.493 
Correlation 0.467 
Descriptive statistics for the two measures of competitive balance in table 6.3 show that 
win dispersion is wider and performance persistence is higher in the after SWW sample, 
indicating weakened competitive balance over time. This is consistent with Groot 
(2008). Moreover, for both measures, the highest level (weakest competitive balance) is 
found in the latest period, while the minimum points (best balanced) are found in the 
first part. 
In this thesis, HHI has been measured, using ten season periods as base. If the same 
periods are applied to the NSQF ratio and the SRCC measures of competitive balance, it 
could be possible to compare all three dimensions of competitive balance highlighted in 
this thesis over time. This is done by comparing ten-seasons moving average of NSQF 
ratio and SRCC, with the ten-season HHI. The results, indexing the last calculation to 
100 (because of easier comparison to the Norwegian league later in this chapter), from 
the after Second World War sample are shown graphically in figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2: Ten-season moving average for the NSQF ratio, SRCC and HHI in the post 
SWW period of the English top division 
For the indexed values of competitive balance, the positive coefficients for all three 
dimensions are all highly significant. However, there is more variation around the line 
for the HHI, than for the two others. Summarised, the trend after the Second \Vorld War 
has been towards weakened competitive balance for all three dimensions. 
As is indicated in figure 6.2, the correlation between the moving average calculations 
2 for the different dimensions of competitive balance is relatively high. '' This is 
particularly proved for the correlation between the NSQF ratio and SRCC, with a 
coefficient just above 0.9, reflecting moving average of these two dimensions to a very 
large degree to fluctuate in the same direction over time. The correlation between these 
competitive balance dimensions with championship concentration is smaller, about 0.5 
(the NSQF ratio is 0.48 and the SRCC is 0.53). 
The expectations that the HHI will show improvement after the extensions of the UEFA 
Champions '251 seem to 
be supported at the end of the sample time period for the 
The ten-season mo\ ing average on Kendall's T in Groot (2200S) has a relativel\ similar pattern as the 
SRC'C. 
Compared to the Norwegian league. ha\ ing a one team dý nast\ \\-here the moncý from the UEFA 
Champions League participation has been an important factor for continuing the sporting performance of 
the particular teams, the explanation seems to he realistic. 
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English top division. In other words, it might be that decisions outside a domestic 
league's governing body, have significant relevance for both competiti,. C balance in all 
the three dimensions used in this chapter, as well as for the competitive intensity at the 
upper part of the league. 
6.4.4. Two Sample t-ratio Analysis of Competitive Balance 
The next analyses follow the "first generation" tests of competitive balance effects from 
changes in regulations from NAML, applying simple t-ratio analyses for comparisons. 
Different time periods are applied. Short term effects are measured by using three 
seasons before and after the changes. Medium term period is reflecting the five season 
average competitive balance around the time for changes, while these periods are 
increased to ten seasons in the long term analyses. The latter analyses also include the 
HHI, for comparing concentration ratio for the championship winners. 
6.4.4.1. Results 
The results are presented in the tables below. 
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6.4.4.2. Discussions - Changes in Regulations 
Labour Market Changes 
Maximum Wages 
A problem when analysing the effects of maximum wages on competitive balance is 
that of separating the effects from those of other changes occurring around the same 
time. The automatic relegation system was established only three seasons prior to the 
introduction of the maximum wage in 1901. Just two years after removing maximum 
wages, the transfer market restriction was modified. These events have to be taken into 
account when interpreting the t-ratio tests for the effects of maximum wages in 
competitive balance in English football. From the t-ratio tests, the short-time and 
medium-time effects of introducing maximum wages seem to differ between the two 
competitive balance methods, primarily applied in this chapter. While only small 
changes can be found on the dispersion of sporting outcome, performance persistence 
seems to have increased (as is reflected by negative t-ratio in this analysis). In other 
words, it does not change the relative sporting quality between the teams in general, but 
it increases the probability of continuing at the relative same level of ranking as before. 
One explanation could be that players may have less financial incentive to change 
teams, when there is a limit on wages, and on the other side, also when the strict transfer 
system is taken into account, teams may be more able to resist the financial pressures to 
sell players. In a free market, only the richest teams might be able to keep their best 
players. 
The longer-term effects on win dispersion are positive and significant, while 
performance persistence is not significantly affected. As a consequence of the 
arguments above, the maximum wage (together with the retain-and-transfer system) 
might make it more difficult for big market teams to be dominant, and hence, narrowing 
the distribution of sporting output among the teams in the league. The effects on 
championship concentration, from introducing, maximum wages. seem to he a much 
better distribution of championship winners. 
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When removing maximum wages, a similar pattern for the NSQF ratio can be found. 
The short term effect is rather small (with a positive sign). while the long term effect i, 
a strongly significant weakened competitive balance. The SRCC also indicates 
decreased competitive balance (significant). Are these findings a result of more "power 
to the bigger market teams? Note that the HHI indicates a (slightly) improved 
distribution of championship winners. 
Transfer Systems 
Retain-and-transfer system 
The English Football League went from a free agency system to a player reservation 
system, when the retain-and-transfer system was introduced. The related t-tests are only 
calculated for short- and medium time periods, because these changes took place prior 
to the sixth season of the Football League. The calculations indicate that the change in 
transfer system did not have any immediate positive effect on competitive balance. 
Measured by the SRCC, the effect on competitive balance was actually negative over 
the shortest period. This result can reflect that teams could easier hold on to their better 
players, and hence, reduce the overall variance in rankings from season to season, at 
least in the short run. However, the medium term effects for the SRCC are insignificant. 
while the NSQF ratio shows signs of improving the competition among the teams in the 
league, and therefore, at a ten percent significance level, the invariance proposition is 
rejected. 
Option-and-transfer system 
As pointed out earlier, the transfer system in English football had a modification only 
two years after the elimination of the maximum wage system. The effects on 
competitive balance measured by SRCC are negative, regardless of time period, while it 
is only in the long-run that the negative effect can be found on the NSQF ratio. 
The changes in 
labour market policy in the first part of the 1960. ß 
In general, the effects of the changes in labour market policy in the early 1960,, (based 
on analyses before the elimination of maximum wages compared to the period after the 
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modification of the transfer system) are unconditionally negative for competitive 
balance measured by the SRCC. while this effect is only valid in the long run for the 
NSQF ratio. 
Sloane (1969) claims that after the Eastham case: The essence of the system.. . remain. 
namely that in order to obtain the services of a player with another club, a club must pay 
a transfer fee to the club with which the player is currently registered-though the 
transfer fee in the event of a dispute may be modified or quashed by either of the aboý c- 
mentioned bodies" (p. 187). If the modifications of the transfer regulations, by going 
from the retain-and-transfer system to the option-and-transfer system, were only minor, 
it is the elimination of maximum wages that is the expected significant driver in relation 
to changes in competitive balance. Given these analyses, it seems like maximum wages 
(at least together with restrictive transfer market) had positive effects on competitive 
balance. Only one measure does not confirm this conclusion, the HHI, when removing 
the maximum wages. 
The Michie and Oughton's index of competitive balance (C5ICB) might be used to 
analyse whether worsened win dispersion, as indicated by the NSQF ratio, can (partly) 
be explained by improved relative performance at the top of the league (top fiv'c teams). 
The results based on C5ICB measure in Table 6.7 follow the NSQF ratio and suggest 
that the long term negative influence of relaxing labour market restrictions coincides 
with an increased concentration at the top of the league. 
Table 6.7: Labour market changes in English football at the beginning of the 1960s and 
the C5ICB 
Long term Medium term Short term 
C5ICB 1951/52- 1963/64- 1956/57- 1963/64- 19', 8t59- 1963' 64- 
1960/61 1972,73 1960/61 1967/68 1960 61 1965; 66 
Mean 1.250 1.317 1.294 1.297 1.281 1.286 
Variance 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 
t-value -2.925*** -0.124 -0.133 
p-value 0.005 0.452 0.450 
one-sided 
-11 Significant on one percent level. 
l4v 
Freedom-of-contract 
The effects on competitive balance, from introducing the "freedom of contract" s}stem. 
seem to be significantly negative on performance persistence in the short and medium 
term, but also related to the effects on the concentration of championship winners 
(mainly because of the Liverpool FC dominance). The effects on the NSQF ratio are 
insignificant for all time periods. In other words, it is only the «win dispersion measure 
that confirms the theoretical hypothesis of changes in the transfer market (the invariance 
proposition). One possible explanation is that the relative differences among the teams 
are relatively unaffected by these changes, while the performance persistence increases 
significantly, especially in the shorter period of time. 
Other changes in transfer market policy 
The next major changes in labour market policy in English football came after the 
Bosman verdict. These effects are discussed together with the increased number of 
teams to the UEFA Champions League later in this section. 
Product Market Changes 
Gate sharing 
Even though the negative t-value for the SRCC in the long run is higher than unit, the 
effects on competitive balance, from introducing revenue sharing, are rather small. 
These insignificant results are consistent with general theories, assuming a profit 
maximising regime (see, for example, Quirk and Fort, 1992; Fort and Quirk, 1995). 
However, they might be surprising, since in a win maximising regime, the effects are 
expected to be positive on competitive balance (Kesenne, various). 
Also when removing revenue sharing, the effects on competitive balance are 
insignificant, even though there might be some short time negative effects on the NSQF 
ratio and the SRCC, as they have t-values higher than one. The latter is expected in a 
league with win maximising teams. Apart from improved HHI, which is opposite of the 
hypothesis in a win maximising regime, no long run effect on competitive balance can 
be found from removing revenue sharing. 
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The creation of the FA Premier League (including changes in broadcasting revenue 
sharing systems and the general structure of the teams ' revenues) 
The creation of the FA Premier League, including changes in the distribution system 
from the collective sale of the broadcasting sales and other financial changes during this 
period, had no effect on competitive balance, when it comes to win dispersion and 
performance persistence, at least in the short-term periods. There might be 
(insignificant) signs of increased persistence in the long run. Moreover, the HH I 
indicates increased championship concentration (Manchester United domination) after 
the reorganisation of the league. 
6.4.4.3. Discussions - Tournament and Prize Structure Changes 
Test matches 
The short run effects on competitive balance, from introducing test matches, are small. 
For the NSQF ratio, the medium term is also calculated, and supports on ten percent 
level the alternative hypothesis, that relegation has a positive incentive effect on 
competitive balance. 
Relegation policy 
Introducing automatic relegation in 1898/99 had positive effects on competitive 
balance. For the SRCC, the short-term effects are highly significant, while the long term 
is only weakly significant. For the NSQF ratio, positive effects are significant in 
medium and long term periods. These results follow, to a large degree, the suggestions 
in the literature about the positive effects on competitive balance after introducing a 
relegation/promotion system. These results also suggest that incentive effects are bigger 
when automatic relegation compared to test matches/relegation playoff. 
Increasing the number of teams relegated in 1973/74 has also improved competitive 
balance, both by the NSQF and the SRCC measures. This is especially reflected in the 
medium time period. However, these results are not found in all dimensions of 
,; o 
competitive balance, since the concentration of the championship winners, measured by 
the HHI, indicates increased concentration (Liverpool domination in the post-period). 
However, the latter result is not expected to be related to the number of teams to 
relegate, since relegation should only affect incentives at the lower part of the division. 
By increasing the number of teams to automatically relegate by one (= 50 %), the 
expected effect should be an even harder fight for survival among the bottom half teams 
of the division, and hence, lead to decreased NSQF ratio (improved win dispersion). On 
the other hand, the more teams to automatically relegate, the higher probability that the 
bottom team(s) will be helplessly behind, and hence having lesser incentives to play 
well than if fewer number of teams were to be relegated (further away from the 
threshold). 
In addition, the improvement in competitive balance, measured by the NSQF ratio, can 
be a result of that the third best team in the second level division has a sporting quality 
that is better than the third least in the top division. If that is the case, one would expect 
the dispersion of sporting outcome to be narrowed in the following season, ceteris 
paribus. The improved SRCC might indicate that even the third best team in the second 
level division is performing relatively better than what the third least did before, or that 
the increased fear of relegation increases risk-taking behaviour for avoiding relegation. 
The latter might increase the volatility in performance over seasons. 
Offside 
The immediate effects of changing the offside rule on competitive balance seem to be 
positive (highly significant for both measures), totally rejecting the alternative 
hypothesis. In other words, the distribution of outcome narrows, and the performance 
variance for the teams also increases, as is the opposite of the suggested tentative 
hypothesis. For the longer period, the NSQF ratio is most influenced (positively) from 
the changes in offside rules, while the positive effects on the SRCC decrease and 
disappear over time. Differences between short and long run effects might be related to 
learning effects from the new system. The championship winner concentration is higher 
in the period after the changes in the offside rules, mainly because of Arsenal having a 
golden period in the first half of the 1930s. 
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Point score system 
Changing the point score system seems to have a short run positive effect, both on the 
SRCC and NSQF ratio, while the long run effects are minimal for both measures. One 
would expect these changes to be related to changes in incentives, at least in the short 
run. A different explanation can be that the short run effects are related to uncertainty 
about how to play efficiently, given the new system. Learning effects ýti ill reduce these 
uncertainties over time, and one would therefore expect these differences to weaken in 
the long run, as is also confirmed by the empirical results. At least on short time. the 
theoretical and empirical results of increased win dispersion in Haugen (2008) are 
strongly rejected. 
UEFA Champions Cup 
Establishing the UEFA Champions Cup does not have significant effects on competitive 
balance, except from the long run win dispersion t-ratio analysis for the NSQF ratio. In 
general, if there are some effects, they are negative for the vin dispersion and rather 
positive for the competitive balance measured by the SRCC. The HHI suggests only a 
minor change in championship concentration after the introduction of the post-season 
play. 
A measure testing for increased relative sporting quality among the better teams after 
the championship winner also qualified for the UEFA Champions Cup, may be done by 
applying the Michie and Oughton's C5ICB. The pre period and the post period 
for this 
simple analysis are of equal size, and are not affected by other regulatory and regime 
changes. Therefore, the cut off point is the season before the maximum wages are 
removed. 
T, ihl., A Q" intrniiit'tinn of the t JFFA Champions Cup and the 
C5ICB 
Pre and post UEFA Champions Cup 
CSICB 1949%50-1954 55 1955'56-1960,61 
Mean 1.220 1.277 
Variance 0.001 0.003 
t-value -2.119*' 
-value one-sided 
0.030 
Significant on five percent level. 
2; 2 
These results support the (alternative) hypothesised effects, as the concentration in the 
top of the English Football League increased after the introduction of the UEF. -\ 
Champions Cup. 
6.4.4.4. Discussions - Combination of Transfer Market Changes and Expansions of 
Teams to the UEFA Champions League 
1996/97 - International Bosman and two teams to the UEFA Champions League 
The next major changes in labour market policy came as a consequence of the Borman 
verdict, when international transfers for "out of contract" players were without financial 
compensations, as well as opening the labour market for players from the EU and "EU 
associated" countries. At the same time, the number of teams qualifying for the UE: F. -A 
Champions League expanded by one for the teams in the English FA Premier League. 
The t-ratios show different effects on competitive balance, as a consequence of these 
changes, depending on time for the NSQF ratio analyses. In the long run, all measures 
of competitive balance go in the same direction, towards weakened competitive balance. 
This is consistent with Groot (2008), analysing changes in win dispersion and seasonal 
concentration of performance for the best team(s) over approximately the same period. 
However, the long run effects might be affected by other changes/modifications in this 
period. In the short run, competitive balance measures by the NSQF ratio improve. 
Theoretically, this can be explained by going from a nearly closed to a much more open 
labour market (see, for example, Dobson and Goddard, 2001) and the Gould hypothesis. 
However, this seems to be a shorter effect on the distribution of sporting outcome, but 
the changes in rankings from season to season decrease. The other element is the 
increased number (from 1 to 2) of teams in the UEFA Champions League, which might 
also have a negative effect on the NSQF ratio. 
1998/99 - Domestic Bosnian and a new expansion in the number o/'teams to qualifiý 
f or 
the UEF. 4 Champions League 
The expectations for the NSQF ratio might be proved by the 1998/99 season changes. 
where also the shorter term effects seem to be negative, especially for the SRCC. The 
long-run effects are highly significant negative for both measures. In other words. the 
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effects on competitive balance. from introducing domestic free agency and increasing 
the number of teams to UEFA Champions League, are negative, both for win dispersion 
and performance persistence, and in particular, in the long run. However, theoretically, 
one can say that the domestic Bosman should not affect competitive balance (invariance 
proposition), so it might be the UEFA Champions League effect that is the driving 
factor for these negative effects on competitive balance, as is argued in for example the 
discussions in Groot (2008). 
2002/03 - Bosman 11 and the 2001/02 expansion of teams to UEF-1 Champions Lea(rie 
The combination of modifying the transfer system (more restricted for players under 24 
and the introduction of the transfer windows), together with increased number of teams 
to the UEFA Champions League, had a minor effect on short time competitive balance. 
However, it can be found in the medium time period, when the NSQF ratio sug`(Tests a 
negative effect. These effects are the opposite for performance persistence. 
Possible explanations for the different effects can be that further expansion of teams to 
the UEFA Champions League increase budgets for the best teams, and ceteris paribus, 
widening the gap between these teams and the weakest teams. This will increase the 
dispersion of sporting success, and hence, weaken competitive balance measured by the 
NSQF ratio. On the other side, the increased number of places for the UEFA 
Champions League might increase the probability that a higher number of teams are 
taking a more increased risk-taking behaviour for reaching top four in the league, and 
the teams that do not reach this goal, might weaken their potential ability the next 
season (getting a set back). Further, reduced persistence from season to season might 
appear if these high performance potential teams come back to their initial level later. 
Another case to analyse is the possible effects of introducing a relatively restricted 
transfer windows system. On the basis of the data sample in this thesis, it is difficult to 
pull out effects from the transfer windows system. This is therefore a task beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
The interpretations from the t-test analyses of the English top division are that by 
weakening the labour market restrictions and increasing the number of teams to the 
UEFA Champions League, the distribution of sporting outcome seems to be v ider and 
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the performance persistence increases. On the other side, by increasing the rate of teams 
to relegate, the effects on the two dimensions of competitive balance to move in 
opposite directions. The distribution of championship winners seems to be relativ clv. 
unaffected by these changes. 
6.4.5. Time-Series Analysis of Competitive Balance in English Football 
Following Maxcy (2002) and Maxcy and Mondello (2006), ordinary least square (OLS) 
methods in time-series data are applied to analyse the effects that regulatory regimes 
and structural issues have on the dependent variable, competitive balance. Competitive 
balance is measured by the NSQF ratio and the SRCC. These measures of competitive 
balance are exactly the same as Maxcy (2002) uses for the MLB, and `laxcy and 
Mondello (2006) apply for the other NAML. 
Because of the limitations of this thesis, only one model will be used, which can be 
called a regime model, where changes in regulations and tournament/prize structure are 
specified by variables. Other models could also be relevant, such as period models, 
where different periods are analysed by using dummy variables, based on different time 
periods (more related to the t-ratio analyses above), and structural break point analysis, 
related to recent analyses in the NAML by Lee and Fort (2005) and Fort and Lee 
(2007). 
The analyses for English football will be made on basis of two time periods. The first 
contains all seasons (1888/89-2005/06), while the other only concentrates on the after 
Second World War seasons (1946/47-2005/06). 
Since the t- and the F-tests are based on the assumptions that the "stochastic process has 
a stationary (i. e. time-independent) probability distribution" (Gerrard. 2000a, p. 1). 
testing for stationarity for the dependent variable is necessary if the time-series 
regression analysis is to be classified as valid. Greene (1993) defines weakly 
stationarity, or covariance stationarity, as a situation where a stochastic process, y,, has 
the requirements that E[y, ] is independent oft, \'ar[v, ] is a constant, independent oft, 
and that Cov[y,, y; ] is a function of t-s and not oft or s. 
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Recent research in sport economics in related topics have focused on stationarity in timt 
series of competitive balance in NAML (e. g. Maxcy and Mondello, 2006. Lee and Fort. 
2005; Fort and Lee, 2007), in addition to attendance analyses, such as in Schmidt and 
Berri (2001,2002). Following Fort and Lee (2006), the first step, wehen using sport time 
series approach, should therefore be to determine if the time series are stationary or not. 
Consistent with their figure 1 (p. 410) about the "Time Series Approach Schematic". an 
ordinary unit root test is applied to suggest if the competitive balance variable for the 
different leagues is stationary. 
Maxcy and Mondello use the Phillips-Perron test (PP) for unit roots on competitive 
balance in the NBA, NFL and NHL, and find that competitive balance from 1951-2004 
in these leagues is characterised by stationarity, both measured by the NSQF ratio and 
the SRCC, by strongly significantly rejecting the unit-root hypothesis. Lee and Fort 
(2005) find that the unit-root hypothesis can be rejected, both for the AL and the NL in 
competitive balance analyses of the MLB, measured by the NSQF ratio and the tail 
likelihood. In addition to the PP-test, they also use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (. -\DF) 
unit root test (with constant and time trend). The same unit-root testing methods are 
used in Fort and Lee (2006) for testing the same competitive balance measures in the 
other major leagues. Only one test does not reject the null hypothesis about unit-root, 
the ADF for the LTL in the NFL. The ADF tests allow for more complicated lag 
structures, trends and seasonal effects than the basic Dickey-Fuller test (DF), while the 
PP procedure tends to be applied if there are possible structural breaks. This thesis only 
uses the basic unit-root tests based on the DF for the different periods and measures of 
competitive balance (see Doornik and Hendry, 2006a). This is done because there are 
no indications of unit roots (see table below), and that there is no evidence of structural 
breaks (see, for example, Hendry and Juselius, 2000; Enders, 2004). 
Table 6.9: Unit-root tests for the time series of competitive balance in the English top 
division 
Dependent 
variable 
Time period t-value Critical 5% Critical 1°o 
NSQF Whole period - 5.737 - 2.889 - 3.493 
AfterSWW -4.586 -2.911 -3.544 
SRCC Whole period - 6.597 - 2.889 - 3.49', 
afterS"AV -5.69 -2.912 -x. 546 
The unit-root tests suggest that unit-root on all dependent variables, independent of 
times, can be rejected on one per cent level, and hence, anticipating : tationarity for all 
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of them. These competitive balance measures will therefore be the dependent variables 
in the models presented below. 
The right hand side variables, except lagged dependent variables in some cases. have 
small degree of variation, as they are binary or are related to numbers that chan'-'e 
seldom, such as the number of teams in the top division. Therefore, instead of testing 
each of those variables for unit-root, it is more appropriate to test if the linear 
combination of them is stationary, or that the series are co-integrated (see, for example, 
Hendry and Juselius, 2000; Enders, 2004). This will be done for each regression below. 
Whole Period Model (1888/89-2005/06) 
Independent variables: 
Max wage - This is a dummy variable for the period with maximum wage - 1901, O2- 
1960/61. 
Retain - This is a dummy variable for the period when the retain-and-transfer system 
existed in English football - 1893/94-1962/63. 
Option - This is a dummy variable for the period with the "transfer and option" transfer 
system - 1963/64-1977/78. 
Freedom - This is a dummy variable for the period with the "freedom of contract" 
transfer system - 1978/79-1995/96. 
Post-Bosman - This is a dummy variable for the post-Bosman period - 1996 97- 
2005/06. 
Reg 1996 - This is a dummy variable for the seasons 1996/97 and 1997,9K, and it 
reflects three issues of relevance; the introduction of the international free 
agency, the opened labour market within EU/EU-associated countries, and the 
increased number of teams to the UEFA Champions League (from one to two 
teams). 
Reg 1998 - This is a dummy variable for the seasons 1998,99,1999 00,2000'0 1 and 
2001/02. It will take into account the domestic free agency system and the 
increased number of teams to the UEFA Champions League (from two to three 
teams). 
Reg2002 - This is a dummy variable for the seasons from '002' 
'03 and onwards. and is 
reflecting two changes of relevance for this thesis; the introduction of the FIFA 
transfer rules (that includes the transfer wti indows), and the increased number of 
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teams to the UEFA Champions League (from three to four teams, which 
happened in the previous season - the 2001, "02 season). 
Gateshare - This is a dummy variable for the period with gate re% enue sharing (80-20) - 
1919/20-1982/83. 
FAPL - This is a dummy variable for the period after the formation of the FA Premier 
League - 1992/93-2005/06. 
Points - This is a dummy variable for the period with (3,1., 0) score system - 19S182- 
2005/06. 
Teamnumb - This is a variable reflecting the number of teams each season. 
TestPO - This is a variable reflecting the number of teams from the top division that are 
included in "test matches" or relegation playoff matches. 
AutoREL - This is a variable reflecting the number of teams to automatically relegate. 
CLparticipants - This is a dummy variable equal to 1, if the English league has team(s) 
to qualify for the UEFA Champions Cup or UEFA Champions League. 
CLexclusion - This is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the seasons when English 
football teams were banned from the European football cups at team level - 
19885/86-1989/90. 
More about the UEFA Champions League/Champions Cup 
In the analyses in this chapter, winning automatically and the qualification place for the 
UEFA Champions League will not be divided (i. e. 2+2 will be treated as four teams). A 
long tradition has been that the holder automatically qualified for the UEFA Champion 
Cup. Different rules apply for the UEFA Champion League, such as the situation that 
occurred when Liverpool won the tournament in 2005, but did not qualify automatically 
to defend the title the following season. UEFA recognised the anomaly and gave special 
dispensation for five English teams to qualify for the UEFA Champions League that 
season. 263 These extra teams to qualify for the tournaments are not taken into account in 
the analyses in this chapter. 
similar situation occurred in 1999/00 involving Real Madrid (w'ww%%. rss f. com tahless span00. htm1). 
In that case, the Spanish football authorities operated the rile that Real Madrid would replace the fourth 
best team in the Spanish league in the Champions League. According to the Regulations of the UEFA 
Champions League 2007/08. the title holder is guaranteed a place in the group play. ', cc Article I for 
more about effects on play in Europe for other teams in the given association 
(ww ww \\ . ucfa. cotn new stiles 
19071 . pdt). 
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After Second World War Model (1946/47-2005/06) 
Relevant independent variables that differ from the "whole period" model: 
Max wage - This is a dummy variable for the period after removing the maximum wage 
limitation - 1961/62-2005/06. 
Gateshare - This is a variable for the period without gate sharing (80-20) - 1983 84- 
2005/06 
Model: yt = ßl + ß2Teamnumb, + ß3Autorel, + ß4TestPO, + 13; D,, +.... + ßDk, + £,, 
where D= dummy variable 1 to k related to the different dummy variables presented 
above. 
-):, 9 
Table 6.10: Time-series analysis on competitive balance and determinants in the 
English top division 
1888/89-2005/06 1946/47-2005/06 
Post-Bosman Post Bosm. in per. Post-Bosman Post Bosm. in per. 
Model NSQF SRCC NSQF SRCC NSQF SRCC NSQF SRCC 
II III (IV) (VI) (VII) VIII) 
Constant 0.911 -0.138 1.117 -0.131 0.965 -1.535 0.965 -1.480 
Std. error (0.499) (0.379) (0.450) (0.382) (1.686) (0.934) (1.615) (0.938) 
Max wage -0.084 0.110 -0.080 0.111 0.026 0.001 0.026 -0.001 
(0.118) (0.084) (0.114) (0.085) (0.183) (0.101) (0.175) (0.102) 
Retain -0.141 0.177 -0.175 0.178 
(0.182) (0.130) (0.173) (0.131) 
Option 0.040 0.5073 0.015 0.5103 0.216 0.2452 0.216 0.2742 
(0.225) (0.165) (0.219) (0.166) (0.175) (0.097) (0.168) (0.103) 
Freedom 0.295 0.7083 0.276 0.7113 0.446' 0.4313 0.446' 0.4613 
(0.263) (0.191) (0.255) (0.193) (0.235) (0.130) (0.225) (0.135) 
Post-Bosman 0.433 0.8883 0.582' 0.7473 
(0.276) (0.201) (0.297) (0.164) 
Reg 1996 0.082 0.8653 0.256 0.749' 
(0.298) (0.225) (0.316) (0.187) 
Reg 1998 0.425 0.9393 0.5992 0.8553 
(0.278) (0.214) (0.296) (0.184) 
Reg2002 0.5532 0.8583 0.7272 0.7563 
(0.278) (0.212) (0.296) (0.179) 
Gateshare 0.043 0.061 0.062 0.063 0.175 0.162 0.175 0.152 
(0.118) (0.087) (0.114) (0.087) (0.202) (0.112) (0.193) (0.113) 
FAPL 0.198 0.045 0.205 0.046 0.106 -0.023 0.106 -0.012 
(0.151) (0.108) (0.146) (0.109) (0.170) (0.094) (0.163) (0.095) 
Points -0.170 -0.106 -0.167 -0.105 -0.319 -0.224' -0.319 -0.220' 
(0.175) (0.125) (0.169) (0.126) (0.208) (0.115) (0.199) (0.116) 
Clexclusion 0.3402 0.020 0.3542 0.022 0.114 -0.086 0.114 -0.122 
(0.171) (0.119) (0.163) (0.120) (0.225) (0.126) (0.215) (0.128) 
CLparticipants 0.148 -0.049 0.153' -0.049 0.014 -0.1772 0.014 -0.2253 
(0.092) (0.066) (0.090) (0.066) (0.118) (0.068) (0.113) (0.074) 
Teamnumb 0.035 0.015 0.028 0.015 0.023 0.0992 0.023 0.1012 
(0.035) (0.026) (0.034) (0.026) (0.079) (0.044) (0.076) (0.044) 
AutoREL -0.1762 -0.1232 -0.1782 -0.1242 -0.131 -0.102' -0.131 -0.108' 
(0.072) (0.051) (0.069) (0.051) (0.109) (0.060) (0.104) (0.061) 
TestPO -0.049 0.013 -0.057 0.013 -0.030 -0.091 -0.030 -0.087 
(0.056) (0.041) (0.054) (0.041) (0.218) (0.121) (0.209) (0.121) 
Offside -0.128 0.022 -0.128 0.022 
(0.097) (0.069) (0.094) (0.069) 
Lagged dep. var. 0.026 0.042 0.033 -0.120 
(0.109) (0.097) (0.099) (0.136) 
R2 0.487 0.487 0.522 0.490 0.348 0.525 0.427 0.554 
Observations 106 
3 
105 
3 
107 
3 
105 
3 
60 
2 
59 
3 
60 
3962 2 
58 
4743 3 F 5.702 5.623 6.140 4.916 2.087 4.243 . . 
Unit-root resid -10.063 -10.853 -10.32 -10.863 -7.3143 -8.4483 -7.9463 -7.9263 
DW 1.98 2.08 2.00 2.08 1.85 2.17 2.00 2.07 
AR 1-2 test 1.261 0.802 1.135 0.775 0.617 0.264 0.420 0.209 
ARCH 1-1 test 2.472 0.187 2.696 0.199 0.030 0.007 0.076 0.012 
Normality test 1.795 0.963 1.218 0.916 2.113 0.552 1.350 0.618 
Hetero test 0.358 1.021 0.468 0.908 0.684 0.805 0.895 0.626 
RESET test 0.265 0.571 0.388 0.627 0.524 1.390 0.572 
0.460 
-- - . - -. 1 n' --` -- __ _ ........ " 
Is.. el 
Significant on ten percent level; ` Significant on five percent level; - ziignincanL on utic PU«: ICU< «V%. -I. 
The results from the time-series models explain about 50 percent of the variation 
in 
performance persistence, and nearly the same for win dispersion 
(weaker in the SWW 
period) (column V and VII). Maximum wage has no significant effect on win 
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dispersion. On performance persistence. however. maximum vage has t-value above 
unit when the whole sample period is applied (column II and IV). Ho%ever, the sign is 
opposite of the hypothesised. 
Following the results from the transfer market restrictions, they show that more 
significant variables appear for the SRCC measure than for the NSQF ratio. Howwwev er, 
the signs and the coefficients for the latter follow the hypothesised effects, where a 
higher degree of restrictions gives higher coefficients. There also seems to be more 
negative effects on freedom-of-contract, Reg2000 and Reg2002 than the Reg 1996. This 
might reflect positive response on opening up the football players' labour market. For 
performance persistence, the level of significance is much higher, and it occurs as soon 
as the retain-and-transfer system is modified. Coefficients and significance strongly 
indicate a high degree of relationship between transfer market restrictions and 
performance persistence. Note that the possible positive effect on competitive balance, 
from opening the labour market within Europe, only appears on the win distribution of 
performance, and not on performance persistence. 
Taking the whole period into account, the theoretical hypothesis about gate sharing in a 
profit maximising league is supported. However, there might be some insignificant 
indications of negative effects when it is removed for performance persistence (column 
VI and VIII). 
When it comes to tournament structure, an increased number of teams to be 
automatically relegated seem to have a significant positive influence on both measures 
of competitive balance. The results on the whole sample are significant, ý'ý'hile the after 
SWW results have a lower degree of significance. However, t-values are still well above 
one for the insignificant coefficients. These results are interesting as they follow the 
general theoretical suggestions, as is shown earlier in this thesis. 
The positive effect on competitive balance from changes in the offside rule in the t-tests 
earlier in this chapter is not significantly supported when taking control variables into 
account, even though the tendency between the two measures are upheld, as the t-value 
on win dispersion is greater than unity (for improved competitive balance) (column I 
and [1 1). 
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For the whole sample period, no significant influence on the number of teams in the top 
division in English football can be found in relation to competitive balance. while the 
after SWW sample indicates significant increased persistence as the number of teams 
increase (column VI and VIII). The relatively frequent number of times to expand the 
league in the early period of the Football League, might affect the different results for 
the SRCC over the two samples. 
Incentive effects from changing the point score system are observed in the after S\t \\ 
sample, as the t-values for win dispersion are greater than one (column V and VII) and 
performance persistence is (weakly) significantly weaker (column VI and VIII). For the 
whole period sample the signs are equal, but t-values are (just) below unit. In other 
words, if effects from changing from the (2,1,0) to the (3,1,0) system, they are positive 
on competitive balance. This is not consistent with the recent theoretical development 
and empirical findings in Haugen (2008). 
The introduction of the UEFA Champions Cup/League and the exclusion of English 
teams from the tournament have different results over the samples and the measures. 
Both variables are close to or significantly negatively related to win dispersion in the 
whole sample, while in the smaller sample, only SRCC has coefficients that indicate a 
relation; the significant positive influence on performance persistence (weaker 
persistence) to being involved in the UEFA Champions Cup/League. 
The introduction of the FA Premier League (including changed financial situation 
among the teams in the league) is a highly insignificant determinant on competitive 
balance in the smaller sample, while in the sample covering the whole period of the top 
division in English football, t-values are higher than one for worsened win dispersion, 
but insignificant. 
Analysis of why the invariance proposition might not be accepted in English football 
can be related to its assumptions. A difference between England and the NAIL is the 
geographical closeness between competing teams in England, compared to the 
monopoly markets in major leagues cities. In England, teams are competing in partly 
the same markets, and this might have an effect on the revenue balance between teams. 
For example, there might be greater effect on incentives for competition for new prizes 
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The diagnostics from the regressions show that no tests are rejected on ten percent level. 
Further, there is no indication on unit-root in the residuals. Except from the win 
dispersion in the after SWW sample (p-value is 0.037 in column V and 0.014 in column 
VII), the regressions have the F-test rejected on one percent level. These results are also 
a consequence from including a lagged dependent variable in three out of the four 
regressions in the whole sample period. A lagged dependent variable is also included in 
the SRCC after SWW sample (where the post-Bosman period is split - column VIII), 
which has a positive influence on the model. For the other models, this variable is not 
included, because it is highly insignificant. 
A possible time variable is omitted from the final regressions because: 
- RESET test fails for the SRCC models, when whole period is applied. 
- SRCC in after SWW sample; time variable is highly insignificant (p-value 0.969 
[split] and 0.842). 
- NSQF ratio in the whole sample and no split in the post-Bosman period; the time 
variable is not included because diagnostics are rejected on ten percent level. 
- NSQF ratio for the whole period and split in different regimes in the Post-Bosnian 
period; the time variable is significant, but omitted, because it is "replacing" the 
significant regime dummy variables. 
- NSQF ratios for the after SWW samples have the time variables insignificant (the p- 
value is 0.132 when one post-Bosman period in column V and 0.580 when this 
period is split in column VII), and they are also "replacing" the significant regime 
dummy variables. 
6.5. Changes in Regulations and Tournament/Prize Structure in the 
Context of Competitive Balance. The Case of the Norwegian Top 
Division 
The Norwegian Football Association (Norwegian FA) was founded in 190-2 (Goksoyr 
and Olstad, 2002), joined the FIFA in 1908 (fifa. com) and has been a member of the 
UEFA since 1954 (uefa. com). The population in Non ay is small compared to 
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England, 2M but the area of the country is much larger, 265 implying a much smaller 
population density in Norway. These conditions are important determinants, explaining 
why the development of the Norwegian football league, to a large degree, has lagged 
significantly behind developments in England. Another issue of possible relevance is 
the economic situation historically in Norway. When Norway became an independent 
country in 1905, it was one of the poorest in (Western) Europe. There are also important 
regional differences. For example, the Northern part of Norway was only included in 
the league structure from 1971 onwards 
(www. rsssf. no/stats/NNLeagueChamps. html). 
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One of the characteristics of the Norwegian football league is that it retained its amateur 
status longer than most other European football nations until the beginning of the 1980s. 
The "amateur" ideal in sports was so important that, until 1969, Norwegian professional 
football players playing in other countries were not allowed to play for the national 
team (Goksoyr and Olstad, 2002, p. 315-319). It was not until the 1984 season that 
semi-professional player contracts could be issued. After seven years of semi- 
professional football, the motion for "full professionals" for players was carried in 
1991,267 and from the 1993 season all teams had to be professional to be members of the 
top division (through a licence, that can be called "licence of professionalism"), more 
than a hundred years later than in England (Goksoyr and Olstad, 2002). 268 
The professionalism of the Norwegian football league was probably an important factor 
in bringing more success than ever into Norwegian football, both for the national team 
and at team level, but also for Norwegian players abroad. For example, the national 
team qualified for the World Cup in 1994, for the first time since the only previous 
appearance in 1938. This qualification was repeated in 1998, and the qualification for 
Euro 2000 was the first ever. Regarding players abroad, Norwegian players were rarely 
represented in other leagues before the 1990s. Whereas over the whole period 1932 to 
1990, only 69 Norwegian players played abroad (Gokseyr and Olstad, 2002, p. 316 and 
264By August 2007 the population in England was just above 50 million 
(www. statistics. gov. uk/CCI/nugget. asp? ID=6). 
265 England: 130,395 km2 (en. wikipedia. org/wiki/England) and Norway: 385,155 km2 
(en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Norway). 
266These considerations are consistent with Hjelseth (2006), who also uses geography and revenue 
potential as two factors that might have affected the framework of the Norwegian football league. See 
Gokseyr and Olstad (2002) for a historical overview over Norwegian football and geography. 
267 According to Hjelseth (2006), it was implemented from the 1992 season. 
268Additional to Gokseyr and Olstad, 2002), more about professionalism and economic development of 
Norwegian football can be found in for example Hjelseth (2006) and Gammelsaeter and Ohr (2002). 
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317), while in 2001 88 Norwegian players were playing for teams outside Norway. 269 
The Bosman verdict of 1995 must be taken into account, enabling free movement of 
football players between members and associated members of the EU (and the EEA 
area). 
270 
At team level, the same pattern of success can be found. Apart from SK Lyn's (Oslo) 
success in the UEFA Champions Cup in 1968 (reaching the quarter finals), there was 
little success for Norwegian teams in the UEFA tournaments until 1995, when 
Rosenborg BK qualified for the UEFA Champions League for the first time, and then 
did so in nine of ten seasons thereafter. In addition, other Norwegian teams have also 
performed well, given the general international competitiveness of Norwegian teams in 
the UEFA team tournaments. For example, SK Brann (Bergen, 1996/97) and 
Vaalerenga (Oslo, 1998/99) both reached the quarter finals in the UEFA Cup Winners' 
Cups, and in 1999, Norway had two teams in the UEFA Champions League (Molde FK 
was the second participant). 
As for the English top division, comparisons of competitive balance over time can be 
done by applying ten-season moving average for the NSQF ratio and for the SRCC. 
These measures are compared with the ten-season HHI. Because of problematic layout 
when using the initial calculation as an index of 100, this index is rather used in the last 
calculation (the 2005 ten-season moving average). 
269 My calculation based on data from RSSSF Norwegian Football 
Archive (www. rsssf. no/archive. html). 
270 Norway is one of the EFTA members (and non EU member) included 
in the European Economic Area 
(EEA), and has been member of the EEA from its beginning 
in January 1,1994 
(en. wikipedia. org/wiki/E%C3%98S). 
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Figure 6.3: Ten-season moving average for NSQF ratio, SRCC and HHI after the 
restructuring of the Norwegian top division in 1963 
Also for Norway, the coefficients for the three dimensions are positive, indicating 
weakened competitive balance over time. However, the coefficient of the NSQF ratio is 
lower than the English and is only significant on the five percent level. The HHI is 
special, because Norway had a long period of one-team dominance, where Rosenborg 
BK had 13 championships in a row. 
Below are the correlation coefficients, based on the moving average of NSQF and 
SRCC, and the HHI presented: 
NSQF-SRCC: 0.519 
NSQF-HHI: 0.795 
HHI-SRCC: 0.844 
Compared to the English top division, the correlation between the ten-season moving 
average for the NSQF and the SRCC is much weaker in Norway. However. the-, c 
measures' correlation to the HHI is higher. 
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6.5.1. Regulatory Changes the Norwegian Top Division 
As for the English top division, the statistical null-hypothesis is the starting point (i. e. 
no changes in competitive balance caused by changes in regulations) in the following 
empirical analyses of competitive balance in the Norwegian top division. 
6.5.1.1. Changes in Labour Market Regulations 
Historically, transfer rules in Norwegian football were such that when a player's 
contract expired, there was a period of suspension if the player moved from one team to 
another. According to Goksoyr and Olstad (p. 301) this "suspension time" was 
increased from two to three months in 1950s, to four months at the end of the 1960s and 
further to six months in 1972. From the 1991 season, disagreements on transfer fees 
between the teams after a player's contract expired, were dealt with by a commission at 
the Norwegian FA, which settled the final transfer fee (Goksoyr and Olstad, 2002). 
Prior to the 1996 season, the international Bosman verdict was included in the 
Norwegian transfer rules. From the 1998 season, the "Bosman rule" became the rule 
also for transfers between Norwegian teams.? ' ' In the autumn of the 2002 season, the 
"FIFA/UEFA - EU" international transfer system, that included compensation for 
training young players and transfer windows, was introduced in Norwegian football 
(Gokseyr and Olstad, 2002). 
There is little literature focusing on the relationship between competitive balance and 
professionalism. However, Owen and Weatherston (2002,2004) look at this topic in 
New Zealand rugby. Because of differences in regulations and organisation of leagues, 
it is difficult to draw direct comparisons with Norwegian football. According to Owen 
and Weatherston, results for the period after introducing professionalism (from 1995 to 
2002) suggest that competitive balance has worsened for the "National Provincial 
Championship" compared to the "Super 12", which is a league including teams from 
South Africa and Australia as well. Owen and \Veatherston (2004, p. 235) claim that: 
"Some commentators have expressed the view that the professional game is pulling 
talent away from the provinces into the metropolitan unions that act as hosts to the 
Super 12 franchises.... " Further, Owen and Weatherston (p. 238) emphasise that "a 
'"' ýýýý w. tötball. noitilcs'%7Bý`9BDODF-? ý? F-4F. ýf, -ti ý3ý-ý ýýýýý? ýýF68F°ö7D. pdf, p. 
11. 
2() 7 
degree of competitive imbalance in the NPC is not a phenomenon that is new to 
professionalization, and the pattern of imbalance largely reflects the distribution of the 
population......... More analyses are required to eventually decide if the alternative 
hypothesis for professionalism is one-sided. Therefore, in this chapter it will be treated 
as two-sided. 
The alternative hypotheses in relation to competitive balance are: 
H1 (1984): Semi-professional football - two-sided. 
H1 (1991): Following the arguments from the English top division earlier in this 
chapter, relaxing the transfer market has negative impact on competitive balance - one- 
sided. 
HI (1993): Requirement of professional football - two-sided. 
H1 (1996): Two effects because of the international Bosman verdict, where international 
free agency has negative effect on competitive balance and the opening of the labour 
market for players should have a positive effect on competitive balance. In total this 
suggests a two-sided alternative hypothesis. 
H1 (1998): Domestic free agency is related to negative effects on competitive balance - 
one-sided. 
H1 (2002): The difficulties predicting effects on competitive balance because of the 
changes in the regulations, lead to a two-sided alternative hypothesis. 
The relationships (in time) between changes in UEFA Champions League and the 
changes in the labour market are much weaker for the Norwegian league, compared to 
the situation for the English top division. Only once during the history of the UEF=A 
Champions League has another Norwegian team, other than the championship winner, 
participated in this tournament, and the dominating team during this period (Rosenborg 
BK) has qualified for the UEFA Champions League season after season. However, 
since Norway had two teams in the UEFA Champions League one season, it is not 
impossible that this led to risk-taking behaviour among better teams in the league. 
Overall, one would expect that the Post-Bosman splits will be relatively more related to 
the changes in the labour market restrictions for the Norwegian league, than for the FA 
Premier League. 
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6.5.1.2. Changes in Product Market Regulations 
The level of gate revenue sharing has been significantly reduced over time. Until the 
1989 season, the teams paid as much as 30 % of the gate revenues in sharing, %%-here I 
% was shared with the away team, and where 15 % was a levy to the governinz body. 
From the 1989 season, the 15 % revenue sharing to the away team was removed. In 
addition, the "15 % rule" to the governing body fell to five percent later on. Howe" er. 
the percentage to pay was then dependent on the financial solidity of the teams. 
Currently, it is five percent (Gokseyr and Olstad, 2002). 272 
Revenues from sale of broadcasting rights were relatively low before the 19')? deal. 
when the amount of NOK 135 million (about £11 million) Evas divided into four 
seasons. The next deal, covering the period 2002-2005 was NOK 300 million (TV 
Sports Markets, 2006). Because the amount for the teams was only a minor percent of 
their total revenues, specific variables related to broadcasting deals are omitted from the 
analyses below. 
6.5.1.3. Tournament and Prize Structure Changes 
The first round-robin tournament, the "Norgesserien", was also introduced a long time 
after the Football League in England. 273 It was only played in three seasons (1937-38, 
1938-39 and 1947-48). From the 1948/49 season, the league was reorganised into the 
"Hovedserien", which is the starting point for analyses of competitive balance in the 
Norwegian top division, and is by Hjelseth (2006) claimed to be the first unitary league 
system in Norwegian football. This league system included two groups, where the 
winner of each group qualified to a double (1948/49-1950.51) or single (1951i52- 
1960,61) match to decide the champion. Each group had eight teams, and the bottom 
two teams relegated automatically. The next restructuring of the league took place prior 
to the 1961,62 season, when the teams in the former two groups were merged into one 
group of 16 teams. The championship winner was decided on basis of the winner of the 
final standing at the end of the season (no playoffs). The name of this league, 
'" See also Seri cIorenin,, cn av 1972 (1997). 
'" Goksoyr and Olstad (2002) and rsssf. com are used as sources in this part of the chapter. The link is 
also a source tier further overview over the creation of Icaguc s stems in Nor egian football in a 
historical context. 
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"Overgangsserien ("Maratonserien")" indicates that it was only a "transitional season". 
before another reorganisation. 
The new "First Division" was established from the 1963 season, and it consisted of ten 
teams, where the bottom two teams were automatically relegated. This system lasted 
until the 1971 season, when only one team was automatically relegated, and the top 
division was expanded to 12 teams from the 1972 season onwards. In addition, the 
changes in the tournament structure also increased the number of teams at the bottom of 
the league to be automatically relegated (three teams). This tournament structure was 
unchanged until the 1981 season, when the third last team in the league, instead of being 
automatically relegated, had to play a post-seasonal relegation-promotion play off 
(against the second best in each of the two second level groups). 
The 1986 season was the last to have the traditional (21,1,0) point score system. A 
(3,2,1,0) point score system was introduced for one season in the Norwegian top 
division. This system increased the points of winning matches to three, as well as 
having two outcomes for draw matches, depending on the results from the after final 
time shoot out, where the winner won an additional point (two in total), and the loser 
still got one point. As earlier, the loser of a match received zero points. In general, the 
"shoot-out experiment" was viewed as not very beneficial to the Norwegian top 
division, and was therefore removed before the start of the next season. 274 In addition, 
the point score system was changed again, to the current (3,1,0) system. 
The next change in tournament structure in the Norwegian top division took place in the 
1994 season, when only the bottom two teams were relegated automatically (with no 
playoff for the team finishing third bottom), as a part of the 1995 expansion to 14 teams. 
The relegation procedure from the 1995 season was that the bottom three teams ww ere 
automatically relegated. This structure was changed from the 1997 season, when the 
third bottom team went into the relegation-promotion playoff system. The 1997 
structure continues throughout the sample period in this thesis (including the 2005 
season). 
' In addition, previously the matches had been played on Sundays. 
In the 19,0 season, one tried to copy 
the English tradition of plaving, on Saturday afternoon. This e\pcriment was ako reverted 
before the next 
season. 
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The alternative hypotheses for these changes are presented in the following-: 
H, (1963): Because it is difficult to predict a priori the direction of change %%-hen 
comparing a ten-team league with the bottom two relegated with two horizontal 
divisions of eight teams and two teams automatically relegated from each, a two-sided 
alternative hypothesis is used. 
H, (1972): Two-sided alternative hypothesis, because expectations about improved 
competitive balance as the (relative) number of teams automatically relegated increases 
might be outweighed by an increased number of teams in the league. 
H1 (point score system changes): Following the arguments from Haugen (2008), the 
modern (3,1,0) system is expected to weaken competitive balance - one-sided 
alternative hypothesis. 
H, (1989): Applying the same arguments as for the English league, removing revenue 
sharing is expected to weaken competitive balance, therefore one-sided. 
HI (1995): Because of an increased number of teams and an increased number of 
automatically relegating teams (at the expense of the team to relegation-promotion 
playoff) can be expected to move competitive balance in opposite directions, the 
alternative hypothesis is two-sided in the short term period. However, since the 
relegation system changed back after two seasons, the alternative hypothesis in the long 
term period is one-sided and negative. 
6.5.2. Two Sample t-ratio Analysis of Competitive Balance 
Following the structure from the analyses of the English top division in football, two 
sample t-ratio analyses of possible changes in competitive balance, because of changes 
of regulations and tournament structure in Norwegian football, are presented in the 
following. 
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Labour Market Changes 
Semi-professionalism 
The introduction of semi professional football in Norway had no significant effect on 
competitive balance, but t-values well above one, for both win dispersion and 
performance persistence, might indicate some negative short time tendency on 
competitive balance. For the longer period, the effects on competitive balance are 
minimal (including the HHI). 
"Freedom-of-contract " 
Opposite of the (one-side) alternative hypothesis, it looks like introducing the "treedom- 
of-contract" transfer system in 1991 had a positive short run influence on competitive 
balance (t-value for SRCC is significant and NSQF ratio is close to significant). 
However, the long-run effects seem to be more negative. 
Full professionalism 
Related to full professionalism in the Norwegian football league, the two most 
interesting results are the strong significant weakened win dispersion, when comparing 
ten seasons before and from the 1993 season, and the exceptional increase in the HHI. 
However, other factors might be more relevant determinants for these results, such as 
the best team's continued qualifications for the UEFA Champions League, than just the 
introduction of full professionalism. There is no other significant result on the other 
tests. 
International Bosman 
Introduction of the international Bosman rule might have had some negative effects on 
competitive balance, but these results are not significant. This period also reflects that 
the dominant team in the league (Rosenborg BK) had the opportunity to become even 
more dominant through qualification for the UEFA Champions League. and the 
consequent substantial increase in revenues. 
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Domestic Bosman 
The domestic Bosman rules seem to affect the persistence most, and are significantly 
negative on SRCC, both on short-term and medium-term level. The latter is also 
significant for the NSQF ratio. Also here, the long run effects are less clear. In general, 
this might reflect that the domestic free agency follows the alternative hypothesis about 
weakened competitive balance in the Norwegian league, and, hence, that the invariance 
proposition is rejected. 
Bosman II 
The effects in the short and medium (4 seasons post period due to end of sample period) 
time on competitive balance in the Norwegian top division in football are positive, on 
both the dispersion of sporting outcome and the performance persistence dimensions, 
but only the NSQF in medium term is significant. 
One problem, when interpreting these results, is that many of the teams in the 
Norwegian league went through financial problems in the first part of the current 
decade. This might have been partly driven by the "depression" in the international 
transfer market for Norwegian football players, following the "bubble" in the last part of 
the 1990s. Therefore, it might be that the league needed a number of seasons to "settle" 
again. 
Product Market Changes 
Gate sharing 
Removing gate sharing has no effect on performance persistence in the Norwegian top 
division in football, but it has a long-run significant negative effect on win dispersion. 
The latter finding is, however, difficult to interpret, because in this period, a number of 
other relevant changes, in the context of competitive balance in Norwegian football, 
took place. Since the teams in the Norwegian league, in general, can be categorized 
under the objective of win maximisation, one would expect removing revenue sharing 
to have a negative effect on competitive balance. This is partly supported in this 
analysis. 
1 ^ý 
Another interesting observation is the championship concentration before and after 
removing the gate sharing to the away team. The HHI had a big change. as it increased 
from 0.20 to 0.66. As explained above, it is difficult to determine if the change in the 
revenue sharing policy eventually has been a significant determinant for this result. 
Tournament- and Prize Structure Changes 
From two to one group (not including the 1961/62 season) 
The changing tournament system seems to have had a positive significant effect on 
SRCC (weak significant in short and long term). However, because of no interdivisional 
play, it might be difficult to find an appropriate way of comparing competitive balance 
before and after the restructuring. 
A reduction of the HHI indicates less championship concentration. This is inconsistent 
with the hypothesis, because one would anticipate that two groups with a playoff at the 
end of the season would reduce the probability of winning the championship for the 
"best team", because of increased uncertainty, when playing the one or two final 
deciding matches. 
197? 
The 1972 changes in tournament structure include an increased number of teams in the 
top division (from ten to twelve), as well as an increased number of teams to relegate 
(from two to three). The consequences of the dual tournament structure change seem to 
be minor. This might be a consequence of the two changes turning in the opposite 
directions, when it comes to predicted effects on competitive balance. 
Point scort' Polly' 
Note that (the significant better) competitive balance for the 1987 season, having the 
(3,2,1,0) point score system, is not included in this analysis. It is a comparison between 
the traditional (2.1,0) and the modern (x, 1,0) point score systems. Changing point score 
system is significantly negative for the NSQF ratio. Different from the English top 
-76 
division, the results from the Norwegian top division support the theoretical and 
empirical findings in Haugen (2008) about weaker win dispersion after the point score 
change. Pulling out the effects from changing point score sý stem alone might be 
difficult, because of the other changes that happened at about the same time. as 
described above. The increased HHI reflects the start of the Rosenborg BK dynasty. 
1995 
In short term, the 1995 restructuring from 12 to 14 teams in the Norwegian top division 
had minor effects on win dispersion and performance persistence. However, the long 
term significant negative effect on the NSQF ratio supports the alternative hypothesis 
about negative effects from increasing the number of teams (which might have been 
compensated in the short term, because of the relegation procedure changes). 
General comments 
Only a few significant results can be found in the simple t-ratio analyses. An interesting 
observation is that effects on competitive balance are weaker in the Norwegian top 
division, compared to the English. 
6.5.3. Time-Series Analysis of Competitive Balance in Norwegian Football 
Time-series analysis of the after Second World War time period in Norwegian football 
includes a number of radical changes, in both tournament structure and, not least, the 
professionalism of the sport. As can be shown below, unit root is rejected for both 
measures of competitive balance applied in the time-series analysis. The results from 
the unit-root tests are shown in the following table: 
Table 6.13: 
top division 
Dependent 
variable 
Unit-root tests for the time series of competitive balance in the Norwegian 
Time period t-value Critical 5°o Critical 1° o 
NSQF Whole period -7.155 - 2.91-I - 3.550 
After 1963 -4.868 - 2.932 - . 59% 
SRCC Whole period -7.658 - 2.915 - 3.552 
After 1963 -6.780 - 2.932 - 3.593 
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The DF unit-root tests reject the null hypothesis of unit-root at one percent level for all 
dependent variables. As for the English top division, continuous independent variables 
for the Norwegian top division also have the pattern of small variation over time. 
Hence, unit-root tests are only done on the residuals. 
Because of the diagnostics, there will be some differences in the structure of some of the 
independent variables for the Norwegian top division compared to the English. Instead 
of a continuous variable for the number of teams in the division, it is preferable to create 
dummy variables for Norway. Since the diagnostics in most of the Norwegian cases 
prefer that the number of teams to be automatically relegated and the number of teams 
to get a relegation playoff place are added together, this will also be done in the analysis 
below. 
Because the expansion of teams to 14 in the Norwegian top division happened only one 
season before the start of the first implementation of the Bosman verdict, there will not 
be one dummy variable for the post-Bosman period, such as in the analysis of the 
English top division. In addition, the start of the (3,1,0) point score system and the 
elimination of the 15 percent gate sharing to the away team happened very close in time. 
These variables are therefore merged, to avoid multicolinearity. Further, the 1987 
season is included as a control variable, because of the special point score system. For 
the whole sample, the same is done for the 1961i62 season, since this was a transitional 
season with 50 percent of the teams to be relegated. 
Independent variables: 
Semi-prof - This is a dummy variable for the period with semi-professionalism - 1984- 
1992 (using 1993 as the cut off point because the 1993 season is the first when 
professionalism is required in the top division). 
Professional - This is a dummy variable for the period where the top di% ision is 
based 
on full professionalism - 1993-2005. 
"Freedom" - This is a dummy variable for the period after softening the transfer market 
until the Bosman verdict - 1991-1995. 
Bosnian-int - This is a dummy variable for the first period after the 
introduction of 
international (EU/EU-associated members) free agency (1996-1997), and no 
restriction of players from EU EU-associated countries. 
'1 ?ý 
Bosman-dom - This is a dummy variable for the period after the introduction of the 
domestic free agency (1998-2001). 
Bosman II - This is a dummy variable for the period after the Bosnian II (2002-2005). 
Point_gate - This is a dummy variable for the period of (3,1.0) score system and the 
period without gate sharing to the away team (1988-2005). 
AutoPORel - This is a variable reflecting the number of teams to either automatically 
relegate or to relegation/promotion playoff. 
1961/62 - This is a dummy variable reflecting the transitional season. It had A% of the 
16 teams relegated, as well as it was the first season only having one single 
group as the top division. 
1987 - This is a dummy variable for this season, having a special point score system. 
Teamnumb 10 - This is a dummy variable equal to unit wtiýhen 10 teams in the top 
division and zero otherwise. 
Teamnumb 12 - This is a dummy variable equal to unit when 12 teams in the top 
division and zero otherwise. 
Teamnumb 14 - This is a dummy variable equal to unit when 14 teams in the top 
division and zero otherwise. 
Model: yt = (3i + ß2AutoPORe1, + (33D1, +... + ßDkt + s, where D= dummy variable 
to k related to the dummy variables presented above. 
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Table 6.14: Time-series analysis on competitive balance and determinants in the 
Norwegian ton division 
Model 
1947/48-2005 
1947/48-2005 1963-2005 
NSQF SRCC NSQF SRCC 
I (II (III (IV) 
Constant 1.578' 1.020 1.365 0.584 
Std. error (0.833) (0.664) (0.408) (0.325) 
Semi-prof. -0.071 0.161 -0.071 0.159 
(0.158) (0.126) (0.161) (0.128) 
Professional 0.232 0.034 0.232 0.027 
(0.309) (0.246) (0.315) (0.252) 
"Freedom" -0.407' -0.098 -0.407' -0.105 
(0.223) (0.179) (0.227) (0.182) 
Bosman-int -0.317 -0.043 -0.317 -0.040 
(0.374) (0.298) (0.380) (0.304) 
Bosman-nat -0.246 0.230 -0.246 0.223 
(0.353) (0.282) (0.359) (0.287) 
Bosman II -0.643' -0.133 -0.643' -0.129 
(0.353) (0.281) (0.359) (0.287) 
Point_gate 0.251 -0.010 0.251 -0.001 
(0.200) (0.161) (0.203) (0.164) 
AutoPORel -0.061 -0.112 -0.061 -0.124 
(0.208) (0.166) (0.211) (0.171) 
1961/62 0.830 -0.197 
(0.868) (0.698) 
1987 -0.318 -1.0063 -0.318 -1.010' 
(0.282) (0.225) (0.287) (0.230) 
Teamnumb 10 -0.213 -0.439 
(0.451) (0.360) 
Teamnumb 12 -0.100 -0.267 0.113 0.187 
(0.230) (0.184) (0.259) (0.212) 
Teamnumb 14 -0.052 -0.179 0.161 0.267 
(0.332) (0.266) (0.470) (0.378) 
SRCC_, -0.175 -0.125 
(0.120) (0.138) 
R2 0.328 0.535 0.317 0.539 
Observations 57 55 43 42 
F 1.616 3.2823 1.307 2.828 
Unit-root resid -7.115; -8.754; -5.6673 -7.772` 
DW 1.94 2.33 1.69 2.39 
AR 1-2 test 0.018 1.572 1.300 1.574 
ARCH 1-1 test 1.352 0.509 0.556 0.216 
Normality test 0.509 0.944 0.614 1.948 
Hetero test 0.415 0.621 0.464 0.477 
RESET test 0.099 0.559 0.095 0.658 
Significant on ten percent level; 2 Significant on five percent level; 3 Significant on 
one percent level. 
Note: 
- SRCC_1 is included to avoid rejection of diagnostics (column II and IV). 
- SRCC: Trend not included because it 
is insignificant (both samples) or leads to 
inappropriate diagnostics (whole period). 
- NSQF: Trend is insignificant, and 
it is replacing significant dummy variables (both 
samples). 
- NSQF_i: Insignificant variable (both samples). 
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Apart from the strong significant control variable for the 1987 season on performance 
persistence (increased variation), the models over the two different sample periods have 
only few variables of significance, as is also indicated by the low F-values for the 
NSQF. The significant F-tests for performance persistence seem to be heavily affected 
by the control variable mentioned above (column II and IV). 
None of the other variables are significant on five percent level or better. However, on 
ten percent level, the Bosman II period has better win dispersion, and the freedom of 
contract system also seems to have a better win dispersion (weak significant on the 
whole sample; column I). The other variables are insignificant on win dispersion, but 
the changed point score system has, together with elimination of revenue sharing to the 
away team, a tendency to insignificantly worsen within-season competitive balance. In a 
reduced form on win dispersion (not presented here), these results are confirmed with 
the first two (Bosman II and freedom-of-contract) as significant Variables, while the 
latter combination is significant in the whole period sample. 
For performance persistence, no other variable than 1987 is significant. Because of the 
lack of significant variables, the results from the regime regressions are only giving 
some indications of variables that might affect competitive balance in the Norwegian 
top division, such as an insignificant negative effect on variation across seasons in the 
period of semi-professionalism. Also a lower number of teams have a t-value greater 
than unit, indicating a possible positive influence on variation of performance across 
seasons in the whole sample (column I). A reduced form model indicates that the latter 
variable might be significant, and also that implanting the Bosman verdict for domestic 
transfers can be a significant negative factor. 
In general, there are no rejections of the diagnostics, and the unit-root tests for the 
residuals are rejected. However, the time-series models give minor explanations on the 
regime determinants for changes in competitive balance in Norwegian football. This 
means that these variables might not be significant explanatory factors- for changes in 
competitive balance in the top division of football in Norway. Other alternative wtwa\, of 
modelling the time-series regressions can give other results, such as if applying a 
general-to-specific strategy for deciding the variables to be included in the final 
regression. This is a natural follow up for later research. 
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6.6. Conclusions 
On basis of the analyses in this chapter. the main conclusions are listed below: 
- The level of competitive balance can be affected by regulations and 
tournament/prize structure. 
- The level of these effects and how they effect might vary between leagues. 
- In English football, the changes in labour market restrictions from the beginning of 
the 1960s have had a negative impact on competitive balance (although it is difficult 
to separate the latest changes from the influence of the increased number of places 
in the UEFA Champions League). 
- Changes in product market have little, if any, influence on competitive balance. 
- Relegation, and particularly increases in the number of teams to be relegated, has a 
positive effect on competitive balance in English football. In Norway, the increased 
number of teams to be relegated seems to be insignificant on both NSQF and SRCC. 
- Increasing the number of teams in a league has no effect on win dispersion, but there 
are indications of increased performance persistence, depending on the period of 
analysis. 
- Different effects of introducing the (3,1,0) point score system are observed. In 
England, the effect seems to have been positive on the NSQF and significant on 
performance persistence (in the after SWW sample), while the effects are rather 
negative (non-significant) for win dispersion in Norway. However, this variable also 
includes elimination of revenue sharing in Norway. 
- The regime determinants in the analyses have a higher explanatory 
degree in 
English football than in Norwegian football. 
In the future for the two leagues, competitive balance might be most affected by 
changes that happen outside the leagues, since the players' labour market now is largely 
dependent on the UEFA, FIFA and EU, as well as the decisions made from UEFA about 
the number of teams qualifying for the UEFA Champions League. 
The mechanisms left for the domestic governing bodies to decide, might have less 
influence on competitive balance, such as product market restrictions. However, effects 
from sharing broadcasting revenues might have more effect than these analyses ha% e 
been able to pick out. Minor effects can be expected from changes 
in the number of 
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teams in the league. The systems for relegation might also be sensitive on competitive 
balance, and can therefore be the most significant part. 
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7. Discussions and Conclusions 
Differences in financial strength, sporting quality and sporting outcomes among 
contestants are typical parts of a sporting tournament's life. In this context, competiti% e 
balance and uncertainty of outcome are among the fundamentals in the busine and 
economics of professional team sports. Tournaments with relatively weak competitive 
balance and uncertainty of outcome have a greater probability of offering an 
uninteresting product, and might therefore have higher risks related to their continued 
viability. This basic understanding ensures that competitive balance and uncertainty of 
outcome cannot be neglected by governing bodies and others interested in the well- 
being of a given sport or tournament. 
As suggested in Cairns et al. (1986), fan support for weaker teams might fall if they arc 
never close to competing for the league trophy. Further, Cairns et al. suggest that the 
interest for dominating teams can also be reduced. These relationships are further 
emphasised in the Report of the Commissioner's Blue Ribbon Panel on Baseball 
Economics (Levin et at., 2000 p. 13), which "assumes that a reasonable degree of 
competitive balance is an essential foundation for the continued popularity and growth 
of the game, and that mechanisms must be in place to ensure long-term competitive 
balance despite the inevitable inequalities in size, local market conditions and 
demographics of the communities in which MLB franchises are located". This means 
that also for big market teams, there is interdependency with the smaller teams to keep 
the league both sporting and financially viable. Without the weaker teams, the whole 
league might collapse. A recent example from the Italian top division in football, Serie 
A, emphasises these relationships. The teams in the league have individual TV-deals, 
and the outcome from these deals made the distribution of TV-money across the teams 
too unbalanced. This forced the smaller teams to take action. They refused to play and 
thus postponed the start of the 2002 03 season (Solberg, 2004). 
Even with an academic history of more than half a century, many basic topics related to 
competitive balance are still ill-defined and confusing. Therefore. the first part of this 
thesis has its focus on conceptual issues, such as the important fundamentals of what is 
meant by competitive balance, how to measure it and reasons why competitive balance 
has been a central part of the literature of the business and economics of professional 
teani sports. The basic v-iewt- throughout the conceptual framework of this thesis k the 
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recognition of the complexity of competitive balance. This is evident, especially when 
stripping the league structure to reach the core of the concept. Even in this simple 
league context, three fundamental dimensions of competitive balance appear: win 
dispersion, performance persistence and prize concentration. It is also shown that in the 
relatively big pool of competitive balance measures, many of them can be related to this 
simple league framework. 
The next step in developing the understanding of competitive balance was to put the 
complex concept into a complex real-world league structure context. This has at least 
two basic consequences. First, the established simple league context measures may need 
to be adjusted, and, second, new measures may be required to capture the increased 
complexity of competitive balance. The latter is closely related to the increased number 
and type of prizes offered by a tournament. Post-seasonal playoff and interdiv, isional 
movement through a promotion-relegation system are two examples that are considered 
in this thesis. 
The theoretical framework of competitive balance must be sufficiently rich to analyse a 
complex concept in a complex league context. This knowledge might increase the focus 
on the relationship between multiple prize league tournaments and competitiveness. 
This thesis suggests that competitiveness within a league should be related, not only to 
competitive balance, but also to competitions for the whole spectrum of prizes in a 
modern professional league. It has been argued that the focus in the relationship 
between competition and fan interest should be on competitive intensity related to a 
given tournament's prize structure. 
Empirically, competitive balance has been the main issue of this thesis. The descripti% e 
statistical focus has been related to three parts. The first is to calculate the level of 
competitive balance in different leagues, based on measures from the basic dimensions. 
Second, even if measures typically calculate how far away from, for example, perfect 
competitive balance a given league is, more information can be given by comparing the 
levels from other leagues as well. The third is related to time, because comparison is 
both relevant in a cross-sectional focus at a given time, and in a longitudinal setting, 
where trends in own league and relative comparisons with other leagues over time give 
meaningful information. 
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Competitive balance has been empirically well documented and analysed in the major 
leagues in North America (see, for example, Quirk and Fort. 1992). Empirical analyses 
are also done in European football, where the Big Five (Germany. England, Italy, Spain 
and France) are fully or partly involved (see, for example, Gerrard, 2004b). One aim in 
this thesis has been to give a broader picture of competitive balance among the member 
leagues of the UEFA. Empirically, this is done by using post Second World War data.. - 
data sample of up to 60 years for a high number of leagues makes it possible to follow 
the suggestions mentioned above, and to compare competitive balance in many time 
periods, both within and between leagues in Europe, and the NAML. 
The first part of comparisons among groups of leagues is done by measuring the three 
fundamental dimensions of competitive balance. The Big Five leagues have, on average, 
a better win dispersion than the other groups of leagues. At the other end of the scale, 
NAML have an overall weaker win dispersion than the European football leagues, while 
the young leagues from the former league of the Soviet Union are, on average, the 
weakest (last period). The latter seems to be part of a pattern, where bit . er leagues, 
which also include Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, demerged into a number of smaller 
leagues, which again lead to weaker average win dispersion among these small leagues, 
compared to their "original" league. This is an interesting result that should be given 
more attention in future research. 
Another interesting aspect in these results is the relatively wider win dispersion among 
the teams in the NAML, compared to European football leagues, in general. This 
difference has usually been explained by the fact that these are closed leagues, 
compared to the open European football leagues. Time-series analysis from England in 
this thesis confirms this hypothesis, related to the introduction of relegation. Another 
possible determinant for differences in the level of competitive balance across leagues 
might be found in the recent research by Schmidt and Berri on the Gould hypothesis. 
applying biology in combination with the playing structure of the sport. This aspect 
could have been appropriate to include in future analyses across different types of 
(European) team sports. 
For championship concentration, at least three conclusions can be found. First, on 
average, there has been increased championship winner concentration over the sample 
period for the Big Five leagues. Second, the last decade 
has seen a relative high level of 
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similarity in concentration levels across the different groups of leagues in European 
football. Third, concentration is much smaller in the NAML. One possible explanation 
for the latter result can be related to tournament structure, as the NAIL all have post- 
season playoffs, based on knock-out systems. 
Tournament structure is one of the hypothesised determinants for differences in 
competitive balance, and is a major focus in this thesis. However, in relation to 
championship winner concentration and post-seasonal championship plavvoff, the 
differences between the NAML and the European football leagues might be determined 
by two issues. First, European football leagues with playoffs typically arrange these 
over a small number of seasons, and, second, the relationship between regular season 
performance and the starting point in the playoffs beyond qualification is much stronger 
in Europe. The latter is particularly applied when all, or parts, of the regular season 
score are transferred into this starting point of the post-seasonal tournament (not knock- 
out). 
The empirical performance persistence results have some of the same pattern as 
championship concentration. There might have been an (insignificant) increase in 
persistence among Big Five leagues on average, as has (significantly) also happened in 
small European leagues and some Eastern European leagues. On the other hand, the 
NAML seem to have had the opposite pattern. However, the level of persistence across 
groups of leagues are relatively similar in the last period analysed. Further analyses 
need to be done to learn more about determinants for across-seasonal changes in team 
performance over time, beyond what is done in this thesis. However. the time-series 
analysis from the English and Norwegian top divisions might give some indications. 
The response on performance persistence is relatively low in Norway, while for 
example relaxing transfer market restrictions, also in combination with an expansion of 
the number of teams qualifying for the UEFA Champions League, seems to have 
increased persistence among teams in the top division in English football. Extensions of 
these analyses may give better answers for why performance persistence varies less 
across leagues (including the NAML) than the win dispersion dimension. 
Complex league system measures are applied in a number of example,,. mainly related 
to qualifications for playoff. The results are partly driven by the measures' ý, ensitivity to 
the number of teams that quality. Treating qualification for the UEI~A Champions 
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League similar to playoffs in NAML and Australian leagues, the concentration is. 
independent of measure, much higher among the Big Five leagues in Europe compared 
to leagues from the other continents. An interesting result from the NAIL is that one of 
the playoff concentration measures finds that the NBA is not weakest. This measure 
finds the MLB to be the most concentrated. 
Even if measuring UEFA Champions League qualification concentration is 
inappropriate in Norway, a comparative study is possible. using the Scandinavian Royal 
League as benchmark. Because of the short history of this tournament, limited data is 
available. However, based on four seasons, the concentration in the Norwegian tootball 
league is relatively similar to the Swedish, while the Danish league seems to have a 
higher concentration at the top of their league. Given that this tournament will continue, 
similar comparative studies should be appropriate for future research. 
Another measure to be applied in a complex league structure is related to difference', in 
sporting quality across tiers in leagues with promotion and relegation systems, which is 
a characteristic of European football. In particular, the pattern for the English league 
indicates increased differences, which might reflect the huge difference in the financial 
value of for example broadcasting deals between the first and second tier. However, this 
is not a general conclusion among the analysed leagues, because other Big Five leagues 
and Norway have had greater (within-league) differences in previous periods. 
Extensions related to the economics of relegation should be relevant topics for further 
research. 
The closed NAML in contrast to open leagues in European football provides an 
important comparison of the effects of differences in prize structures. This thesis 
focuses on three general types of prizes in a league. These are the championship, merit 
qualifications and relegation. Prizes might affect competitive 
balance through incentive 
effects and are, by definition, related to competitive intensity. 
Tournament structure is 
therefore an important variable in many of the issues treated in this thesis. 
beyond the 
general empirical measures of competitive balance. 
The recognition of variations in the level of competitive 
balance across (European) 
leagues motivates the empirical analyses of determinants 
for these differences. Unlike 
analyses from NAML, the relative high similarity 
between the European football 
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leagues when it comes to tournament regulations, such as labour market policy. requircý, 
other factors to be taken into consideration. On the other hand, national macro factors. 
less relevant in similar analyses in the NAML. vary across the European football 
leagues. Among the hypothesised determinants applied are, for example. population. 
economic development and agriculture percent, together with the overall domestic 
sporting level. Moreover, prize and tournament structures are also included in these 
analyses. In other words, this thesis has not only descriptively analysed the data on 
competitive balance in European football, it has also focused on analysing systematic 
structural equalities and differences in underlying determinants for competitive balance. 
The cross-sectional analyses are done by applying the three basic dimensions of 
competitive balance. There are differences in how these three dimensions of competitive 
balance react on the range of variables hypothesised to possibly affect competitive 
balance. The best relationship seems to be in win dispersion, where geographical, 
economic and sporting quality variables are significant for the average ten season 
dependent variable, while championship playoff replaces geography, when a five season 
average dependent variable is applied. Championship playoff is among the group of 
variables categorised into tournament structure. However, not all possible structural 
variables are available for analyses. The reason is that at the end of the sample period, 
both point score system and an elevation system through a merit hierarchy system 
(except from San Marino) appear in all leagues. A measure for relegation, that has been 
applied, is the relative number of relegated teams. Results indicate negative effects on 
ten season average performance persistence differences, but cannot be found as a 
significant determinant for differences in win dispersion. Some of the geographical 
variables and sporting quality might be significant drivers for differences in 
championship concentration. However, other factors affecting differences in 
championship concentration are also found to be outside the hypothesised variables 
analysed. One suggestion is that more "local" historical conditions within the different 
leagues are among these variables (see, for example, the sociology of football 
attendance in chapter seven in Dobson and Goddard, 2001). 
The last part of this thesis attempted to complete the picture of competitive balance by 
using within single leagues' time-series analysis. where competitive balance is the 
dependent variable. These analyses show differences in the response on competitive 
balance from different regulatory regimes, as well as differences in tournament 
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structure. For the two leagues, the FA Premier League in England and the top division 
in Norway, the hypothesised determinants seem to be more significant in English 
football than in the Norwegian. There are indications that relaxing labour market 
restrictions might weaken competitive balance, and relegation has a positive influence 
on competitive balance in England. An open labour market tends to have a positive 
effect on win dispersion. It is more difficult to find relationships in the Norwegian 
league, but the Bosman II regulation seems to have a positive effect of win dispersion. 
In the future, analyses of why the competitive balance response on the hypothesised 
variables exists to a much larger degree in the English top division than in the 
Norwegian, should be of interest, including discussions of possible determinants 
omitted from the analyses in this thesis. 
A side analysis of competitive balance over time for the English top division might 
indicate that the reduced championship winner concentration at the end of the sample is 
something to analyse further. It appears that this reduced concentration can be related to 
the increased number of teams qualifying for the UEFA Champions League. One 
hypothesis presented in this thesis is that going from one to four qualification places not 
only increases the likelihood of a dominant team to continuing to qualify, but it also 
increases the probabilities for other teams to qualify for this prestigious and financially 
lucrative competition. This will, ceteris paribus, make it more difficult to hold on to 
sporting and financial advantages for a single dominant team. Given that players are 
attracted by playing in the UEFA Champions League, other teams will now increase 
their ability to attract such players on sporting terms, and, of course, the prospect of 
substantially increased revenues also makes it easier to give potential class players a 
competitive offer. Therefore, the increased number of teams to the UEFA Champions 
League might have been one explanation why Manchester United's dominant position 
has been reduced, as other teams from the FA Premier League have been able to qualify 
for this tournament without winning the domestic championship. 
The higher number of qualification places for the UEFA Champions League inight also 
have been attractive for rich owners to join the game (e. g. Chelsea, Aston Villa, 
Manchester City and West Ham). The extraordinary amount of money these owners 
have put into the teams has increased their teams' relative competitiveness. Chelsea FC 
is one obvious example. The increased number of teams qualifying for the UEFA 
Champions League in combination with the attractiveness of the FA Premier League 
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might thus have increased the number of teams that are realistically able to become the 
championship winner. This might lead to a greater intensity at the top of the league 
which may challenge the dominance by the Big Four teams (i. e. Manchester United, 
Arsenal, Chelsea and Liverpool) in the future, and hence, weaken the performance 
persistence at the top of the league. This uncertainty might be extended by rules limiting 
constructions of a player squad in a free market, such as in the UEFA Champions 
League. 275 On the other hand, continued participation in the UEFA Champions League 
for the biggest teams in the future might increase the probability of group domination, 
not only because twenty percent of the teams qualify for this tournament each season, 
but also because new technology increasingly strengthens the scope and scale of play-er- 
data. 276 As the knowledge on how to utilize this information improves. the probability 
of extending the accuracy in investment of expensive new players is expected to 
increase. If these relationships are positively related to the teams' financial capacity, this 
might further increase the probability of having continually high performing playing 
squads. The different predictions of the future at the top of the English FA Premier 
League could be analysed as part of a study of performance persistence among the 
different tiers, within the top division in English football. 
The time-series analysis of the Norwegian league in which only one place has usually 
been available for the UEFA Champions League, is consistent with this having been 
one of the explanations why one team could be so dominating over many seasons. More 
analyses should be done in the future, as the team, Rosenborg BK, at the time of writing 
this thesis, seems to have lost its dominating sporting position. 
A follow up demand study for Norwegian football would give an opportunity to do 
research on long-run uncertainty of outcome. Downward and Dawson (2000) suggest 
that the expected effects of the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis may be complex, by 
using Manchester United Football Club's success in the FA Premier League in the 1990's 
as an example of a dominant team where the home attendance was not reduced. This 
suggests two central questions. First, what is the criterion for being defined as a 
dominant team? Is the hypothesis only relevant when one team is dominant, or is it still 
appropriate even when two or more teams are dominating the league'? The literature 
does not give a clear answer. Second, at what stage is the long-run dominant team 
25 Sec Article 17 in the Regulations of the UEFA Champions League 2007,08 
(NN-NN ww. uefa. com'newstiles' 19071. pdf). 
2-' Sec, for example, products by ProZonc (wý%ww'. pzfootbalI. co. uk index. htm). 
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defined as dominating within a particular season" Suppose that a dominant team %t ins 
the championship in the very last match of the season. This season may have had hi, _, h 
fan interest, because the dominant team did not dominate during the whole season. and 
the prospect for other team(s) to end the season at the top of the table may have 
increased the interest in the league. Fan interest in the hope (rather than the actuality) 
that "underdogs" can beat the long-run dominant team/dynasties can complicate the 
relationship between fan interest and long-run dominance (Humphreys. X003; 
Sanderson and Siegfried, 2003; Szymanski, 2003a). Humphreys (2003, p. 286) calls this 
"the David versus Goliath paradox". Szymanski (2003a) also points out that it might be 
of interest to follow the dominant team, because of the uncertainty related to whether 
the team will continue its dominance. Hence, domination might also have advantages 
for the interest/demand for the league. It can be that much focus on the dominant team 
at the beginning of the season (tournament), both with regards to its possibilities to 
continue its dominance and to other teams' possibilities to remove the dominant team 
from the top of the league, can increase the marketing of the league. Mane of these 
issues question the Yankee-paradox in Vrooman (1996). 2" 
Because long-run uncertainty, or in the term of Szymanski (2003b), championship 
uncertainty, has not been much analysed empirically, the data from the Norwegian 
league gives information available for future research. Additionally, including data 
from, for example, Scotland and England could be a good basis for analysing the 
possible research questions above. Applying the "glory factor", constructed by Jennett 
(1984), to analyse possible differences in fan behaviour between dominating team(s) 
and other teams when winning the championship at a relatively early stage, can be an 
appropriate part of such a study. 
Given that what is called the Rottenberg's uncertainty of outcome hypothesis is 
reasonable, why has it been much more difficult to get acceptance in the empirical 
literature (Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999; Downward and Dawson. 2000: Dobson and 
Goddard, 2001; Borland and Macdonald, 2003)" One answer can be that the ompirical 
methods, including the measures of uncertainty of outcome, have not 
been at an 
appropriate level. Another answer is the combination of multiple 
drivers for demand 
and that a general league consists of teams with unequal distribution of 
drawing power. 
These aspects question if perfect competitive balance, and hence, the 
highest 
Sec also Neale (1964). 
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uncertainty of outcome, is the optimal solution for the league aiming to maximise joint 
profit or joint interest, for example. measured by total attendance.. - third possibility is 
that the hypothesis might be valid in a simple league context, but it is more difficult to 
find the correlation between competitive balance and attendance in a complex multi- 
prize league context. 
The core of the importance of competitive balance is related to the interest of a sporting 
tournament, through the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis. This is because competitive 
balance is seen to be the main driver for uncertainty of outcome. In other words, the 
importance of competitive balance and uncertainty of outcomes is related to the fan 
response of a league, with regard to its competitive balance, or as emphasised in 
Zimbalist (2002, p. 119): "Fan perceptions and behaviour are at the core of the 
competitive balance problematic". However, this thesis has made a point of using an 
extended hypothesis related to uncertainty of outcomes, where the number of outcome 
is related to prize structure. Therefore, both competitive balance and prize structure are 
hypothesised to be demand drivers. One aim in this thesis has been to improve and 
extend the first part of the road from competitive balance to demand.. follow-up study 
should, hence, apply this knowledge into demand studies. 
Demand studies for football have been given for many leagues in Europe, from the first 
article in this area by Hart et al. (1975). The literature has, typically, focused on I Inglish 
football (see, for example, Bird, 1982; Walker, 1986; Peel and Thomas, 1988,1992; 
Dobson and Goddard, 1992,1995,1996; Simmons, 1996; Baimbridge et al. 1996, 
Kuypers, 1997; Szymanski and Smith, 1997, Szymanski, 2001; Forrest and Simmons. 
2002). There are also studies of football in Germany (Czarnitzki and Stadtmann, 2001) 
and the former West-Germany (following the team Hamburger SV) (Gärtner and 
Pommerehne, 1978), in Belgium (Janssens and Kesenne. 1987), and Spain (Garcia and 
Rodriguez, 2002). The demand for Scottish football has been analysed in a number of 
studies (Jennett, 1984; Cairns, 1987; Smart and Goddard, 1991, Peel and Thomas, 
1996). As a Norwegian, a natural follow up to this thesis is a demand study for 
Norwegian football. 
Sloane (1971) claims that even if teams' objective is to obtain the highest hoý,,,, ible 
sporting, level, they are also interested in success of their rivals. 
This is because "the 
more successful the rival in terms of league position and popularity the 
larger will be 
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the total attendance resulting from the common product" (p. 124). This follows a 
general anticipation about the relationship between the demand and sporting success of 
a given team, the demand increases as the sporting success improves, but at a given 
point of sporting success, the team will be too dominating, and hence stronger 
domination will lower the interest for this team. However, future research should not 
only focus on this general relationship, but also on possible segmentations on the 
demand-side for sport. 
Cairns et al. (1986) claim that consumers of professional team sports can be divided into 
two groups. The first is the spectators attending the match or following the match on 
radio and TV (and now also on internet). The other group is firms through, for example, 
sponsorship and advertising. These two main groups might be called household 
supporters and business-to-business consumers. 278 Concentrating on household 
supporters, these can further be divided into two parts, where one can be called "team 
supporters", and the other "match or league supporters" (see also Gerrard, 2006b). A 
match-/league-supporter is a supporter who cares about the sport, but does not have any 
particular preferences for the teams participating in a particular match. Related to 
domination, interpreting Cairns et al. (1986), team supporters are further split into two 
groups. The first is team fans, valuing the fact that their team is in a close championship 
race. Second, individual consumers (team fans) appreciate success for their team, but 
not valuing a close contest. In other words, the first group of team fans will indirectly 
(and ironically) receive utility from the success of other teams (in the battle for the 
championship). The other type of team fans' utility curve should be strictly increasing 
with improved sporting success of their team, even when the team is the dominating 
one. Further, the marketing literature has a broader separation of fans. According to 
Shank (2002), Sutton et al. (1997) use three categories of fan identification. First, there 
are low identification fans attending due to social or entertainment reasons. Medium 
identification fans, or focused fans, are fans that identify with a team or player for a 
short period of time, but mainly when success is achieved. Of course, for both these 
groups of fans, it is possible that fans "transfer" to a higher level. The high 
identification fans are fans that have "a long-term commitment to the sport, team, or 
player" (Shank, p. 208). 
`-S Shank (2002) calls them individual and corporate consumers. 
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The relationship between the different segments of spectators and their understanding 
and response on competitive balance and uncertainty of outcomes are topics for a follow 
up to this thesis. It could be applied in a cost-benefit analysis related to fan reaction', 
and implications on revenues and might require a combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative research methods. 
The introduction of the concept of competitive intensity is an innovative part of this 
thesis and has, during the process, created a new principal arm in the "tree of 
knowledge" of the competitive balance area. Competitive intensity will be affected from 
both the intensity of the competition for prizes and the number of significant prize, in 
the tournament. Further analyses of the concept competitive intensity should follow 
natural time structures, as can be found in both uncertainty of outcome, competitive 
balance and demand studies. The suggestion is therefore to divide the concept into en(! - 
of-season competitive intensity and within-season competitive m iens/ty. End-of-season 
competitive intensity would capture the intensity for prizes on basis of analyses from 
the final (end-of-season) league table. This means that end-of-season competitive 
intensity and competitive balance can be compared, as well as being part of demand 
studies related on seasonal data. However, future research depends upon creating 
appropriate measures for end-of-season competitive intensity. 
Analyses of within-season competitive intensity will be even more complicated and 
complex. It should focus on the match significance literature, and, hence, should follow 
the thoughts by Jennett (1984). Match-level data can capture the fluctuation in intensity 
during the season much better than an end-of-season data and can therefore be applied 
in cross-sectional and panel data demand studies. Development of within-season 
competitive intensity should therefore be a prioritized task for future research. 
In European football, the cross-border UEFA Champions League is the highest quality 
league. Two directions of further research seem obvious. One is to extend the anale, is 
of the impact of the UEFA Champions League in the domestic leagues, beyond the 
effects on competitive balance, as is analysed in this thesis. In sporting terms, one ill 
expect the introduction and extension of this tournament to have an impact on 
competitive intensity in leagues. Additionally, financial impacts from the expected 
financial payoffs. from qualifying for this league, are also highly significant. A second 
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topic is to analyse competitive balance in the Champions League itself, as a follow up to 
Gerrard (2004b). 
Many issues related to this thesis can be used in analysing consequences of a possible 
future introduction of a European Super League in football. Even if Hoehn and 
Szymanski (1999) have done such analyses, other topics, such as for example effects on 
competitive intensity in the domestic leagues, from eventually changing the UI .A 
Champions League to a closed European Super League, should be of relevance in future 
research. 
Other, perhaps more realistic, changes in tournament structure in European football can 
also be analysed, such as changes in the number of teams to qualify for the UFF. -\ 
Champions League from the top leagues. 279 Will this imply improved win dispersion, 
weakened performance persistence, but higher championship concentration in the FA 
Premier League? This could be the analogous interpretation from the results on 
competitive balance related to increasing the number of UEFA Champion League 
places in a domestic league. Moreover, similar time-series analysis could also be done 
for other European football leagues, to find a clearer picture on consequences on 
competitive balance in domestic leagues. 
The Scandinavian Royal League was introduced in 2004. This league is a new 
phenomenon, where separate domestic leagues go together and create an international 
playoff for their top teams. The Royal League is accepted by the UEFA, but does not 
have any relations with the UEFA tournaments (i. e. there is no qualification for Ufa FA 
tournaments). Extended analyses of possible consequences for domestic league 
competitive balance (which is also a part of this thesis) and the relationship to 
competitive intensity for the domestic leagues, are possible research areas for the future. 
This knowledge might be even more relevant, if similar leagues appear in the future. `'" 
Analyses of competitiveness within multiple prize competitions are not only relevant in 
professional team sports. Most individualistic sports can also be put into this 
categorisation. The influence of "sub-" competitions (prizes) within a greater 
This is for example suggested by the tUEF. A President Michel Platini. Scc 
w\\"\1. ti11lesonllne. co. uk/tol-'sport/football european_football article_'? 56084. cce. 
280 The Baltic League is a similar tournament. See www. balticleague. com standings 2007 final . 
Scianta 
Sports Cup is an All-Ireland Cross-Border cup. See \\ -\ww\\. rsssf. convtablesa alliercuphist. html and 
en. wikipedia. orý: \\ iki Sctanta_Sports_Cup. 
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competition, such as Tour de France, "Vasaloppet"2`' and the new competition in cru": - 
country skiing called Tour de Ski,, ý2 should allow further scope to investigate the 
relevance of applying competitive intensity beyond professional team sports. 
The recent contribution on competitive balance in European football by Groot (2008) 
includes discussions about policy implications on basis of the negative trends in 
competitive balance among the Big Five leagues, except the Spanish league, as well as 
the Dutch league. In particular the post-Bosman verdict period (that also includes 
changes in the UEFA Champions League) seems to have been negative on win 
dispersion and concentration in sporting output at the top of the leagues (see table 6.1 in 
Groot). 
Groot looks to other contributors to possibly solve within-league competitive balance 
problems, such as Hoehn and Szymanski (1999) about forming a European Super 
League, a NAML look-a-like league, and to Kesenne (2005b). Following Kesenne 
(2007c), a problem in the post-Bosman and UEFA Champions League period is the 
deviation between a closed product market (domestic leagues) and an open labour 
market with the consequence that the differences between teams from different leagues 
have escalated. However, the theoretical analysis does not claim that this should weaken 
the domestic competitive balance. Therefore Kesenne's argument for an international 
European Super League is based on competitive balance problems between leagues. 
Groot suggests a different approach to solve the current "competitive balance problem", 
by turning the clock backwards to the systems from the 1950s with matches shown on 
free-to-air television without commercials (others than covering the costs). In other 
words, Groot wants to welcome a system close to the Spectators-Subsidies-Sponsors- 
Local model in Andreff and Staudohar (2002), but, contrary to the others mentioned 
above, within the current dual competition system including both domestic and 
international competitions. 
This thesis has emphasised that it is important not to over focus one dimension of 
competitive balance, since it is a multi-dimensional concept, where all dimensions are 
pieces in the broad picture of competitive balance. It has also been a focus- on within- 
league competitive balance, both with regards to level and determinants. Analysing 
\v ww w . vasaloppet. se. 
w\v . tour-de-ski. com . 
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between-league competitive balance is, however, outside the framework of this thesis. 
Looking at within-league competitive balance, there might still be a question if 
eventually competitive balance problems are big enough to reconstruct the whole 
system of European football in this context. Except from the average of the new leagues 
in the former Soviet Union area, win dispersion is still (last decade of the analysis) on 
average better in European football, and this is in particular the case for the Big Five 
leagues, compared to the NAML. Performance persistence is better in the NANIL in the 
same period, but the difference is not very big. On the other hand, the championship 
concentration seems to be much higher in European football. The same is shown when 
it comes to qualification to post-season playoff for the Big Five leagues. Even if the 
differences are lesser between the minor Scandinavian leagues and NAML, this might 
be issues of importance in the future. One obvious difference in the qualification 
procedure for playoffs is the relative higher number of teams to qualify- in the NAML, 
compared to the UEFA Champions League. However, variations among the teams to 
qualify for the UEFA cup might be higher than for the UEFA Champions League, and 
is hence reducing the potential competitive balance problem. However, this segment has 
not been analysed in this thesis. 
The determinants for differences in competitive balance across European football 
leagues generally find characteristics outside the sporting league to be most significant, 
and not tournament structure decided by the governing body, maybe except from 
championship playoffs. However, there might be some indications that the distribution 
of revenues from sale of broadcasting rights can be relevant for the Big Five leagues. 
This is therefore one obvious factor that should be considered in the future. The 
significance of determinants for possible changes in within-league competitive balance 
over time differs between leagues. Even if it might be possible to affect competitive 
balance positively by increasing the number of teams to relegate, and also with regards 
to the number of teams in the top division, factors currently decided outside the league 
seems again to be of more importance for the domestic leagues. This means the 
structure of the UEFA Champions League and the labour market. However, the latter is 
not easy for the sport in general to affect, since it is also dependent on general political 
agreements. What league governing bodies might want to do is to affect 
decisions 
related to the structure of the UEFA Champions League. Here, 
it is important to 
emphasise that many changes affecting European football have 
happened since the 
middle of the 1990s, and probably we still don't know all 
long-term consequences yet. 
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For example. for the Norwegian league the same team won every championship in the 
first nine years in the post-Bosman period (1996-2004). However, from 2005 to 2008 
four different teams have won this league. In general, competitive balance seems to 
have improved for all three dimensions in the Bosman II period compared to the 
previous period in the Norwegian top division (not significant for the SRCC). The 
dynasty in the first part of the post-Bosman verdict period has been partly explained by 
the introduction of the UEFA Champions League, and the extended revenues rewarded 
to one particular team. Clearly, it affected the revenue balance in the Norwegian top 
division. However, with the relative high probability of not qualifying for s mal I league 
teams (mainly only the championship winner qualifies for the qualifying round), failure 
for a dominating team to qualify in a number of seasons is highly probable. One 
obvious long-term difficulty is hence caused by the probability of a changed cost 
structure, due to the extended revenue streams related to qualifications for the group 
play in the UEFA Champions League, because it can be difficult to reverse. " This 
might actually have a long-run positive effect on competitive balance for this type of 
league, related to the reduced advantage from the distribution of financial resources, if 
the dominating team/teams fails/fail to qualify. 
The prize structure of modem professional team sports leagues might relax the 
statement in Cairns et al. (1986) mentioned earlier in this chapter, related to the demand 
for supporting a team, as might be diminishing if the team is never in the competition 
for the championship. This is because a team can be a winner even if it is not the 
champion. One example from English football is that Liverpool FC has never been the 
winner of the FA Premier League, but has won the UEFA Champions League. When 
Chelsea won the FA Premier League in 2004- 05, the team became the championship 
winner for the first time since the 1954/55 season. In other words, the current system of 
European football still gives opportunity for "new" teams to win the league, and also to 
be winning a number of prizes during a season. However, the latter might be more 
relevant in bigger leagues than smaller leagues, even if smaller leagues also have 
different cup tournaments. Adopting a North American like playoff system (i. e. knock 
out tournament) might reduce the championship concentration in these leagues. Another 
possibility for European football leagues outside the biggest is to co-operate in a post- 
seasonal tournament similar to the Scandinavian Royal League. However. even if "uch a 
league could be positive for the teams' revenues and increasing the domestic leagues' 
2'3 Sec Solberg and Haugen (2009) for an example from Swedish football. 
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competitive intensity, it has been a failure. which is reflected in that the tournament has 
not been held the last two seasons. 
This thesis suggests that multi-prize tournaments and the competitiveness within the 
tournament might have compensated eventual negative effects from bigger differences 
in sporting quality among the teams in domestic leagues. Even if there might still be a 
question about the long-run effects on competitive balance from the changes during the 
last 15 years, the results from the English top division suggest that relaxing the transfer 
system towards free agency together with the structural changes in the UEFA 
Champions League, have a negative effect on competitive balance, maybe except from a 
possible positive effect on championship concentration from the latest expansions. The 
latter has, on the other hand, increased the competitive intensity in for example this 
league. This thesis has not focused on optimal level of neither competitive balance nor 
competitive intensity, but there might be some trade-off point between eventually 
increased qualifying differences and sporting prize structure, when it comes to fan 
interest. 
In summary, based on the time-series analysis of the English and Norwegian top 
divisions in football, the strength of how regulations and prize and tournament structure 
affect competitive balance varies between leagues and over time, with more significant 
reactions in the English league. Across leagues, variables outside the sport might be at 
least as important as sporting regulations, such as that higher GNP per capita is an 
explanatory factor for better win dispersion and less performance persistence. Because 
of the many aspects of competitive balance, broad analyses are required to give precise 
conclusions on a league's competitive balance level. The top division in the Nor«vezian 
league emphasises this, because when the league was least balanced in the dimension of 
championship concentration, both win dispersion and performance persistence 
dimensions ranked the league in the European top ten. 
Competitive balance seems to be an inexhaustible topic. It has been subje. t for many 
analyses, but there is still a broad range of analyses left for future research. This thesis 
concentrates on a conceptual framework, recognising that competitive balance is a 
complex concept. Further, the complexity of current real-world league structure 
complicates the initial understanding of the competitive balance and within-league 
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competitiveness. Future research should therefore go beyond competitive balance and 
focus more on the competitive intensity of professional sports leagues. 
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